A Perfect (Winter) Storm, a Changing Climate, and the Future of Texas’ Energy Infrastructure
It has been a little over a month since the winter storm that overpowered Texas’ electric grid, plunging its residents into electricity blackouts and little respite from freezing temperatures. The state’s electricity grid was “seconds or minutes” from a total collapse that could potentially have caused months-long blackouts, according to the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) — a statement that is so utterly shocking (and, frankly, unacceptable) to hear about a state in the 21st century United States, especially one that prides itself on its energy independence and production capabilities. The storm has sparked much discussion in the past few weeks about how Texas moves forward from this failure — whether it pertains to our aging infrastructure that is perhaps ill-prepared for climate catastrophes, or the flaws of our isolated energy grid— and what the future has in store for Texans.
As Ezra Klein writes in his article “Texas Is a Rich State in a Rich Country, and Look What Happened”, a multitude of factors contributed to the state’s electrical collapse. ERCOT was warned ten years ago in 2011 after a cold snap that its energy infrastructure was ill-prepared for severely cold weather; ERCOT’s worst-scenario planning used 2011 as a data point, but seemed to fail to recognize a 1989 incident that had more severe ramifications than in 2011. In addition, Amal Ahmad of the Texas Observer claims ERCOT does not use climate models and projections for its planning, rather choosing to solely use past data to determine supply and demand, which can prove misleading; the past will certainly not look like the future, as climate scientists have warned.
(therefore, ^like above sentence)Texas is no stranger to the deleterious effects of climate change. Two recent events — this winter storm and Hurricane Harvey — have proved the potential for climate change to wreak havoc upon Texas citizens. Tropical cyclones that make landfall on Texas are predicted to become more fast-moving in the coming years (Hassanzadeh 1), increasing their potency and putting Texas’ coastal communities at a higher risk than before. Texas is susceptible to drought exacerbated by climate change, which in turn would put a strain on its agricultural industry and water infrastructure, according to the EPA. And, as evidenced by this February, fiercely cold weather events (which Texas is unprepared for) could potentially be on the rise as Arctic warming weakens the jet stream. All of the aforementioned challenges will put increased strain on Texas’ energy infrastructure.
Combine modeling and prediction oversights with political rhetoric of doubting climate change and incorrectly blaming renewable energy, and you get a state stubbornly stuck in muddied waters, even as natural disasters are predicted to become more frequent. Texas is indeed a rich state, as Klein says — but it is still all the more susceptible to infrastructure failures in light of worsening climate disasters. We’ve long prided ourselves on our independence, but climate change necessitates cooperative transformation. The challenges climate change will bring are closely intertwined with public policy, particularly energy policy. To prevent more needless suffering, we will need to reevaluate how to best transform our systems and speak in terms of the facts.
(background — move up?)Energy economics professor Ed Hirs has been studying Texas’ electric grid for over a decade and predicted its failure. Texas’ individualism and distaste for federal regulation compelled the state to disconnect from the national electricity grids and avoid regulation by the Federal Power Commission. Texas has allowed market forces to determine all aspects of the grid, choosing not to pay energy producers to maintain backup power plants in the case of an emergency. The drive to reduce energy costs and cut corners on regulation — as Texas did not require energy providers winterize their plants or provide for additional energy generating capacity, both of which would have raised costs — ironically came at the cost of a devastating system breakdown. As Hirs said, “They all chose cheap over reliable, and they got it.”
This is not to say that our isolated grid was solely borne from hubris and self-importance — lower taxes and regulations have incentivized the energy market in Texas and provided some economic returns — but rather that the facts of the matter do indeed necessitate greater cooperation, and the combination of independence and lax regulation can and will come to a head during crises such as February’s winter storm. There is no responsibility without accountability; if we give our energy providers the responsibility to provide for the needs of Texans, they must be held properly accountable for failures. Our current model of a scarcity market (not paying for unused power) cuts costs in regular weather, but fails during severe weather events. This is opposed to a capacity market, in which providers are paid to be available during emergencies, or connection to the national grid, in which unused power can be sold to other states.
The city of El Paso, which is on the Western Interconnection electricity grid, can be examined as an interesting case study to compare to ERCOT and Texas’ electricity grid. El Paso managed to keep the lights on as the rest of Texas went dark during the winter storm, largely due to a difference in planning. The 2011 winter storm that served as a warning for ERCOT was not unnoticed by El Paso, and the city spent $4.5 million to winterize its power plants in hopes of averting a future winter crisis. El Paso also draws benefits from its connection with the Western Interconnection grid; the grid provides a safety net for the city, from which El Paso can buy energy if needed but also sell its excess energy. These financial benefits provide an incentive to winterize and properly maintain facilities, as profits can be made from excess energy. The Texas Interconnection grid does not share these characteristics; as a result, any regulations on infrastructure unsurprisingly only incur a significant cost, with no return.
Kenneth Hersh, chief executive of the George W. Bush Presidential Center and co-founder of NGP Energy Capital Management argues that climate resilience should be prioritized over developments green energy. We are already in the midst of a worsened climate, with forest fires, hurricanes, and storms to prove it. Hersh claims that our investments in green energy detract from opportunities to bolster our current energy infrastructure, and that the provided incentives for green energy in places such as New York and California only seem to waste time and drive up prices.
I would argue, however, why not focus on both green energy development and climate resilience? It is true that a focus on adaptation is necessary in light of worsening climate disasters, but this is just the tip of the iceberg when it comes to the natural effects of climate change. As long as we continue our reliance on fossil fuels, our global temperatures will continue to rise and further destabilize our climate. Hersh likens the focus on green energy to the emperor fiddling while Rome burns — but divestment from fossil fuels can hardly be considered an activity as idle as the emperor’s fiddling. Ignoring the ways we can prevent our climate from worsening will only result in a vicious cycle of hardening infrastructure just to have it fail again as conditions worsen — one that will cost more in the long run than a combined focus on renewable energy and climate resilience. Furthermore, the solution to improving Texas’ energy infrastructure does not have to lie in cutting down another productive investment; reforming our market-based mechanisms, such as building a capacity market, can also potentially provide economic benefits.
