The Cultural Structure of American Security — and the Economic Result
Many people wonder why the attacks of September 11th, 2001, were not prevented. This paper will attempt to take a look at the culture of American security before 9/11, the FBI, and the role this perspective fills in grasping a better understanding of why September 11th was not prevented. This paper will also depict one of the factors that was influenced and affected by these attacks: The American Economy.
In June of 2002, the director of the F.B.I. Robert S. Meuller III told the American people that the F.B.I. “missed many warning signals on terrorism” (Johnston, 2002) in regards to 9/11, and previous terrorist attacks. Which leads to one of the main questions: Did the culture/structure of American security and the F.B.I. help lead to the September 11th, 2001, attacks? In a New York Times article written in 2002 by David Johnston, a former economics/law professor at the stated that “despite efforts to strengthen its counterterrorism programs over the last decades, and despite hefty increases in its budget, American security and the F.B.I. never developed a nimble enough structure, analytic capability or sense of mission to foil terrorist plots before they were carried out (Johnston, 2002). Simply put, American security was not ready for these attacks, even though they thought otherwise. There was an increase in funds towards counterterrorism, but no effective strategy to end it. According to Johnston (2002), “current and former F.B.I agents have long believed that one of the bureau’s great weaknesses is its failure to properly analyze the immense amount of information that it collects, and to share it among its field offices.” This lack of information being disseminated to F.B.I. agents does nothing but hinder their ability to advance counterterrorism efforts. This can be linked back to the cultural alignment of the F.B.I. over many years, implemented by J. Edgar Hoover, the first ever director of the F.B.I. Many believe Mr. Hoover, and those who followed him, ran the F.B.I in a way that was better suited to catch criminals after the fact, not to prevent plotted terrorist attacks. Dale Watson, the chief of the F.B.I.’s counterterrorism unit stated:
‘’While the F.B.I. has traditionally relied on an approach that focused generally on the identification, penetration and neutralization of terrorist organizations, the bureau has not developed a ‘grand strategy’ in which resources and programs are systematically directed toward progressively reducing and neutralizing and ultimately eliminating the terrorist threat to U.S. interests.’’ (Johnston, 2002).
Suggesting, that the F.B.I. was poorly structured and lacked the proper communication skills to instill a clear “mission”. A former F.B.I. agent anonymously reiterated this when he stated; “The F.B.I is the greatest in the world at investigating a crime after it happened, but it is not equipped to prevent crimes, it wasn’t in the 90’s, it wasn’t on 9/11.” (Johnston, D. 2002). One can infer after all of this information that the structure and culture of the F.B.I. was part of the reason the attacks of September 11th, 2001, were not prevented. There was a strict hierarchy, and the lack of communication disseminated to the subordinates in the F.B.I. overlooked many warning signals pertaining to the attacks of September 11th, 2001.
Due to the fact that these attacks were not necessary preventable, it is imperative to know the driving factors behind these attacks. One of the main driving factors was the American Economy. The United States was seen as the main financial supporter of Islam, and in a sense exemplified everything that a terrorist group loathed. According to an article written by Mark Schug, an Economics professor at the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee, “The terrorists who planned the attacks of September 11, 2001, understood that New York City is the financial center of the United States, the home of the dominant stock exchanges and bond markets. Many national and international corporations maintain their headquarters there, making the city the heart of the foreign exchange market and a vital link in international trade relations.” (Schug, 2004) Thus, laying out how impactful it would be for terrorists to attack this iconic city, because at its heart the World Trade Center was the world wide hub for international relations. The impacts of the attacks were felt in a plethora of ways. According to an article written by David Yerger, an associate professor of economics at the University of Indiana, “In the aftermath of the attacks, sectors such as airlines, property insurance, tourism, and manufacturing faced significant business disruptions in numerous ways, from decrease in revenues to an increase in security.” (Yerger, D. 2011)
In 2004, five financial buildings were said to be targets for future terrorist attacks. According to Don Van Natta Jr, a writer for the New York Times. “The buildings were barricaded behind fences, and flanked by armed police officers. The extra security reflected both the new threats and growing reality that the country’s financial institutions were becoming increasingly attractive targets for terrorist attacks.” (Van Natta, D. 2004) According to Adam Z. Rose, professor at the University of Southern California “the economic consequences of these attacks was $109 billion in loses to U.S. GDP. (Rose, A. 2009) In order to attempt to get a full grasp of the impacts 9/11 has had on the world, it is imperative to look at the impacts it had on the American Economy.
References
Johnston, D. J. (2002, June 2). Wary of Risk, Slow to Adapt, F.B.I. Stumbles in Terror War. The New York Times.
Rose, A. Z. (2009). The Economic Impacts of the September 11 Terrorist Attacks: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis. Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy, 15(2). doi:10.2202/1554–8597.1161
Natta, D. V., Jr. (2004, August 2). Al Qaeda Seeks to Disrupt U.S. Economy, Experts Warn. The New York Times.
Yerger, D. B. (2011, September 1). The Economic Costs of 9/11 on the U.S. Phi Kappa Phi Forum., 91(3), 12–13.
