WHEN IN MANCHESTER
Jokowi’s special staff scandal: a tip of the iceberg in Indonesia’s deep clientelistic governance
Here are my takes on the recent conflict of interest issue surrounding President Joko Widodo’s millenial special staff. Bear in mind I am writing this in frustration because of the hype from people suddenly becoming political scientists (yes, that includes me too). This is an off-the-bat writing of what is in my head, so should anyone be interested in reading more on the concepts on politics of development that I mention below, let me know and I’ll give some references and we can talk.
Basically I see the scandal as a clientelistic relationship gone sour. But this clientelistic relationship is nothing new in Indonesia. So why the hype now?
Views are my own.
What is a clientelist relationship? It is when clients or interest groups (usually wider than just economic agents or cronies, extending even into civil society) that have the capacity to fulfill the needs of the patron (someone who is usually of higher hierarchy, possesses access to resource to be tapped by clients, seeks support and expertise) come together for a common goal. This is not to mean that the client and the patron do not have personal interests, they do. But for a clientelistic relationship to work for the greater good, both the client and the patron need to settle on a long term goal. Though sadly, patron-client relationships mostly don’t make it to the greater good, even if they both committed to do so in the beginning.
What does a clientelistic relationship look like? Take for example you are the head of a country. Being the good leader that you are, you want to bring good things to your country. But sadly, you can’t work on your own. You lack two things: 1) you don’t have the capacity to lead but also have the technical capacity to know how to efficiently develop a thriving oil and gas industry or 2) that you don’t have the political support to make the majority of the people to agree with what you want to do. That is when you get close with people that have either of the two things. You appoint someone that has years of experience building a famous international oil company as your ministry of energy. You make friends with local leaders that have gained the trust of groups of people. In return, the people that you seek help from also want something from you. They want exposure. They want access to the resources that you command. Patron (you, as one having access but lack support) and client (those who have support/expertise but do not have access) relationships are mutual.
Is clientelism an abuse of power? I’d say yes and no. Yes because in a democratic country as Indonesia it is unfair to favour certain interest groups than others, especially if it is at the expense of the public. That’s when the clientelistic relationship leads to corruption and there is no justification for such crooked act. However, because Indonesia is also a developing country that does not have clear ‘rules of the game’ (e.g. property rights and rule of law), making sure to get things done (e.g. sustained economic growth) is hard. Resource and power is scattered (or more like concentrated) in channels outside of formal governance. The only way that developing countries such as Indonesia and many others can ensure sustained growth is to extend the distribution of resource and power to informal rules and means. I do not think clientelism is an abuse of power when strategic alliances are formed through accountable and democratic processes. However, this is not to say that clientelism is always attained this way.
To respond to the growing sentiment on ‘conflict of interest’, I don’t think it looks at the bigger picture. The notion of conflict of interest offers a narrow and negative sentiment that when one is put in power because of his/her strategic affiliation and not on merit, they will always act in their personal interests and not the public. On the contrary, I see that clientelism responds to something than that, hence the ‘tip of the iceberg’. It is a developmentalist strategy to attain resources and keep strategic and loyal people close for the purpose of long-term development and structural change. This is not to say that these patron-client relationships do not have personal interests themselves. So yes it is still controversial, that is why check and balances still need to be in place to avoid abuses that are to the expense of the public.
Is clientelism something new? Nope. In Indonesia this dates way back. A significant example is when Chinese conglomerates helped secure economic growth and political stability during Indonesia’s deteriorating parliamentary era in the 50s (see Slater, 2010). Oil and real estate companies with close affiliation to the military and ruling coalition did the same thing for Soeharto and right up to Jokowi. Uu possesses the ability to mobilize support for RK and in return his supporters also receive particular benefits from RK’s policies. The same logic applies Ma’ruf Amin when he suddenly became the vice president candidate, and seems to me he will not be giving up his MUI position any time soon.
Just because it is so entrenched in the Indonesian governance, it does not mean it is the right thing to do. Yes. But having competent people wanting to make good for the people is a step towards something better.
Is there a case where clientelism leads to better development outcomes? Yes. Like I said, this happens when you put the right people in the right positions in pursuit of a desired goal for the greater public. This also happens because the leader or the patron has developmental ideas or visions. The reason why a country such as Uganda, who only in 1986 recovered from a 20–30 year dictatorship, managed to quickly pass a gender-based violence bill in 2 years was because its leader President Museveni had strong views on gender equality and put in place strong advocators in parliament to push the bill through (Nazneen & Hickey, 2019). The reason why South Korea emerged out of its poverty-ridden primary-based economy in the 60s to become one of the world’s leader in electronics is the commitment of the government in structurally transform its steel industry into making electronic parts (despite the advice from international organisations) and its trust in chaebols to execute the ideas (Vu, 2007). The passing of Ethiopia’s national health strategy accelerated in only 3 years to enact a national healthcare system after decades of stalling because then-President Meles had appointed Dr Tedros Adhanom, whom was competent and loyal to Meles, to lead as Minister of Health and advocate for Universal Health Care (Lavers, 2019).
Putting the right people in the right position, through through informal means of trust and patronage, has proven to potentially lead to developmental outcomes. This is not to say that it does not fail or that it is always the right thing (there’s this really interesting journal article by Latishew 2019 that explains how big start-ups managed to get so big is because they became politically close to the ruling coalition, might explain one or two things about Gojek and friends!). But the absence of formal institutions to drive efficient distribution of rent means that you have to ‘work with the grain’ and ‘think and work politically’ (Levy 2014).
So what about the special staff to the President scandal? Well it is also a clientelistic relationship.
In part of the President, it is evident that he is appealing to the ‘millennials’ by having them feel that the younger generation are given a chance to not only be represented in government but also be involved in decision-making processes. It is also not a coincidence that these particular millennials are chosen — they benefit the President by having access to emerging sectors in the Indonesian economy. This is not to say that the President will always turn to their affiliated backgrounds for related policies right away because complicated bureaucracies and check and balance mechanisms exist to ensure abuse of power does not happen. But at least they have 1) the capacity to advise state in policies relating to their backgrounds, and 2) the window to access resources once so hard to access because of the lack of formal institutions is now within arms-reach.
In part of the staff, perhaps this is naive but I do have confidence in the younger generation of Indonesia that we want to do good for the public, albeit that it is also inevitable that they have their own personal interests. The people who were chosen to be young millennial special staff grew up knowing the horrors of a corrupted government, they are educated and want to use their knowledge to do good things, and they have established careers in helping many people even before entering government. Yes, this is not to say that once they enter government that their ideals stay the same, as people such as Fadli Zon or Fahri Hamzah also changed when they entered government. I think what makes these millennials in a way different is because of the exposure that they desire to keep thing doing what their ‘ideals’ tell them to do, and also the level of accountability they feel towards the public as engagement with other millennials in Indonesia through social media is rife.
So whats the problem with this scandal? First, I think the millennial special staff should have known better about what they were getting themselves into. Belva explained in a lengthy thread that he was not required to step down from his position in Ruangguru when he accepted the job as special staff. Hence, there was always potential for scandal. But perhaps, as the positivist in me says, that Jokowi and his special staff were in it for the greater good. It is a matter of the other factions in the ruling coalition that might not have the same developmental views.
Second, I think it is not a matter of whether the presence of special staff are significant or not (which yes I do think this is significant because of the 2 things I mentioned earlier that a president as a patron needs to realize his developmental ideals), but it is a matter how the whole ruling coalition is governed. The millennial special staff were one of the more competent ones. But we should be wary of what kinds of developmental ideas seeks to attain by 2024 through clientelistic governance and for whom. Jokowi has nothing to lose as it is his last term in office, the term to leave a legacy. Will he side with the people, as he has done by populist means since being the Major of Solo, or will he succumb to the pressures of the big boys with the capital? There is no use to ponder on the millennial staff for too long. There are bigger forces and ideals we need to worry about.
Third, information today spreads and twists like wildfire. Once one of the millennial staff got caught, the media and people in general started poking into other potential scandals. This is always how the iceberg becomes visible to the public, but it does not mean that it was never there. Particularly as people are in a sensitive state because of the pandemic, the government needs to look always on the ball with its limited resources. It needs to do quick action that maximizes benefit for the many. Another thing is that many people had put in hopes towards the millennial special staff to bring fresh air towards the deteriorating government. I do not think the millennial staff are completely the ones to blame, should they really put their personal interests above the public, as the rest of the ruling coalition has always been in the predatory clientelistic game for so long.
In the end, the millennial special staff scandal is only the tip of the iceberg for Indonesia’s entrenched clientelist and often predatory governance. The millennials were potential agents of change, but in the end the system got the better of them. Should we always If you think that merely getting rid of the millennials from the special staff solves the issue of predatory clientelism, think of the system that put them in the special position in the first place.
