Supporting the Office of High Representative (OHR) Would Aid Stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Instability in Bosnia and Herzegovina is nothing new; today’s tensions are the logical development of a flawed peace process which led to a dysfunctional state. The resulting environment poses threats to European security by threatening hot conflict and providing a front through which pernicious actors can exert influence upon the rest of Europe. In response, the U.S. and EU should seek to enhance their support for the office of High Representative (OHR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to help strengthen Bosnia’s institutions against corruption and pervasive secessionist forces.
Dayton’s Legacy
26 years ago, the Dayton Accords brokered an end of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This was accomplished, in part, through the establishment of a rotating tripartite government that would assure equal political representation to each of Bosnia’s three main ethnic groups. As such, over the past quarter-century the citizens of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina have voted for either Bosniak or Croat candidates, whereas the citizens of the Bosnian Serb entity of Republika Srpska have cast their votes for various Serb candidates.
It was hoped that the tripartite government would facilitate cooperation in a post-conflict setting. Instead, it created a dynamic whereby the three respective sides use their presidential seat to undermine one another. The result has been a dysfunctional political system in which corrupt politicians are able to carry out their misdeeds with little fear of reprimand.
The Dayton Accord’s shortfalls have been a persistent driver of instability within post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over the past several months, the longterm implications of said shortcomings have come to the fore as political elites in Republika Srpska have taken increasingly bold stances toward Sarajevo, beating the drum of Serbian nationalism and vowing to secede from Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Office of High Representative (OHR)
Dayton’s discontents are not limited to within Bosnia and Herzegovina. The leadership of Republika Srpska routinely directs attacks against various outside institutions, one of which has been the U.N.’s Office of High Representative (OHR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OHR — also a product of Dayton — was formed to aid Bosnia in developing functional national institutions. The office holds legislative, judiciary, and executive powers over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The OHR’s mandate is enshrined by the Bonn Powers, which grant it authority for “dismissing public officials from their offices and banning them from holding public employment again”, should the actions of said officials jeopardize Bosnia and Herzegovina’s legal and/or political development.
Such powers are troubling for many of Bosnia’s corrupt political elites, who commonly attempt to cover up their greed and incompetence by deferring to bombastic nationalist rhetoric that fires up their constituencies in order to distract popular attention away from the roles which they — the elites — play in perpetuating Bosnia and Herzegovina’s underdevelopment. The embodiment of such practices is Milorad Dodik, the leader of the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD) and the Serb member of Bosnia’s presidency.
China and Russia
Local elites are not the only ones who target the OHR’s authority. Indeed, the office’s existence has frustrated great powers—namely, China and Russia—who view the OHR as an impediment to their strategic objectives in the region.
China wishes to extend its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) into Bosnia and Herzegovina. This plan necessitates the signing of business deals with the region’s corrupt elites, against which the OHR is an impediment. Furthermore, Beijing’s desires to do away with the OHR is likely part of a broader strategy whereby China seeks to exert increasing influence over the UN in order to facilitate its geopolitical ambitions.
Russia is also an investor in Bosnia’s economy. While Russia, like China, has few qualms about conducting business with corrupt elites, the Kremlin’s aversion toward the OHR stems from its strategic desire to perpetuate divisiveness and instability throughout former Yugoslavia. Doing so stalls the region’s integration into European institutions such as the EU and NATO, thereby limiting the capabilities of Southeastern European countries to push back against the Kremlin’s malign influence over Europe.
Recently, China and Russia proposed a UN resolution which would have abolished the OHR. They argued that the office has outlived its usefulness. Fortunately, the resolution was turned down and the OHR’s mandate was extended. In response to the UN’s refusal to abolish the OHR, Russia and China have vowed to use their P5 status to prevent the Security Council from recognizing the legitimacy of the OHR. Thus, the OHR remains in force, but its capabilities to effectively carry out its mandate have been severely undercut.
Future Possibilities
While Western powers deserve credit for forming the OHR, they also deserve reprimand for today’s mess. Bosnia’s postwar years were marked by strong commitments on part of Washington and Brussels toward promoting regional development. Over time, however, the US and NATO have grown ambivalent about altering the post-conflict status quo, opting instead to placate the regions corrupt elites in the guise of avoid unrest. The results of such policies have come to fruition in recent weeks.
What exactly the present situation — if left unchecked — will amount to is unclear. Along with threats of secession, Dodik has stated that he intends to cleave Bosnian institutions away from Republika Srpska and replace them with parallel ones. Doing so includes breaking apart the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to form a separate army of Republika Srpska—an idea that chills the spines of many who lived through the wars of the 1990’s.
Given Bosnia’s demographic composition, such a move — even if successful — would nevertheless leave the balance of power tilted toward Sarajevo. Thus, Republika Srpska would require outside support in order to win independence from the rest of Bosnia. Support would most likely be sought from neighboring Serbia; Belgrade’s posture has grown increasingly bold of late. However, the prospects of Serbia providing military support to clandestine forces in a breakaway territory of Bosnia seem a far stretch. Ffter all, Belgrade has not forgotten when the Yugoslavian National Army invaded Kosovo in 1998, thereby prompting a NATO bombing campaign. The other option for Dodik would be to seek military support from Russia. But problems would abound with this strategy as well, given that Russian military contributions to the Western Balkan region have declined in recent years as the Kremlin has become increasingly concerned with developments along Russia’s immediate borders.
Conclusion
The U.S. and EU could best address European security concerns stemming from Bosnia’s current unrest by doing away with attempts of appeasing Dodik and his cronies in favor of increasing support for the OHR. This can be accomplished through two predominant means. First, the U.S. and the EU.\ could provide more funding to the OHR. Second, the U.S. and EU should seek to facilitate the forging of partnerships between the OHR and various state and non-state actors within Bosnia and Herzegovina whose ideals and actions reflect a commitment toward combatting corruption and building robust legal and political institutions.
Acting in manners that ensure the OHR will have the teeth to strengthen Bosnia’s political and legal institutions will serve as a bulwark against pervasive corruption, thereby facilitating Bosnia and Herzegovina’s integration Western European institutions such as the EU and NATO. Doing so would benefit broader European security interests. Furthermore, America’s strategic pivot toward Asia would be benefitted from assisting the OHR; the perceived successes would serve to reduce America’s long-term commitments to the Western Balkans, thereby freeing up resources which can be directed toward other regions of interest.
