The Curse of the Spanish Armada

When Scale Becomes Self-Sabotage

In 1588, King Philip II of Spain launched a naval campaign that should have been the climax of Catholic Europe’s struggle against Protestant England. The Spanish Armada, 130 ships strong and carrying more than 30,000 men, was to sail through the English Channel, rendezvous with Spanish ground forces in the Netherlands under the Duke of Parma, and deliver a crushing blow to Queen Elizabeth I’s rule. It was a plan that relied on the immutable power of overwhelming force, blessed by divine purpose and sanctioned by imperial ambition.

But the largest fleet ever assembled in Europe was routed.

The defeat of the Armada has often been ascribed to celestial winds and English luck. But this lets Philip off too easily. The Armada failed — not in spite of its size, but because of it.

The campaign relied on absolute obedience and sequential execution: the Armada would arrive in the Channel, hold position, and wait for the Duke of Parma’s forces to sail out. But Parma didn’t control the seas. He had no deep-water port for his men to embark safely. Communication between the fleet and the ground forces was practically nonexistent. Messages took days to travel over land and were further delayed by weather and enemy patrols. The two halves of the plan — naval and land — never…