Keeping Peace, Not Making War: Reassessing the United States National Defense Budget
Executive Summary
The United States leads the world by far in military expenditures; the country spends upwards of $750 billion annually on military activities. Prioritizing military investment strains the federal budget, consequently hindering the government’s ability to combat other pressing domestic issues. There currently exists an emphasis on the international role of the U.S. military, but overinvolvement in international matters has historically seen little success and deteriorates both domestic and foreign perceptions of the U.S. government. Scarce resources are dedicated to a military strategy that stresses maintaining heavy overseas presence both in active combat as well as through global allies. But the American people are forgotten. Funds are wasted on inconsequential activities instead of actively securing the liberties and interests of American citizens — both the public as well as military members. Reassessing present spending patterns, then reducing the budget appropriately and prioritizing investment towards more efficient ventures is key to creating a brighter future. Limiting spending in areas such as global strategy that fail to produce congruent returns and instead allocating the National Defense budget smarter to consolidate and futureproof the country’s power is imperative. Congress should aim to create a financially sensible military budget by reallocating funds to emphasize research and development and transform how the U.S. expresses global influence. Replacing outdated strategies — namely interventionist policy — with investment in innovation and measures to revolutionize overseas personnel management will ensure the U.S. is able to create lasting advantages.
Current U.S. National Defense Expenditures
The United States of America National Defense budget exceeded $750 billion in 2022. And this number has been consistently rising: the official U.S. Department of Defense budget report requested over $770 billion for fiscal year 2023, and the actual amount spent likely exceeds that (Department of Defense). This amounts to over 12% of annual federal spending — and comprises an astonishing 40% of total global military expenditures. To put this into perspective, the U.S. spends more than the next 10 countries with the highest military expenditures combined.
Present Spending Strategy
The Department of Defense (DoD) budget request states:
“…the 2022 National Defense Strategy prioritizes four objectives:
1. Defending the homeland paced to the growing multi-domain threat posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC
2. Deterring strategic attack against the United States, Allies, and partner
3. Deterring aggression while being prepared to prevail in a conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe
4. Building a resilient joint force and defense ecosystem” (Department of Defense).
The DoD outlines a tripartite blueprint to attain these goals: “Integrated Deterrence”, “Campaigning”, and “Building enduring Advantages” (Department of Defense). Integrated Deterrence pertains to preparedness for conventional armed conflict and deterring war through military might; about $300 billion was spent on weapons, vehicles, munitions and defense systems in 2022. Campaigning encompasses overseas strategy — maintaining worldwide presence, strengthening alliances, and ensuring combat readiness. $135 billion was invested in this component, which even includes outer space weapons systems. Building Enduring Advantages invested $130 billion on research, development, test & evaluation (RDT&E); this part of the strategy also includes management and operations costs, military personnel healthcare, and veteran benefits. This is far from a comprehensive breakdown of the $750 billion, but it is apparent that the budget funds an array of activities from research & development to munitions to personnel costs. The above summary illustrates the essence of U.S. military spending as it currently stands.
Critique and Reevaluation of Strategy
Combining investment into innovation, personnel benefits, and manufacturing appear to formulate an altogether sound defense strategy. While the U.S. military certainly does invest in welfare and defense technologies to protect domestic soils, it also incurs unnecessary, bizarre expenditures. For stance, the military spent over a billion dollars in 2022 to audit its own spending, a cost in large part attributable to the extensive spending across domains (Department of Defense).
Moreover, military expenses constituted 45% of government nondiscretionary spending in 2022; the other 55% was divided amongst arguably more important domains, including education, transportation, health (COVID response), and housing (Congressional Budget Office). Overspending on the military is one of many factors that exacerbates government debt. Most economists view debt as a danger to the economy (Rooney et al.) Thus, prioritizing the defense budget in lieu of other areas is a mistake that threatens economic progress. Although military sector spending can generate growth through technological spillover and creating job openings, macroeconomic research shows that other forms of public spending — namely infrastructure investment — has higher potential to induce greater growth. Investing in capital has a greater long-run multiplier and thus, “Prioritizing defense spending over infrastructure investment, a long-standing domestic concern, might undermine economic growth…in the long run” (Rooney et al.). The first concern, therefore, is that the military simply spends too much.
Prioritizing defense spending over infrastructure investment, a long-standing domestic concern, might undermine economic growth…in the long run
A second concern is the amount of weight placed on the international role of the American military. Interventionism is an outdated strategy. For one, maintaining alliances by directly stationing troops in allied countries is no longer warranted. The original rationale behind garrisoning troops dates back to global instability pre-WWII. Lack of American military presence worldwide supposedly increased allies’ susceptibility to “force or threat of force”’ from “rival powers”, which is risky for the U.S. as enemies are allowed to exert influence (Friedman and Logan). In reality, upkeeping military bases in foreign countries produces returns severely disproportionate to levels of spending. Neither the U.S. nor any other country — faces imminent threat from a regional power threatening large-scale invasion enough to warrant U.S. troops stationed nearby as a deterrent.
Another argument for interventionism is that regional tensions will heighten without U.S. presence to mediate when necessary, hence posing a larger threat to commerce and incurring greater costs to America (Friedman and Logan). An illustrative example can be found in the aforementioned official strategy. Two of the four aforementioned strategic points stated by the DoD mention efforts to combat China. This urgency is misplaced as the “threat” has yet to materialize — and likely never will materialize — in the form of direct military aggression. There is little evidence to suggest that current regional powers — Korea and Japan in the case of contesting China — cannot balance each other without U.S. intervention (Mueller). Labeling the Chinese challenge as an active threat is an error, a shadow of the remnants from decades of U.S. interventionism.
Arguments in favor of interventionist policy are hence obsolete. Its continued prominence, though, is highly indicative of the country’s attitude towards expanding global influence over resolving domestic issues. This is alarming and needs to be addressed.
National “Offense”
Yet another concern is the U.S. government’s active role in overseas ventures supporting regimes and policing regional wars (Mueller). The U.S. has a history of extensive military involvement in foreign countries, most notably the Korean War, Vietnam War, combating terrorism in Afghanistan, and intervention in Iraq. The official “national defense” nomenclature becomes ironic in light of the fact that federal funds are invested into activities tangential to the American interest instead of being utilized directly for the prosperity of the American people.
A poignant example is the “Global War on Terrorism”. Twenty years of continuous military activity in the Middle East proved fruitless for the United States. Perceptions of terrorist threat are inflated: notorious events like the 9/11 attack etch unforgettable images into people’s minds. Terrorism is magnified because people cannot believe such a “monumental event could have been pulled off by a trivial group, and there has consequently been a massive tendency to inflate the group’s importance and effectiveness” (Mueller). In reality, Americans’ support for the War on Terror consistently dwindled as the U.S. failed to thoroughly uproot extremist strongholds through its overseas involvement (Pew Research Center). Although Al-Qaeda has not succeeded in conducting any further terrorist attacks on U.S. soil since 2001, this is because the threat they posed was negligible to begin with. In fact, annual global casualties from Islamic extremism outside of warzones total 200~400, which is comparable to the number of people who die drowning in bathtubs in the U.S. yearly (Mueller).
In reality, interventionist policy might be to the detriment of both American troops and locals. Diplomat and journalist Daniel Benjamin explains that American military intervention “played right into the terrorist narrative of the United States as a predatory power” (Callahan). Military efforts to displace regimes are unsuccessful because they fuel the cycle of war, with opposing ideologies villainizing opponents and upscaling conflicts. It is thus appropriate to reconsider National Defense funding for international endeavors.
military intervention “played right into the terrorist narrative of the United States as a predatory power”
Some might point to the Taliban seizing control of Afghanistan immediately after U.S. withdrawal to argue that intervention was necessary to displace the regime. However, one must also remember that the Taliban has never posed an active threat to the U.S. homeland. In fact, as former CIA analyst Marc Sageman reveals, “I have not seen any significant terrorist plots that have been disrupted and not disclosed. On the contrary, the government goes out of its way to take credit for non-plots” (Thrall and Goepner). The U.S. can continue to embrace its position as a global leader by promoting nonviolence instead of dedicating resources to fighting imaginary or trivial enemies. We must keep peace, not make war. This means expatriating troops only when necessary. It means remaining composed in the face of potential threat. It means deescalating combat instead of jumping at the opportunity to fight.
Tackling the Issue
With the current extent of inordinate federal spending, the American people’s interest that the military is supposed to protect is disappearing; while money is poured into the military, a plethora of domestic crises await resolution. Americans’ best interests need to be established before they can be protected. Although it may be equally valid to argue that peace and freedom guaranteed by military prowess underpin the environment for prosperity, it does not change the fact that efficacy of funds spent within the military is unsatisfactory. Aiming for National Defense budget reduction necessitates reassessment of fund allocation priorities. The ultimate goal should be proper strategic investment towards high-quality modernization and asserting global power through means other than military might.
Re-centering Priorities
Contemporary U.S. military management tends to gravitate towards resolving issues through sheer size. While problems such as soldiers facing lengthy deployments and consequent exhaustion are very real, “The solution… is not a larger force, but a more consistently funded, more efficiently operated, and more modern one” (O’Hanlon and Miller). To address the current state of misdirected military spending, two directions of progress should be pursued. First, military expenditures should, at a minimum, be justifiable to taxpayers. The key is not necessarily cutting the budget. Rather, money needs to be operationalized appropriately to drive progress and create revenue. Second, the overarching strategy governing our military needs revision. A potential course of action to do so, according to Friedman and Logan, is creating an “insular maritime power”. Both are addressed in detail below:
The solution… is not a larger force, but a more consistently funded, more efficiently operated, and more modern one
Quality Investment Within the Military
A major advantage of the U.S. military is technological advancement. “The rise of China and the return of Russia supercharge the competition and raise the strategic stakes…. (this) era of rapid progress in science and technology could reward innovators and expose vulnerabilities” (O’Hanlon and Miller). Continuing to develop cutting-edge technologies for both combat and management will ease the strain on troops. Used correctly, technologies can mitigate several challenges associated with traditional military operations.
Leveraging increased investment in RDT&E over mere manufacturing futureproofs the superiority of U.S. defense systems. Creating and implementing dependable, automated systems run on artificial intelligence and big data allows streamlined and optimized systems, which removes excess costs by increasing efficiency and ease of operation. Further, investing in technologies such as nanomaterials, advanced defense systems, and upgraded unmanned vehicles can greatly bolster defense capabilities (O’Hanlon and Miller). Modernizing equipment and systems also reduces the risk that troops face. It increases safety for operators of weapons and minimizes the need for personnel to be put in dangerous situations.
Additionally, innovation and subsequent exports of updated technology can be used to ease the budget deficit. This not only strengthens ties between government and private enterprise, it also reinforces allies’ abilities to defend themselves, lessening the need for direct involvement overseas. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States “generated “40% of all arms exports during the period 2018–2022,” and originates upwards of $100 billion in arms sales yearly (Thompson). The U.S. has “four of the five largest private arms companies in the world: Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, and Raytheon” (Chicago Policy Review). The majority of weapons sales are indeed direct commercial transactions, but fiscal year 2023 also saw $80.9 billion in arms value transferred through the Foreign Military Sales System in an official capacity. Real threats by Russia and China against smaller West-leaning countries such as Ukraine have caused demand for arms to spike in recent years, and the U.S. has an opportunity to cement itself as the premier supplier by driving innovation to meet demands. The arms business is undeniably lucrative for both private and public sectors. Budget reallocation toward R&D of military equipment is thus also justifiable for being financially rewarding and closing the budget gap.
A valid counterargument against increasing arms sales is that it increases the amount of weapons in circulation, and exported arms may wind up being sold to adversaries. In short, it makes war. Anti-war activists have even accused the U.S. government and corporations alike of misconduct that has led to war crimes and human rights violations (Chicago Policy Review). True: lack of transparency within the industry makes it difficult to determine how weapons navigate the market, and there is no guarantee that weapons will end up in the right hands. It is a problem with no easy solution. A case can certainly be made in favor of restricting arms sales, but doing so on the grounds of potential downstream violence on another continent might be difficult. This is not to say U.S. institutions bear no responsibility for possibly igniting tensions in volatile regions with access to arms, but what technologies are to be exported to whom is a separate diplomatic matter exceeding the scope of my central argument. For direct sales, the government needs to update its framework for assessing risks and intent. Secondary or unofficial transfers are unfortunate but largely unavoidable hazards that accompany the trade. Within the scope of restructuring military spending, focusing on innovation is the surest guarantee of U.S. domestic security.
Syncing Macro-strategy with Needs
As aforementioned, high U.S. military presence in overseas bases strains personnel and budgets; this exposes troops to greater risk associated with human error and to negative health effects post-deployment. Improved rotational logistics to fit the needs of armed forces personnel should be implemented to fortify this weakness. According to O’Hanlon and Miller:
“The Army is overworked partly because it maintains deployments… through frequent rotations of multiple units, rather than permanent stationing of individual brigades… More flexible and unpredictable deployments can ease strain on the force without giving adversaries any solace. The Navy can also consider crew swaps while ships remain at sea, rather than bringing crews and ships home from deployment together every six to eight months, as is now the norm” (O’Hanlon and Miller).
Military readiness should be methodical and managed. Troop welfare can be increased even with reduced expenses if the focus is shifted to the “ready” part of “readiness”. The military does not need constant precautionary engagement against threats that have yet to materialize. We must keep peace, not make war.
Some might argue that global presence keeps the world safe — recent developments indicate otherwise. Presence overseas has not prevented armed conflict from arising in Eastern Europe and the Middle East over the past few years. Supporting supposed allies has not stopped dozens of U.S. citizens from being killed in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Bacon et al.). Keep in mind that I argue all of this from the perspective of the American majority specifically targeting government fiscal policy. The safety and interests of the people take precedence over any and all foreign affairs. From a strategic point of view, the U.S. is geographically secure and safeguarded by immense weaponry and wealth. In other words, external threats are unlikely to affect domestic security.
Others view military power as a necessity to protect U.S. economic interests for fear that regional instabilities may threaten commerce. Friedman and Logan propose dropping prevailing assumptions about global trade and adopting a true defensive posture. Military involvement has primarily been founded on presumptions that “global trade is brittle rather than robust,” and further, “threats to peacetime commerce are plentiful” (Friedman and Logan). In reality, the global economic ecosystem is resilient as a result of its interdependence. Globalizing markets promote cooperation for the benefit of all participants’ interests, eliminating vulnerabilities and thus making efforts to police trade unrewarding. Current policy pursues an agenda tangential to homeland safety and fails to actually insure Americans’ interests. Shedding the pretense that military effort is necessary for commerce and instead channeling those resources to areas such as R&D or infrastructure investment will increase the efficacy of the National budget.
In this unprecedented era of worldwide peace, it is imperative to hold high the objective of maintaining harmony as innocent civilians are the most powerless and most harmed in war. The prevailing mode of U.S. military investment reflects a country raring to engage in conflict. These aforementioned strategic adjustments aim to change the imbalance to make and maintain peace instead. Improving military strategy via intelligent planning and modified macro-strategy will make upkeeping the military more affordable and allow the U.S. to manage its activities efficiently. More importantly, it will elevate the U.S. government’s capability to ensure the greatest good for Americans and citizens of the world beyond.
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