A New Lens of the Semiconductor-Dependent World: A Response to Miller’s Chip War

In the modern world, nearly every piece of technology, from a dishwasher to a phone, runs because of a semiconductor chip, better known as a microchip. Microchips are used in devices such as smartphones and even automobiles that allow for electrical current conductivity, fundamentally enabling each device to work in the first place. Many take microchip technology for granted in their everyday lives, unaware of the relevant political implications microchips can have on our everyday lives, and focus on the consumer side of chips to make our phones operate correctly.

In Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technologies, economic historian Chris Miller delivers a detailed historical account of the steep rise of the semiconductor industry and the contentious international race to develop new software to make the most efficient and powerful models to date. In exploring the complex history of the microchip, Miller discusses how microchips have military, economic, and geopolitical implications for microchip production and global standing, highlighting how the rise in technology has proportionally provoked a dependent use of microchips in the modern world.

The birth of microchip technology, according to Miller, offered a plethora of opportunities, especially in terms of military use in light of the Cold War conflict with the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union first sent humans to space, the race to develop space technology emerged, and the United States used newly produced semiconductor chips used in the Apollo missions and the Minuteman II missile in the Cold War, provoking an immense increase in production and use in microchips in all things military from missiles to sonar devices.

The steep success for American microchip producers emerged from competitors who hoped to achieve success in the new microchip empire. Russia invested significantly in semiconductor research and managed to mass-produce microchips using American technology and methods. Russian microchips exposed a weakness in replicating American designs, managing to produce microchip technology exactly five years behind American technology. However, the strategy remained unreliable and led to an inevitable downfall not long after.

Soon, Japan emerged as the leading competitor in the semiconductor industry. Contrary to Russian motives, Japan aimed to sell to the consumer market rather than the military market and sold to Japanese and American markets to expand the semiconductor market internationally. After WWII, despite existing conflict with Japan, the United States employed an official policy to assist Japanese research in technology to support a rebirth in the Japanese economy, arguing that “a strong Japan is a better risk than a weak Japan (Miller, Chris 36).” Japanese market diversification allowed the Japanese semiconductor industry to flourish, and by 1990, Japanese companies owned more than half of the chip manufacturers in the world. As the Japanese gained a grip over the international market, the United States saw the Japanese success as a legitimate threat to their presence in the semiconductor industry and looked elsewhere to regain control. The U.S. befriended South Korea to tame unexpected success in Japan by providing ample funding and research to produce the most advanced chips possible. Korean producers became leading competitors in the semiconductor market, creating some of the most advanced chips at the time, backed by U.S. funding. The advancement in technology inevitably passed Japanese capabilities as the United States has intended to prove a successful strategy to regain control power in the semiconductor industry.

In the final part of the book, Miller discusses the rise of Chinese semiconductor technology. Chinese microchip production began in the 1960s with defense applications and had a small consumer market in the Chinese economy. After a lagged presence in the Asian semiconductor market, China was forced to rely on Taiwanese production, which offered technology at lower technological standards. However, a former senior executive at Texas Instruments, Morris Chang, influenced Chinese emergence in the semiconductor industry after founding the semiconductor company TSMC (Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company). TSMC made a significant contribution to the semiconductor industry after making a company that was built on manufacturing companies’ chips using their designs, a process yet to be introduced in the international market. For the first time, companies around the world were able to mass produce microchips with lower upfront costs, all while simultaneously protecting their designs with an alliance with companies in the industry chain. Chang became an important figure in the microchip world as companies around the world understood the benefits of working with TSMC and jumped at the opportunity to produce new chip technology.

TSMC fostered the steep growth of Chinese semiconductor production by providing an opportunity to mass-produce microchips close to China at a lower price. Despite China’s late entrance into the semiconductor market, with TSMC’s support, the nation became a more significant threat to American dominance during the COVID-19 pandemic. As the rest of the world shut down, China supercharged its semiconductor industry. In the early months of 2020, China enforced some of the harshest restrictions on its population in an effort to suppress the spread of the pandemic as much as possible. The government-enforced restrictions applied to every Chinese company except for one facility, YMTC (Yangtze Memory Technologies Corporation), China’s head producer of NAND memory chips commonly used in smartphones (Miller, Chris 97). Miller described the lack of restrictions on chip-specializing companies as a potential “Sputnik moment” that may be the reason China developed rapidly while the rest of the world began to shut down in the face of the pandemic (Miller, Chris 97). The steep progress caused an international fear that Chinese advancements in the semiconductor industry may cause a significant change in market share in favor of China.

Chinese companies were among the first to use TSMC, propelling the nation into the semiconductor industry and immediately expanding their presence internationally. Although at face value, TSMC offers an opportunity for both China and the U.S. to benefit significantly from manufacturing and designing, China’s rapid increase in development in the semiconductor industry has emerged as a threat to the U.S. economy. If Chinese development continues to increase at its current rate, the U.S. worries that countries around the world will become dependent on high-end chips produced by Chinese companies. Chip War is certainly an example of brilliant historical storytelling, backed by hundreds of researchers and professionals, and urges the reader to consider the significance of the Chip War in our everyday lives. However, Miller lightly touched on labor challenges in the books, failing to recognize the consequences of mass-producing microchips internationally and the implications the chip war introduces in the face of its success.

Surprisingly, Miller’s goal to present a historical account of the rise of the semiconductor industry internationally leaves out a vital element in understanding the logistical challenges to obtain a skilled workforce compatible with the steep increase in semiconductor mass production. The production process begins with skilled laborers creating designs. These designs are often backed by years of research and innovative technology to produce an advanced chip to sell to the market. The company imports all of the necessary components from the design to make the product work, and they are sent to a technician to work the puzzle together and create a quality product. Unlike mass-producing t-shirts or even a product like a chair, microchips require several steps that work because of technical understanding and ability in the designing and manufacturing to produce one chip, let alone hundreds of thousands of chips. Many confuse mass production with purely low-skill labor, however, mass production of microchips is only possible with experienced workers with sufficient training to tend to the complex technology. Mass-producing microchips internationally quickly and efficiently is only possible when paired with high-skilled labor and talent acquisition. Michael Miller of the University of Cincinnati explains the extent of training to produce technicians, including that it “can take up to two years” to develop a highly skilled worker into a proficient semiconductor technician at Intel (Miller, Michael). Semiconductor technicians are jobs that require intense and lengthy training to work on some of the most technologically advanced microchips in the world, creating a problematic future for a worker pipeline in the industry. Chip War’s Chris Miller focuses on political moves to lower Japanese success by funding a competitor or to impact Chinese production by restricting goods sold internationally. However, he lacks an explanation behind labor logistics in a plan for the U.S. to produce microchips domestically, missing a crucial aspect of U.S. strategy.

In the book, Miller does not explicitly address the severe labor shortage that may occur in light of the rising demand for highly skilled workers required to successfully mass produce microchips. One article argues that labor shortage is the biggest issue in the microchip industry and an even more significant issue in the future, writing, “By 2030, the semiconductor industry will grow by 80%, meaning an additional one million workers will be needed to meet demand (Ackerman).” To reach the intended goals that would satisfy the international demand for microchips, higher semiconductor technicians become increasingly vital to avoid a domestic chip shortage in the U.S. again. The projected rise of the semiconductor industry will leave tens of thousands of jobs vacant, according to recent degree completion patterns (Ackerman). The projected job deficit in the future holds an unfortunate reality for the semiconductor industry and provokes a dilemma in hiring new workers to mass-produce microchips. In response to the lack of labor for semiconductor technicians, do U.S. companies look to lower standards for training for prospective employees, or will the lack of experience compromise and hinder U.S. innovation and consistency in production? U.S. companies have already looked to make incentive-based programs aiming to raise production and proportionally satisfy domestic demand. However, incentivizing production is not a viable option for companies to rely on in the long run (Sourcengine Team). Miller does not recognize the talent challenges from U.S. domestic semiconductor production but also does not recognize the labor shortage that may arise because of the projected rise in microchip technology. As a result, a strategy to achieve U.S. technological prowess in the semiconductor industry lacks logistics around potential labor challenges and, therefore, is a partially unreliable strategy for the U.S. government to pursue.

Despite the lack of explanation in the book regarding the potential labor shortage in the semiconductor industry, Miller touched on labor and talent acquisition in an interview with Noah Smith, a writer from Tuft University. Smith asked Miller’s perspective on labor and talent for U.S. chip manufacturing, and Miller responded by explaining the need for a training pipeline for highly skilled workers to produce chips. Miller included that the U.S. is “making significant progress in training, with a number of new programs having been set up by chipmakers and universities (Smith).” Miller also includes the potential need for a pipeline that simultaneously trains immigrant and domestic workers. As Miller explains, “I think the CHIPS Act should have been coupled with a CHIPS Visa program to make sure companies have fast-track access to the workers they need, though the Commerce Department is trying to take steps to facilitate visas for semiconductor workers within the boundaries of existing legislation (Smith).” The CHIPS Science Act, signed by the Biden Administration on August 9, 2022, aimed to propel domestic chip research by investing hundreds of billions of dollars to fund companies to successfully mass produce chips domestically. The book was released months after the act was passed in October; however, it overlooked the dilemma of efficiently training workers to combat the inevitable rise in demand for highly skilled workers needed to mass produce chips domestically. Miller recommends the idea of creating an efficient training pipeline for semiconductor workers with the CHIPS Science act, also suggesting the implementation of a VISA act that would allow immigrants to mass produce microchips domestically.

What may seem like the best move to allocate the most workers for the industry to accommodate a labor shortage may come at a cost. Some may argue that bringing Taiwanese workers to American manufacturers is an attempt at cheap labor exploitation in order to mass produce microchips domestically. The president of TSMC Arizona, Brian Harrison, argues the opposite, suggesting that “It actually is more expensive to bring the workers from Taiwan, pay them a fair U.S. salary while they’re in the U.S. and pay for all their relocation and housing and support (Partsinevelos).” Harrison exposes the dilemma that perhaps hiring immigrant workers is a more expensive venture than hiring domestic workers, and if you don’t hire immigrant workers, the labor shortage will heighten and consequently open the gap between U.S. and Chinese semiconductor technology, enabling China’s ability to control the market. Contrary to Miller’s opinion that an immigrant worker pipeline may be one of the best courses of action in the face of labor challenges, Harrison suggests that immigrant workers may be economically hindered when mass producing microchips domestically.

Miller also didn’t dive into the semiconductor field with a vision of artificial intelligence in mind; an evolving topic that may be a legitimate way of labor in future years. Artificial intelligence has potential to cushion the high skilled labor shortage in the semiconductor industry. AMD senior vice president Ivo Bolsens explains, “We are entering an era of electronic design creation”, predicting that A.I. will eventually be able to see through the electronics’ high-level specifications. However, he explained that complete replacement of human chip design may not come in the near future (Perry). Despite extended research into artificial intelligence, A.I. applications have only recently taken a dip into industrial robotics industries. Artificial intelligence technology is far from replacing highly skilled work and is more capable of replacing monotonous, simple tasks that do not involve semiconductor technology.

Despite the slow advancement of artificial intelligence, things such as ChatGPT and other A.I. AI-generated content have already taken over educational systems; it can only make one wonder what the future holds in an AI-driven world. Miller’s choice to leave out the topic of artificial intelligence misses an issue that is becoming more relevant every day, and inevitably calls for a question of politics and ethics. A.I. has the potential to revolutionize technological advancement, and shape geopolitics differently with the implementation of artificial intelligence in the military, labor, and innovation. Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and SpaceX explains, “We will have for the first time something smarter than the smartest human. It’s hard to say exactly what that moment is, but there will come a point where no job is needed.” It is difficult to imagine that technology can be smarter than the most intelligent human being, but Musk proves the potential of artificial intelligence. A.I. has the potential to change the global labor economy forever; however, it provokes the question of a dystopian world run entirely on artificial intelligence. A topic of such gravity regarding our future holds both exciting and alarming truths: artificial intelligence can change geopolitics and technological innovation forever.

Works Cited:

Ackerman, Kathryn. “The Labor Shortage Is the Biggest Problem for the Semiconductor Industry.” Sourceability, 1 Dec. 2023,

sourceability.com/post/the-labor-shortage-is-the-biggest-problem-for-the-semiconductor-industry.

Miller, Chris. Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology. SIMON & SCHUSTER LTD, 2022.

Miller, Michael. “UC Launches Training for New Intel Jobs.” UC News, 6 June 2023, www.uc.edu/news/articles/2023/06/uc-begins-training-for-new-intel-microchip-fabrication-jobs-i n-ohio.html.

Partsinevelos, Kristina. “Growing Talent Gap in U.S. Chip Space Emerges as Makers Spend Billions.” CNBC, CNBC, 9 Aug. 2023, www.cnbc.com/2023/08/09/us-chip-sector-talent-gap-emerges-as-makers-spend-billions.html.

Perry, Tekla S. “How Will AI Affect the Semiconductor Industry?” IEEE Spectrum, IEEE Spectrum, 15 Nov. 2023, spectrum.ieee.org/how-will-ai-change-semiconductors.

Smith, Noah. “Interview: Chris Miller, Historian and Author of ‘Chip War.’” Tufts University, 26 July 2023, sites.tufts.edu/fletcherrussia/interview-chris-miller-historian-and-author-of-chip-war/.

Sourcengine Team. “Semiconductor Industry News — March 2024 Update.” Sourcengine, 29 Mar. 2024, www.sourcengine.com/blog/semiconductor-industry-news#July-14-2023.