The Influence of President Trump’s Drone Policies on U.S. Military Policy

I. Introduction

During the first seven months of the Trump Administration, drones killed more civilians in the fight against ISIS than the American-led coalition has since 2014, when it was established under the Obama Adminsitration.[1] Drones, or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), have revolutionized the United States’ counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East. Modern UAV technology can be flown autonomously to strike militants and provide surveillance without putting military personnel in danger. Drones have been used in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, to target Islamic militants that are seen as a threat to the United States. Under the Obama Administration, the U.S. military limited the use of drones in warfare to the killing of jihadists with leadership roles or special skills, and proposed strikes maintained high level vetting before strikes. In September 2017, the Trump Administration announced that new military policies would abandon the requirement for high level vetting and drones would now strike jihadists without special skills, including foot soldiers.[2] The loosening of this policy will increase the use of drones in the U.S. military tactic, easing the possibility of intervention in countries like Libya, Somalia, and Yemen.

As counterterrorism efforts increase, world leaders are concerned about how striking low level militants conflicts with international law. International regulations protect civilians from drone strikes, but with the abandonment of strict policies, civilians are more at risk, threatening the reputation of the U.S. military tactic in the international community. When surveyed by the Pew Research Center in 2015, 48% of Americans were very concerned that attacks using U.S. drone technology were endangering the lives of civilians. While almost half of Americans were concerned, a majority of the American people (58%) still supported U.S. drone strikes.[3]

The relaxation of policies concerning drone warfare established by the Obama Administration will expand the United States military policy and increase drone strikes in the Middle East, and possibly beyond. This will increase the United States’ involvement in counterterrorism efforts but will ultimately cause tension in the international community.

II. A Controversial Inheritance

President Obama normalized and expanded the use of armed UAVs “to enable the delivery of force from a distance” in the War Against Terror. [4] Just three days into his presidency, President Obama authorized two strikes in Pakistan, killing twenty civilians.[5] His predecessor, President Bush, had authorized fifty-seven strikes in his small but rapidly developing drone program.[6] The Obama Administration approved a total of 563 strikes by the end of his second term, almost ten times the amount from the previous Administration.[7] Since drones became a frequently used asset for the U.S. Military in 2008, they have provided a seemingly cheaper, safer solution to comparably dangerous combat directly involving U.S. personnel.

The regulations established by President Obama regarding drones were as follows: In order for a drone to strike a target, personnel had to reach near certainty that civilian bystanders would not be killed.[8] Additionally, proposed strike targets were required to be militants that posed a “continuing and imminent threat,” particularly those with leadership roles and special skills.[9] To be carried out, proposed drone attacks underwent high-level vetting to ensure targets were qualified.[10] International laws on drones state that in conflict zones, strikes must be in line with the laws of armed conflict.[11] These laws require drone operators to act with proportionality, meaning the military objective outweighs potential colateral damage.[12] The laws also demand that operators act with distinction, stating that the only valid targets are military objectives.[13] International law also states that targeted killings can only be authorized after nonlethal means have been determined ineffective in preventing imminent threats to human life.[14] While important, these laws leave much ambiguity and controversy concerning what is considered an imminent threat that requires “self-defense.”[15]

In 2013, President Obama assured the American public that “America’s actions are legal… So this is a just war, a war waged proportionally, in last resort and in self-defense.” He asserted that “America cannot take strikes wherever we choose; our actions are bound by consultations with partners, and respect for state sovereignty.”[16] Human rights groups have vocalized great concern with perceived governmental secrecy concerning casualty count statistics and a general disregard for the lives of civilians. Amnesty International, a non-governmental organization that advocates for compliance with international laws criticized the Obama Administration. The organization insisted that the “intentional use of lethal force against terrorism suspects and other people who happen to be near such suspects appear to go far beyond what international human rights law permits. Indeed, from what has been publicly disclosed, the policy and its implementation seem simply to disregard international protections for the right to life and the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of life.”[17] While Obama insisted that the U.S. “act[s] against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people,” the term “imminent threat,” has become increasingly controversial in its usage related to international law and civilian safety.[18]

In response to mixed concerns and complaints of vagueness surrounding the American drone program, President Obama pledged in 2016 to improve policies surrounding drone use in warfare. He proposed reducing the risk of civilian casualties through superior technology, compensating injured civilians and their families, and releasing an annual report summarizing discrepancies in casualty estimates between the U.S. military and nongovernmental organizations.[19] President Obama even acknowledged the existence of the U.S. military’s “kill list.”[20] The list was a product of President Bush, who established the targeted killing program when he signed the Memorandum of Notification after the September 11th attacks, authorizing the CIA to kill high level terrorists.[21]

In 2013, President Obama warned the American people that drone technology “can also lead a President and his team to view drone strikes as a cure-all for terrorism. And for this reason, I’ve insisted on strong oversight of all lethal action.”[22] In 2017, President Trump affirmed his conflicting stance on drone use, and announced before the United Nations that he has “totally changed the rules of engagement in our fight against the Taliban and other terrorist groups.”[23]

III. An Update: Fewer Internal Obstacles and Near-Sighted Policy

In September 2017, the Trump Administration announced intentions to eliminate many of the Obama Administration’s limits on drone strikes. He has proposed to abandon the requirement that militants must be considered to be “high-level” to pose a “continuing and imminent threat” to the American people.[24] U.S. drone policy would be expanded, as targets would include foot-soldier jihadists that are not required to have leadership positions or special skills.[25] Secondly, proposed kill targets would not have to undergo high-level vetting by U.S. military personnel.[26] While President Trump plans to honor the Obama Administration’s commitment to requiring near certainty that bystanders will not be killed, there exists great concern about how the broadening of individuals that are deemed “qualified targets” and the abandonment of high-level vetting could potentially increase civilian casualties.[27] In eliminating comparably tight Obama-era regulations, President Trump will dissolve many obstacles that drone operators previously faced before striking targets. While war zone rules permit the killing of civilian bystanders in the case that these deaths are deemed appropriate and necessary relative to the greater threat at hand, many human rights groups have expressed concern that new U.S. military policy violates international law that protects civilians.[28]

Human rights groups have argued that “under pressure from rights groups, Obama made important but insufficient improvements to his lethal drone-strike program… [The new] proposal threatens to unravel many of those reforms at the expense of innocents’ lives. The result could be not only unlawful and immoral, but also short-sighted.”[29] Senior Director of Programs for Amnesty International USA, Zeke Johnson, asserted that “Obama’s administration’s policy guidance on the use of lethal force was a positive step but fell far short on human rights protections… Any decision to weaken those standards would be a grave mistake.”[30] The Obama Administration failed to identify what qualifies as an “imminent” threat, which could be interpreted as immediate or long term, perhaps in the span of years. These loose policies in Obama’s “drone playbook” at the end of his presidency enabled the incoming Trump Administration to expand targeted killing policies.[31] While Obama admitted that the policies required further transparency and adjusted regulations in 2013, President Trump believes his changes in policy will allow the United States’ “retribution [to] be fast and powerful.”[32] GOP Senator John McCain and former FBI counterterrosim special agent Clint Watts expressed their concerns that easing policies and increasing the ability to conduct strikes will alienate populations and encourage individuals to join groups like ISIS.[33] President Trump’s changes to the U.S. military tactic may prove to assist the U.S. military on a short term basis. In the long term, the U.S. will not be winning the hearts or minds of those who survive brutal drone strikes, and will instead give an advantage to jihadist groups recruiting civilians.[34] While saving the lives of civilians is important, it is critical to assess the additional effects of increased drone strikes on allied government and on populations vulnerable to terrorist propaganda.

IV. Bold Isolationism

How will the Trump Administration’s changes in drone policy affect U.S. military policy, and the U.S. perception abroad? With an increase in the ability for drone operators to perform strikes, there is potential for counterterrorism missions in nations that have active Islamic militants but have not experienced regular combat with the United States. For example, increased missions could be carried out in Libya, Somalia, and Yemen, or in regions within Asia and Africa, where smaller pockets of terrorists exist.[35] President Trump has confirmed his stance that “the killers need to know they have nowhere to hide, that no place is beyond the reach of American might and American arms,” suggesting his willingness to use less bureaucratic drone policies as an advantage in targeting more insurgent groups in new regions.[36]

President Trump’s proposals in new countries would require, under international law, approval by the country’s leaders to target militants that pose fewer threats.[37] In a 2014 poll by Pew Research Center, drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia were seen as unpopular by majorities or pluralities in 39 out of 44 countries surveyed. Only Israel and Kenya supported drone strikes.[38] Aside from inheriting a general lack of support internationally, President Trump’s drone policies have had unintended consequences in countries with active terrorists within the first year of his presidency. The loosening of regulations resulted in more air attacks in Afghanistan, prompting the Taliban to respond with increasingly frequent raids in 2017. [39] Similarly, in Somalia, President Trump’s altered rules of engagement and regular drone strikes were met with an increase in counter attacks by al-Shabab, a primary terrorist organization.[40]

While the elimination of Obama-era policies may pave an easier path to killing suspected terrorists, President Trump must convince global leaders that these policies will be beneficial, or the U.S. is in danger of isolating itself in the war against insurgent groups in the Middle East. Furthermore, the perception of a president who is willing to act at the expense of civilian lives threatens the reputation of the United States in peace-seeking organizations such as the United Nations. While President Obama used drones strikes in raids every 5.4 days on average, President Trump has used them every 1.25 days on average.[41] Beyond the potential of increased civilian deaths, the increase in damage caused by drones could play to the advantage of recruiting terrorist organizations. If insurgent groups continue to expand and emerge, the United States will have to continue to dedicate resources, personnel, and risk further lives in a war that cannot be solely eliminated by unmanned aircraft.

Bibliography

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[1] Tom O’Connor, “Trump Has Already Killed More Civilians than Obama in U.S. Fight Against ISIS,” Newsweek, last modified August 22, 2017, accessed December 4, 2017, http://www.newsweek.com/trump-has-already-killed-more-civilians-obama-us-fight-against-isis-653564.

[2] Charlie Savage and Eric Schmitt, “Trump Poised to Drop Some Limits on Drone Strikes and Commando Raids,” The New York Times, September 21, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/21/us/politics/trump-drone-strikes-commando-raids-rules.html?_r=0.

[3] Pew Charitable Trusts, “Public Continues to Back U.S. Drone Attacks,” Pew Research Center, last modified May 28, 2015, accessed November 12, 2017, http://www.people-press.org/2015/05/28/public-continues-to-back-u-s-drone-attacks/.

[4] Rosa Brooks, “Drones and the International Rule of Law,” Georgetown University Law Center, last modified 2013, accessed November 12, 2017 .http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2296&context=facpub.

[5] Micah Zenko, “Obama’s Final Drone Strike Data,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified January 20, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.cfr.org/blog/obamas-final-drone-strike-data.

[6] Jessica Purkiss and Jack Serle, “Obama’s Covert Drone War in Numbers: Ten Times More Strikes than Bush,” The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, last modified January 17, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covert-drone-war-in-numbers-ten-times-more-strikes-than-bush.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Savage and Schmitt, “Trump Poised”.

[9] Barack Obama, “President Obama’s Speech on U.S. Drone and Counterterror Policy” (speech, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., May 23, 2013).

[10] Savage and Schmitt, “Trump Poised”.

[11] Vivek Sehrawat, “Legal Status of Drones under LOAC and International Law,” Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 5, no. 1 (April 2017): [174–197], accessed November 12, 2017, http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1162&context=jlia.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] USA.gov, “U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities,” The White House, last modified May 23, 2013, accessed November 12, 2017, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/2013.05.23_fact_sheet_on_ppg.pdf.

[16] Obama, “President Obama’s Speech on U.S. Drone and Counterterror Policy”

[17] Peter Benenson House, “United States of America ‘Targeted Killing’ Policies Violate the Right to Life,” Amnesty International, last modified June 2012, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/usa_targeted_killing.pdf.

[18] Obama, “President Obama’s Speech on U.S. Drone and Counterterror Policy”

[19] Exec. Order №13732, 81 Fed. Reg. (July 1, 2016). Accessed November 12, 2017. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/01/executive-order-united-states-policy-pre-and-post-strike-measures.

[20] Zenko, “Obama’s Final,” Council on Foreign Relations.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Obama, “President Obama’s Speech on U.S. Drone and Counterterror Policy”

[23] Donald Trump, “President Trump’s Speech to the UN General Assembly” (speech, 72nd United Nations General Assembly, New York, September 19, 2017).

[24] Savage and Schmitt, “Trump Poised”.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Alexandra Wilts, “Trump under Fire for Plans to Scrap Obama-Era Restrictions on Drone Strikes,” Independent, last modified September 22, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/trump-drone-strikes-rules-scrapping-attacked-human-rights-a7962517.html.

[30] Savage and Schmitt, “Trump Poised”.

[31] Letta Tayler, “How Obama’s Drones Rulebook Enabled Trump,” Human Rights Watch, last modified September 26, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/09/26/how-obamas-drones-rulebook-enabled-trump.

[32] Donald Trump, “Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia” (speech, Fort Myer, Arlington, VA, August 21, 2017).

[33] Eliza Mackintosh, “Trump Ban Is Boon for ISIS Recruitment, Former Jihadists and Experts Say,” CNN Politics, last modified January 31, 2017, accessed December 4, 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/30/politics/trump-ban-boosts-isis-recruitment/index.html.

[34] James Igoe Walsh, “The Effectiveness of Drone Strikes in Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism Campaigns,” ed. James G. Pierce, Dr., United States Army War College, last modified September 2013, accessed November 12, 2017, http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/pub1167.pdf.

[35] Savage and Schmitt, “Trump Poised”.

[36] Trump, “Remarks by President.”

[37] Ibid.

[38] Pew Charitable Trusts, “Global Opposition to U.S. Surveillance and Drones, but Limited Harm to America’s Image,” Pew Research Center, last modified July 14, 2014, accessed November 12, 2017, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/.

[39] Rod Nordland and Fahim Abed, “Taliban Attack Major Base in Eastern Afghanistan,” The New York Times, last modified June 18, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/18/world/asia/afghanistan-taliban-attack-paktia-province.html.

[40] Kevin J. Kelley, “Somalia: Al-Shabaab Remains a Threat as Attacks Increase,” All Africa, last modified May 27, 2017, accessed November 12, 2017, http://allafrica.com/stories/201705270198.html.

[41] Michael Shank, “Doubling Down on Drone Mistakes,” U.S. News, last modified June 29, 2017, accessed December 4, 2017, https://www.usnews.com/opinion/op-ed/articles/2017-06-29/president-trump-is-doubling-down-on-president-obamas-drone-mistakes.