How JASTA Will Ultimately Affect the United States
Over fifteen years after the September 11th attacks, the families of the victims involved are finally given an outlet to seek financial compensation for the suffering they endured. The Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (JASTA) became law this past September after Obama’s veto of the bill was overruled by Congress. The law aims to make it easier for 9/11 victims and their families to sue Saudi Arabia in US court for its role in financing the attacks. Jack Goldsmith and Stephen Vladeck (2016) argue in their article, Why Obama Should Veto 9/11 Families Bill, that JASTA “represents both a symbolic affront to Saudi Arabia (and other nations) and a toothless vehicle for any actual recovery against them” (Goldsmith & Vladeck, 2016). The combination of these two claims prove how this law will hurt victims and their family’s ability to sue Saudi Arabia, while simultaneously causing both foreign relations and diplomatic problems.
Voting against such a bill that would allow for victims of 9/11 to seek claims from the Saudi government for their involvement seems to many as un-American and disrespectful to those affected. This would be the case if the bill did what it was advertised to do. Instead, the version of JASTA passed by Congress is very different from the original bill and consequently will do more to harm victims’ ability to seek claims from Saudi Arabia than it will do to help. Steve Vladeck (2016), in his article The Senate Killed JASTA, Then Passed It, explains that there are four major differences between the original JASTA and the one that was passed by Congress, but of these, three will have the greatest affect on limiting victims ability to sue Saudi Arabia. First, by eliminating a provision that would have made it possible for people to sue other nations because of aiding-and-abetting claims, but now people must prove that Saudi Arabia was directly liable for the attacks, something that has always been a problem in 9/11 litigation (Vladeck, 2016). Second, a new provision in the bill “creates a procedure whereby the US government (which section 5(b) allows to intervene in cases brought under JASTA) can seek to stay any case under JASTA indefinitely” (Vladeck, 2016). This means that as long as the Secretary of State claims that the US is in discussion with Saudi Arabia then the case may be put on hold for an indefinite amount of time (Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, 2016). This section of the bill is only important if a court was to decide to stay a case, but this is actually very likely to happen. Vladeck (2016) points out that up until this point, federal judges have “looked for any possible way to avoid reaching the merits of these suits,” and this section now arms justices with a legal way to put these cases on hold indefinitely (Vladeck, 2016). The final feature that will dilute the power of the bill even further is related to victim’s ability to actually collect the claim from Saudi Arabia. “The new bill creates a new exception,” says Vladeck (2016), “which does not have a corresponding waiver of attachment immunity,” in simpler terms this means that even if someone was able to obtain a judgment against a foreign nation, it would be nearly impossible to execute that judgment and collect the claim (Vladeck, 2016). The fact that the revised version of JASTA will make it nearly impossible for victims to secure any sort of repayment from the Saudi government should have been enough for Congress to let Obama’s veto stand, but on top of this the law will further damage the already unstable relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia.
The United States relationship with Saudi Arabia has always been one of highs and lows. In the time leading up to September 11th, these two countries seemed to have an amicable relationship that was beneficial to both. But as David Long (2004) puts it: “Since the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, US-Saudi relations have plummeted from being one of the closest and most durable bilateral relationships between a major oil-producing state and a major oil-consuming state to an all time low” (Long, 2004). The main reason for the failure of this relationship is due to the fact that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers involved in the attack were Saudis, making American citizens and officials believe that the Saudi government must be involved in the attacks. Since then, two separate congressionally-mandated independent investigations have “concluded that the Saudi government had no role in al-Qaida’s plot to attack America on September 11, 2001” (Riedel, 2016). Danica Curavic (2010) explains how this will lead to much larger issues when trying to rebuild the United States’ necessary relationship with Saudi Arabia because “naturally, states will question the sincerity of executive rhetoric…when American courts are entering multi-million dollar judgments against them in their sovereign capacity” (Curavic, 2010). By giving this impression to the Saudi government, it will be far less inclined to use its enormous influence in the Islamic world to benefit the United States and in some cases may instead use it to harm us.
Despite JASTA’s appearance to help the victims of September 11th have their day in court, it is in fact much less than that and in the end will only bring harm to the United States. We have passed a law because of politicians being too concerned with their appearance in the upcoming elections rather than making the seemingly unpopular decision that will in the end be better for us as a country. Bruce Riedel summarizes the problems that will occur by saying: “In the past, the Kingdom has all too often encouraged intolerance and fanaticism in Islam. It has fanned the flames of sectarianism…JASTA will likely bring out the worst in Saudi behavior” (Riedel, 2016). This should be of great concern to both the American people and Congress and act as a warning for future foreign policy and the potential effects that it may have.
References
Curavic, D. (2010). Compensating Victims of Terrorism or Frustrating Cultural Diplomacy The Unintended Consequences of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s Terrorism Provisions.Cornell International Law Journal 43(2), 381–408.
Goldsmith, J., & Vladeck, S. (2016, September 13). Why Obama should veto 9/11 families bill. Retrieved October 30, 2016, from CNN website: http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/13/opinions/obama-9-11-families-bill-goldsmith-vladeck/
Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, S. 2040, 114th Cong. (2016). Retrieved from https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/2040
Long, D. E. (2004). US-Saudi Relations: Evolution, Current Conditions, and Future Prospects. Mediterranean Quarterly 15(3), 24–37. Duke University Press. Retrieved October 31, 2016, from Project MUSE database.
Riedel, B. (2016, October 3). What JASTA will mean for U.S.-Saudi relations. Retrieved October 30, 2016, from Brookings Institute website: https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2016/10/03/what-jasta-will-mean-for-u-s-saudi-relations/
Vladeck, S. (2016, May 18). The Senate killed JASTA, then passed it. Retrieved October 30, 2016, from Just Security website: https://www.justsecurity.org/31156/senate-killed-jasta-passed-it/
