Next Steps for Denuclearization in North Korea
At the end of February, President Trump once again sat across from North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un — this time in Hanoi, Vietnam. This summit — which would be more accurately described as a photo op — was similar to the first in Singapore last June in that neither meeting culminated in any type of agreement on concrete, verifiable steps towards denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula.
Since then, as reports circulated that Pyongyang will soon launch a missile, the Trump Administration shifted its tactics to demanding that North Korea give up all of its weapons of mass destruction before any other economic or diplomatic steps. Such a demand is a complete non-starter, as evidenced by the testimony of Director of National Intelligence Daniel Coats, FBI Director Christopher Wray, and CIA Director Gina Haspel this past January, when they stated that North Korea would likely not give up those very weapons.
The president nonetheless maintains that Pyongyang will cave. Just last week, he went so far as to completely dismiss the efforts of U.S. Special Representative to North Korea Stephen Biegun to continue negotiations with North Korea, as he has long believed that his “very good relationship” with Kim will be what ultimately brings Kim around to his demands. He also threw the administration into complete chaos last Friday when he tweeted, without issuing any guidance to the relevant officials, that he was withdrawing additional sanctions on North Korea.
All of this serves to demonstrate the fact that President Trump is not the one to effectively lead the negotiations over denuclearization, as he cannot understand the intelligence community’s testimony regarding Pyongyang’s death grip on its weapons, let alone comprehend the sanctions in effect against North Korea or see the issue beyond the lens of his “friendship” with Kim. What the Trump Administration should do instead, therefore, is putt technical experts and experienced diplomats at the forefront of negotiations with Pyongyang and task them with pursuing complete, verifiable denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula through good-faith implementation of small, step-by-step agreements.
SINGAPORE SUMMIT
In June 2018, after canceling the meeting at one point, President Trump met North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un for the first time in Singapore. During the summit, President Trump pledged to end joint U.S.-South Korean military exercises, which he called “very provocative” and “inappropriate.” In return, Kim promised to shut down a missile testing site and support the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Those pledges were about as specific as the so-called agreement between the two got. A joint statement released at the time demonstrated how completely President Trump and Kim failed to determine any concrete steps forward, as they ultimately just vaguely stated their intentions to “cooperate for the development of new U.S.–DPRK relations and for the promotion of peace, prosperity, and security of the Korean Peninsula and of the world.” Pretty, but empty, words.
After all, in the months since that summit, very little progress towards denuclearization was made. In fact, North Korea — while making empty gestures such as the detonation of a test site — reportedly moved ahead with developing its missile program at more than a dozen bases and expanded a likely location for the launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles capable to reach the United States. Negotiations also effectively ground to a halt, considering that North Korea wanted the United States to first make concessions such as an official end to the Korean War or the lifting of sanctions, but the Trump Administration kept shifting its position.
For instance, in October 2018, during meetings with senior officials in South Korea, Biegun said that Pyongyang must take steps toward denuclearization before an end to the Korean War could be negotiated. “The primary requirement for us to get to the end point,” Biegun commented, “is to achieve final, fully, verified denuclearization of North Korea.” By December, North Korea stated that it would not unilaterally denuclearize unless the United States first take certain steps, such as withdrawing troops in South Korea or removing the nuclear umbrella defending South Korea and Japan. The following month saw the U.S. intelligence chiefs, led by DNI Coats, testifying that North Korea was “unlikely to completely give up its nuclear weapons and production capabilities.” With these events overshadowing negotiations, by the end of January 2019, Biegun seemed to reverse the administration’s demand from October when he suggested that the Trump Administration would no longer demand a comprehensive inventory of Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction as the first step in negotiations and that the president was ready to end the Korean War.
The Trump Administration constantly shifting its story when it comes to denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula is nothing new. After all, even the deadline for negotiations is up in the air: In early 2018, Secretary Pompeo said that there will be “no timeline” on negotiations over denuclearization with North Korea, but in September, he declared January 2021, the end of President Trump’s term, as the deadline before walking it back. Nevertheless, despite his vacillating demands, President Trump continued touting a great relationship with Pyongyang and persevered with scheduling a second face-to-face meeting with Kim.
VIETNAM SUMMIT
President Trump’s dreams of a second summit came to fruition in late February in Hanoi, Vietnam. The months between Singapore and Hanoi saw empty goodwill gestures on behalf of North Korea as negotiations struggled forward, often stumbling over the exact definition of denuclearization.
Though it did come to pass, the summit in Hanoi ultimately ended early, with the scheduled signing ceremony being canceled. For its part, the United States — in addition to no longer demanding a comprehensive inventory of Pyongyang’s weapons, as abovementioned — also reportedly offered to declare an end to the Korean War and open liaison offices in each country. However, reports from Vietnam indicated that requirements for establishing a rigorous verification regime in North Korea were falling by the wayside — a fact that, if true, means that the serious diplomacy needed to protect our security interests was missing from these conversations. Ensuring a thorough verification regime is of ultimate importance; after all, the United States would never have accepted such a nuclear deal with Iran (in fact, the president withdrew from that deal falsely claiming that the verification mechanisms were not strong enough) and should not do so with regard to North Korea.
In the end, this summit proved just as much of a photo op as the one in Singapore, and it demonstrated the president’s inability to negotiate on behalf of the United States. For instance, while in Hanoi, President Trump commented on Otto Warmbier, a University of Virginia student who was detained in North Korea for 17 months before returning home and dying shortly afterwards. The president said, “[Kim] tells me that he didn’t know about it, and I will take him at his word. Those prisons are rough. They’re rough places, and bad things happen.” Immediately, both Democratic and Republican leaders in Congress rightly criticized the president. Congressman Adam Schiff (D-CA) said that the “detestable” remarks harken “back to Trump’s duplicitous acceptances of denials from other dictators,” referring to President Trump’s subservience to Russian President Vladimir Putin in Helsinki in July 2018 and blanket acceptance of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s denial of involvement in the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Evidently, President Trump cannot be counted upon to defend and act in the best security interests of the people of the United States — especially when considering how often he forces his administration to change its negotiation tactics.
For, just a few weeks following the summit in Vietnam, in March, Biegun again announced that the United States would require Pyongyang to give up all of its weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear, chemical, and biological) before any other economic or diplomatic steps. “We are not going to do denuclearization incrementally,” Biegun said “The President has been very clear about that.” However, the president has not really been that clear — just remember Biegun’s statement at the end of January about no longer requiring a comprehensive inventory of Pyongyang’s weapons of mass destruction.
A few days following Biegun’s announcement, North Korea threatened to suspend denuclearization talks with the United States entirely, denouncing what it viewed as “the gangster-like stand” of the Trump Administration. In response, President Trump dismissed Biegun’s efforts to keep negotiations alive and made unclear statements about sanctions in place against North Korea. There have been no major developments since, leaving the future of negotiations with Pyongyang, now apparently led by our bombastic president, unclear.
PATH FORWARD
First and foremost, President Trump cannot be the lead on U.S. diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis North Korea considering his loose grasp of the process’ intricacies; plus, it is entirely possible he might resort back to threatening to use his “Nuclear Button” if not given his way. Technical experts and experienced diplomatic professionals should instead be the ones directly engaging in negotiations with Pyongyang, as well as South Korea, in order to have the greatest chance of success on the peninsula.
Second, to achieve complete denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula, the course forward must be founded upon good-faith implementation of small agreements (contrary to National Security Advisor John Bolton’s opinion). In the case of North Korea, the administration could start by reasserting its request for a full accounting of their weapons and pairing that request with one asking for access to facilities and testing sites for those weapons. In exchange, Pyongyang could receive moderate sanctions relief. If both sides follow through on those steps, says Alexandra Bell, the Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation and a Security Fellow with Truman, the United States can continue to hold back on joint military exercises with South Korea, while the North continues to shutter its weapons facilities. Eventually, this process would move towards the actual dismantlement of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons. While these smaller agreements move forward, overarching negotiations about a peace declaration ending the Korean War and the opening of liaison offices should take place.
Ultimately, diplomatic and economic efforts, undertaken by qualified individuals rather than the president, remain the best path towards achieving complete, verifiable denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. As Bell says, “No matter what, we have to have patience and will, coupled with clear messages and adequate pressure. We also need to remember that there is no viable military solution to this challenge. We must invest in a robust and sustained diplomatic effort.”
Shannon Bugos is the Communications and Writing Manager at Truman National Security Project and the editor-in-chief of the Doctrine Blog. Views expressed here are her own.
