Why a Common European Military is not the Solution to Europe’s Defense Problems
A resurgent Russian state, a border crisis, and an inconstant ally are all problems to add to the growing list of European security concerns in the past decade. To some strong advocates of European integration, a common European defense force supervised by the European Union is the panacea to the growing pressure on the EU’s eastern and southern borders. The delegation of additional security powers to the European Union’s departments will not be the miracle solution European policymakers are hoping for. Rather than building a common force from scratch, a better course would be strengthening local security actors.
The most imminent and primary issue has been the aggressive foreign policy of the Russian State, especially regarding the states formerly aligned with the Soviet Union. With Russia actively backing separatists in Donbas in an ongoing war against Ukraine, European leaders have become increasingly concerned with Russian threats in the Baltic and Eastern Europe. Some argue that a centralized European force would present a more compelling collective response to Russian aggression. There are two major problems with the force. The first is that decisions would likely be slowed in the same manner as NATO as a result of consensus-based requirements for taking action. In complex, quickly changing situations with multiple actors, it is likely that a military force directed by the European Union will be constrained by the same strong institutional and regional limitations placed upon other EU agencies. The second is that the force has a problem of differentiation. NATO would serve in many of the same functions as a proposed European common military, only excluding nations like Turkey and the U.S., both of which are extremely relevant to counterbalancing the expansion of Russian influence. As modern conflicts become more and more asymmetrical, a traditional military force with these two constraints is more likely to suffer from time-related deficiencies as a result of the institutional constraints placed on European supranational agencies. Specifically, the wider range of intensity in the conflicts likely to occur mean that an effectual European deterrent requires a flexible range of responses. In the unlikely case of an actual war declaration, garnering political support for a strong response would not be a difficult task. In the case of the increasingly common low-intensity conflicts, which has characterized the War in Donbas, it would be likely difficult to gather consensus within the European Union on taking significant military action in response to a less direct hostile action on the part of Russia.
In some respects, Frontex, the European Union’s border security agency, has served as a case study and preliminary example for European common security projects directed from the supranational level. Established in 2004, the organization has undergone significant challenges, the most important of which was the 2015 European migrant crisis. Although the organization has had significant success in facilitating information coordination between relevant European member state border patrol agencies, the operation of the agency has exposed and amplified tension between representatives of the European Union and member state officials. As jurisdiction is often redundant and overlapping, conflict between policy-making directors at the national level and the consensus reached by representatives of the European Union can result in paralysis or paradoxical objectives by Frontex and corresponding national border enforcement authorities. An additional concern is the problem of freeloading as some European Union member states offload their proportional budgetary responsibilities onto member nations closer to or bordering major crisis areas. In other words, the proposed common military organization can actually cause infighting among the member states similar to the controversies that arose in 2015 when European Union member states closer to North Africa and the Middle East suffered the brunt of the economic costs in patrolling the border and taking care of refugees. These complications with Frontex, are likely to be transferable to any established common European security force directed from the European Union.
Proponents of the security force claim that the common European military would offer more flexibility and enjoy greater support from the constituent member nations. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the organization would be significantly more efficient than NATO for several reasons. First, a common defense force supervised by the European Union would actually have more red tape, not less, as a result of the increased number of informal and formal channels that European member states and subnational institutions have connecting them to the decision-making bodies which would supervise the proposed common military force. The increased influence of both member national governments and subnational governments would only increase complexity and reduce efficiency at the top of a common European military force. Second, while a European common defense force may enjoy more support from constituent member countries, the advantages are outweighed by the funding lost from the exclusion of the U.S. Another problem is that the issue of some states freeloading is not likely to be reduced in a major capacity by the decreased geographic scope of the proposed defense force. In both the cases of NATO and any proposed European defense force, the two organizations are closely aligned in their policy towards Russia in Eastern Europe.
Moving forward, a better solution would be to focus on supporting the strengthening of national militaries in Eastern Europe through proper allocation of subsidies and block grants to European Union member states and allies actively involved in conflicts with Russia. This process, similar to the outsourcing of European immigration controls to North African countries and Turkey, would avoid most of the problems endemic to supranational coordination in time-dependent crises.
