Military Withdrawal from Afghanistan
A Critical Period for Transatlantic Relations
Starting with the previous administration’s agreement with the Taliban in February 2020, the United States government’s eagerness to end “America’s longest war” continued under the current administration, leading to complete military withdrawal approximately one year later. This occurred against the wishes of Europe, producing strong feelings of anger and resentment from European nations and eroding transatlantic relations.
This is not the first time NATO has experienced pressure due to international events. In the mid-20th century, the U.S. advised against France and the UK developing nuclear capabilities. In the 1970s, the reunification of East and West Germany triggered anxiety that Western transatlantic relations were deteriorating. Still, throughout the unfruitful WMD search and the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Iran Nuclear Deal, ties between the U.S. and Europe have held; it is unlikely they will break now.
There are a few things that make Afghanistan unique: Europeans have started calling for “strategic autonomy;” geographical considerations are forcing Europe to evaluate the transatlantic power dynamic more closely; and NATO has lost its most substantial operational commitment and is experiencing less joint-military cooperation.
- What “Strategic Autonomy” Means for Europe
After former President Trump withdrew from the Iran Nuclear Deal, German Chancellor Angela Merkel revitalized the phrase “strategic autonomy.” According to European Council President Charles Michel, Europe’s primary goal is strategic independence–especially from the U.S. With the situation in Afghanistan compounding tensions within EU-U.S. relations, strategic autonomy has gone from a theoretical topic of debate to a tangible topic of necessity.
Europe wants to take a more aggressive approach to its participation in digital and financial markets in order to negotiate with the U.S. more equally. The European Union Trade Commissioner Valdis Dombrovskis specifies “strengthening… economic resilience and… looking at different options: on-shoring, near-shoring, stockpiling, diversifying, shortening supply chains.” This also includes diversifying suppliers and strengthening supply chains, potentially decreasing the U.S.’s role in European markets.
Not everyone is on board with the idea of strategic autonomy in Europe; however, Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron are pushing for a more autonomous Europe, stating that the EU’s competitive edge “must be rapidly modernized.” Afghanistan has forced Europe to realize how much it depends on the U.S. to make foreign policy decisions. If Europe can logistically achieve strategic autonomy, it will not only affect the future of transatlantic relations but internal dynamics within the continent as well.
2. Geographical Considerations from Afghanistan
Another consideration in regards to the aftereffects of Afghanistan is geographical proximity. Europe feels that the abrupt withdrawal from Afghanistan will have a destabilizing impact on its geopolitical security. This has uniquely contributed to the stress on EU-U.S. relations because of uncontrollable migration in the region.
Since 2014, both France and Italy have prioritized illegal migration as a key national security concern. Over two million refugees are fleeing to their neighboring countries of Iran and Pakistan, through which they can reach Europe. Consequently, the U.S. has evacuated over 65,000 Afghans and approximately 24,000 have arrived on American soil since efforts began in mid-August. It is clear that while the U.S. is dealing with migration issues, they are of an entirely different order of magnitude. The reality of geography places Europe in a more pressing situation in this case.
A second-order effect of unsecured borders is the risk for terrorist attacks, which is also a driving force to Europe’s strategic autonomy policies. The presence of terrorist activities is a major concern for EU nations, and it is only exacerbated by the geographical closeness of Europe to Afghanistan. The global post-9/11 attitude and 21st-century attacks in Madrid, London, Paris, and Brussels have contributed to the prevalence of this pervasive fear of terrorism. With the Taliban’s lightning-fast rise to power, it is no surprise that Europe is concerned. Regardless of the similar feelings the U.S. and the EU may share, Europe is on the front lines of the terrorist threat, making it a key stakeholder in the Afghanistan crisis.
3. Weakened NATO Military Cooperation
Adding to Europe’s resentment brought on by geopolitical strain and its movement towards strategic autonomy, closure in Afghanistan has brought an end to NATO’s largest joint-operations mission. This not only means division between NATO’s political leaders but division of countries’ military cooperation as well.
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was a UN-mandated peacekeeping force whose mission was to support the Afghan government’s authority and strength against terrorism. At its peak, more than 50 NATO and partner countries contributed to the 130,000 person force. NATO rallied around the cause in Afghanistan and it gave military leaders and personnel a reason to work together. Now that these services are not needed, the U.S. and Europe will lose touch-points with each other in regards to joint-military training and exercises as well as conferences and assemblies relating to strategy in Afghanistan. The loss of real-world military cooperation now that ISAF is no longer operational is cause for added requirements to boost U.S.-EU exercises and engagements outside of Afghanistan.
How can we improve upon these aforementioned weaknesses and create a new chapter of U.S.-EU relations?
- The US should embrace and support the growth of Europe.
For its own strategic purposes, it is understandable why the U.S. might not want Europe to gain more military or economic stability and overall independence. If Europe gains equal power, the U.S. will not be able to protect itself as easily if Europe becomes a potential threat. It is similarly true that equal footing between these powers will require more negotiation and discussion on topics of mutual interest, because Europe may no longer be content to let the U.S. take the lead. However, with the foundation of a strong EU, the U.S. and Europe could coordinate on global initiatives like climate change and human rights that affect the transatlantic coalition as a whole, instead of the implicit motivations of the most influential nation.
New growth can have positive effects as well. The U.S. could rely more heavily on Europe to take care of issues on its own, like border control and internal security. With the U.S. shifting its focus to China and Russia, “a greater European capacity to promote stability in a region whose problems often affect Europe directly would allow Washington to lead from behind.”
2. Europe should continue to invest in NATO while following through with its ‘strategic autonomy’ initiatives.
Europe should work to improve its defense and economic stature. Defense budgets in Europe have been increasing since 2015, but it’s going to take more effort to reverse decades of disinvestment. Specific capabilities like airpower, operational force readiness, and strategic transport have historically caused Europe to rely heavily on the U.S. for hard power support. Heavy Franco-British support, in addition to the rise in strategic autonomy discussions, could give Europe the momentum it needs to turn policy into action, allowing them to more adequately contribute to NATO.
Overall, members of the transatlantic alliance have and will continue to grow apart, but they consistently find their way back. If Europe follows through on growing its capabilities–and the US supports them in doing so–the EU-U.S. relationship could transform from an imbalanced, unsteady membership to a healthy, cooperative partnership.
SOURCES
1. Paola Tamma, “Europe wants ‘Strategic Autonomy’–it just has to decide what that means,” Politico, October 15, 2020, https://www.politico.eu/article/europe-trade-wants-strategic-autonomy-decide-what-means/.
2. Robin Niblett, “Failure in Afghanistan Won’t Weaken America’s Alliances,” Foreign Affairs, August 19, 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-08-19/failure-afghanistan-wont-weaken-americas-alliances.
3. “ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan (2001–2014) (Archived),” NATO, August 19, 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_69366.htm.
4. Rachel Rizzo, “The Transatlantic Relationship: A Call to the Next Generation,” Böll Thema, n.d., https://eu.boell.org/en/2020/07/30/transatlantic-relationship-call-next-generation.
5. Alina Polyakova & Benjamin Haddad, “Europe Alone: What Comes After the Transatlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs 98, Issue 4 (July/August 2019), https://omnilogos.com/europe-alone-what-comes-after-transatlantic-alliance/.
ADDITIONAL SOURCES
Rachel Ellehuus and Pierre Morcos, “Fall of Kabul: Inconvenient Truths for NATO,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, August 27, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/fall-kabul-inconvenient-truths-nato.
Richard Youngs, “The EU’s Strategic Autonomy Trap,” Carnegie Europe, March 8, 2021,
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2021/03/08/eu-s-strategic-autonomy-trap-pub-83955.
