Case study: Digital identity, cornerstone of a Digital Government
This article was written by Uma Kalkar.
At the start of 2020, over 4.5 billion people — 60% of the global population — were online. Recognizing the value of technology-based methods for service delivery, private corporations utilized digital strategies to provide customers with better services. Yet, many governments lag in adapting their functionalities to leverage the agility and efficiency of the virtual world. E-government, or the practice of digitizing analog public services, is vastly different from digital government, which reshapes policies and programs to build a digitalized society. When examining successful pivots to digital government, such as Estonia and India, a fundamental strategy appears: the establishment of a universal digital identity.
The Purpose of a Digital Identity
A digital identity creates a repository of citizen information that bolsters digital infrastructure. First, using “government as a platform (GAAP)” methodology, it registers people within public sector systems. Second, it reduces the bureaucratic frustration caused by public services by following the “once-only” principle. Since citizen data is attached to IDs, they do not need to re-enter identifying information across agencies to access services. In short, digital IDs ‘online’ provide a wide array of services, from driver’s license registration, passport renewal, and other public services to private banking and authenticated e-signatures to revitalize government for the 21st century.
The Estonian Digital ID Model
Estonia has long been heralded as a trailblazer of digital government. In response to the economic crises of the 1990s, Estonia, a tiny nation unbridled from legacy IT systems, implemented interoperable digital infrastructures across its government. To access online public services, all 1.3 million Estonian citizens receive a digital identity at birth that includes a private key stored on a physical “smart-chip-based ID card.”
Digital government has allowed us to be very lean, contributing greatly to fiscal prudence, which Estonia takes pride in and is known for. … We also see the effectiveness and efficiency gains in every policy sector.
— — Siim Sikkut, “Building a Digital Government the e-Estonian Way”, 159.
By streamlining government services, Estonia saves 2% of its total GDP, cuts out the annual workload of 1400 people, and shaves off 800 working hours. Additionally, the digital ID reduces the potential for fraud, and allows physicians to quickly identify patient medical histories. Moreover, it gives Estonians the freedom to be global citizens — through their digital IDs, Estonians can securely file taxes and vote online from anywhere in the world. Almost three decades into their digital government project, 99% of Estonian government services are online, save for buying a house and getting married or divorced.
The Indian Aadhaar Card Case
In 2010 India launched Aadhaar, a “foundational identity system.” Prior to Aadhaar, citizens required numerous ID documents — ration cards for food, PAN cards for taxes, driver’s licenses, electoral ID cards, etc. — to access different government functionalities. This disjointed system impeded social services and benefits access, especially among lower-income citizens and migrants, and was rife with corruption. To transition towards GAAP and reach all margins of society, the Indian government provided 1.2 billion people (90% of the population) with Aadhaar’s unique 12-digit number (UID) to sync with each individual’s “demographic” and “biometric” information.
How did India reach and register over 1 billion people? First, they drew on the brain trust of tech policy makers and digital government experts to create a “sophisticated back-end infrastructure that ensured data integrity” to weed out false claims. Second, Aadhaar focused on identity, removing itself from the tense political conversation of Indian nationality. Moreover, the amount of citizen data gathered was capped at fingerprints and iris scans so as to be minimally invasive.
“A lot of government agencies thought Aadhaar should collect more information because that could make it more useful. … Aadhaar means foundation. At its core, it’s a foundation for your economic and social life, but no more.”
— — K. Sudhir, “What Happens When a Billion Identities Are Digitized?”
Digital Identity Challenges
While the Aadhar system exercised restraint with regard to data collection, issues over privacy invasion and nefarious data use through digital ID cards concern cybersecurity experts and watchdog organizations. A strong “IT backbone” is imperative to fend off cyberattacks and data breaches. In 2017, a security flaw in e-Estonia’s framework inconvenienced 800,000 citizens and reinforced the need to decentralize information and install safeguards. Additionally, Estonia allows its citizens to “act as “Big Brother” over government” by providing full transparency on who, when, and why someone accessed their information and offering swift recourse for misuse.
While Estonia implemented “privacy by design principles” across partner agencies, the Aadhaar system only incorporated these measures on the back-end to prevent hacking. As a result, journalists managed to bribe government agencies to access Aadhaar databases, violating citizen trust in the system. While the Aadhaar system did not directly link to other personal accounts, many feared it could be used as a starting point for “360-degree profiling”; indeed, the UID was easily used to trace one’s “previously private economy activity.”
China, a non-democratic country, envisages a digital identity tied to a “social credit” system, threatening the creation of a social ranking system à la the dystopian sci-fi series Black Mirror. Weighing the digital ID system against the propensity for Orwellian surveillance, K. Sudhir, Director of the Yale School of Management’s China India Insights Program, states that “[i]n democracies, certain kinds of data are better off not being stored.”
“A poorly designed digital identity system is a tool for mass surveillance. If you want to consider the worst possible scenario, it’s a tool for genocide.”
— — Dakota Gruener, “One Country’s Uber-Convenient, Incredibly Invasive Digital ID System”
Despite its benefits, the Aadhaar system “has the potential” to violate the fundamental right to privacy and thus requires government regulation to safeguard democratic rights. Recently, the Indian government introduced a “Data Protection Bill” outlining allowed use cases of Aadhaar information. However, the legislation includes a loophole that allows access to data “strictly necessary” for service delivery.
Conclusion: Could Digital IDs be the Secret to Digital Government?
Digital government strategists cite national IDs as a key catalyst for ubiquitous, straightforward, and user-centered public services. As seen in Estonia, digital IDs help close the gaps between citizens and government to create a platform that engages with the larger digital ecosystem and reduces resource consumption. However, a universal digital identity is a powerful tool — and with great power comes great responsibility. India’s ambitious Aadhaar card project encountered fraudulent card duplication, hacking, and identity theft that weakened its national connectivity goal. Thus, to update democracies, open government, transparent decision-making, and personal privacy laws must accompany digital identity initiatives to keep governments accountable to their citizens.
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