Isaac Wu
WRIT 150 (1:00–1:50)
Professor Dochterman
Dec 4, 2021
In Defense Of Nothing
Composed for a 1971 Taiwanese film, 梅花 (Plum Blossom) artfully captures general sentiment towards early-era Taiwan. With flowing lyrics and an upbeat melody, the song paints a metaphor of the plum blossom, comparing the Taiwanese people to the flower’s resilience in the dead of Chinese winters. At one point in the song, the artist chooses to add in a line “有土地就有它” (If there is dirt, there is the blossom). An unceremonious nod towards the island, the song reflected an era where many looked longingly across the Strait, confident of a day where the White Sun would once more rise over the mainland. However, times change, and while one would be hard-pressed to find anyone with such ludicrous aspirations today, a genuine concern breeds in the latest news cycles: the threat of Chinese annexation. General Secretary Xi Jinping, enjoying high approval ratings and overwhelming power in government, has constantly repeated his belief that China will never be whole “without its other half”- that other half being Taiwan. And as incidents of Chinese aggression and provocation continues to ramp up around the South China Sea, a dominant question now pervades the mind of the East-Asian security leaders: Should the United States give Taiwan a definite security guarantee? I believe that the answer is a definite no. By analyzing the situation through the strategic perspective of Chinese policymakers, I argue that Taiwan should advocate against a US-backed security guarantee, and instead pursue internal defense improvements to increase the cost of conflict for Beijing.
Today, Taiwan rests in a unique geopolitical limbo- akin to purgatory for countries. Recognized by 14 out of 193 members of the United Nations, Taiwan’s political state can be described as somewhat paradoxical. Without proper diplomatic ties to most countries, the island relies on a patchwork of informal and de facto embassies to carry out its international affairs. Even its closest ally, the United States, does not acknowledge the nation’s statehood. Instead, the core pillar for US-Taiwan relations comes in the aptly named Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Including everything from commerce regulations to the specific transportation doctrine between the countries and their respective dignitaries, the 1979 act broadly defines how the United States approaches Taiwan today. Perhaps one of the most important provisions of the act and the reason for Taiwan’s unique position today is the implementation of strategic ambiguity. Referred to as the backbone of US-Taiwan security policy, strategic ambiguity directs that the US would abstain from clarifying its intervention conditions given a conflict involving Taiwan. In short, this strategy forces China to spin a “Wheel-of-War,” where a conflict with Taiwan may or may not invoke the wrath of its greatest rival.
While strategic ambiguity has kept the peace for over 40 years, this policy seems slated for change. In the past few years, China seems more intent on reigning in its “rogue province”, which it sees as rightfully Chinese territory. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) now closely models the US in measures ranging from missile defense to battleships (Sisk). As a result, Beijing has become increasingly aggressive in its cross-Strait activities, flying bombing sorties, testing missiles, and conducting training exercises deep into maritime areas that the Taiwanese claim as their own. More recently, a 27 plane strong PLA squadron was detected flying over Taiwan’s ADIZ, or the air defense identification zone (The Associated Press). These flights pose a significant risk to the country, as they put many cities within range of Chinese attack. Thus, as Chinese saber-rattling has steadily increased, calls have mounted from commentators in both Taipei and Washington for a new plan: strategic clarity (SC).
The premise of strategic clarity is straightforward- it is simply the opposite of strategic ambiguity. In this case, the US would offer Taiwan a direct security guarantee, signaling that any conflict between the Strait would unques tionably bring American intervention. Proponents of this policy argue two points. First, they underscore that SC would reinforce the US’s commitment to the Pacific region. Second, they believe that US military force would be a clear deterrent to further Chinese provocations. Unfortunately, both perspectives are myopic and geopolitically speaking, do not look more than two moves ahead on the metaphorical chessboard. However, on face, SC seems like the intuitive option. Is a definite answer not always better than a maybe?
The answer becomes clear when one analyzes the unique situation of Chinese-Taiwanese relations. With peace as the primary goal, strategic ambiguity aims to prevent unilateral action from being taken by either country. Consider a thought experiment where the United States declares a definite security agreement towards Taiwan, as strategic clarity dictates. On one side, US-American tensions are now vastly heightened. The Chinese view the supposed breakaway state as a holdout from the century of humiliation, a time in which China underwent repeated conquest and subjugation by foreign powers. To declare direct support for the Taiwanese would legitimate the US as an “enemy of nationalism” and give credence to the Politsburo’s claim that the Americans are working against the rise of Chinese people. On the other side, the Taiwanese hardliners are now emboldened. With the backing of a global superpower, supporters of Taiwanese independence may feel as if they can act more aggressively, provoking China with a unilateral declaration that Taiwan is a free nation. Both of these situations are problematic and antithetical towards the preservation of peace in the region, and the possibility of such should be closely considered before a radical paradigm shift is considered.
Furthermore, absent direct Chinese or Taiwanese action, a declaration of a security guarantee could also inspire its own destabilizing actions. As Bonnie Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director of the China Power Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, explains in the Foreign Affairs, “If the United States extends an unqualified security commitment to Taiwan today, without the ability to make its threats credible, China could respond by mounting an attack” (Glaser et al.). The premise is simple. A direct declaration may force Beijing to call the US’ bluff. Since the window of opportunity until the US will have the bite to match its bark may be brief, Beijing may be incentivized to pursue rash action and attack before America organizes its forces, closing their perceived chance at Taiwanese dominion. Even if China does not initiate direct conflict, just preparing for one is inherently dangerous. Indeed, a security commitment to Taiwan could force both sides into an arms race, wherein either side overdevelops its forces in anticipation of the other’s, heightening the chance of conflict. Research published in the Journal of Peace Research finds that “an arms race increases the probability of war by 331%” (Rider et al. 97). Thus, these core problems bring us back to strategic ambiguity. Strategic ambiguity works because strategic clarity does not. By preventing rash action from both sides, this policy creates a situation that scholars call “dual deterrence.” As Richard Bush, senior fellow in the Center for East Asia Policy Studies (CEAP) at Brookings, explains,
“(Dual deterrence is) a mix of warnings and reassurances. Towards Beijing, the basic US line was to warn against attacking Taiwan and reassure that Washington did not support Taiwan’s independence. Towards Taipei, the message was to warn against political steps that would unnecessarily provoke a Chinese military response” (4).
Strategic ambiguity is a carefully designed policy, and Taiwanese leaders should understand that a reversal of such a doctrine could easily tip the balance of a delicate strategic equilibrium.
A Taiwanese proverb reads “城门失火, 殃及池鱼” (A fire at the city gates also spells doom for the fish in the moats). The lesson here is that a conflict with Taiwan may also have unintended effects for others. In the case of a potential conflict with the mainland, Taiwanese authorities should realize that if they could generate costs for China greater than the benefit of conflict, Bejing may soon realize who the proverbial fish is in this situation. Traditional geopolitical theory often leaves Taiwan itself outside of the discussion. In the view of some, Taiwan seems to become a mere pawn, beholden to a game played by two larger forces. However, this notion is dangerously misguided- I argue that Taiwan can effectively deter China from invasion, as long as they can show their adversaries how injurious it would be to set fire to the nation’s city gates. Using this framework, Taiwan may be able to convince its larger neighbor that a bearable peace in the status quo is preferable over the long-term pain of conquering a rebellious nation. Thus, aside from preserving the status quo, I propose two core policy recommendations that can be taken to align with this strategy.
First, Taiwan needs to reassess its current arms purchases with the United States. Past arms deals with the US often focused on flashy, big ticket items, such as F-16 fighter jets or large battle tanks. And while they give a clear signal of cooperation between the two countries, large sales such as these are of little use in a real defensive setting. Indeed, experts often warn that US weapons are “are expensive, designed to project power over great distances, and maximize mobility and networks to take the fight to the enemy with overwhelming superiority” (Thompson). In contrast, the potential war Taiwan is facing is vastly different. The island lies just 100 miles away from the mainland, putting it in a range of options such as cruise missiles or bombers that will most likely ensure that these expensive pieces of machinery will never see action. Instead, policymakers should be cognizant that any war is a losing one and focus their efforts on deterrence. Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND)’s recent shift towards what is known as an “asymmetric strategy”, where the military has focused on using affordable and maneuverable forces to prevent an attack on land is a step in the right direction, but it is not enough. Drew Thompson, former Director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia in the Office of the Secretary of Defense explains that
“The new concept is animated by the most critical mission of the Taiwan military: denying China the ability to land and resupply an invasion force. Beijing can use blockades, coercion, hybrid warfare, or “gray zone” pressure, but the only thing that guarantees Beijing can achieve its political objective of Taiwan’s surrender is putting Chinese boots on the ground and physically seizing control of the island.”
While the new military doctrine may prove valuable on paper, a change in action must complement it. Taiwanese leaders should invest in equipment that deter, rather than provoke their adversary. Renegotiating arms deals towards expanding low-tech solutions such as sea mines and other area denial capabilities should be seriously considered. As Thompson outlines, these tactics make it harder for Beijing to mount an invasion force, and will inflict a greater cost of doing so. Deploying these measures may thus be key in forcing China to rethink a costly ground landing. Anything but a relatively quick and painless battle would delegitimize the PRC’s claims to a world of Chinese hegemony, and thereby tank domestic support. Current symbolic arms deals do little to deter Chinese adventurism, and it’s time Taiwanese leaders realize so.
Second, Taiwan needs to overhaul it’s strategic reserve system. The current state of the reserve forces does not inspire much confidence. Plagued by structural issues like a deficit of training, low pay, and overall declining morale, the military is as Foreign Policy correspondent Paul Huang describes, “a hollow of its former shell”. While the island can boast platoons of well-trained and disciplined volunteers, the reserve force is one expected to defend the island in the event of a Chinese invasion. For Beijing to reconsider landing a ground force, reform is desperately needed. Unfortunately, current policy aimed at reform does not have its intended effect. Indeed, President Tsai’s recent initiatives to revamp the reserve forces have yielded little fruit. The problem is that reforms are often top-down, and get caught in bureaucratic specificities before they have any chance to make a real impact (Huang). Instead, I believe that creating something more akin to a home guard will be more beneficial to the Taiwan’s defense. Replacing the reserve force, which suffers from a lack of organization and equipment, with platoons of people assigned to defending their literal homes may improve morale substantially. This is logical, as citizens may be more enthusiastic to defend the land that they know and the people they hold dearest. The concept of a home guard is not foreign to the realm of deterrence. The Baltic countries, which are under constant threat from Russia, have all employed similar strategies, with the organization of volunteer forces that act as reserve defenders in their home provinces. Incidently, research published in the Journal of Strategic Security concludes that “Baltic volunteer forces do appear to have a deterrent effect on Russia” (Beehner et al. 51). Furthermore, such a reorganization of the reserve forces may inspire and make insurgency activity easier to conduct across provinces. The possibility for insurgent conflict further increases the cost of conflict for Beijing, even if the initial conflict has long passed. Thus, a combination of these effects may further shape Taiwan into a less desirable prize for a hungry China.
While a stratagem shift towards strategic clarity may sound appealing on paper, it is unfortunately too myopic. It encourages rash action from all parties involved and ignores the nuances of the situation. Taiwan is no stranger to the existential threats it faces from the mainland and should be prepare itself accordingly. With an overhaul of its reserve system and substantial investment into area denial capabilities, perhaps the Taiwanese should consider a new national flower to represent themselves: The blossom of a spike-filled cactus.
Works Cited
Beehner, Lionel, and Liam Collins. “Can Volunteer Forces Deter Great Power War? Evidence from the Baltics.” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 12, no. 4, University of South Florida Board of Trustees, 2019, pp. 51, https://www.jstor.org/stable/26851260.
Bush, Richard. “The United States Security Partnership with Taiwan,” The Brookings Institution ,https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_taiwan_alliance.pdf
Glaser, Bonnie S., et al. “Dire Straits.” Foreign Affairs, 11 June 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-09-24/dire-straits.
Huang, Paul. “Taiwan’s Military Is a Hollow Shell.” Foreign Policy, 16 Feb. 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/02/15/china-threat-invasion-conscription-taiwans-military-is-a-hollow-shell/.
Rider, Toby J., et al. “Just Part of the Game? Arms Races, Rivalry, and War.” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 48, no. 1, Sage Publications, Ltd., 2011, pp. 97, http://www.jstor.org/stable/29777471.
Sisk, Richard. “China’s Military Has Surpassed Us in Ships, Missiles and Air Defense, DOD Report Finds.” Military.com, 2 Sept. 2020, https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/09/01/chinas-military-has-surpassed-us-ships-missiles-and-air-defense-dod-report-finds.html.
“Taiwan Sends Jets after 27 Chinese Planes Enter Buffer Zone.” ABC News, The Associated Press , 28 Nov. 2021, https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/taiwan-sends-jets-27-chinese-planes-enter-buffer-81431008.
Thompson, Drew. “Hope on the Horizon: Taiwan’s Radical New Defense Concept.” War on the Rocks, 2 Oct. 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/10/hope-on-the-horizon-taiwans-radical-new-defense-concept/.
