Grim Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan
The United States and the Taliban signed a milestone agreement to end Afghanistan’s 20-year civil war on February 29th, 2020. The agreement has four main components.¹ First, the Taliban guaranteed that Afghan soil would not be used by terrorist groups to launch attacks against the United States. Second, the U.S. and its allies in Afghanistan agreed to withdraw their military forces and civilian personnel from the country within 14-months of the signing of the agreement. Third, the Taliban began peace talks with the Afghan government in the aftermath of the agreement; these intra-Afghan negotiations have taken place in Doha, Qatar, for the past six months. Fourth, the ongoing intra-Afghan negotiations are required to produce a comprehensive ceasefire between the Taliban and the Afghan government.
Unfortunately, the intransigent ideology of the Taliban will doom the intra-Afghan negotiations. Moreover, as U.S. and foreign forces continue to withdraw from Afghanistan, conflict with the Taliban could cripple the Afghan government. To prevent this, the United States should maintain a brigade combat team (BCT) and the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan.
I. The Taliban Will Prevent Peace in Afghanistan
The Quetta Shura Taliban are Afghanistan’s preeminent rebel group. It is estimated that the Taliban field 55,000 to 85,000 fighters and generate $300 million to $1.5 billion in revenue per annum.² ³ The Taliban dwarf other rebel groups in Afghanistan such as al-Qaeda and ISIS-K, which draw on 400–600 and 2,200 fighters, respectively.⁴ ⁵ Having fought against the United States and the Afghan government for nearly 20 years, the Taliban are an extremely militarily and ideologically resilient insurgency.⁶
Taliban ideology represents the greatest obstacle to ending the Afghanistan’s civil war. Core Taliban principles are Afghan national sovereignty, military strength, the sacredness of jihad, and the absolute authority of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate.⁷ This ideology pervades the organization, leading to disdain among the Taliban for the Afghan government and foreigners.⁸
To avoid fragmentation, the Taliban will not make concessions that compromise their ideology during the intra-Afghan negotiations.⁹ The Taliban are a cohesive rebel organization, meaning that their leadership exercises robust control over their rank-and-file.¹⁰ For example, the Taliban completely ceased attacks against U.S. forces after the signing of the US-Taliban agreement.¹¹ However, the Taliban have been sensitive to internal disputes after a disastrous period of fragmentation in 2015.¹² This means that the intra-Afghan negotiations carry high stakes for the Taliban; if the Taliban are perceived as not providing for the interests of their members in an intra-Afghan agreement, they will experience internal disputes and defections to insurgent groups such as ISIS-K.¹³ It is unsurprising, then, that Taliban leader Mullah Fazl reassured supporters that the organization would insist on three demands during negotiations: “the Taliban is to choose the leader of Afghanistan’s future government, the future government must be an emirate, and it is to be based entirely on Sharia.”¹⁴ This unyielding set of demands indicates the Taliban’s determination to maintain their principles. Though the Taliban have been unable to win Afghanistan’s civil war and incur severe costs by continuing to fight it, their desire to preserve their principles and cohesion will prevent them from making meaningful concessions. In turn, this will devastate Afghanistan’s prospects for peace.
The Taliban have demonstrated their inability to make concessions throughout the peace negotiation process. In particular, they have been unable to cease their attacks against the Afghan government, which they view as illegitimate. The day before intra-Afghan peace talks began, for example, Afghanistan’s senior vice president barely survived a Taliban bomb attack on his convoy in Kabul.¹⁵ Next, a USFOR-A report recorded 50% more Taliban attacks against the government this quarter than last quarter.¹⁶ In the past several weeks alone, the Taliban have staged bombings in 24 of Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and launched an offensive against the capital of Afghanistan’s Helmand province, Lashkar Gah.¹⁷ ¹⁸ In addition, the Taliban have not distanced themselves from al-Qaeda, flouting an important component of the US-Taliban agreement.¹⁹ This violence and the Taliban’s duplicity indicate the inability of the Taliban to engage with peace talks.
II. The Failure of intra-Afghan Peace Negotiations Could be Disastrous
Taliban intransigence makes it doubtful that an intra-Afghan agreement will be reached, and ominously, intra-Afghan peace negotiations have been stalled for months.²⁰ In spite of the lack of progress made toward intra-Afghan reconciliation, moreover, the Trump Administration plans to draw down U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan from 4,500 to 2,500 by the end of 2020 and to completely withdraw U.S. troops from the country by May 2021.²¹
The Afghan government will struggle to independently combat the Taliban, making the simultaneous failure of intra-Afghan peace negotiations and withdrawal of U.S. troops deeply troubling. Though the Afghan National Army (ANA) is composed of nearly 180,000 personnel and enjoys the support of the U.S. military, the Taliban contest 50 to 60 percent of Afghan territory and fully control 21 of Afghanistan’s districts.²² ²³ Alarmingly, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been reliant on the U.S. for training and combat assistance, meaning that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan could severely strain the organization.²⁴ For example, the U.S. is in the process of closing Kandahar Airfield, depriving the ANSF of an important source of military support in southwestern Afghanistan and rendering them vulnerable to Taliban incursions in Helmand.²⁵ The Taliban doesn’t yet control any of Afghanistan’s provincial capitals; however, they have made repeated incursions against Afghan cities in recent years.²⁶ With a breakdown in negotiations and the withdrawal of U.S. support, the Afghan government will be weakened and these population centers may begin to fall. Thus, prematurely withdrawing troops from Afghanistan could jeopardize what the U.S. has accomplished in the country.
The U.S. has many reasons to remain invested in the future of Afghanistan. First, the U.S. has spent 20 years, $800 billion dollars, and 2,000 lives fighting for the future of Afghanistan, and allowing that work to be undone would be a profound waste.²⁷ Second, the Afghan government is a functioning democracy and female representation in Afghan society is higher than ever, but Taliban advances would jeopardize these gains.²⁸ Third, a weakened Afghan government would be exploited by terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS-K. The U.S. entered Afghanistan in 2001 to safeguard the world from terrorism, and the resurgence of terrorist movements in Afghanistan is a clear national security threat.
III. U.S. Troops Should Remain in Afghanistan
The intra-Afghan peace negotiations will end in failure. When combined with continued U.S. troop withdrawals from Afghanistan, this failure will have a deleterious impact on Afghan society and U.S. security. In light of this, the United States should maintain a brigade combat team (BCT) and the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing — representing roughly 5,000 troops — in Afghanistan. The U.S. should attempt to renegotiate the US-Taliban peace deal to allow these troops to remain in Afghanistan for at least five years to enforce the terms of an intra-Afghan peace agreement. In the likely event that intra-Afghan peace negotiations fail, however, these troops should remain until the Taliban no longer threaten the stability of Afghanistan.
The 455th Air Expeditionary Wing is one of two air wings currently deployed in Afghanistan and has been stationed at Bagram Airfield-BAF — the largest U.S. military base in Afghanistan — since 2002.²⁹ It is composed of 2,000 airmen and five multipurpose aircraft groups.³⁰ U.S. BCTs, on the other hand, cycle through Afghanistan at a rate of once per year and are composed of between 2,500 to 5,000 troops.³¹ Currently, the 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division is stationed in Afghanistan, but it will soon finish its deployment.³² A BCT and the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing would allow the U.S. to operate 2–3 military bases across Afghanistan.³³
IV. Implementation
The U.S. political climate supports a continued troop presence in Afghanistan. Though the Trump Administration plans to reduce U.S. troop strength in Afghanistan to 2,500 by the start of 2021, this move is unpopular among both Democrats and Republicans in Congress.³⁴ Two weeks ago, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell delivered a speech lambasting the decision.³⁵ In addition, the American public supports continued U.S. engagement in Afghanistan. For example, at the start of 2020, a plurality of Americans felt the U.S. had an obligation toward Afghanistan and supported maintaining current U.S. troop levels in the country.³⁶ ³⁷ With President-Elect Joe Biden taking office on January 20th, the Trump Administration’s troop withdrawal can be offset with an immediate and modest increase in the number of troops in Afghanistan.
However, the Taliban will oppose any U.S. effort to remain in Afghanistan, undermining the intra-Afghan negotiations. A core component of the US-Taliban agreement was that U.S. troops would withdraw from Afghanistan 14 months after the announcement of the agreement.³⁸ Any U.S. effort to deploy troops for longer than this period will give the Taliban an excuse to withdraw from negotiations. But, given that the Taliban have made little progress in intra-Afghan negotiations or in breaking ties with al-Qaeda, the U.S. is under no obligation to withdraw its troops.³⁹ Thus, the U.S. should renegotiate its treaty with the Taliban to allow U.S. troops to stay for an additional five years if a substantive intra-Afghan peace agreement is reached. In the likely event the Taliban either rejects this offer or the intra-Afghan negotiations collapse independently, the U.S. should maintain the recommended units in Afghanistan until the Taliban no longer threaten Afghanistan’s stability.
V. A Continued U.S. Troop Presence Will Benefit Afghanistan and the U.S.
A U.S. presence of 5,000 troops in Afghanistan through a BCT and the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing would benefit the Afghan people and the United States. First, a U.S. military presence will allow for the continued use of airpower in Afghanistan, preventing a Taliban takeover of the country. Second, a U.S. presence in Afghanistan will permit continued counterterrorism operations without creating blowback among the Afghan population. Third, these benefits are justified given the low cost of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan.
First, keeping the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing based in Afghanistan will bolster the security of the Afghan government. Airpower has been the fundamental tool by which the United States has supported the Afghan government over the past 20 years by providing 24/7/365 support, a rapid response mechanism to attacks, and the capacity for surgical strikes, MEDEVAK, and resupply.⁴⁰ This offers Afghan and U.S. soldiers alike an unprecedented level of flexibility, especially in the context of Afghanistan’s difficult-to-traverse topography.
Airpower is an effective way to halt insurgent offensives, which will prevent the Taliban from advancing on Afghan population centers. Though airpower has only limited efficacy in asymmetric warfare, when insurgents act as a conventional offensive force airpower can exact a devastating toll.⁴¹ The efficacy of airpower in crushing insurgent offensives was most recently demonstrated in Operation Inherent Resolve, an air campaign launched in 2015 to check the advance of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.⁴² During the first year of the operation, the U.S. launched nearly 14,000 precision airstrikes against ISIS, making it impossible for ISIS to muster the supplies and fighters needed to continue their advance through Iraq.⁴³ ⁴⁴ Airpower played a crucial role in the defense of Iraqi cities like Ramadi, and ultimately checked the advance of ISIS in the latter half of 2016.⁴⁵ Tellingly, the Taliban’s assault on Lashkar Gah last month was repelled due to U.S. airstrikes.⁴⁶ While retaining the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan will not defeat the Taliban, especially if they engage in asymmetric warfare, it will ensure that Afghanistan’s population centers do not fall into Taliban hands.
Next, ongoing U.S. air support in Afghanistan is important given the deficiencies of the Afghan Air Force (AAF). As of August 2020, the U.S. had appropriated $8.5 billion to develop the combat capacity of the AAF.⁴⁷ The AAF currently has 140 operational aircraft, on its face an impressive number.⁴⁸ However, these aircraft are outdated and the AAF has experienced training and operational setbacks.⁴⁹ Up to 40% of the pilots the AAF has trained have gone missing and U.S. efforts to bolster the AAF — most recently through a program to modernize its helicopter fleet with U.S. Black Hawks — have fallen flat.⁵⁰ ⁵¹ Keeping the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing in Afghanistan will compensate for the weaknesses of the AAF.
Second, retaining U.S. forces in Afghanistan will allow for the continuation of counterterrorism operations. Targeting terrorists in Afghanistan has had a marked depressing effect on violence in the country by disrupting the ability of terrorist cells to organize attacks.⁵² In the past year alone, US-led counterterrorism operations incapacitated numerous al Qaeda leaders, devastating the group.⁵³ Moreover, U.S. airstrikes and special forces operations were instrumental in breaking the power of ISIS-K in Afghanistan’s Nangarhar province.⁵⁴ 5,000 U.S. troops in Afghanistan will allow the U.S. to continue surgical strikes against al Qaeda and ISIS-K, limiting their ability to threaten Afghanistan and the international community.⁵⁵
Moreover, U.S. airstrikes and counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan have incurred increasingly limited collateral damage. Studies have shown that U.S. actions that inadvertently harm civilians, like airstrikes, can increase insurgent support in future time periods.⁵⁶ However, stringent rules of engagement and new technologies have allowed the U.S. to reduce the collateral damage of its operations in Afghanistan. Shifts in U.S. operational practices and the widespread adoption of laser-guided technology in Afghanistan depressed the share of civilian deaths caused by airstrikes from 29% in 2009 to 4% in 2013, though the figure stood at 10% in 2019 due to an escalating U.S. air campaign against the Taliban.⁵⁷ ⁵⁸ Civilian casualties as a result of U.S. operations are repugnant, but the U.S. has increasingly been able to confront terrorists with limited collateral damage. In short, U.S. counterterrorism operations enhance the security of all parties.
Third, the benefits of the recommendation are justified in light of the modest costs of continued U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The U.S. military reported no fatalities in Afghanistan last quarter and consistently low casualty figures in the quarters prior to the signing of the US-Taliban agreement.⁵⁹ The monetary cost of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan is also low. In 2020 the U.S. is expected to spend $30 billion in Afghanistan, and the continued maintenance of 5,000 troops in the country will cost roughly as much per annum.⁶⁰ In the context of the $740 billion dollars that the DoD has requested for 2021, $30 billion is a worthwhile and affordable sum.⁶¹ Finally, leaving only 5,000 troops in Afghanistan is a significant reduction from historic U.S. troop levels in-country, allowing the U.S. to maintain its core mission in Afghanistan while keeping the vast majority of U.S. soldiers out of harm’s way.⁶²
In conclusion, the Taliban’s inability to compromise means that the intra-Afghan peace negotiations will end in failure. This, when combined with ongoing U.S. troop withdrawals, will devastate Afghan society and U.S. security. Maintaining a U.S. presence of 5,000 troops in Afghanistan through a BCT and the 455th Air Expeditionary Wing — while not conducive to intra-Afghan negotiations — will at least ensure that the Afghan government remains resilient in the face of Taliban attacks. Therefore, while peace in Afghanistan is unlikely, a continued U.S. troop presence in the country will make Afghanistan, and the world, a safer place.
Endnotes:
¹ DoS, “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.”
² “Eleventh Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2501 (2019) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability and Security of Afghanistan,” 11.
³ “Eleventh Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2501 (2019) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability and Security of Afghanistan,” 13.
⁴ Mir, “Afghanistan’s Terrorism Challenge,” 7.
⁵ “Eleventh Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2501 (2019) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability and Security of Afghanistan,” 4.
⁶ Mashal, “How the Taliban Outlasted a Superpower: Tenacity and Carnage.”
⁷ Semple, “Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement,” 8.
⁸ Semple, 9.
⁹ Watkins, 16.
¹⁰ Watkins, “Taliban Fragmentation — Fact, Fiction, and Future,” 13.
¹¹ Mir, “Afghanistan’s Terrorism Challenge,” 12.
¹² Watkins, “Taliban Fragmentation — Fact, Fiction, and Future,” 12.
¹³ Watkins, 16.
¹⁴ “Taking Stock of the Taliban’s Perspectives on Peace,” 20.
¹⁵ Boot, “Peace Talks Have Begun in Afghanistan, Major Pitfalls Await.”
¹⁶ “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 74.
¹⁷ Constable, “Taliban Shows It Can Launch Attacks Anywhere across Afghanistan, Even as Peace Talks Continue.”
¹⁸ Constable and Hassan, “Taliban Offensive in Helmand Threatens U.S., Afghan Peace Efforts.”
¹⁹ Mir, “Afghanistan’s Terrorism Challenge,” 8.
²⁰ Hadid, “Afghan Peace Talks Stalled Over Rules To Refer To When Sides Reach A Deadlock.”
²¹ Garamone, “U.S. Will Draw Down Forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, Acting Secretary Says.”
²² “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 58.
²³ “Eleventh Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2501 (2019) Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability and Security of Afghanistan,” 11.
²⁴ “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 94.
²⁵ Lawrence, “Business in Discarded US Military Goods Is Booming as Kandahar Base Empties Out.”
²⁶ Zucchino and Sukhanyar, “Taliban Attack Second Afghan City in 2 Days as Peace Deal Nears.”
²⁷ “Cost of War Report.”
²⁸ Allen and Felbab-Brown, “The Fate of Women’s Rights in Afghanistan.”
²⁹ “455th Air Expeditionary Wing Fact Sheet.”
³⁰ “455th Air Expeditionary Wing Fact Sheet.”
³¹ Feickert, “Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) Mobility, Reconnaissance, and Firepower Programs.”
³² U.S. Army, “Army Announces Upcoming 1st BCT, 10th Mountain Division Unit Rotation.”
³³ O’Hanlon, “5,000 Troops for 5 Years.”
³⁴ “Trump to Order Further Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq.”
³⁵ “Trump to Order Further Troop Withdrawal from Afghanistan and Iraq.”
³⁶ Telhami and Rouse, “American Attitudes toward the Middle East,” 6.
³⁷ Telhami and Rouse, 8.
³⁸ DoS, “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.”
³⁹ DoS.
⁴⁰ Henriksen, Airpower in Afghanistan 2005–10, 255.
⁴¹ Wilkinson, “Airpower against the Taliban: Systems of Denial,” 49.
⁴² Ohlers, “Operation Inherent Resolve and the Islamic State: Assessing ‘Aggressive Containment,’” 198.
⁴³ McInnis, “Coalition Contributions to Countering the Islamic State,” 3.
⁴⁴ Belser, “Operation Inherent Resolve Airstrikes Proving Effective in Iraq, Syria.”
⁴⁵ Belser.
⁴⁶ Constable and Hassan, “Taliban Offensive in Helmand Threatens U.S., Afghan Peace Efforts.”
⁴⁷ “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 97.
⁴⁸ “Security Contents,” 94.
⁴⁹ Zucchino, “The U.S. Spent $8 Billion on Afghanistan’s Air Force. It’s Still Struggling.”
⁵⁰ “Security Contents,” 96.
⁵¹ Snow, “US Cuts Number of Black Hawks to Afghanistan by Two-Thirds.”
⁵² Wilner, “Targeted Killings in Afghanistan,” 319.
⁵³ “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 9.
⁵⁴ Mir, “Afghanistan’s Terrorism Challenge,” 13.
⁵⁵ O’Hanlon, “5,000 Troops for 5 Years.”
⁵⁶ Condra and Shapiro, “Who Takes the Blame?”
⁵⁷ Perkins, “Air Power in Afghanistan,” 23.
⁵⁸ “Afghanistan Protection of Civilians Annual Report — 2019,” 59.
⁵⁹ “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 70.
⁶⁰ “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress,” 48.
⁶¹ “DOD Releases Fiscal Year 2021 Budget Proposal.”
⁶² “Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” 8.
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