Nation Building- A one-nation job?
What comes to mind when I say the words “Nation-Building?” To the Ameican Zoomer or Millennial, the same series of familiar scenes may play in our minds. Whether it is U.S. GI’s standing amidst a burning oil field, George W. Bush’s premature “Mission Accomplished” speech, or patriotically colored packages of USAID being distributed amidst a crowd of refugees, Washington’s 20-year foreign policy track record has been overwhelmingly ingrained in our minds as a resounding failure. Two weeks ago, as I sat down amidst the rows of rigid wooden seats in the Village dining hall, I was greeted with an image of a young Afghan clinging to the landing gear of the last American plane on CNN. With the story finished, the reporters shifted to commentary on the football preseason, leaving America’s 20 year, trillion-dollar failure in rearview mirror as quickly as which it came. To me, the 12-second video couldn’t be any more fitting as a symbol of our exit; A hurried retreat with little coordination, leaving the host nation in disarray. And while policymakers on Capitol Hill scratch their head and argue over what went wrong, here’s my (relatively unqualified) opinion on the matter: America has lost its way with our foreign policy. We focus too much on being right, trying to mold the host in an image of ourselves, and when our methods don’t work, we double down and find a scapegoat to blame our problems on. As Dominic Tierney, chair of political science at Swarthmore University puts it in the case of Afghanistan,
“If we had just had a little less righteousness in 2002 and a little more pragmatism and savviness about how the war was going to go and how there was not going to be an easy victory, then maybe we could have cut a deal, and at far lower costs for America and for Afghanistan (Tierney).
Can nation-building retain its legitimacy as a tool to bring stability and prosperity to nations around the globe? While some argue that nation-building is pre-engineered to fail, I believe that when benefactor countries adopt a global mindset and place align their goals with the host country, nation-building can be one of the best ways for the global south to receive infrastructural, economic, and political developments.
In light of our recent experiences with foreign assistance, there are some who say that the process of nation-building is wholly incompatible with the true development of a host nation. They point to different examples; whether it is the US in Vietnam, the Soviets in East Germany, or even the European Union’s involvement n Yugoslavia. Yet when we examine almost every instance of failed nation-building, there are certain factors that we can point to as reasons for the failure. In Vietnam, the US’s efforts largely disregarded the culture, traditions, and customs of the local people, which meant that we could never effectively rouse the morale and support of South Vietnam. In East Germany, the Soviets ruled with an iron hand, shutting down dissent to ensure conformity within its citizens, creating a culture of distrust and eventually government dissatisfaction. For Yugoslavia, the lack of clear strategy and direction that the EU provided throughout their involvement delayed and ultimately eliminated the chance of crafting functional political institutions. Today, Yugoslavia is no longer country, divided into multiple ethnic states in a region that is still mired in ethnic and civil conflict. Yet among all three examples comes a commonality: The complete unwillingness for the benefactor country to adopt a global mindset, that is, willing and able to frame their decision making calculus not on the benefit it will have for themselves, but the region and world as a whole.
I am a Taiwanese American, and without US nation-building, I probably would not be here in America today. Allow me to explain: The year is 1949, the small island nation still recovering from over 50 years of Imperial Japanese rule. As the Chinese Civil War draws to a close, the defeated Kuomingtang brings over 2 million refugees to the island, fleeing from the now communist-controlled mainland. The economy is stifled with rampant inflation, a lack of real industry, and corrupt government officials. For Taiwan, the future outlook did not look bright. However, over the next decades, the nation’s GDP rose by over 350%, the wealth gap within the nation decreased significantly, and urban sectors were revitalized, creating something that the world dubbed a “Taiwanese Miracle”. However, miracles are rare, and the reason for success can be sourced to one big reason: over 4 billion dollars in US aid. From the standpoint of an external observer, it seems that the US had a sudden outburst of generosity. Yet the truth is less ideal. When we analyze the support of the US, we begin to question the reasoning behind this investment: Why did the US send this aid? Why Taiwan, and not the hundreds of other countries that needed similar assistance in economic, global revitalization?
The answer comes in the form of power projection. US aid almost never comes with a “No strings policy”. When we look back now, it is clear that US policymakers approved the aid not out of generosity, but of national gain. The Taiwanese Miracle occurred at the height of the Cold War. As the communist mainland of China encroached upon East Asia, the United States realized it needed an ally there, lest “all of Asia fall into the hands of the communist heathens”. Thus, the decision to send aid to Taiwan came in droves. From free use cash agreements to foreign direct investment, Taiwan saw everything from bags of rice to M16s. Pretty soon, the US had shaped Taiwan in its own image, complete with Mcdonald’s just a block away from the presidential office.
Nonetheless, Taiwan today has been a shining success in the light of American nation-building. Its poverty rate is one of the lowest in Asia, the government satisfaction high, and an economy largely well off. However, it is wise to note that it is still a victim of neo-imperialism — its government, politics, and economy all shaped after economic ideals. Thus, the question is, what made Taiwan such a success in the realm of nation-building itself?
The answer comes relatively simple. A willingness for policymakers on both sides to acquiesce and engage within meaningful dialogue on effective development strategy. Throughout Taiwan’s period growth, American administrators recognized and allowed the independent creation of stable civil structure and society within Taiwan. Whether this meant allowing domestic aid organizations independent freedom or allowing independent civilian political institutions to develop, the US approach in Taiwan has been a multifaceted and balanced presence, with both sides willing to understand each other and move towards stability in the future. Although the US did have external and unrelated reasons for actually giving assistance and aid, it recognized Taiwan’s own interests and allowed their policymakers to distribute and frame a stable network within their own government. Here, US leaders understood that any overt or hardline approach would trigger a response by Eastern bloc powers, and thus acted with a global goal in mind — to retain world stability and peace. In essence, the benefactor was not only able to think about its internal interests, but how its dealings with the host nation would affect the broader globe as well.
So how can future nation-building ventures replicate this in the future? Today, outside of America, nation-building ventures still exist around the world. One example would be China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI). Developed to assist and connect nations worldwide through infrastructural and investment projects, the BRI is China’s own bid to increase its soft power across the globe. Poised to be the largest foreign-sponsored project yet, the BRI will invest and build across 70 countries. It is not without its faults, however, with claims of debt trapping, ecological building disasters, and worker exploitation, being launched by its opponents. Today’s policymakers should be mindful of how their actions impact the globes around them. By following the example of Taiwan, we can set a good precedent to how external and foreign aid can be conducted in the future, where policymakers who think in the concept of global stability are able to help nations reach their goals, internal and external.
Works Cited
Chang , David W. “U.S. Aid and Economic Progress in Taiwan.” Asian Survey, vol. 5, no. 3, Mar. 1965, pp. 152–160.
Elliott, Philip, and Dominic Tierney. “A Political Scientist on Why the U.s. Lost in Afghanistan.” Time, Time, 18 Aug. 2021, time.com/6091183/afghanistan-war-failure-interview/.
