Adaptive Leadership Handbook: Innovative Ways to Teach and Develop Your People by Fred Leland and Don Vandergriff

Innovative Ways to Teach and Develop Your People: A practical handbook to develop adaptive thinking and leadership abilities in those on the bleeding edge of today’s Law Enforcement and Security challenges. With techniques and methodologies proven over years of real-world application, this book will bring to life “how to think” under stressful, ambiguous and often dangerous circumstances. By improving the speed and accuracy of your decision-making and problem solving, you can adapt and respond effectively to any situation. In truth, I’ve already started this read. So far, it recalls why I was so impressed the first time I met these gentlemen in October 2011. They were struggling with the same aspects of training that I was struggling with as a squadron Weapons Officer, attempting to make every moment count in training Airmen how to best apply their craft and survive the encounter. I came away from that experience with new energy and a few critical course corrections on how to make tactical instruction count in preparation for life and death decisions.

Ender’s Game by Orson Scott Card

Recently, I wandered off my usual path, thanks to a small spark via a preview to a spectacularly wonderful short story about drones written by fellow Airman Mark Jacobsen (when it goes public it is a must-read)! One thing led to another, including what I thought was an extremely well-done novella (which appears to be a first in an exciting series), Awakening, by Brett “B.A.” Friedman, another must-read. And then, after several had made comparisons of Awakening to The Forever War by Joe Haldeman, I had to read that touching book as well. Ender’s Game comes with critical acclaim by most of my associates in the military strategy game, although there are some mentors who have panned it. Supposedly, it has insights for the military mind, but I wonder if the military reader enjoys it primarily because it seems to reinforce or draw out what we already think and feel as truth (like how The Forever War seems to in these present times). We will see. Old Man’s War is probably next. Then on to Mark’s The Lords of Harambee. Who knew Mark would have provided such a powerful taste that has since dominated my leisure time? He seemed to be saying: the first hit is free.

Pure Strategy by Everett Carl Dolman

I think this will be an important work for me. Recently, friend Adam Elkus has been on a kick where he is purposefully, and quite prudently, challenges all of our deterministic notions of military strategic. He wants us to focus less on balanced Lykkian-stools, and more on changing the rules of the game towards continued advantage. To borrow a shared favorite phrase, he is continually reminding us against our “habitual line-stepping” towards narrow-minded heuristic determinism, along, perhaps with the help of Christopher R. Paparone and Everett Dolman. From the inside cover of Pure Strategy:

This book, Pure Strategy, is animated by the recurring question of whether there are enduring principles of strategy. In the process of isolating and interpreting the fundamentals of strategy, the reader is confronted with a startling realization: the concept of strategic victory must be summarily discarded. This is not to say that victory has no place in strategy or strategic planning. The outcome of battles and campaigns are ever-present variables within the strategist’s plan, but victory is a concept that has no meaning there. The pure strategist accepts that war is but one aspect of social and political competition, and ongoing interaction that has no finality. Strategy therefore connects the conduct of war with the intent of politics. It shapes and guides military means in antcipation of a panoply of possible coming events. In the process, strategy changes the context within which events will happen. Pure Strategy is thus an inquiry into the fundamental truth of strategy; its purpose, place, utility, and value. It places the classic works of strategy into a framework informed by the modern physical and biological sciences as well as the military ones. While it is more properly a philosophy of strategy than utilitarian investigation, and is meant to be a heuristic rather than deterministic, it nonetheless intended for practicing strategists.

The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and Their Lessons for Modern Strategists by Barry S. Strauss and Josiah Ober

Many critics say that there is no new ground tread here, but often works like that provide great usefulness for putting all of these ideas in one place, so that the reader can more freshly hold them in their mind together. Gen James Mattis, USMC (Ret), is famously known for stating that “The problem with being too busy to read is that you learn by experience… ie: the hard way….Thanks to my reading, I’ve never been caught flatfooted by any situation…It doesn’t give me all the answers, but it lights what is so often a dark path ahead.” From the inside cover:

A winning strategist needs to be shrewd, thoughtful, and modest. Would-be conquerors, on the other hand, often display overconfidence, egotism, a tendency to underestimate the enemy’s idiosyncrasies and staying power, and a refusal to retreat before it becomes too late. In eight case studies from the ancient world, the authors tell the stories of great generals whose flawed strategies brought them tumbling down—from the well-known, such as Mark Anthony and Hannibal, to the largely forgotten, Darius III and Jugurtha. Ancient historians who have written and lectured on military strategy, the authors ponder the lessons of ancient defeats for today, be it in Vietnam, Afghanistan, or some future struggle.

The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics by Samuel P. Huntington

This read is precipitated by the recent CNAS military fellows report “Zone Defense: A Case for Distinct Service Roles and Missions.” Like many CNAS reports, a reader can fully grasp their recommendation(s) by walking through the footnotes. This “blurred lines” report from CNAS is heavily reliant upon the extremely important history provided by James Kurtz and John Crerar titled “Military Roles and Missions: Past Revisions and Future Prospects,” which in turn is heavily reliant upon Huntington’s book. One great risk in reading historical work is in applying the “would’a, could’a, should’a” armchair test to the context of the period. This is the kind of method that I think befalls pundits in their modern interpretations of the decision-makers in the past, and their specific context at that time, like I have seen so far here, as well as in Carl Builder’s Masks of War. Some bits and pieces from the preface:

If this book has any distinctive message, it is that military policy can only be understood as the responses of the government to conflicting pressures from its foreign and domestic environments. Decisions on strategic programs, in particular, must be viewed in the broader context of American politics and government. This book is concerned with strategy, but the reader will find in it little information on missile capabilities and military concepts and much discussion of budget battles and political compromise…. Military policy cannot be separated from foreign policy, fiscal policy, and domestic policy. It is part of the warp and the woof of American politics…. Military policy is always the product of politics. Good military policy is only the product of brave choice and ingenious compromise by experienced politicians.