How the Cold War Ignited the Modern Israel-Palestine Conflict

Graham M. Glusman
The Pensive Post
Published in
6 min readMar 4, 2018

President Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital late last year reignited a fierce debate over the Israel-Palestine conflict. Amidst the uproarious approbations and excoriating condemnations arose a valid question: Why does the United States’ opinion on Israel’s capital carry such weight? The answer to this question lies not in the fact that Israel — as the only properly functioning democracy in the region — serves as an ideological political partner, a theory that is regularly put forth. As the case of Saudi Arabia attests to, the United States has happily forged alliances with the most nondemocratic regimes in the world. Instead, the United States’ custodianship over Israel is a vestige of its Cold War competition for power with the Soviet Union.

While the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union is frequently thought of in terms of the major proxy wars in Korea and Vietnam and the subsequent American interventions, the Middle East operated as an equally important theater for the increasingly intense contest for global influence. Between 1945 and 1991, the Middle East functioned as a battleground for resources and strategic alliances, a fact that had enormous consequences for existing regional rivalries of the day. Nowhere was the impact of the Cold War more pronounced or pervasive than in the newly independent state of Israel. The triumph of the Israelis during the first stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict (and the revival of hostilities thereafter) is just one example of how the competition for regional influence between the United States and the USSR impacted rivalries and altered the political destiny of the Middle East. While the Cold War is long over, its ghosts continue to haunt the nations that were swept up in its tide.

Although the British created the Israel-Palestine conflict by signing the Balfour Declaration in 1917 which vaguely recognized the existence of an independent Israeli and Palestinian state, the Cold War carried the dispute into the present day. The impact of the Cold War on the Arab-Israeli conflict can be divided into two distinct phases, the first of which involved an unlikely alliance between the United States and the USSR in favor of an independent Israeli state. Between 1947 and 1949, both the USSR and the United States supported the Partition Resolution passed by the United Nations, which officially granted Israel statehood and 55 percent of the contested territory, leaving 45 percent of the land to an anticipated Palestinian state. After the Palestinians rejected the partition plan, Israel fought and won its first war against the neighboring anti-Zionist nations. Israel witnessed success in this arena in part because it had developed essential relationships with both of the newly anointed superpowers. On the other hand, Palestine “failed to acquire any great-power support,” according to Middle East scholar Rashid Khalidi, which severely inhibited its ability to resist the superpower-backed Zionist movement.

After the Palestinians rejected the superpower-backed partition plan, Israel fought and won its first war.

Although the Cold War had only just begun, a competition between the United States and the USSR for the allegiance of the new Israeli state had already changed the nature of the regional conflict, spreading the disagreement from the confines of the initial disputed territory to the international stage. The primary source of this competition was a mutual desire by the United States and the USSR to prevent one power from gaining leverage over the other in what was becoming a strategically essential region. The nontransparent preference for Israel held by the United States and the USSR came in the form of indispensable military and diplomatic support. Given the fact that Israel was besieged by Arab forces immediately following its establishment, such support was vital for the survival of the state and the victory it saw in its first war. In the words of Khalidi, although Zionist forces were well equipped to handle the Arab threat, it was the “overt backing of the United States and the Soviet Union that gave international cover and legitimacy” to the Zionist cause. In this regard, Israel’s initial favorability with both superpowers demonstrated the ability of the Cold War rivalry to shape regional outcomes.

While the first phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict witnessed an unexpected union between the Cold War powers, the second phase saw a shift in alliances in which the United States and the USSR adopted more traditional Cold War stances in opposition to each other, a realignment that ultimately reinitiated hostilities between the Arabs and Israelis. The 1960s ushered in a period known as the “classic phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict,” in which the Soviet Union shed its alliance with Israel in favor of one with the Arab states, while the United States maintained its commitments to Israel.

The new web of alliances ossified in 1967 when the Soviets — in an attempt to establish a pro-Soviet, anti-Zionist alliance with the Arab states — reported to Egyptian President Nasser that Israeli forces were gathering on the Syrian border. The report was false, but it nonetheless prompted Nasser to close the Red Sea to Israeli transport, a move viewed by the Israelis as an act of war, thus restarting the conflict. In under six days, the Arab armies involved suffered a resounding defeat, and the victory of the Israelis was viewed internationally as a victory for the United States over the USSR.

The Arab countries entangled in the conflict — most notably Egypt and Syria — suffered the near complete destruction of their Soviet supplied air force, and subsequently requested additional military equipment in the aftermath. The prospect of important Soviet vassal nations being left without any means of defense, combined with the clear demonstration of the inferiority of Soviet military technology, prompted the Soviets to comply with Egyptian and Syrian requests for additional armaments. This move initiated a small-scale arms race in the Middle East, in which both superpowers engaged in a pattern of military “one upmanship” in order to secure favorable outcomes for their proxies. The superpowers were locked in this policy pattern through the October 1973 war between Israel and its traditional Arab foes, during which both superpowers worked tirelessly to use and exploit the conflict to their benefit. Israel’s victory in the October War signaled another win for the United States over the Soviet Union and its Arab proxies.

Thus, as a result of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union — whether united or in opposition — were determined to influence regional rivalries to ensure favorable outcomes, often at the expense of those involved. In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Cold War competition for influence was responsible for Israel’s resounding victory following partition, as well as the renewal of hostilities against it in 1967. Although the Cold War is long over, the partnership that was forged between the United States and Israel continues to shape regional political outcomes, as President Trump’s recent declaration—and the ensuing protests in the Middle East—evidenced.

Through manipulation, backstabbing, and provocation, the United States and the USSR undermined internal politics and international relations between countries in the Middle East in order to establish themselves as the dominant powers and secure the influence, resources, and prestige that came with it. In the case of Israel and Palestine, the consequences of these actions are still unfolding. While the conflict between the Israelis and the Palestinians has always been complex, the Cold War is undoubtedly responsible for the conflict’s continuing salience on the international stage.

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