Life After Death: When the Foreign Fighters of ISIS Return Home

Ben Abeles, bba28@cornell.edu

“All of us with a memory of the ’80s and ’90s saw the line drawn from Afghanistan in the ’80s and ’90s to Sept. 11…We see Syria as that, but an order of magnitude worse in a couple of respects. Far more people going there. Far easier to travel to and back from. So, there’s going to be a diaspora out of Syria at some point and we are determined not to let lines be drawn from Syria today to a future 9/11.”

— FBI Director James B. Comey, May 2014 [1]

No conflict in recent memory has been so complex, so internationally engaging, and so globally threatening as the ongoing war in Syria. Sparked by protests against President Bashar Al Assad in 2011, the war has in just five years evolved into a conflagration setting ethnic, religious, and political sects against one another, all backed by the unending support of major powers. The war is civil, breaking down in simplest terms accordingly: opposition groups seek overthrow Assad; Assad is determined to maintain power; in the north, Kurds are fighting to establish independence; and to the east ISIS remains the common enemy of all. Beyond Syria’s borders, however, major powers hold major stakes. Iran and Russia back the Assad regime while Iran and Turkey seek its ousting. Turkey — for whom the conflict in Syria, its neighbor, is perhaps the most salient — has been unsettled by the influx of two million Syrian refugees and the potential creation of a Kurdish state. [2] Russia holds its only Middle Eastern naval base in Syria while ideological and regional concerns motivate Iran’s involvement. Saudi Arabia seeks only to heighten the costs of Iranian efforts. Meanwhile, the primary objectives of the United States — weary from wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — have been the destruction of ISIS, and the overall de-escalation of the conflict in order to dampen both migrant flow and radicalization. That so many powerful states have so many different and competing interests indicates that risks of escalation must not be understated.

Conventional wisdom is enough to understand the precariousness of the conflict in Syria. Commentators, notably RAND Corporation authors James Dobbins, Philip Gordon and Jeffrey Martini, are correct in arguing that a bargain for ceasefire is at this point the optimal solution. While such analyses are by no means myopic, they fail to accurately depict the risk of the foreign fighter to all countries involved. ISIS will not, as these articles assume, plainly cease to exist. Incorporating the costs of the foreign fighter into bargaining calculations could serve to expedite the very bargaining process. [3] Terrorism is a threat to all countries involved, as demonstrated by even a brief survey of attacks in the past two years. Reiterating the danger of not only ISIS, but its ability to engrain and spread radical ideology, is indeed a fact that must not be overlooked in any negotiating process or recommendation. For this reason, I aim to shed light on the real threats posed by foreign fighters.

As millions of Syrians have fled death and destruction, thousands of have rushed with zeal to the Levant to join the ranks of ISIS. For at least the last two years of the conflict, consensus among international security leaders is that the cultivation of these fighters pose a long-term threat. The danger of the conflict in Syria is therefore twofold: on the broadest and shortest term level, it seems that war between major states is becoming more and more likely; long term projections are geared towards future waves of terrorism invoked by the return of the 20,000 foreign fighters of ISIS. [4] In this paper, I examine if, how and to what degree these foreign fighters will pose danger of further and future terrorism and radicalization. Considering both the current state of affairs and a brief historical analysis, I conclude that these foreign fighters should be at the least a cause of concern and policy action. First, the flow of people from Turkey into Europe must be controlled and mitigated. Likewise, ISIS’s use of Twitter and online propaganda must be controlled and studied. Finally, the current surge of returned foreign fighters entering European prisons allows for the fast spread of radicalization. While I am not the first writer to raise an argument of this sort, it seems that it is evermore and increasingly pertinent to factor such considerations into short-term policy for the destruction of ISIS and long-term policy on anti-radicalization.

LESSONS LEARNED: AFGHANISTAN

During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, around 20,000 foreign fighters traveled to the country to support local mujahedeen. No more than a few thousand were ever in Afghanistan simultaneously; moreover, these foreign fighters lacked experience and were often of little utility. [5] What these foreign fighters would go on to do, however, may indicate the possible actions of those who will eventually return from the battlefields of Syria.

The most notable example is the well-known story of al Qaeda. Among the Afghan Arabs were Osama bin Laden and Abdullah Yusuf Azzam, eventual founders of al Qaeda. After Afghanistan (and Azzam’s death in 1989), bin Laden and his cohorts found refuge in Sudan, where the group’s focus shifted towards jihad against the United States. Eventually expelled from Sudan, bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, tapping into the network he formed during Soviet invasion. While the skills that Afghan Arabs obtained may during the Soviet invasion are difficult to quantify, it is the tightly-knit and expansive network of jihadists that remains of interest.

Given the fact that in just five years over 20,000 foreign fighters have flocked to Syria, it stands to reason that the reverse flow of these jihadists will give birth to further radicalization and violence. How much and to what degree remain the question; as the war has evolved, so have commentators’ analyses.

QUANTIFYING RISK AND ADJUSTING EXPECTATIONS

In a 2014 paper, two Brookings Institution writers explored parallels between Syrian foreign fighters and their predecessors of Afghanistan. As the title, “Be Afraid. A Little Afraid,” of the paper suggests Byman and Shapiro reach the conclusion that although the quantity of foreign fighters is high, a number of mitigating factors inherent to the Syrian conflict — combined with Western government’s security capabilities — lessen the threat these foreign fighters will pose. Thinking of attacks Paris and Brussels (which occurred after the writing of their paper), some may now view this claim as naïve. However, Byman and Shapiro’s model is incredibly useful for understanding the phenomena of the foreign fighter: a person becomes motivated to fight; he then travels to the country of interest; in country he develops skills, gains access to the greater jihadi network, and adopts more radical views; he then returns to his home country and avoids law enforcement; finally, he plots and carries out and attack, recruiting new fighters in so doing. [6] The cycle is illustrated nicely in Byman and Shapiro’s schematic (next page):

Byman and Shapiro do recognize the dangerous nature of such a cycle: “Western security services fear that the foreign fighter threat in Syria and Iraq is different in important ways than past foreign fighter problems. Young European and American Muslims will go on to fight in Syria and Iraq as Sunni idealists but will return as anti-Western terrorists.” [7] However, in retrospect, we are able to see that Byman and Shapiro fail to fully grasp the practical implications of this truth. At the time of Byman and Shapiro’s writing, the sole terror attack on European soil carried out by a returned foreign fighter was that of Mehdi Nemmouche on the Jewish Museum of Belgium in May 2014. The attack was minor, killing only four; Nemmouche’s poor planning and ostensible lack of training rendered his capture quick and the relative damage minimal. For Byman and Shapiro, the story of Nemmouche served as a convenient case-in-point: there will be attacks, the two argue, but the attacks will be limited in scope and damage due to a number of alleviating factors: “The danger posed by returning foreign fighters is real, but American and European security services have tools that they have successfully deployed in the past to mitigate the threat. These tools will have to be adapted to the new context in Syria and Iraq, but they will remain useful and effective. Experience thus far validates both perspectives on the nature of the threat. The Nemmouche attack demonstrates the danger, but European security services have also disrupted five plots with possible links to Syrian foreign fighters to date, in locales ranging from Kosovo to the United Kingdom.” [8] Byman and Shapiro downplay the threat (rationally so) according to the climate in which they wrote.

BRUSSELS AND PARIS AND BRUSSELS

Our worst fears, however, seem to be coming to fruition. After the Nemmouche attack, there were few (publicly known) attempts at attacks by returned foreign fighters. In November of last year, however, this trend reversed with the attacks in Paris; the March attacks in Brussels have further raised concern about foreign fighters.

Four of the 11 Paris assailants had at one point fought in Syria before returning to France and orchestrating their attack. Linked to these attackers was Najim Laachraoui, one of the two eventual suicide bombers in the Brussels airport. Days after the Brussels attack, the links between Syria and France, Belgium were clear: “Mr. Laachraoui, like Mr. Abdeslam and the suspected architect of the Paris attacks, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, is a veteran of the conflict in Syria. He traveled there in February 2013, helping to blaze a jihadist trail that has since been taken by hundreds of other young Muslims from Belgium, Europe’s biggest source of jihadist fighters relative to population size.” [9] While the fact that Laachraoui and the Paris attackers were connected — ISIS claims Laachraoui made the bombs used in Paris and Laachraoui did rent a house that was inhabited by the Paris attackers — may weaken the argument that all foreign fighters pose a great threat (one could argue they all acted as part of the same cell, even if not simultaneously), the attack in Paris and the second in Brussels demonstrate that foreign fighters may have a much higher capacity for large-scale terror acts than did Nemmouche, who returned during an earlier part of the conflict.

Furthermore, one step absent from Byman and Shapiro’s model is post-return imprisonment, which could serve as an appropriate addendum, or even replacement to the current 4th step of avoiding law enforcement. Despite the fact that only two years have passed since the publishing of their article, we now know that a foreign fighter does not simply return home. As security communities have become more cognizant and adept at tracking these individuals, European prisons have seen an influx of former foreign fighters who were either caught re-entering Europe or in other more benign criminal activity. [10] Within European prisons whose populations are largely Muslim, these returning fighters seek to gain prestige through radicalizing fellow inmates. This fold is further developed in the following section, but it is useful to note that we need adjust the model articulated by Byman and Shapiro.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS: TURKEY, TWITTER, AND PRISONS

Beyond recognizing the danger posed by foreign fighters, my recommendations are three: Turkey’s border must be secured; security agencies must not only monitor but act on the social media usage of ISIS and its affiliates; finally, some sort of prison reform is necessary to dampen the spread of radicalization behind among the highest-risk demographics. These solutions are admittedly not simple, and each requires extensive discussion within the countries where each would take place. All considered, if security is valued — and after Paris and Brussels it is — some freedoms need be sacrificed.

The most obvious policy objective is perhaps to assist Turkey in the sealing of its border. As Turkey continues to recover from July’s failed coup attempt, government resources are stretched. Recent waves of bombings demonstrate lack of Turkish control; attacks from both the P.K.K. (Kurdish Workers Party) and ISIS have rocked the country in past months, most recently the day prior to this writing, October 10th. [11] The border shared by Turkey and Syria is hundreds of miles long, but with support of UN Peacekeepers the risks of foreign fighters’ returning to Europe could be mitigated.

Monitoring and censuring publicly available social media can both help identify terrorists and reduce the spread of ISIS propaganda. A 2016 study by the RAND Corporation analyzed support and opposition for ISIS across the Arabic Twittersphere. The results of the study were useful in indicating which macro-communities within the greater Muslim world support ISIS, and which do not. Geotagging of Tweets allowed for the production of maps demonstrating from where support stems. [12] Such data can perhaps be used as a predictive tool, if not as an outright policing device. The study found that Twitter bans drastically slowed dissemination of ISIS propaganda — a key tool in recruiting and inspiring both foreign fighters and domestic lone-wolves. Twitter therefore provides the tools for security institutions to crack down on likely terrorist operatives; dilemma arises, however, when considering not only freedom of speech but conspiracy to commit terrorism laws in democratic countries. As Byman and Shapiro note, taking action against returnees on evidence such as a Tweet can be legally difficult — if not impossible — in a number of European countries. [13] However, induction following the form of this study can help identify those who are at risk of becoming foreign fighters while the banning of radical accounts can serve as a preemptive measure to defeat further recruitment.

Lastly, one must note that European prisons present another dilemma. A July Wall Street Journal Article illustrates how returning foreign fighters are already changing the landscape of radicalization in Europe: “…the return over the past year of an unprecedented number of jihadists from Islamic State territory is placing European prisons in an even bigger bind. To keep militants of the streets, authorities are throwing many of them in jail, but that is injecting battle-hardened radicals into overcrowded prisons.” [14] Prior to the conflict in Syria, the article makes clear, such radicalization was already an issue; however, the influx of already radicalized individuals is exacerbating the problem. Possible solutions raise ethical dilemmas for Western democracies. Solitary confinement for radicals may prove too extreme a form of punishment; separating radicals from the rest of the prison population creates the risk, according to a spokeswoman for the Belgian Justice Ministry of “[creating] a Guantanamo.” [15] A detailed discussion on prison reform is beyond the scope of this paper, however, this case does serve to demonstrate how returning foreign fighters are already a pressing issue.

CONCLUSION

I conclude by anticipating the critique that recent attacks in Paris and Brussels are outliers, mistakes never to be again repeated, and that a more status-quo approach to policy forming (such as that of Byman and Shapiro) is sufficient to guard the West from future attacks and waves of radicalization. Recent data points, however, indicate this is not the case. Taking into consideration current European prison populations, we must add — rather than subtract — to the total of potentially radicalized individuals seeking to wage jihad on Western societies. As ISIS weakens, we must remember that its threat stills exists: 20,000 men and women from over 80 countries have been swayed by its influence in the last five years, and how fast this network may expand we can only guess. At the least we can anticipate and prepare for a new wave of terrorism.

Notes

1 Horowitz, Sari and Adam Goldman. “FBI Director: Number of Americans Traveling to Fight in Syria Increasing,” Washington Post, May 2, 2014.

2 Dobbins, James, Jeffrey Martini and Philip Gordon. “A Peace Plan for Syria.” Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015. 7.

3 Lake, David A. “Two Cheers for Bargaining Theory: Assessing Rationalist Explanations of the Iraq War.” International Security, 35, no. 3, 2010. 50.

4 Atteridge, Amber. “Foreign Fighters Post Conflict: Assessing the Impact of Arab Afghans and Syrian-Iraqi Foreign Fighters on Global Security,” International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, 2016. 3.

5 Hegghammer, Thomas. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.” International Security 35, no. 3 (Winter 2010/11): 63.

6 Byman, Daniel and Jeremy Shapiro. Be Afraid. Be a Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq. 7.

7 Ibid. 2.

8 Ibid. 1. Emphasis mine.

9 De Freytas-Tamura, Kimiko and Andrew Higgins. “In Brussels Bombing Plot, a Trail of Dots Not Connected,” The New York Times, March 26, 2016.

10 Bisserbe, Noemie. “European Prisons Fueling Spread of Islamic Radicalism,” The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2016.

11 The Associated Press. “Car Bomb Kills 18 at a Military Checkpoint in Turkey,” The New York Times, October 10, 2016.

12 Bodine-Baron, Elizabeth, Todd C. Helmus, Madeline Magnuson and Zev Winkelman. Examining ISIS Support and Opposition Networks on Twitter. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016.

13 Bisserbe, Noemie. “European Prisons Fueling Spread of Islamic Radicalism,” The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2016.

14 Bisserbe, Noemie. “European Prisons Fueling Spread of Islamic Radicalism,” The Wall Street Journal, July 31, 2016.

15 Ibid.