Human rights, freedom of the press, independence of judges: the illiberal democracy of Orbán’s Hungary in the heart of Europe
di Kata Karath
Hungary’s ruling Fidesz party quit on March 18 the European Parliament’s largest centre-right political bloc, the European People’s Party (EPP), two years after it was suspended for policies labeled by conservatives as authoritarian. Fidesz’s departure was inevitable as the EPP was moving towards excluding it from the group following a long conflict over the Hungarian government’s perceived backsliding on the rule of law and human rights. “In reality, Fidesz didn’t want to wait for a humiliating expulsion,” says Dániel Hegedűs, political scientist and fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, adding that when Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán withdrew the Fidesz delegation from the EPP group on March 3, it also breached the faction’s statutes. This meant the EPP was free to issue a statement on triggering the exclusion of Fidesz on the same day, an endgame Orbán didn’t want to see playing out. “Presumably, negotiations with [the Italian] League party and the Polish ruling Law and Justice party have reached a certain point that Viktor Orbán thought the time has come for this decision” he says.
Orbán has long vowed to build a new political group for parties more aligned with his far-right vision. But it’s very unlikely, Hegedűs says, that Hungary’s divorce from EPP will trigger a domino effect among other members like Slovenia or Croatia, prompting them to follow Fidesz and form a new nationalist bloc together. Hungary’s ruling party is now expected to join the eurosceptic European Conservatives and Reformists group (ECR), where one of Orbán’s closest allies the Polish government party is the strongest member with 24 MEPs. Another option for Fidesz would be to join Matteo Salvini with his League party in the far-right Identity and Democracy Group (ID) — a parliamentary grouping with even more fringe parties.
Whichever direction Fidesz will take, its departure from the EPP will have little to no implications both in the European Parliament and Hungary’s domestic affairs, at least not in the short term. The EPP will not remain without a representative from the Hungarian ruling parties as KDNP (a party that officially forms a coalition with Fidesz in Hungary but has very little power in reality) MEP György Hölvényi will remain in the group. While Fidesz is no longer shielded by the EPP, giving the European Commission more room to deal with Hungary’s democratic backsliding, Prime Minister Orbán won’t be slammed with sanctions or other dramatic conflict situations in the near future. Hegedűs thinks this is because Orbán’s main influence has always been his veto powers of EU affairs which is not something Hungary will lose after leaving the EPP. Moreover, Orbán and his “illiberal democracy” in Hungary could have evolved, virtually unopposed, for over a decade now because EU institutions were neither able nor willing to address the Hungarian government’s systematic crackdown on democratic values like human rights, press freedom, or judicial independence in a proper way.
Tensions between Fidesz and the EPP first escalated in 2019, when Orbán’s party turned its anti-EU rhetoric against senior EPP members. Fidesz campaigned with posters that demonized EPP member Jean-Claude Juncker, then head of the European Commission, alongside the Hungarian-born billionaire philanthropist George Soros, who is still a favorite target of the Hungarian government’s propaganda machine. Featured on posters and billboards nationwide, the image was captioned “you too have a right to know what Brussels is preparing” and accused Juncker of promoting a pro-immigration plan backed by Soros.
Hungary’s poster war was first launched in 2015 at the height of the migrant crisis, with the initial giant billboards featuring messages in Hungarian like “If you come to Hungary, you cannot take the jobs of Hungarians!”, or “If you come to Hungary you have to respect our culture!”. Later, the focus shifted towards George Soros, the Hungarian opposition, and the European Union as the influx of refugees and asylum seekers trying to enter Hungary dropped significantly due to the barbed-wire fence the government had elected along the country’s southern borders. According to Márton Magócsi, a Hungarian photojournalist, the intention behind these poster campaigns is ‘to provoke fear, anger and moral outrage’. “Migrants need to be threatening, male, wild and criminal-looking. They should have a victim, preferably blonde, female and white. Opposition politicians have to look stupid, incompetent and should preferably be depicted alongside a convict or of course George Soros. Opposition supporters should look threatening, foreign, gay — but at the very least, clueless.” he says in an interview for the European Journalism Observatory. Even though the number of asylum seekers has decreased dramatically over the last few years, the Hungarian government and media outlets loyal to the government consistently follow up and reinforce Orbán’s anti-immigrant rhetoric. Aside from posters, ad campaigns, news programs and other shows across state and private outlets, including TV and radio stations and even social media channels, always carry an underlying message that ‘Brussels bureaucrats’ are pro-immigration. While Prime Minister Viktor Orbán is always painted as the only leader strong enough to protect “Christian” Europe from outsiders. Orbán also regularly incorporates this rhetoric in his speeches as well. “Western Europe had given up on … a Christian Europe, and instead experiments with a godless cosmos, rainbow families, migration and open societies,” he said at the inauguration of a monument commemorating the Treaty of Trianon in August 2020.
These unapologetic campaigns against the EU, Soros, and immigration are largely possible because most media outlets are controlled by the government or government-friendly businessmen. Meanwhile, independent press is eliminated one by one, mostly through a buyout of publishing company shares by a government-friendly businessman, or as in the case of the latest victim, Klubrádió (Hungary’s leading independent radio station), the Fidesz-appointed Media Council decided not to renew its license, which expired on 14 February. A court upheld the decision, even though the reasons cited by the Media Council (i.e. that it had not been informed of the Klubrádió’s music programming or airtime quotas) have been described by Reporters Without Borders as “trivial”. The Media Council did not waste time, and soon after its decision about rejecting the renewal Klubrádió’s license, it announced a tender for its radio frequency in November 2020. In an interview for Radio Free Europe, András Arató, president of Klubrádió, said that applications for this type of media/broadcast tenders are overly complicated. Just the tender has about 80 pages of description and conditions, while the applicants need to prepare about 300–500 pages-long proposals with highly detailed spreadsheets, financial plans, statements and certificates. And since the Media Council doesn’t accept electronic authentications, every statement must be notarized individually. “These tender conditions are difficult to predict and fulfill. You can be excluded for a slip in a spreadsheet or an incorrect rounding of a number. And there is no opportunity for correction or filing of missing documents” says Arató, adding that he believes the procedure is so complicated so it would be “legally fine” if someone is excluded for other than professional reasons. Klubrádió submitted its application for the tender, but the Media Council swiftly disqualified its proposal based on technicalities even though the station was the only applicant. The station plans to appeal the decision, but Arató told local media that if necessary they will take the case to the European Union’s Court of Justice.
Another textbook example of Orbán’s crackdown on press freedom is the firing of Szabolcs Dull, the editor-in-chief of Index.hu, Hungary’s top independent news site. Dull was dismissed in July 2020 after warning that the outlet’s independence was at risk because Miklós Vaszily, a businessman with close ties to the prime minister, bought a 50% stake in its parent company in March 2020. Vaszily was the same man who earlier oversaw a dramatic pro-government shift at Hungary’s then-biggest news outlet Origó. More than 80 journalists at Index.hu resigned in protest over Dull’s firing. The group has since founded a new news site, called Telex, thanks to a successful crowdfunding campaign. “Traditional revenue sources like advertising cannot safely and reliably sustain a media company in a balanced way, largely because the Hungarian state itself is the biggest advertiser and chooses which outlets it will spend advertising money on and where it won’t,” Veronika Munk, Telex’s editor-in-chief told VOA. She explained that many Hungarian businesses avoid placing advertisements with outlets that are critical of the government out of fear of reprisals.
The other end of the spectrum is the widespread control over pro-government outlets, which Reporters Without Borders described as “unprecedented in the European Union.” In 2018, nearly 500 of Hungary’s pro-government outlets were put under the control of the Central European Press and Media Foundation (KESMA), a media conglomerate headed by Orbán loyalists. The 476 outlets account for around 40% of all media revenues in Hungary, according to Mérték Media Monitor.
The work of independent journalists has also become increasingly harder, with access to information is limited or flatly denied. They are often excluded from official events, banned from freely asking politicians in the Parliament, and usually government politicians do not give interviews to government-critical media outlets. Independent journalists are also often denied access to publicly held information and actively hindered from communicating with public officials. This treatment has hit a low point at the beginning of the Covid-19 pandemic in Hungary when the government passed a “coronavirus” law in March 2020, allowing Prime Minister Viktor Orbán to rule by decree during the state of emergency. The legislation also included a provision that allowed prison terms of up to five years for those who spread fake news, or distribute information that “inhibits the successful defense” against the pandemic. While the measures were lifted in June 2020, the government will be able to implement the extended false news laws under future states of emergency.
The Orbán government’s crackdowns on press freedom since 2010 have also been noticed by the US government, which in 2019 approved the re-opening of Radio Free Europe’s Hungarian services after a 27-year absence. And most recently, Germany’s international broadcaster Deutsche Welle has also resumed publishing material in Hungarian for the first time in decades, driven by concerns at declining media plurality and press freedom.
Hungary has dropped 33 places in Reporters without Borders’s Press Freedom ranking since 2013. Over the years, media advocacy groups, including the European Federation of Journalists, have repeatedly complained about the situation to the European Commission, urging it to take meaningful action against Hungary, especially since EU-funds are constantly used to finance pro-government media and spread anti-EU messages.
Apart from dismantling the free press, three other factors have proved to be crucial building blocks for Hungary’s ‘illiberal democracy. The first of these was the electoral system, with its strong majoritarian element dating to the time of the postcommunist transition. Being able to have a two-thirds majority in the Parliament, Fidesz is essentially free to pass any legislation it pleases. The second element is the disheartening memory of the political crisis that struck the country between 2006 and 2010. In May 2006, Socialist prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány told a party gathering that his government had accomplished nothing despite four years in power, and had been lying to voters about it. This triggered such a widespread public outrage that still to this day, Fidesz uses it as a reoccurring theme in its propaganda campaign to cement its voters’ support. Then in 2008 came the world economic crisis, triggering IMF-imposed austerity measures. Orbán and Fidesz capitalized on the discontent, promising more justice, efficiency, and democracy while vowing to remove ex-communist elites from public institutions.
The last element is that Orbán is a very charismatic leader with a legion of excellent communication experts. Fidesz has led a well-funded campaign to change the hearts and minds of Hungarians. Since 2015, the government has spent more than 100 million euros to convince voters of various conspiracy theories, mostly involving George Soros and the EU, both accused of wanting to bring millions of immigrants to Europe.
Meanwhile, the opposition remains too much a Budapest phenomenon, without fractions in the countryside that would be strong enough to challenge the core of Fidesz voters, middle-class workers. Many citizens, especially in smaller towns, also fear that if they voted for the opposition this might become known and cost them their jobs and subsidies.
Despite all this EU-hating facade, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán needs the European Union because of the immense funds it provides and as the main destination of Hungarian export.
Hungary tops the list of countries where irregularities with EU funds have been uncovered.
According to Direkt 36, a Hungarian investigative journalism collective, the share of EU-funded projects made up 94% of the total value of public procurement contracts signed by Elios, Orbán’s son-in-law’s company between 2010 and 2014. The company was also reported by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) for corruption. Meanwhile, Orbán’s childhood friend, Lőrinc Mészáros, who is Hungary’s richest person, benefits even more from EU funds. They accounted for 99% of the total public procurement contract value his company won. A recent study by The Corruption Research Center Budapest also showed that in the first four months of 2020, corruption in Hungary reached the highest level since 2005, with the share of contracts without competition reaching 41%.
As a result of such a high level of misuse of funds, OLAF recommended the European Commission recover 3.93% of payments made to Hungary under the EU’S structural and independent funds and agriculture funds. This was over ten times more than the bloc’s average (0.36%).
Hungary’s next election is in 2022, and Orbán is likely to press on the EU smear campaign even more from now that Fidesz left the EPP. But it’s highly unlikely that the EU will impose any sanctions on Hungary before the vote. The EU is currently investigating Hungary’s suspected rule-of-law violations under its Article 7 procedure, which can lead to the suspension of a member state’s voting right. But the Covid-19 pandemic has slowed down much of the procedures, especially that any major decision can only be made during in-person voting (which Poland would most likely veto anyway). Hungary and Poland have also filed a complaint with the EU’s supreme court over this mechanism. This means that the implementation of the new funding rule could be delayed up to two years, ensuring for Orbán that Hungary won’t be slammed with any significant sanctions ahead of the crucial 2022 elections. “The European Union can make it harder for the Hungarian government to abuse EU funds in the same way as before, but I don’t think there is much chance that it can fundamentally undermine the regime’s support” concludes Hegedűs, while also highlighting that the Hungarian opposition promised to be united for the first time in the 2022 parliamentary elections.
The EU’s patience also seems to run out. On March 25, the European Parliament voted to take the European Commission to court unless it quickly applies the new funding rules that make access to billions of EU funds conditional on respecting the rule of law. passed by a wide majority of legislators, the resolution gave the Commission until June 1 to write its guidelines or face a lawsuit in the EU’s top court.
