What My Children Can Teach U.S. Policymakers
Why the United States Should Stop Undermining the Expansion of the European Union’s Defense Role
I have a confession to make. Sometimes… to get our kids to eat their vegetables… my wife and I bribe them with candy. Sometimes, we entice them with TV. And, on some auspicious occasions, just telling them “you’ll get big and strong!” works. In short, our three small children are motivated differently depending on the day. Recognizing this is a critical part of ensuring they receive proper nutrition (and of preserving our sanity).
The United States intends to shift its national security focus towards the Indo-Pacific in the coming years. At the same time, however, the stability and security of Europe seems to be degrading. The threat of renewed violence in Bosnia looms large. China has garnered greater economic and political leverage in the region. And, of course, there’s the elephant in the “dining room”: Russia may have a GDP smaller than that of Canada, but it can still disrupt transatlantic economic, military, and political stability. As Europe is one of the United States’ largest overseas markets and one of its closest sociopolitical partners, European stability and independence are important U.S. interests. With these factors in mind, the United States has often demanded greater European contributions to transatlantic defense burden sharing. At the same time, however, it has often undermined actual European steps towards such capacity. In the context of the Indo-Pacific pivot, this diplomatic posture is unsustainable, and it’s time for the United States to try alternative ways of convincing Europe to “get big and strong.”
Without a doubt, Europe has its own defense neuroses, independent of U.S. influence. Germany, the world’s fourth largest economy, only has seven conventional ground combat brigades in the Bundeswehr, compared to fourteen in the Army of Poland, a country with a GDP one sixth that of Germany. (For context, Russia has 76 combat brigades by my count.) But, beyond cultural and historical aversions to military spending amongst European elites, the United States has not helped matters. The U.S. diplomatic and defense establishment becomes agitated each time Europe suggests it should achieve a degree of defense self-sufficiency. The latest incarnation of this line is European strategic autonomy, and, true to form, the United States and NATO have not been particularly keen on its (admittedly vague) realization.
Why? Critics have claimed for decades that an EU-led initiative would duplicate NATO efforts, creating redundant usages of limited European defense resources. But let’s be honest: the United States has its fair share of defense inefficiency, from politically motivated base realignment and closure (BRAC) decisions, to over-purchases of Abrams main battle tanks, the failure to develop a replacement dedicated scout helicopter, a lack of training for Navy surface warfare officers, various nuclear weapons scandals, and, of course, the F-35 program. Furthermore, while the United States boasts to NATO that it spends 3.3% of GDP ($778 bil) annually on defense, only a small fraction of that goes towards the U.S. European Command area of responsibility.
<RADIO SQUELCH> Pot, this is Kettle. Recommend we tend to our own garden prior to criticizing others’, over. <RADIO SQUELCH>
There will, of course, be some duplication of effort if the EU expands its defense role, but such inefficiencies would be worth it for the United States and NATO. EU “branding” would offer European leaders political capital and domestic flexibility, allowing them to pursue additional defense capacities and capabilities more easily. In addition to greater traditional military capacity, this might also include important but often overlooked efforts like foreign security assistance, joint equipment maintenance and acquisition, and transportation infrastructure renewal. These investments would be useful not just for the EU, but for NATO as well.
Why can’t the United States simply lead such efforts in the context of NATO? Throughout much of Europe, public perceptions of the United States have plummeted, and outward-facing U.S. defense leadership is becoming increasingly politically toxic. Look no further than the Afghanistan withdrawal, lingering European fears of U.S. populist politics, the AUKUS debacle, and the targeted killing of Iranian General Qassem Suleimani to see why. It seems clear that, with both a U.S.-skeptic Europe and a Pacific-facing United States, calls by the United States for Europeans to “eat their defense vegetables” under NATO auspices will be met with cynicism.
What can the U.S. and NATO do? One easy step U.S. policymakers should take is to stop exercising their de facto veto against efforts to expand EU and European programs such as the EDF, PESCO, EI2, and others. Additionally, NATO should embrace efforts to collaborate with the EU’s defense planning bodies rather than ignoring them.
Speaking of toxic political narratives, let’s go ahead and get rid of NATO’s 2% of GDP defense spending goal too. It has become anathema in many European capitals, has done little to build relevant, modern capabilities, and is often fulfilled through states’ pension and medical spending, with limited relevance to deterring Russia or maintaining regional stability. Implementing new metrics for burden-sharing would be no small feat, as the history of such efforts suggests. However, defense-industrial “candy” could offer a means of rewarding states that meet specific capability targets. Rather than telling states to spend an arbitrary 2%, states with particular numbers of combat-ready brigades, special operations teams, ships, fighter squadrons, cyber defense elements, etc. might be rewarded with privileged access to EU, NATO, or U.S. defense contracting opportunities. Vested defense industrial interests are sure to challenge such thinking, but the value of leveraging financial incentives to motivate allied behavior makes such a bold move at least worth considering.
Parenting is messy, as is leading a broad community of states with different threat perceptions and national security interests. But, if we fear a little bit of inefficiency now, all of the vegetables may be left on the table (or, heaven forbid, spilled all over the floor) tomorrow.
