A look at Corbyn’s Labour: What went so wrong in the 2019 election?
After Labour’s worst result in over 80 years, the party will have a long time to reflect before they have to face the electorate once more. But will they learn from their mistakes? Corbyn may be going, but is this the end of Corbynism?
First, we must address what Labour’s frontbench are blaming for the defeat. Brexit. The only thing that has been consistent for much of Labour’s time in opposition since 2017 is that its outlook was unclear by design. The fence-sitting that took place for two years meant that by the time the Labour Party came up with a pragmatic, logical solution, it was already too late. Labour lost nearly 8% of their total vote share from just two years previously.
The reallocation below illustrates their catastrophic failings: just over half of that 8% went to the Liberal Democrats. 2% to the Brexit Party. Remain and Leave voters left in their droves because the Labour Party tried to appeal to both, and got neither. It wasn’t impossible to do; the policy wasn’t incoherent in any way. It was poorly sold by a cult used to talking to the converted; it was sold by a group with no experience in selling anything.
Leavers did not believe the Labour Party when they suggested that they could negotiate a better deal. With no clear definition on the Brexit deal that they were supposedly going to achieve in Brussels, it is no surprise. There was no real attempt to scrutinise the deal Boris Johnson had negotiated, and no attempt to explain how their deal was any different. Their efforts to criticise it on the NHS could have cut through, but if asked how Labour would avoid the same fate with a trade deal outside the EU, there was silence. The fact that those in the shadow cabinet were repeatedly coming out for remain, but the leavers were staying quiet (until the very end of the campaign), did not help either. It made the whole position unfeasible.
Remainers too were unwilling to support a party that took so long to come to their second referendum position; there was a real lack of trust in Labour’s promises. A lack of trust that comes from Jeremy Corbyn’s consistent Euroscepticism throughout his career; there was a sense that the pledge was designed to appease the Remainers that were leaving in their droves to the Liberal Democrats and Greens. They did not all return.
To lose one of these two groups is damaging, to lose both results in an electoral catastrophe. But the failure of Labour’s Brexit position was not inevitable; it could have been avoided by competent and consistent leadership. It was a problem, one that needed to be dealt with and quickly, but the loss of Labour votes in every part of the country shows that they did not. Though the fact that the vote share slumped in all parts of the country suggests that there is far more at play than simply Brexit — much to the disdain of the Corbyn Outriders.
For Labour to blame Brexit — and Brexit alone — for this electoral defeat is an attempt to absolve themselves from the guilt of letting down the communities that needed them the most. If you cannot win, you are no use to those communities. To compound this, these areas actively voted against what Labour were offering. If they do not feel like they need your support, then you have failed.
For those enamoured with the Corbyn project, the first thing they must take note of is that they are a relatively small minority in this country. They cannot go it alone in an election again if they truly want any of their policies to be implemented, and they certainly cannot do it by ostracising the non-believers.
Those who do not believe in the radical, socialist ideals of Corbyn are not all your enemies. But, if you tell these moderate, left of centre voters to ‘p*** off and join the Tories’ enough, don’t be surprised that they turn around and place their cross in such a way to spite you come election day. People don’t enjoy being taken for granted, and they certainly don’t enjoy being insulted. Doing both at the same time is an inevitable disaster. To win under FPTP, you must be a broad church — and not just a broad church in terms of your parliamentary makeup. You must genuinely appeal to both wings of the party, and by extension the country, from the cabinet to the manifesto. Corbyn’s Labour did neither.
An unwillingness to accept the non-believers, and criticising the moderate wing of the Labour Party that so many were willing to support in 1997, certainly did not help. It almost felt as though they did not want your vote. You were impure and undesirable; you did not deserve to support the party. Alan Johnson — from the moderate wing of the Labour Party — sums up the discontent felt by many:
A fact that highlights this is that over half of Labour’s lost voters went to the Liberal Democrats this election. The attempts to win them back consisted of attacking the leadership and calling any that were supporting them ‘closet Tories’. These are people who had voted Labour previously, and were disillusioned. They were asked to lend their votes to Labour for nothing in return. No promise of electoral reform. This meant that it was effectively a permanent agreement; one that many were unable to stomach again whilst being attacked for having their own beliefs.
Labour’s 2017 manifesto was a vote winner. After the Tories under May failed to offer anything but further cuts to the electorate, it offered a change of tack that genuinely appealed to the voters. The rise in the polls after it was announced reflected this. The same didn’t happen in 2019, but why? Two reasons.
The Tories learned their lesson. Labour took it a step too far.
It is possible to be too optimistic in a manifesto. Since Labour’s staggering defeat on Thursday, their front bench is doing everything possible to defend its policies from scrutiny. They are saying it was ‘positive’ and ‘popular’, that it offered ‘hope’ and ‘unity’. This is largely true, and most of their policies on their own are relatively popular with the electorate. Put them together, however, and they become unbelievable for the many. The policy on ‘communist broadband’ may have some legs in terms of it now becoming a public utility. Though not particularly unpopular, people are uncomfortable with it coming out of general taxation.
But who is renationalising Mail going to benefit? Is removing, instead of reducing, tuition fees really a priority? Those from the least fortunate backgrounds can now go to University knowing they never have to pay anything back until it has helped them get a career. A disproportionately high percentage of those paying for tuition fees come from private schools and wealthy backgrounds. Is it worth the enormous outlay, and whose votes does it gain? Certainly not those in Blyth Valley.
Removing the Marriage tax allowance makes sense — it is an outdated and unfair policy. Politically, however; it is a naive stick that you are giving to the opposition to beat you with. It means that the pledge of no tax rises for those earning under £80,000 has a glaring exception. An exception that makes the whole statement an effective lie. The same is true with the fully costed manifesto. It sounds great, but when you promise a £60 billion bribe to the WASPI women the day after, seemingly from nowhere, it again loses its legitimacy.
The Tories, on the other hand, exaggerated their promises: on Nurses, on Police, on Hospitals. Most of the promises were simply reverses on cuts from 2010. But that was enough of a change for people to think that it was believable and achievable. It was not particularly ambitious, but it was an end to austerity combined with (an impossible) promise to ‘Get Brexit Done’ by January 31st. It was not radical, but it was simple to repeat and could cut through at a time of year where politics is at the back of people’s minds. For Labour, there was too much on offer. Nothing could truly cut through; it was too complicated. Unclear. It felt like the second iteration of the longest suicide note in history, and was a repeat of 1983 in more ways than one.
Finally, we need to address the issue that exacerbates all the problems that Labour has faced in this election, and one that the data shows is clearly the most important. Jeremy Corbyn is an incredibly unpopular leader. He is also not a very good leader. It is a very large elephant in a very small room, and anybody that has canvassed in this election will attest to it. For a party to be electable, its leader must be somewhat palatable. Jeremy Corbyn is not. And there are reasons for this that stretch beyond the dreaded MSM and their evil henchmen. His past baggage on the IRA, Hamas and Hezbollah cut through to older voters. The fact he is an unapologetic 1970’s socialist also doesn’t help. He isn’t very articulate, and he struggles to win people over.
It must be noted that Johnson was also historically unpopular for an election winner, but under FPTP he only had to be less unpopular than his main rival. Corbyn was a gift to the Conservatives, and for 43 percent of those that did not vote Labour, it was the main factor given.
Jeremy Corbyn’s hopeless management of a genuine problem in Anti-Semitism in the Labour Party is one of two things: A failure of leadership, or a failure to care about British Jews. One makes him a bad leader, the other a bad person. Take your pick; the outcome is the same.
His outriders tend to support Chris Williamson, despite getting sacked for Anti-Semitism. The fact that the process took over a year makes it look like those in the leadership were supportive, even if they were not. They are also desperate to attack the wonderful Luciana Berger for putting her career on the line to escape a tirade of abuse from within her former party. There has been no attempt by the leadership to apologise for the hurt they have caused to those forced to leave their party.
It is far more than a stain on the Labour Party’s reputation, it is shameful. It goes against everything that Labour should stand for. It may take some time for those British Jews to forgive a party that many once called their home, and who can blame them. Labour’s inability to deal with its Anti-Semitism problem is accompanied by an inability to accept criticism. Not everything is a smear and some things must be addressed, and addressed properly. Jeremy Corbyn failed to do this.
He has failed to apologise to British Jews, and he has failed to apologise to his supporters that he has let down by allowing this electoral defeat. He has failed to apologise to those who have lost their jobs because of his leadership. He has failed to do all of this because he does not believe he is to blame. His inability to take responsibility for his missteps, and address his criticisms, is why he was wholly unsuitable to be Labour leader.
It has been nearly 50 years since Labour won an election without Tony Blair. This is no longer the 1970s, and Labour must refocus in an attempt to regain power. They must be able to be pragmatic and must unite the centre and the left to make any change in government. They have to persuade those in smaller parties to back them with the offer of electoral reform. They must have their package ready years before the election in 2024, and must expose the lies the Conservatives have told in their election promises, most notably on Brexit. Without it, it could be a decade or more of consistent Tory rule, and Labour will only have themselves to blame.
