Where Things Stand on Ukraine’s Bid to Join the European Union
Flying high in central Kyiv’s “maidan” are two flags: one, the sky-blue above wheat yellow of Ukraine; the other, blue with a circle of golden stars, that of the European Union. The symbolism could hardly be less subtle. It is abundantly clear that Ukraine wants to be part of the European Union. But does the EU want to welcome Ukraine? This is not a new question, but one that should be monitored and updated regularly, given the importance of EU accession in the larger geopolitical context of the region. As it stands, the EU emphasizes inadequate judicial reform and offers support for Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty during talks. But both the EU and Ukraine should address that Russia is a major factor preventing accession in a way that they do not seem to be doing at present.
None of the current five “candidate” countries are Ukraine. Instead, the current state of EU-Ukraine relations is called an association agreement, which includes a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement, open skies agreement, and 90-day visa-free travel. This agreement was initially ratified in 2014. After then-President Yanukovych delayed its signing, riots ensued, as the EU-supporting student population took to the streets, in what is now called the “EuroMaidan” protests. Almost half a million Ukrainians actively expressed their anger at Yanukovych’s government and support for Ukraine’s EU integration. Their protests caused Yanukovych to flee the country. His successor, Poroshenko, wisely signed the agreement, later implemented in 2017. These protests are vital to modern Ukraine’s political identity, and are considered the impetus for the ongoing Russian occupation . EU citizens should know how important EuroMaidan was and remains to Ukrainians. Indeed, the main protest site fromseven years ago is now the same square currently flying EU flags. Russia’s annexation of Crimea and aggression in the Donbas and Luhansk regions also sent a strong signal that it viewed closer ties between Ukraine and the EU as highly threatening to its interests, a factor that the EU and Ukraine should be expressly cognizant of as negotiations for accession continue.
To move beyond the Association Agreement, in theory, Ukraine needs to formally apply for membership. Yet, before attempting to do so, President Zelensky has decided to seek support from EU states to bolster his position. So far, four EU states have signaled strong support for Ukrainian accession: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Slovakia. Estonia has signed a similar agreement to support Ukraine on its path to EU membership, yet holds reservations, stating that Ukraine has not made enough progress on implementing the necessary reforms of its judicial processes. Other states farther to the west in Europe have been even more reserved. German CDU party leader Armin Laschet, when specifically questioned about his thoughts on Ukrainian accession, said, “that’s not on the horizon right now,” but that he supports Ukraine on its “difficult trajectory.”
There are consistent messages from the EU and from member state leadership as to what they need to see from Ukraine to prove it is ready for accession. Judicial reform is one noted sticking point. It was recognized in point 8 from the Joint Statement following the 23rd Summit between the EU and Ukraine on October 12 of this year. Judicial reform, and versions of it, appear again in points 9 and 11. Another interesting factor in Ukraine’s potential for accession is the triumvirate agreement between Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia. These three states have pledged to support the others’ EU accession goals, and jointly announced their strong intentions to foster a common European future. This could prove useful, as the states could pool efforts in lobbying EU member states to sponsor their reform efforts and advocate for each other’s accession. On the other hand, should a current EU member state look neutrally upon Ukraine’s accession, but with hostility towards Georgia’s, then the fact of their association may give that potential ally pause at the negotiating table, if they fear a Ukrainian accession would precipitate a Georgian one.
Regarding the “elephant in the room,” active war on Ukrainian soil, the EU does assert that it supports the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and calls on Russia to remove economic and military support from eastern Ukraine. But the EU fails to explicitly acknowledge that the conflict is a major, lasting barrier to Ukraine’s accession goal. Joining the EU would mean that Ukraine could immediately seek to leverage its new friends to remove any occupying forces from its territory, including Crimea. Ukraine may also, post-accession, seek to push the U.S. for NATO membership, using its EU membership as a rhetorical tool. Both of these prospects would not be looked upon favorably in Moscow, which has a reputation for viewing the EU and NATO as a joint western project. The EU could choose to acknowledge Russia’s concerns, thus signaling that one reason the EU is hesitant over Ukrainian accession is that the EU does not want to antagonize its large, gas-rich neighbor, thus at least being honest in its relations with both Russia and Ukraine. For Ukraine’s part, it is unclear what kind of reassurances President Zelensky has offered to quell these potential fears, as he also pushes for NATO membership.
On the topic of reassurances, President Zelensky has been active in the last few months, campaigning in Eastern Europe for Ukraine’s accession prospects and seeking reassurances from EU member states. In fact, Ukraine would do well to offer something to the EU in return, rather than risk being seen by EU member states as simply a future drain on their national resources. Ukraine has things to offer, specifically its agricultural sector, as a good harvest was mentioned by the World Bank as a reason for optimism for the Ukrainian economy’s recovery from its Covid-19 induced slump. Ukraine would add roughly 100 million acres of agricultural land to the EU, or about a fifth of the current total. This is but one example of something Ukraine has that the EU may want, and should consider emphasizing. Before doing so, however, Ukraine will want to consider potential opposition from current EU industry leaders, in this case EU agricultural interests, which may protest new Ukrainian competition. President Zelensky will do well to stress any and all positive changes that Ukraine’s membership could offer EU member states.
Ultimately, the EU is likely concerned that, given the Russian response to EuroMaidan, further escalation of Ukrainian accession talks would prove disastrous to EU-Russian security relations. The EU is not wrong to harbor those fears, and perhaps it is actively expressing them to President Zelensky behind closed doors — though perhaps not. Either way, the EU for its part should make clear to Ukraine what steps must be taken for accession to move forward, such as possible territorial concessions. These steps are currently hidden by the lack of transparency by the EU regarding the real problems for Ukrainian accession. That being said, the EU was founded as an economic unit, and its greatest source of strength on the international stage remains its economic might. Therefore, convincing EU member states that the accession of Ukraine will directly support the realization of the Union’s longterm economic goals would likely overshadow many concerns member states may have against welcoming Ukraine into the European Union. For now, not making a decision on accession is itself a decision, and one that should be made while acknowledging all factors, not just the least controversial ones, for all parties involved.
