“F-35 on the Red Carpet”

It is not enough to lament the narrative when more can be done to address it.

John Tirpak said this in this morning’s Air Force Association’s Daily Report:

The F-35 strike fighter has just added another blockbuster movie to its screen credits, and finally gets some hero treatment. It features in “Ender’s Game,” the Harrison Ford space epic that hit theaters on Nov. 1. In this film (don’t worry, no spoiler here), thousands of F-35s, circa 2040, tangle with alien ships in the skies of the Earth. In previous films—such as “The Avengers,” “Man of Steel,” “Green Lantern,” “Superman Returns,” or “Die Hard 4,” the F-35 is portrayed as ineffectual at best, and, at worst, causing a whole lot of collateral damage in various battles with the bad guys. The F-35—on film, rather than as a computer-generated image—is also likely to get heavy screen time in the planned “Top Gun II,” but that project is on hold since the death of its intended director, Tony Scott.

The appeal to emotion here, in my opinion, is unhelpful. Movies aside, more can be done to contribute positively to the F-35 narrative.

It is understatement to suggest that the F-35 narrative needs a lot of attention. Acknowledging that the narrative is a conversation, the DoD needs to concern itself more with how it is perceived. The DoD must not only tell its F-35 story, but it must also provide a compelling justification for this side of the story. Further, it must do this constantly and tirelessly. It does not matter if you know you’re “right” about something if no one else thinks so.

Some suggestions:

First, start with WHY. This may seem quite banal, I know, because there are many who well understand why the DoD needs the F-35 (particularly within the air services). Humility here does not mean letting the narrative go where it may, but rather, engage the narrative in a unpretentious and meaningful way. To do the former, lends itself to perceptions of smug muteness. To do the latter highlights the risks of alternatives. For example, the theme that the “Air Force hates the A-10 because it is choosing the F-35” cannot be left unchecked. This is a false choice in an operational environment that must place an imperative upon survivability in anti-access denial areas.

Second, be proactive. “Whispers and nudges” may be sufficient for foreign policy, but it is appearing less and less sufficient in our domestic fiscal debates. These debates are fruitful and important, which is why they need more attention, not less. Furthermore, if the justification of the F-35 is not understood, then the story does not matter. For example, letting the acquisitions process set the narrative is a losing strategy. Here there is only a false dichotomy between retrofit and modernization. Obviously, huge mistakes were made in technology and manufacturing readiness, objectives were too aggressive, and difficult choices had to be made in the F-35 joint acquisition program. But all of these considerations are being made from a reactive posture with an air of timidity. This hardly builds confidence for accountability, much less support the positivist (WHY) foundation of the narrative. This posture also has implications beyond our borders in building partner capacity.

Finally, the narrative cannot be left to perceived “interests.” Lockheed Martin is a fantastic and respected organization, but their business interest in the success of the F-35 is hardly helpful or appropriate for reasonable justification (WHY) within our fiscally constrained environment. This responsibility must be shouldered by the unison voice of the DoD, its services, and perhaps its combatant commands. Here, the onus for the narrative is beyond any one service. Rather, every service that has a requirement for the F-35, the Air Force, Marines, and Navy must share the load (implying improved synchronization). Even the Army could afford to concern itself more with supporting a survivable close air support platform, especially where it will contribute crucial technology to creative joint forceable entry tactics in anti-access denial areas. If warfighting is a team sport, then it must be so for high-end acquisition: the inward-looking service-specific Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution la Terreur is inappropriate for a professional military.

The good news on the narrative is… there is already a lot of good news out there in social media. But like the CSAF said, there just needs to be more. If you want more F-35 love in the movies, communicate why you’re lovable.