Critical Reflection
In Hannah Arendt’s Responsibility and Judgement, the author discusses the moral and political standards of collective guilt, collective responsibility, and the implications of thinking. First, she demonstrates that collective guilt builds on the faults of our fathers and our responsibility in undertaking them. Second, the author discusses collective responsibility in light of the Socratic system. Next, she connects moral considerations to thinking.
Collective Guilt: Arendt explains the inherent feeling of guilt by stating, “Where all are guilty, nobody is. Guilt, unlike responsibility, always singles out; it is strictly personal. It refers to an act, not to intentions or potentialities. It is only in a metaphorical sense that we can say we feel guilty for the sins of our fathers or our people or mankind, in short, for deed we have not done, although, the course of events may well make us pay for them” (147). This idea translates into modern day by looking at history and the mistakes made by our predecessors. By looking at post-war Germany, the author demonstrates the guilt that many felt toward the actions made against Jews in the hate crimes during World War II. Though many of these people did not take part in the actions themselves, they took the guilt of those who were responsible and made it their own. Arendt argues that this can only be done in a metaphorical sense for the deed was not their’s for the taking, meaning that one may feel compassion for those who were afflicted by these hate crimes, but cannot take on the role of wrongdoer.
Collective Responsibility: “Two conditions have to be present for collective responsibility: I must be held responsible for something I have not done, and the reason for my responsibility must be my membership in a group (a collective) which no voluntary act of mine can dissolve, that is, a membership which is utterly unlike a business partnership which I can dissolve at will” (149). This idea shows that one cannot escape collective responsibility for everyone is part of a community, even if it is not one’s original community. In this sense, political leaders take responsibility for the previous actions of leaders. Though the actions and decisions were made by people no longer in power, the effects of their reign continue on throughout the ages, creating a snowball effect that must be handled by the current leader.
Socrates strengthens this argument by stating, “’It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong’” (151). Where moral and political considerations intersect is between the world and self. He argues that, “’For it is better for me to be at odds with the whole world than, being one, to be at odds with myself’” (153). This statement puts into question the political and moral considerations of collective responsibility. In an ideal place, there world would be without wrong and suffering would not exist. Socrates plays on that idea by showing the importance of a world without wrong and that by doing wrong, it can cause suffering to not only self but to a larger audience of the world.
Arendt pushes for civic engagement and civic duty to participate in public affairs, “Nonparticipation in the political affairs of the world has always been open to the reproach of irresponsibility, of shirking one’s duties toward the world we share with one another and the community we belong to” (155). She believes that turning a blind eye to one’s civic duty will hurt the system as a whole. By participating, one takes on collective responsibility and contributes to the whole of society. In the case of Hitler’s regime, not participating in the actions was seen as irresponsible and by conforming to those norms was seen as one’s duty, even if it was unwarranted by the participant.
This statement ties back to Socrates when he states, “If I would do what is now demanded of me as the price of participation, either as mere conformism or even as the only chance of eventually successful resistance, I could no longer live with myself; my life would cease to be worthwhile for me” (156). Many would rather suffer in the moment and pay the price of participation than do wrong and live with the consequences.
Thinking and Moral Considerations: Arendt looks to the trial of Eichmann in Jerusalem as a way to further her understanding of thinking in regards to evil. By looking at the philosopher Kant, the understanding of thinking and knowing is discussed, “We owe to Kant the distinction between thinking and knowing, between reason, the urge to think and to understand, and the intellect, which desire and is capable of certain, verifiable knowledge” (163). The author continues by stating that Kant believed that knowledge has its limitations. He separated knowing from thinking and in doing so, made room for thought, allowing himself to “eliminate the obstacle by which reason hinders itself” (164). Arendt ties this idea to the need to identify if understanding right from wrong can be connected to the ability to think. If so, than demanding that any person with the capacity to think must be able to exercise knowing right from wrong, no matter their intellectual level or personality.
She sums up these ideas in connection to the problem of evil in three main points. The first identifies if a connection exists then thinking, as apposed to knowledge, must be attributed to everyone. The second point states that if Kant is correct and thought has a “’natural aversion’ against accepting its own results as ‘solid axioms,’ then we cannot expect any moral propositions or commandments, no final code of conduct from the thinking activity, least of all a new and now allegedly final definition of what if good and what is evil” (167). Lastly, the final point asserts that if it is true that thinking involves invisibles, “it follows that it is out of order because we normally move in a world of appearances in which the most radical experience of disappearance is death” (167).
The author’s ideas of collective responsibility stem from the idea of who is to blame in a negative situation, and once the occurrence has finished, who is to feel guilty for its actions. She argues that those who are not involved surely can relate to the situation through compassion and understanding, but those actions belong to those involved. However, those actions may have repercussions that people for generations may have to encounter. In the case of WWII, many felt the guilt of the actions done during the Holocaust, but the responsibility for those actions belongs to the soldiers and leaders involved. As a collective, people from those communities that were affected must now deal with the after effects of the soldiers and leaders’ actions. They part take in suffering for the action, as Socrates states, “’It is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong’” (151). These ideas continue as she looks closer into the realm of thinking and knowing. Did the soldiers know that their actions were wrong? Or were they simply following orders within their collective arena of responsibility? She delves into Kant’s belief that thought and knowledge can be distinguished and relates these ideas to the presence of evil. Through her main points it can be understood that these they must be applied to every individual, that no final code for truly knowing good from evil can exist if thought averts it naturally, and that thinking is detoured by appearances rather than the use of invisibles.
My Civic Engagement: Arndt’s ideas relate to my volunteer work in the sense that the actions of others effect my responsibilities. As a collective community, we work to enhance the lives of others, but if the actions done by few (interpersonal relationships with parents/ government/ friends) can effect the rest of the community, than we are all responsible in the action. A student came to class last week and told the teacher that his drunk father kicked him and his brother out of the house. In doing so, he could not finish his homework. Because of the action of his father, the student could not participate fully in class, resulting in our tutoring session as a catch-up homework time for the students. Though this is a small example, I felt guilty for the lifestyle that the young boy had to endure on a daily basis. I am in no part associated to his family, and yet I felt the need to apologize. This resembles the collective guilt that Arendt comments on early in the chapter. As a community, we work as a whole and have a shared collective responsibility. Though at times this may work in a backwards way, as seen in Hitler’s time, it can also provide a chance for many to gather behind a likeminded goal and learn to work and think together.
