Land Reform in Zimbabwe

Izabella Ge
The Ends of Globalization
12 min readApr 30, 2022

There has been nothing short of a preponderance of news reports, scholarly articles, and case studies surrounding the fall of Zimbabwe, once proudly known as the breadbasket of Africa. The story is indeed heartbreaking, but one that is crucial for the world to know so that such tragedy never repeats itself again. At the heart of all the chaos lies the issue of land and how to ensure a fairer distribution of land among the white and black populations. Former President Robert Mugabe chose to seize white farms without compensation. In doing so, he disposed of thousands of white farmers and over a million mainly black farm workers who were once exporting millions of tons of agricultural produce. Many of the farms were gifted to Mugabe’s political allies or small-scale peasants but their inability to farm and grow crops at a commercial scale led to Zimbabwe then having to rely on food imports to simply feed its population as not enough produce was being grown. While some may argue that Zimbabwe must complete a total redistribution of land to black farmers to resolve the question of land, I advocate that rather than enforcing the expropriation of land without compensation, implementing a government-sponsored program to train a new generation of skilled black farmers and award them with land based on their competences would allow the nation to finally reach a point of sustainable development. By doing so, land would not be simply nominally transferred from white to black hands, but black farmers would instead be able to actually feed the general population, generate revenue, and thus drive up Zimbabwe’s exports rather than letting the land go wasted.

Zimbabwe has dealt with the question of land distribution for over a century. In 1930, when Zimbabwe was still known as Southern Rhodesia and a white-minority colonial government was still in power, the Land Apportionment Act was passed, granting 49 million acres of land to white farmers and a mere 17.7 million acres to be shared between black and white farmers. At the time, white Rhodesians accounted for less than 4% of the population, yet were entitled to the majority of the land. Later, after Zimbabwe gained independence, the Lancaster House Agreement was signed, meaning that the Zimbabwean government was not to confiscate the land of white farmers for the next ten years. Mugabe operated off of purchasing land from willing buyers, but not much progress was made in regards to land distribution. A 2002 article from the Guardian details the situation, “Yet after 20 years of Mugabe’s rule… the picture was not hugely different. Just 6,000 white farmers occupied half of Zimbabwe’s 81m acres of arable land. About 850,000 black farmers were crammed into the rest. Since independence, only 10% of arable land has moved legally from white to black hands”. Simply put, the proportion of land to each farmer was radically different for white and black farmers. This ratio was seen as a legacy of colonialism and Mugabe sought to increase the percentage of land owned by black farmers. It was widely acknowledged that some sort of land reform was necessary to aid the nearly one million black families who were overcrowded on small sects of land.This vast gap was not sustainable in the long-run and Mugabe had to do something to quell the frustrations.

The world now knows of the notorious land-grabs instituted by Mugabe which saw the forceful removal of white farmers from the lands. However, the implementation of the fast-track land reform policy has had egregious results. As Mugabe began to lose support in the late 1990s, he ordered the implementation of the fast-track land reform program as a way to regain the support of those who were frustrated with the sluggish economic growth. The government actively encouraged squatters to invade white farms along with sending troops over to evict white farmers and their families. Thousands of farms were seized and showered on political cronies as rewards from Mugabe. While the Western media has devoted much attention to the plight of the thousands of white Zimbabwean farmers who were harassed, tortured, and forced off of their lands, over a million black farm workers were evicted, affecting millions of other Zimbabweans as well. Ultimately, the decisions regarding land reform had far-reaching consequences that saw the flight of around a fifth of Zimbabwe’s population.

Mugabe’s land reforms did not succeed because the land was more often than not bestowed on individuals who were incapable of efficiently running large-scale commercial farms. Promising to redistribute land is a convenient and effective way of garnering support right before a crucial election –which is what Mugabe did– but not a viable long-term solution to resolve the issue of land distribution. Farms were first taken over by squatters and war veterans but were later awarded to Mugabe’s political allies, people who had no knowledge of farming nor had any interest in learning. Land was also distributed to smaller-scale peasants but they often were not trained in cultivating land either. In both scenarios, the once fertile land that grew vegetables exported to premier European supermarkets became barren, overgrown only with weeds. The Guardian covered an investigation by ZimOnline that found that “A “new, well-connected black elite” of about 2,200 people controls nearly 40% of the 14m hectares seized from white farmers… These range in size from 250 to 4,000 hectares in “the most fertile farming regions in the country”. With such a startling amount of land in the hands of Mugabe’s cronies, it is no surprise that food production plunged. Zimbabwe officially plunged into a famine in 2004, just three short years after the land seizures began. Former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Powers details the grim statistics in a 2003 article for The Atlantic, writing, “The drop-off in agricultural production is staggering. Maize farming, which yielded more than 1.5 million tons annually before 2000, is this year expected to generate just 500,000 tons. Wheat production, which stood at 309,000 tons in 2000, will hover at 27,000 tons this year. Tobacco production, too, which at 265,000 tons accounted for nearly a third of the total foreign-currency earnings in 2000, has tumbled, to about 66,000 tons in 2003”. Post-land reform, the seized farms were no longer nearly as productive as they had once been. Exiled white farmers watched helplessly as their nation, whose GDP was once heavily supported by agricultural exports, became increasingly reliant on foreign aid and relief in order to feed its own people while millions of acres of farming land lay wasted. It was a severe oversight on Mugabe’s end and his land reforms not only failed to fairly redistribute land in order to correct colonial injustices, but only thrusted Zimbabwe into an economic crisis that persists up to this day. Zimbabwe now lacks a sufficient number of skilled farmers who are learned in the ways of agriculture and the nation suffers greatly as a result.

Based on the economic and political consequences of the land reform policies in Zimbabwe, it is evident that the best solution would be to establish a government-sponsored program to train and develop skilled farmers as well as equip them with the necessary resources to cultivate their land. We have seen that simply showering land on untrained individuals only leads to a waste of valuable assets, but many Zimbabweans suffer from a lack of education and training. Farmers should be incentivized to sell their farms by the state either through financial compensation or other forms of compensation. While this process may be slower, the horrific consequences seen in the past two decades have proved that when only the short-term effects are considered, the results may be horrendous beyond belief. By not expropriating without compensating, the government will regain the people’s trust and confidence in its objectives of alleviating poverty while ensuring that the land will be in good hands and will be well cared for.

In substance, this program would institute government-supported vocational schools that not only offer world-class education but also sufficient resources to support the emerging generation of black farmers. South Korea underwent a dramatic economic transformation in the late 20th century and a major propelling factor was the well-structured education system. South Korean students had the option of either pursuing a general or vocational diploma. For those who chose to attend a vocational school rather than a technical school, they spent two years studying the basics of agriculture, marine studies etc. and later spent a year working in the field while receiving half-of-the-minimum wage (Tzannatos and Johnes, 433). That way, students not only extensively studied the field but had concrete knowledge of what their future careers would look like. The Zimbabwean government would implement a system which would allow Zimbabwean students to do the same. The government would invest heavily into instituting strong agricultural programs in vocational high schools and the teachers would be retired farmers who are passionate about farming, not to mention well-versed in the industry. Where this program would differ from that of South Korea would be in the financing; this program, at least initially, would be funded by foreign aid. The money would be used for three purposes: establishing and running agricultural vocational schools, buying arable land from willing sellers, and purchasing farming resources that young farmers would need such as pesticides, fertilizer, seeds, tractors etc.

One notable example that highlights the success of training individuals to farm is that of former white Zimbabwean farmer Pieter de Klerk who owned a magnificent farm called

Kondozi in the heart of the lush hills of the Manicaland province. Journalist Rosie DiMannio details that Kondozi was a sprawling estate that produced vegetables of the highest caliber for upscale European supermarkets. After the land reform policies were passed, squatters began invading his farm, but instead of attempting to force them off the land, de Klerk’s sons taught them to cultivate and grow vegetables. There were institutions established on the farm in order to educate black people on how to become self-sufficient farmers. De Klerk would purchase the vegetables grown by the squatters and there began the cycle of self-sufficiency. At its peak, Kondozi employed around 6,000 workers and supported tens of thousands more when family members were taken into account. Unfortunately, the farm was seized by the authorities and tens of thousands of livelihoods were suddenly disrupted. Nonetheless, the lessons learned from de Klerk’s endeavors can still be applied to Zimbabwe today. De Klerk’s success in helping produce a sustainable generation of black farmers remains a blueprint for the Zimbabwean government to follow.

Some historians may muse wistfully that a program based on a willing seller/willing buyer basis has already been tried, but at the time the government lacked the resources to successfully implement such a policy. Post-independence, President Mugabe was required to abide by the aforementioned Lancaster Agreement. In order to reach a target of resettling 162,000 black families, President Mugabe operated on a willing seller/willing buy basis, but after ten years, had still only resettled 71,000 black families (Alexander, 333). In a book titled “A Predictable Tragedy” that covers the repercussions of Zimbabwe’s land reform policy, author Daniel Compagnon asserts that “There have always been more farms on offer than the government could acquire… the resettlement program had come almost to a halt because the government did not provide the expertise, training, farming equipment, and infrastructures needed” (Compagnon, 168). While it is correct that the government has attempted to institute something slightly similar, it did not possess nearly enough capital to sufficiently carry out its objectives. What is different about my solution is that there would be a steady source of income for the government to purchase land and to provide resources to train new black farmers. The money would come from the foreign aid on which Zimbabwe is so heavily dependent.

That being said, Transparency.org unearthed that Zimbabwe is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, with a 157/180 on the world corruption index. Since Zimbabwe is still heavily dependent on foreign aid, Western countries like the United States that continue to funnel aid to Zimbabwe have a responsibility to play a part in reducing corruption; they must ensure that the aid is first and foremost a short term investment. Zimbabwe should be given 10–15 years more of receiving aid before it is forced to rely solely upon its own tax payer money. Additionally, the aid would not be granted without strings attached, meaning that Zimbabwe should only be able to receive funds if they meet a target of X number of students successfully graduating from the agricultural vocational program and if they demonstrate proof that the money has also gone towards providing each student with arable land and resources to be self-sufficient. The amount of aid would increase based on the productivity of the farms directly run by students who benefited from the program as well as on the number of candidates in a given year. Any unlawful confiscation of land would result in an immediate end to the foreign aid. The goal is for Zimbabwe to eventually have a sufficient number of farmers who are knowledgeable about the agricultural sector and are able to feed the country, thereby ending its long standing reliance on foreign relief as well as reinstituting trust in the national government.

Now, few people care to even bat an eyelash at the struggles of a small landlocked country in Southern Africa, but the effects of Zimbabwe’s land reform policies affect other countries as well. South Africa is currently undergoing a serious debate on expropriation without compensation and until recently many officials were considering revising the country’s constitution in order to allow the farms of white South African farmers to be expropriated. A Washington Post article states that the complaint is that though the white population makes up only 8% of the total population, over 72% of the country’s arable land is in the hands of white farmers. Regardless of what one’s opinion of expropriation is, according to history, the staggering inequality in South Africa will only bring about some form of land confiscation in the future as people can only be patient for so long. Thus, the issue is how to appropriately avoid expropriation and find another alternative solution. The education-based program that I proposed for Zimbabwe could be modeled in neighboring South Africa as well. By not only investing heavily into educating students about the agricultural industry but also dispensing them with the necessary capital to run a farm, the South African government would likely avert future expropriation without compensation and its devastating repercussions rather than seeing a significant decline in South African food production along with millions of acres of squandered, unproductive farmland. Training a new generation of competent black farmers and awarding them with bought–not expropriated– land based on their competencies would not only ensure that the food production won’t decline but also that the land would be cultivated rather than wasted. It is vital that the issue of land reform be addressed, otherwise countries like South Africa with a complicated legacy of colonialism and injustices could very well face significant turmoil in the years to come. Millions of lives could be in jeopardy and we could witness the downfall of another nation.

In conclusion, land reform is not a spur-of-the-moment sort of decision but rather a well-intentioned and thought out process to truly uplift those who are disadvantaged. When one’s goal becomes retribution, revenge, or political ambition, the policies will fail and the masses are left with dire consequences while the policy makers hardly even feel the effect of the negative repercussions. We must always seek to prioritize the needs of those who will be directly affected by these policies and thus the best course of action to take is to train individuals to farm and to provide them with land that is not expropriated based on their ability to cultivate land. Zimbabwe’s heartbreaking story is a lesson for other nations seeking to redress historic injustices to tread carefully lest they end up plunging their nation into a twenty-year crisis.

Works Cited

Alexander, Jocelyn. “State, Peasantry and Resettlement in Zimbabwe.” Review of African Political Economy, vol. 21, no. 61, 1994, p. 333., https://doi.org/10.1080/03056249408704063.

“Analysis: The Trail from Lancaster House.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 16 Jan. 2002, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/jan/16/zimbabwe.chrismcgreal.

Bloomberg, Mike Cohen |. “Analysis | Why South Africa Is Stuck in a Land Reform Quagmire.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 17 Sept. 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/why-south-africa-is-stuck-in-a-land-reform-quagmire/2021/09/15/2e33b786-15da-11ec-a019-cb193b28aa73_story.html.

Compagnon, Daniel. “The Land ‘Reform’ Charade and the Tragedy of Famine.” A Predictable Tragedy: Robert Mugabe and the Collapse of Zimbabwe, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 2013, p. 168.

DiManno, Rosie. “A Farm Lies Fallow, a Farmer Forsaken.” Thestar.com, 24 July 2010, https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2010/07/24/a_farm_lies_fallow_a_farmer_forsaken.html?rf.

“Mugabe and Allies Own 40% of Land Seized from White Farmers — Inquiry.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 30 Nov. 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/30/zimbabwe-mugabe-white-farmers.

Power, Samantha. “How to Kill a Country.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 15 Nov. 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2003/12/how-to-kill-a-country/302845/.

Tzannatos, Zafiris, and Geraint Johnes. “Training and Skills Development in the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries: A Comparison and Lessons for Developing Countries1.” Journal of Vocational Education & Training, vol. 49, no. 3, 20 Dec. 2006, pp. 431–453., https://doi.org/10.1080/13636829700200025.

“Zimbabwe.” Transparency.org, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/zimbabwe.

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