Security through Diplomacy: Analyzing the Merits of the Iran Nuclear Deal
In 2015, many Americans feared the threat of nuclear war with a nation potentially willing to attack the United States. Fear of Iran’s rapid development of nuclear technology and progression towards militarization created prolonged political debate in search of a solution. The Iran Nuclear Deal was an attempt at de-escalation of this growing threat. An agreement between the P5+1 (US, UK, France, China, Russia, and Germany) and Iran, the deal promised a loosening of sanctions imposed on Iran over years of UN condemnation of nuclear development in return for a freeze on the nation’s nuclear program and the ability to inspect established sites in Iran for the development of weapons. In light of American reconsideration of the deal and its merits following President Trump’s refusal to recertify its implementation, the accomplishments and application of the terms of the deal over the last two years merits support for continued commitment to the deal. Reneging on the Iran Nuclear Deal would further destabilize international affairs and would undermine diplomatic efforts that have proven effective in subduing the threat of a nuclear Iranian state.
Agreed to in July, 2015, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iran Nuclear Deal, was built around world powers lifting sanctions incurred by Iranian nuclear actions in the past in return for an assurance that Iran would not develop nuclear weapons, verified by inspections and limits to nuclear energy development[i]. It is critical to note that the sanctions lifted are only those in place as nuclear sanctions, rather than those pertaining to human rights abuses and state sponsorship of terrorism. In return for the relaxation of nuclear sanctions, the Iranian government agreed to limits on its ability to develop nuclear weapons through uranium enrichment and plutonium. Uranium enrichment was limited by a cap placed on the number of centrifuges used to enrich the element. Further, restrictions on the percentage of enrichment, maintaining a level well below the threshold necessary for a nuclear weapon, as well as limits on the quantity of uranium hinder the Iranian government’s ability to develop nuclear technology rapidly and without detection. Regarding plutonium development, the deal dictates that Iran halts construction of heavy water reactors and only utilize light water reactors when handling nuclear energy, since heavy water reactors are necessary to use plutonium in nuclear weapons. The various terms of the deal are set to expire over the course of the coming two decades, but regulation of Iran’s nuclear capabilities will still be carried out by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the terms of the deal expire. The IAEA carries out regular inspections of Iranian nuclear facilities in search of potential breaches of the terms of the deal. It is thus the role of the President and other parties of the deal to certify that the terms of the deal are met multiple times each year.
The Deal was hailed by many as a victory for diplomacy in the face of the looming threat of nuclear proliferation, but others also expressed concerns about trusting a government so prone to anti-American rhetoric that has been designated as a state sponsor of terrorism[ii]. In an interview following the initial agreement, President Obama expressed optimism about the Deal and warned analysts against misjudging the goal of the diplomatic efforts, stating, “We’re not measuring this deal by whether we are solving every problem that can be traced back to Iran, whether we are eliminating all their nefarious activities around the globe. We are measuring this deal — and that was the original premise of this conversation, including by Prime Minister Netanyahu — Iran could not get a nuclear weapon”[iii]. Furthermore, when describing what a potential Republican successor would inherit as a result of the Deal, Obama explains, “He will be in a position to know that 98 percent of their nuclear material has been shipped out. He would know that the majority of the centrifuges had been removed. He would know that there is no heavy reactor there. He’d know that the international community had signed on to this. He would know everything that we’ve learned from the inspection regime. And he’d still be in possession of the entire arsenal of our armed forces, and our diplomatic and intelligence services, to deal with the possibility that Iran was cheating”[iv]. President Obama harkened back to the diplomatic efforts of Presidents Nixon and Reagan when dealing with China and Soviet Union as examples of the value of coming to agreements with antagonistic nations through compromise and focused negotiation. On the contrary, Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer, a major opponent of the Deal at the time of its consummation, argued that the deal would merely lighten the burden on Iran’s economy, allowing them to continue promoting a dangerous agenda globally, and expire only to allow the government to continue developing nuclear weapons. In the end, Senator Schumer simplifies the question at hand by saying, “Ultimately, it depends on how one thinks Iran will behave. If one thinks Iran will moderate, one should approve the agreement. But if one feels that Iranian leaders won’t moderate and their unstated but very real goal is to get relief from the onerous sanctions, while still retaining their nuclear ambitions and their ability to increase belligerent activities in the Middle East and elsewhere, then one should conclude that it would be better not to approve this agreement”[v]. The contrasting points of view surrounding the Deal, even amongst leaders of the same political party, highlight the concerns and hopes expressed at the time of the agreement, but the implementation of the deal in the following years has yielded conflicting results regarding the talking points of both President Obama and Senator Schumer.
The deal has proven largely to be a success in the two years since its implementation, although there are still lingering concerns that trouble opponents of the Deal. All participating nations have consistently certified accordance to the deal on the part of Iran, until President Trump’s recent decertification. IAEA inspectors have verified accordance to the terms of the deal, with minor disagreements along the way. For instance, President Trump cited that, “on two separate occasions, they have exceeded the limit of 130 metric tons of heavy water. Until recently, the Iranian regime has also failed to meet our expectations in its operation of advanced centrifuges”[vi]. It is true that the limits established in the deal were exceeded under the American understanding of the terms. Ambiguity in phrasing, such as a restriction that Iran only operate “roughly 10” centrifuges, was utilized by Iranian officials in these cases to go slightly beyond the numbers written into the Deal[vii]. However the discrepancies were quickly detected and disagreements over precise limits were discussed and resolved by all parties. Further, the IAEA agency head has come out publicly to assure Iran’s compliance with inspections and the restrictions placed on them[viii]. The inspections have proven to be useful tools that set off a chain of negotiations to resolve differences, demonstrating effective implementation of the deal and quelling fears of Iranian circumvention without detection.
Economically, many had hope that the lifting of sanctions would open Iran up to the world and allow for trade to develop Iran into an economic power on the world stage. With the second largest reserve of gas and the fourth largest reserve of oil, Iran had a major export as well as a highly educated, young population that could help diversify the economy over time[ix]. Optimistic projections claimed that, by 2030, 10% annual growth would quadruple the size of the economy, unemployment would fall to a quarter of its size at the time of the Deal, and robust trade with other nations would forge strong economic alliances and foster cooperation[x]. Also, hope of reenergizing the Iranian tourism industry after it had fallen from great pre-revolution success suggested that “Iran aims ‘to attract 20 million visitors a year by 2025, generating up to $30 billion in revenues. Foreign visitor numbers are currently estimated at around four million’”[xi]. Even with such optimism, many believed the effects of the Deal on Iran would take approximately 15 years to materialize[xii]. To this point, there is not enough information to determine a positive or negative effect on the economy, although a reported “$3 billion Boeing airliner deal that could create or sustain 18,000 American jobs”[xiii] suggests that there is increased economic interaction that is benefitting both Iran and the outside world.
Much of the controversy surrounding implementation of the Deal revolves around Iran’s continued aggression in its surrounding regions and an apparent lack of political moderation over the past two years. Although President Obama made a concerted effort to separate the Deal from moderation of Iranian society and politics, many continue to point to the imprisonment of American journalists, near military confrontations, and sustained anti-American rhetoric as proof that Iran is not to be trusted and continues to present a danger. Regionally, Iran is still engaged in a cold war[xiv] with rival power Saudi Arabia, with either side intervening in the chaos enveloping Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Iran continues to support the Assad regime in Syria, much to the dismay of American diplomats and leaders. Furthermore, the government continues to support ballistic missile tests[xv] amid reactionary sanctions approved by the US Congress, claiming the tests are not in violation of any international agreements although many claim they defy a UN resolution on missile testing. The test has also fueled fears that Iran may attempt to eventually mount a nuclear weapon on such missiles, a fear which President Rouhani has denounced and attempted to quell while also pointing out that the tests are not in violation of the JCPOA. While these outward actions do anger many Americans and maintain consistency with the efforts of hardliner leaders of the past, there are signs of political moderation within Iran, as reformists are slowly gaining power under President Rouhani’s leadership. This discrepancy suggests there is hope that the nation is moderating but, “Indeed, the paradox of American engagement with Iran is that Rouhani’s approach, if successful, could result in an Iran that eventually emerges strengthened but whose regional strategy is unchanged, in the same way that the US opening to Beijing, for all of its benefits, also helped facilitate China’s transformation into a highly capable rival”[xvi]. It is even perhaps true that, “On balance, it does appear as though Iran is changing, but the nuclear deal is more a product of than a cause of that change”[xvii]. The effects of the deal on Iranian political moderation will become clear over time and will continue to dominate discussion of the Deal, even if it is not a main goal of the initial agreement.
After years of debate and continued opposition to the Deal, its merits, and its implementation, its future is in jeopardy, sparking consideration of what would happen in the event that the US backs out of the agreement. Prominent nuclear scientists[xviii] have called on Congress to save the Deal, asserting that the limits placed on the nuclear program effectively limit Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. Many other nations[xix], including the other parties of the Deal[xx] have called on the US to remain committed, citing the potentially destabilizing effect of reneging. Iranian government officials have closed the door to renegotiating the deal[xxi], undermining one potential option many American officials had hoped could work. The fallout of the deal’s breakdown could result in a continuation of Iran’s nuclear program as well as heightened anti-American sentiment surrounding an inability to live up to the terms of the Deal. Any progress towards political moderation and economic prosperity accomplished under implementation of the JCPOA would crumble and fuel growing tensions between Iran and the US. Imposition of further sanctions would do little to slow nuclear development and the door to diplomacy would be closed by the failure of the Deal. Pulling out of the Deal would serve no purpose other than to fan the flames of nuclear proliferation.
Diplomacy requires patience and compromise in order to avoid the prospect of conflict. The JCPOA is a historic agreement that symbolizes the victory of diplomacy over fear and political rivalry. It effectively quells the threat of a nuclear Iran while providing opportunities for the economic development and political moderation of one of the most isolated states in the world. The potential benefits of the Deal are so great that it deserves a chance to succeed. Congress must save the Iran Nuclear Deal for the sake of se
[i] Tabatabai, Ariane. “Preserving the Iran Nuclear Deal: Perils and Prospects.” Cato Institute.
August 15, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/preserving-iran-nuclear-deal-perils-prospects.
[ii] “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” U.S. Department of State. Accessed December 05, 2017.
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm.
[iii] Friedman, Thomas L. “Obama Makes His Case on Iran Nuclear Deal.” The New York Times.
July14, 2015. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://cdn.servizi-italiani.net/allegati/2015/07/16/1124798.pdf.
[iv] Ibid, see iii.
[v] Schumer, Charles. “Schumer: Why I’m opposing the Iran nuclear deal.” New York Post.
August 7, 2015. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://nypost.com/2015/08/07/schumer-why-im-opposing-the-iran-nuclear-deal/.
[vi] Trump, Donald J. “Remarks by President Trump on Iran Strategy.” The White House. October
13, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/10/13/remarks-president-trump-iran-strategy.
[vii] Blanc, Jarrett, and James M. Acton. “The Trump Administration and the Iran Nuclear Deal:
Analysis of Noncompliance Claims.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. October 03, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017. http://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/12/trump-administration-and-iran-nuclear-deal-analysis-of-noncompliance-claims-pub-73214#centrifuges.
[viii] Westall, Sylvia, and Stanley Carvalho;. “Iran fulfilling nuclear deal commitments: IAEA
chief.” Reuters. October 30, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-iaea/iran-fulfilling-nuclear-deal-commitments-iaea-chief-idUSKBN1CZ0YZ.
[ix] Burki, Shahid Javed. “Iran’s Reentry into the World.” SpringerLink. November 01, 2016.
Accessed December 05, 2017. https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1057/978-1-137-59815-8_7.
[x] Ibid, see ix.
[xi] Khodadadi, Masood. “A new dawn? The Iran nuclear deal and the future of the Iranian tourism
industry.” Tourism Management Perspectives. January 17, 2016. Accessed December 05, 2017. http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2211973615300234.
[xii] Ibid, see ix.
[xiii] “Iran nuclear deal is working.” USA Today. July 20, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017.
[xiv] Milani, Mohsen. “Iran’s Regional Policies One Year After the Nuclear Deal.” Rice
University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy. 2016. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/91814/WorkingPaper-Iran-Milani-051916.pdf?sequence=1.
[xv] “Rouhani says Iran will keep producing missiles, state TV reports.” Reuters. October 29, 2017.
Accessed December 05, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-missiles/rouhani-says-iran-will-keep-producing-missiles-state-tv-reports-idUSKBN1CY04S?il=0.
[xvi] Singh, Michael. “One Year After the Nuclear Deal: Is Iran Moderating?” Rice University’s
Baker Institute for Public Policy. 2016. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://scholarship.rice.edu/bitstream/handle/1911/91817/WorkingPaper-Iran-Singh-042516.pdf?sequence=1.
[xvii] Ibid, see xvi.
[xviii] Gladstone, Rick. “Nuclear Scientists Urge Congress to Protect Iran Deal.” The New York
Times. October 30, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/30/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-scientists.html.
[xix] Pinchuk, Denis, and Jack Stubbs. “Iran, Russia and Azerbaijan call for commitment to nuclear
deal.” Reuters. November 01, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-russia-putin-statement/iran-russia-and-azerbaijan-call-for-commitment-to-nuclear-deal-idUSKBN1D15C9?il=0.
[xx] Martin, Michelle. “Danger of war, Germany warns after Trump’s move on Iran nuclear deal.”
Reuters. October 14, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-germany/danger-of-war-germany-warns-after-trumps-move-on-iran-nuclear-deal-idUSKBN1CJ0A9.
[xxi] “Iran Nuclear Deal Is Not Renegotiable, Iran’s Ambassador To The U.N. Says.” NPR. October
20, 2017. Accessed December 05, 2017. https://www.npr.org/2017/10/20/558956230/iran-nuclear-deal-is-not-renegotiable-irans-ambassador-to-the-u-n-says.
