Chornobyl-3
Chornobyl reminded about itself for the third time on February 24, 2022 after the fully-fledged invasion of the russian troops on the territory of Ukraine. For the first time the whole world learned about the small town of Chornobyl as a result of the large-scale accident at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (ChNPP) on April 26, 1986. Then the whole world became aware of the former secret facility Chornobyl-2, which is a Soviet over-the-horizon radar station for early detection of intercontinental ballistic missile launches.
Content
Prelude
Information chain
∘ Gamma radiation sensor (1)
∘ Electronic circuits of the detector (2)
∘ Receiving antenna of the central station (3)
∘ Central server and data QA (4, 5)
∘ Website (6)
Incident that did not happen
∘ Some radiological evaluations
∘ Hypothesis of air transfer
Result
References
Ukrainian version
Prelude
For me this story started on July 5, 2023, when I received a somewhat unexpected letter that dragged me long back to my professional past. In the letter, in particular, a journalist from the United States, Kim Zetter, informed me about her work on an article for WIRED magazine about the intriguing spikes of radiation that occurred in the Chornobyl Exclusion Zone (ChEZ) on February 24–25, 2022, immediately after the russian fully-fledged invasion of Ukraine.
In her letter, Kim referred to an article [1] by a group of scientists from the United Kingdom, published on June 21, 2023. That article refers to radiation spikes in the ChEZ immediately after its occupation by russian troops after February 24, 2022. The authors prove that the recorded spikes were not caused by damage to the soil by military vehicles, or by the rise of radioactive dust or radioactive airborne leakage from radioactive waste storage facilities. According to them, the reason was the use of electronic means: radio electronic warfare (EW), radar stations (radar) or other powerful radio transmitters.
Among other things, British authors refer to:
- my publication [2]. This is a presentation at the GLOBAL international conference held in Japan in 2011;
- open data of the radiation control system at the ChEZ (SSE “Ecocenter”, former SSSIE “Chornobyl Radioecological Center”), which were published by the Ukrainian volunteer project SaveEcoBot [3].
In the end, we managed to talk with Kim twice about issues related to the topic of her planned article. I explained to Kim that despite my experience of working in Chornobyl in 2005–2011 as a deputy and later a director of the Chornobyl Radioecological Center, the facts of the events in Chornobyl after February 24, 2022 were not available to me. Plainly speaking, from the first day of the large-scale aggression of the russian federation against Ukraine, together with my son Ghlib, we joined the ranks of the Territorial Defense Forces of Ukraine (Fig. 2) and my comrades and I, like all Ukrainians, had completely different priorities at that time.
In light of these circumstances, Kim provided me with access to the background material for the article, including a report by cyber security expert Ruben Santamarta [5]. A few days later, Kim’s article was published [6][7].
Information chain
The volume of information in the obtained sources [1][5][6][7], taking into account the additional references in these sources, turned out to be simply huge. Therefore, I rejected the idea of describing this entire array of information and related hypotheses. As a specialist who was directly involved in the creation of a new automated system for radiation monitoring (ASRM) of the ChEZ [8], the data of which are actually formed the basis of the whole intrigue, I found it more convenient to build the chain of formation of information about the radiation situation of the ChEZ myself, in order to later identify its vulnerabilities .
So, I presented the chain of information formation in Fig. 3. It includes six points of transformation of information, which could be, at the same time, points of possible impact and potential distortion of this information. These six points can be immediately divided into three groups according to the nature of the impact: 1) impact directly from gamma radiation, 2) impact from EM radiation and 3) impact on elements of the IT infrastructure:
The effect of radiation:
1. Gamma radiation detector
The influence of EM waves:
2. The electronic circuits of the detector
3. The receiving antenna of the central station
Impact on IT infrastructure elements:
4. Central server
5. Data quality assurance and publishing
6. Website
Gamma radiation sensor (1)
From the very beginning, when the story about spikes began to gain publicity in the media space, the explanations of officials and experts were dominated by the opinion about the impact of gamma radiation on the ASRM detectors and related assumptions about the reasons that could lead to such additional exposure.
The main component of ASRM is the GammaTracer detector (Fig. 4). This detector contains a gamma radiation sensor that converts the tiny energy scattered by gamma quanta in the Geiger-Muller chamber into a weak electrical signal.
It should be noted right away that military means of electronic warfare (EW) and other powerful sources of electromagnetic (EM) radiation in the radio frequency (RF) range do not in any way affect the gamma radiation sensor itself . This is due to the fundamental property of the sensor to register only ionizing radiation, that is capable of “breaking” (ionizing) neutral atoms into pairs: an ion and a free electron. In other words, EM radiation in the RF range cannot in any way ionize the atoms of the medium in which it propagates.
The gamma radiation sensor could potentially be directly affected by all the hypothetical events that followed:
- disturbance of the soil surface as a result of the maneuvers of the russian troops or
- strong dust resuspension of radioactively contaminated soil as a result of the same maneuvers or
- emission of radioactivity and its atmospheric transfer or
- by deliberately placing an artificial source of gamma radiation close to the detector.
Conclusion : Based on the spatio-temporal pattern of the registered radiation spikes by the ASRM sensors, combined with radiological considerations (all of which are discussed in more detail below in the section “Incident that did not happen”), all four scenarios listed here can be classified as implausible.
Electronic circuits of the detector (2)
Part of the equipment of the detector, in addition to the radiation sensor, is a pre-amplifier of the electric signal, as well as an electronic circuits that digitizes, processes, stores and transmits already digitized information via a radio channel to the receiving antenna of the central station located in the city of Chornobyl (point 2 in Fig. 3 ).
In contrast to the gamma radiation sensor itself, this link of the information chain (i.e. electronic circuits) is practically insensitive to gamma radiation (in a wide range of the gamma radiation dose rate), but can potentially be sensitive to EM exposure. Although it is worth noting here that the design of the detector reliably shields all electronics with a metal case (Fig. 3), which is an ideal barrier for EM waves. On the other hand, there are serious doubts that this equipment was intended and passed certification tests for operation in conditions of highly intensive EM fields from powerful military electronic devices.
Conclusion: Again, based on the spatio-temporal pattern of the detected radiation spikes by ASRM sensors, even assuming the possibility of a separate military radio transmitter impacting a separate detector nearby, forcing the latter to generate false signals, simulation by EW and radar devices (would it be intentional or unintentional) of the impact on the entire set of ASRM detectors sparsely located at distances of tens of kilometers from each other, does not seem realistic. Therefore, this scenario is also classified as implausible.
Receiving antenna of the central station (3)
The single receiving antenna of the central ASRM station, located on a tower as high as a 20-story building in the center of Chornobyl (Fig. 5) could be an ideal point for data distortion.
But despite the ideality of the antenna as a point of information distortion, in practice everything turns out to be the opposite. In fact, it is easier to suppress the reception of the antenna (for this, electronic devices are actually created) than to generate the necessary false signals that will simulate the readings of multiple individual detectors. Theoretically, this is possible, but for this one needs to know the method of packaging information in a signal, the protocol of information exchange and specially develop, and then also apply such a device.
Conclusion : Without going into further speculation on the topic of who could do it and for what purpose, we classify this scenario as hypothetical or extremely unlikely.
Central server and data QA (4, 5)
Possible points 4 and 5 (Fig. 3) of impact on final information are united by their direct relationship to the IT infrastructure of ASRM. Therefore, it makes sense to consider them together.
- The central server of the ASRM (point 4), where all the primary information from the detectors was actually collected. Was it possible to make changes to the database? Having full access — theoretically, yes.
- Data quality assurance (point 5). Usually, servers of information systems for automated information collection are not connected to any external Internet services. This is a cyber security issue. In the case of ASRM, a separate radio channel and its own information exchange protocol were used to collect information from the detector network. That is, no Internet at the entrance.
Further on, such information systems never expose primary data directly to the Web. Data are always validated and verified, undergo additional processing and preparation for possible open publication. Such results are stored in separate database tables or even in a separate database. This is a normal practice of delivering quality information to the consumer. Added to this is the natural fear of the owners of socially sensitive information to avoid the appearance of unwanted information leaks in the open media space. In the case of ASRM, the owner of the information has always been the Ukrainian state. And the information concerns the ChEZ. So you understand that under such a combination of circumstances, increased control of the outgoing information flow was naturally expected.
How it was actually organized is not known for sure. But there is no doubt that such information flow control, in one form or another, has always existed.
At this point, making changes to the data can be technically easier than on a central server. Accordingly, the circle of persons theoretically able to do this could be wider.
But under any of the two hypothetical scenarios, the circle of people who would be able to do this without destroying the process itself is extremely limited. Considering the highly stressful situation on February 24, when people were looking for ways and means of evacuation to the south to Kyiv, it is simple to imagine that the server equipment, like many other properties, was simply abandoned. Let’s not forget, this is not about military personnel on a combat mission, but about civilians who feel left to fend for themselves without the support of their own armed forces.
Who could the hypothetical unknown hacker be, if there was one? Did he work for the Ukrainian special services, or did he act on the call of conscience, or, on the contrary, was he an agent of the enemy, or did he arrive as part of the occupation contingent? Here we risk plunging into the deep underworld of conspiracy theories without any noteworthy evidence.
By the way, in Kim Zetter’s article, as a possible explanation for the spikes of ASRM radiation, there is a reference to the interview of Anton Kutenko, a Ukrainian employee of the ChNPP, to the Economist magazine [9], where he talks about the fact that “during the occupation of the station, the ChNPP employees “exaggerated radiation threat” to russian troops, identifying “problem areas” they should avoid — all this was part of a “brazen plan” to influence the movement of russian troops.” However, there are no hints about radiation spikes in the Economist article. It is practically impossible that the act of Anton and his comrades was connected with the spikes recorded by ASRM. The reasoning is very simple: Anton is an employee of the ChNPP and a resident of Slavutych (70 km northeast of the ChNPP, on the left bank of the Dnipro River). In opposite, Employees of ASRM were traditionally shift personnel from Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine, who during their watch lived in the city of Chornobyl (15 km south-east of the Chornobyl NPP on the right bank of the Dnipro River). For example, Mykola Bespaly, technical director of ASRM quoted in Kim Zetter’s article, as far as I remember, always lived in Nikopol, central Ukraine (more than 600 km south of Chornobyl). That is, these two groups of people practically did not intersect in life. In addition, imagine that right on the day of the invasion, a group of people from different locations of the ChEZ, instead of taking care of the safety of themselves and their families, not only conceived, but also implemented their cunning plan to mislead the enemy by distorting information, which no one paid attention to in those two first days. Answer for yourself whether you believe it. Unbelievable. Quoted in Kim Zetter’s article, ASRM technical director Mykola Bespaliy, as far as I remember, always lived in Nikopol, central Ukraine (more than 600 km south of Chornobyl). That is, these two groups of people practically did not intersect in life. In addition, imagine that right on the day of the invasion, a group of people from different locations of the ChEZ, instead of taking care of the safety of themselves and their families, not only conceived, but also implemented their cunning plan to mislead the enemy by distorting information, which no one paid attention to in those two first days. Answer for yourself whether you believe it. Unplausible.
Could russian specialists do this? Theoretically, yes. Judging from the video frame (Fig. 1), it can be seen that russian troops were already on the outskirts of Chornobyl at 15:49 on February 24, 2022. The first spike appeared after 20:00 of the same day. But for such dexterity, it should be a carefully prepared operation in advance — impromptu is excluded here.
Conclusion : Points 4 and 5 (central server and system of quality control and data publication) could be the most likely points of possible distortion of ASRM information. I could not see any noteworthy testimony of who, how, from which side, for what purpose could have done it.
In addition, the probability of system failure (points 4 and 5) should not be discounted — on February 24 and 25 ASRM could very likely work without supervision and uncontrollably produce these spikes.
Website (6)
The ChEZ website may have been hacked and the data compromised. Theoretically, this could happen. Nowadays, such an event is everyday routine news. But no one has made public any statements about this from the Ukrainian or from other parties so far.
Incident that did not happen
At the end of this my story, I placed some apparent evidence proving that there was no radiation incident that led to the spikes discussed. I did this on purpose so as not to clog up the logical sequence of the telling with detailed technical explanations.
In my opinion, there are two main considerations that classify the radiation factor as an improbable cause of ASRM spikes:
- radiological assessments relating the surface soil contamination and the gamma radiation dose rate;
- spatio-temporal pattern of spikes of gamma radiation dose rate, apparently recorded by ASRM.
Some radiological evaluations
Among ASRM monitoring points showed spikes, the Ladyzhichi monitoring point, on the left bank of the Pripyat River delta, is indicated. This sensor is not working today. The readings of the sensor stopped on February 25, 2022 at the mark of 60.5 μSv/h. (Fig. 6).
Fig. 6. On February 25, 2022, the readings of the sensor at the Ladyzhichi monitoring station stopped at the mark of 60.5 μSv/h. Data from the Saveecobot site [3].
The indicated dose rate per year will be 60.5 * 24 * 365 = 529980 μSv/year or 0.53 Sv/year.
The question is, what level of contamination of the soil surface with Cs-137 (there is practically no other gamma-emitting radionuclide in the ChEZ) would have corresponded such a dose level?
For a rough estimate of this question, let’s take the conversion factor that ties the annual dose Eind (μSv/year) to surface radioactivity S of Cs-137 (kBq / m2), from work [2]:
From this formula, we get the surface radioactivity of Cs-137 in 529980 / 0.72–899 = 735184 kBq / m2 or 735 MBq / m2.
According to published data [10], the surface radioactivity of Cs-137 in Ladyzhichi is within 10 kBq/m2. This surface radioactivity value creates an additional radiation dose of no more than 7 μSv / year, that is, two orders of magnitude below the natural background and five orders of magnitude (or almost 100 000 times!) lower than the dose rate indicated in this monitoring point.
If we take into account the decrease in the dose rate from Cs-137 due to its penetration into the soil by 8% / year [2], then in 37 years after the accident it could be about 20, then the hypothetical removal of all Cs-137 to the surface (in a thin layer) increased its contribution in the radiation dose up to 7 * 20 = 140 μSv / year. Even this value will not “compete” with the natural background.
Any dust resuspension does also not change this estimate, because it does not increase the amount of radioactivity, but only modifies its distribution in space, vertically. Also, keep in mind that the end of February in this region of rivers and swamps is not the dry season at all, but quite the opposite. It is simply impossible to raise dust from the ground.
Consider that there are many more ASRM monitoring points, showed spikes, with a low level of surface radioactivity like Ladyzhichi. Particularly, the entire territory of the ChEZ to the south from the latitude of the city of Chornobyl can be accounted for sure as such a safe territory according to the radiological factor [11].
Conclusion : Therefore, two scenarios (1 and 2 in the section “Gamma radiation sensor (1)”) of the possible impact of gamma radiation on the ASRM spikes occurrence can be classified as implausible.
Hypothesis of air transfer
Thanks to the brilliant animation of these spikes in Kim Zetter’s article (Fig. 7), the spatio-temporal pattern of the recorded ASRM spikes is the most vivid and convincing evidence and argument in the analysis of all hypothetical scenarios.
Conclusion: Based on the presented spatio-temporal pattern of the recorded ASRM spikes, combined with radiological considerations, all the four scenarios of radiation impact to ASRM detectors mentioned in the section “Gamma radiation sensor (1)” can be classified as implausible.
Result
Summarizing the analysis, it can be stated that there are three groups of possible causes of the recorded gamma radiation dose rate spikes according to the probable nature of the impact: 1) direct impact of gamma radiation to ASRM detectors, 2) direct impact of EM radiation to electronics circuits of ASRM detectors and 3) impact on elements of the IT infrastructure of ASRM. From all these three groups, two groups (1 ) and (2) can be confidently classified as implausible.The weakest link in the entire information chain, through which interference and distortion of information could hypothetically happen, remains the IT infrastructure of the ASRM of ChEZ.
Who could the hypothetical unknown hacker be — hero, traitor or enemy, if there was one? From what motives did he act? Was it a system failure or the result of careless handling? These questions still remain unanswered… After the victory of Ukraine, we will learn a lot of interesting things about these and other events of this war.
And finally. The sad irony lies in the fact that the russian occupiers, by their actions, managed to add one more requirement to the certification tests of gamma radiation detectors for all world manufacturers — this is proof of the ability of such detectors to work in high levels of EM interference created by powerful electronic means.
References
- Chornobyl radiation spikes are not due to military vehicles disturbing soil — ScienceDirect
- Long-term external dose formation in the Chornobyl exclusion zone | Olegh Bondarenko, presentation at Int. conf. GLOBAL, Japan, 2011
- SSE “Ecocenter” — SaveEcoBot
- Interview by Ghlib Bondarenko, New York Times, February 26, 2022, Kyiv, Ukraine
- Seeing Through the Invisible: Radiation Spikes Detected in Chernobyl During the russian Invasion Show Possible Evidence of Fabrication | Ruben Santamarta, Aug 10, 2023, Black Hat USA 2023
- The Mystery of Chernobyl’s Post-Invasion Radiation Spikes | Kim Zetter, Aug 7, 2023, WIRED
- Radiation Spikes at Chernobyl: A Mystery Few Seem Interested in Solving | Kim Zetter, Aug 8, 2023, substack.com
- Modernisation of the automated system of monitoring of radiological situation (ASMRS) at the Chornobyl exclusion zone. TACIS Project U4.01/03 S (2005–2007) / Olegh Bondarenko. Contribution to 20th anniversary of the Chornobyl catastrophe conference, Heidelberg, March 15, 2006.
- The inside story of Chernobyl during the russian occupation | By Wendell Steavenson with Marta Rodionova, May 10th 2022, Economist
- Map of the Cs-137 contamination of the Chornobyl zone after the Chornobyl accident — Chornobyl Center
- Is the city of Chornobyl suitable for human habitation in view of the radiological factor? | Olegh Bondarenko, August 2012, URPS Blog
