Decoding the 2024 Elections: The Shifting Dynamics of Modi’s Third Term

June 9, 2024, 9pm IST.

As I write, Narendra Modi has just taken his oath as Prime Minister for the third time. “It’s not about arithmetic but chemistry.” Modi has emphasized this several times during his 2014 and 2019 electoral campaigns. By chemistry, Modi means his connection with the electorate, and by arithmetic, the cold calculations of vote numbers. He claimed that his chemistry with the people defines the electoral arithmetic. In 2024, with nearly 37% national vote share for the BJP, and considering the normal anti-incumbency after ten years, Modi’s chemistry seems intact, but the arithmetic went haywire. The result is a steep 21% reduction in elected seats compared to 2019.

With 32 seats short of the majority mark, BJP supporters are in disbelief, outrage, and dismay. On the other hand, the INDI alliance is euphoric. The Congress, for the third time, will be the largest party in the opposition. They have managed to take quite a bit of wind out of Modi’s sails. The elections of 2029 might present a decent chance for Congress to wrest back power from Modi, at least that’s what it seems from their perspective.

Political and election analysts have already decoded the reasons in hindsight. Many have blamed Hindu voters for voting along caste lines. Some have blamed Modi for focusing on “Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas” (“inclusive” development) instead of “Hindu ka Saath, Hindu ka Vikas” (prioritizing Hindu civilizational matters). Others have pointed to economic distress, including unemployment, inflation, and farmer issues. In Maharashtra, many feel that the split engineered by BJP in Shiv Sena and NCP resulted in negative sentiments. The opposition camp claims that Modi’s arrogance has been crushed.

Now that the dust has settled, hindsight is clearer. Here are the four key reasons why Modi’s invincibility is diminished in 2024:

Fear Overpowers Benefits (‘Bhay’ vs ‘Laabh’)

The beneficiaries of the government’s social programs, referred to as ‘Labharthi’, were considered a new vote block that spans across religion and caste. The government’s response during COVID-19 is a prime example of its outreach to the underprivileged. Initiatives like Jan Dhan accounts, which leads to direct benefit transfer, and UPI have transformed the financial landscape for small entrepreneurs and consumers. The list of government schemes from which the electorate has benefited is extensive.

Caste groups such as SC and ST (Dalit and Adivasi) are the largest blocks of ‘Labharthi’ across states. They voted for Modi in 2019 and in several state elections. However, in 2024, a significant chunk of these beneficiaries voted en masse for non-BJP candidates, be it Shiv Sena, Samajwadi Party, or Trinamool Congress.

Why did this happen? The brilliance of the INDI alliance campaign lies in their ability to spin BJP’s slogan “Abki Baar 400 Paar” as a clear call to amend the constitution, suggesting the scrapping of reservations for SC and ST castes. While legislative amendments are routine, Dr. Ambedkar’s championing of the Constitution is seen as the most important safety net for SC and ST castes. This counter-narrative was effective and the BJP could not convince the voters otherwise.

Take the Nandurbar constituency (ST) in Maharashtra as an example. Dr. Heena Gavit, a two-time MP and a BJP spokesperson, belongs to one of the Scheduled Tribes. Despite being a young, aspirational and educated female, who enjoys Modi’s strong support, she lost to a first-time Congress candidate, Adv. Gowal Padvi, who was reluctant to even contest the election. Dr. Gavit lost by more than 1.5 lakh votes, largely due to fears that the next Modi government would end caste-based reservations.

Party Machinery Failed in Key States

Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra, crucial states for the BJP, turned against Modi. In 2019, the BJP won 85 seats combined in both states. In 2024, this number dropped to 42, a loss of 43 seats. There are rumors of internal sabotage in Uttar Pradesh, with nearly 50% of Yogi Adityanath’s picks not getting tickets from the BJP top brass. The highly proclaimed social engineering by Amit Shah that worked in the last assembly election failed this time.

In Maharashtra, BJP MLAs and disgruntled party workers did not campaign effectively, or at all. The induction of Ajit Pawar into the NDA with significant portfolios in the state government caused widespread dissatisfaction. This move failed to positively impact Maratha caste dynamics, and BJP’s score in Marathwada dropped to zero, including the loss of the prestigious Beed seat of Pankaja Munde.

Modi and Shah succeeded in Madhya Pradesh with Shivraj Singh’s exit from state politics. In Rajasthan, they failed to to do the same with Vasundhara Raje’s. Her (forced) exit from state politics was ungraceful, which led to internal strife. Perhaps, this is cost that the BJP is okay to bear.

In West Bengal, Suvendhu Adhikari, an import from Trinamool Congress, failed to replicate the success of his predecessors Dilip Ghosh and Kailash Vijayvargiya (BTW, where is he?), leading to continued violence and loss of seats. The best personnel import made by BJP thus far is Himanta Biswa Sharma, previously from Congress. Adhikari thus far seems no match. Could an onbnoxious yet effective Vijayvargiya been a better bet?

In last five years, a great deal on micro-planning has happened within the BJP for managing elections. Creating of panna pramukh, booth pramukh, ardh-panna pramukh etc., and their respective hierarchies have paid of in state elections. However, in at least three states, this mechanism yielded insignificant results in 2024. Was it complacency or lack of material benefits for the workers at grassroots, or both?

For a cadre-driven party like the BJP, these failures are significant setbacks.

Demography is Destiny

Muslims voted en bloc against Modi, choosing the next winnable candidate, irrespective of party. Uddhav’s Shiv Sena benefitted significantly from Muslim votes in 2024. Unlike Muslims, Hindu voters did not vote as a unified group but along caste lines, which diluted their electoral impact.

The Dhule constituency in Maharashtra exemplifies this. BJP’s Dr. Bhamre received less than 5,000 votes in Malegaon compared to nearly 200,000 votes for the Congress candidate. Dr. Bhamre was leading otherwise by a handsome margin. Malegaon region has more than 80% Muslim population.

Hindu voters tend to vote based on caste affiliations rather than as a single bloc, a pattern observed across India. The BJP does not project itself as a Hindu party because the electorate does not simply vote that way. A Hindu voter has much more to gain at a personal level by voting on caste lines. Hindus are not in minority, and perhaps they will not act beyond caste-lines until they become a religious minority. The day may not be too far.

“Secular” parties are still able to secure votes by wooing Muslims. That will most likely continue. Islam has a clear agenda every country it grows in. Muslims were convinced that building on Ram Mandir in Ayodhya is a clear sign on impending changes in the polity on country. Their social leadership came up with a simple formula. And, the rest is history.

Failure to Identify the Under-current

Modi, Shah, BJP, Congress, news channels, psephologists, pollsters as well the ‘satta’ (betting) market failed to identity the under-current against Modi. The elections occurred in seven rounds. Not a single soul really identified the silent anger that translated into votes. Modi could be a victim of his own ‘400 paar’. Perhaps he created a blind-spot for himself that the election is pro-incumbency.

The question remains though — how did everybody miss it at such a large scale? There is a 1.5% of shift in votes in favour of the Congress. The BJP gained around 60 lakh voters while the Congress gained around 150 lakhs. However, in terms of seat share the Congress gained 47 seats, which is almost double compared with 2019.

Modi’s gains in Orissa and Telangana are unbelievable, both at state level as well as national. No one predicted that scale correctly either.

The consolidation on caste and religious line against the BJP was tremendous. Otherwise, given the gains in Orissa and Telangana, if BJP had been able to keep its electoral course, it would have crossed 325.

The Bottom Line

Arithmetically, Modi and Shah were not too off the mark in calculating the potential degree of their success. But elections are complex. Most pundits have decoded 2024 elections by reducing it to mere binaries of identity politics and Modi’s ostentatious ways.

Modi seemed dejected on June 4 when he addressed his party workers in Delhi. But the bottom line is that 2024 was still about him — for or against. No one else even remotely mattered as much as he did. Modi is still the proverbial electoral boss. And, in INDI alliance, India still does not have a meaningful opposition.