The Fallacy of Falsifiability
The existence of objective knowledge and certainty is rejected by today’s prevailing way of thinking, which is largely characterised by Karl Popper and other representatives of so-called ‘critical rationalism’.
Thus Popper describes, apart from formal logic as in arithmetic, in relation to the possibility of certainty about a thing:
“As soon as we include objective knowledge, we must say that at most a very small part of it can be proved to be certainly true with reasonably adequate grounds: It is (if there is one at all) that small part which is characterised as provable knowledge and comprises (at best) the propositions of formal logic and (finite) mathematics. […]
Everything else — by far the most important part of objective knowledge, and also the part that comprises the natural sciences such as physics and physiology — is, by its nature, primarily conjectural or hypothetical knowledge; there are simply no sufficient grounds for considering these hypotheses to be true, let alone certainly true. […]
Apart from valid and simple evidence in world 3, there is simply no objective certainty. […] From the point of view of objective knowledge, therefore, all theories remain conjectures.”
Therefore, for Popper there is no scientific verification, only ‘falsification’:
“The method of science is the method of bold conjectures and of inventive and earnest attempts to disprove them. […] All we can do is to search for the falsity of our best theories.”
According to Popper, this is done through rigorous testing, in which, in addition to the logic of the theory to be tested, “the incoming evidence is of course empirical.”
But even if “our theory passes all these tests”, one cannot prove its truth, but can only give objective reasons for “surmising that the new theory is a better approximation to the truth than the old one.”
In short, observations can never prove the truth of scientific hypotheses (verification), but they can prove their falsity (falsification).
However, this characterisation of the falsification principle contains a fundamental error in Popper’s thought.
For how can the falsity of a (logical) theory be tested against the given sensory world, i.e. specifically against the experiences accessible to us?
Probably only by attempting to verify a correspondence between theory (concept) and phenomenon (experience) through empirical observation.¹
The resulting possible realisation that there is no correspondence, i.e. a falsification, presupposes a possibility of knowledge in the first place.
This is because the finding that there is no correspondence (falsification) logically implies the possibility of finding that there is no ‘non- correspondence’, i.e. a correspondence (verification).
In other words, the finding that a ‘non-correspondence’ exists, entails the verification of a theory in the sensory world.
To summarise: If any objective value is attached to the findings that result from the principle of falsification (as Popper does), then this necessarily implies that an objective value must also be attached to the principle of verification, insofar as they are two sides of the same coin.
Therein lies the fundamental fallacy in Popper’s argument.
This can be easily illustrated using the example of the sunflower and the Fibonacci law contained therein.
As long as one attempts to explain the pattern of sunflower seeds with a mathematical sequence (law) other than the Fibonacci sequence, it will inevitably always fail when empirically tested on a sunflower.²
There is therefore a falsification (‘non-correspondence’) of theory (mathematical sequence) and phenomenon (arrangement of the sunflower seeds), and Popper attaches an objective value to this realisation.
If, on the other hand, the Fibonacci sequence is checked for correspondence with the pattern of the sunflower seeds and no ‘non-correspondence’, i.e. verification of a correspondence, can be established, then Popper does not ascribe any objective value to this finding.
This makes it clear that Popper is applying a double standard at this point.
For he recognises that humans have a corresponding objective knowledge capacity to determine a ‘non-correspondence’ (falsification).
However, at the moment when no ‘non-correspondence’, i.e. a correspondence (verification), can be established in the empirical testing of a theory in the sensory world, man’s capacity for knowledge would not be sufficient to allow this connection to be regarded as objective, and would at best correspond to an assumption.
These inconsistencies in Popper’s treatment of epistemology are probably due to the fact that his approach was too one-sidedly rationalistic and not empirical enough.
He makes this clear, for example, when he writes:
“One can never rationally justify a theory — that is, claim to know its truth.”
In doing so, he is expressing a truth that he has accepted as certain, insofar as his statement would otherwise be meaningless.
As a consequence, however, he ascribes to himself or to his theory of knowledge a capacity that he theoretically denies to knowing, namely to know the truth or to arrive at empirical-objective knowledge.
His assertion therefore cancels itself out.
In other words, Popper does not start from the empirical observation of the process of knowledge — which he himself carries out — but only ‘theorises’ about it.
Another possible reason why Popper came to this conclusion may have to do with his understanding of ‘true’ or ‘objective’.
This is because Popper understands ‘truth’ to be the quantitative set of all true statements, which is understandably an unattainable goal.
He therefore does not recognise the content of truth in the consistent agreement of all concepts that one possesses, or does not consider them to be true.
Rather, he claims the concept of truth only for the agreement of all concepts in general, which an individual cannot naturally achieve.
This view, which runs like a red thread through the history of epistemology with all luminaries such as Kant, can probably be traced back to the lack of or at least inadequate investigation of thinking itself.
As a result, the objective, lawful component present in thinking has been overlooked, namely the way in which concepts are formed in thinking or appear in their lawful contexts.³
Therefore, a qualitative understanding of truth, i.e. that lawful connections within the totality of reality can be recognised as true on the basis of the knowing faculty of the individual (so to speak ‘partial truths’, true in themselves), is rejected by Popper on the basis of his purely quantitative understanding of truth.
At most, Popper accepts arithmetical findings, e.g. that 1 + 1 = 2, as ‘indisputable truth’, as already expressed in the above quotes.
He thus expresses that, if knowledge can be described as true or objective at all, this would only be possible in the form of a logical agreement of ‘conceptual judgements’ (concept to concept)⁴:
“As soon as we include objective knowledge, we must say that at most a very small part of it can be proved to be certainly true with reasonably sufficient grounds: It is (if there is one at all) that small part which is characterised as provable knowledge and comprises (at best) the propositions of formal logic and (finite) mathematics.”
In his rationalist way of thinking, he therefore sees the “increase in the truth content” of a scientific theory solely as “a purely logical matter”.
However, in order to achieve certainty about something, logical examination alone is not sufficient and is therefore always an empirical question (see also footnote no. 4).
For only the formal correspondence of concept and ceoncept (conceptual judgement) or concept and phenomenon (perceptual judgement) by means of a logical examination does not make it possible to achieve certainty.
Only the consideration of their substantive correspondence (identification of essence) makes it possible to obtain certainty.
In other words, if purely logical judgements are made before any experience, then these are purely formal in character and do not yet enable certainty (speculation).
For before experience, thinking says nothing about the given.
Thinking only creates the opportunity through which, after experience, the laws of the elements of reality, separated by the separation of the mind, come to light.
The resulting knowledge must therefore always emerge from the observation of the given and can never — as with Kant — take place before experience (a priori).
For without the given, thinking lacks the initiative to be able to say anything about the given even before it is experienced.
According to its nature (laws), thinking is therefore only able to form the corresponding forms of thought (concepts) if experience (a posteriori) has taken place beforehand.
This means that the possibly existing laws of the given are only brought to light in this way.
It therefore does not depend on oneself whether there is a correspondence in terms of content (identification of essence), but solely on the recognised content.
The result of this process — i.e. a realisation through the confluence of experience and thought content — is what constantly appears in our consciousness in everyday life, and not the individual (pure) experiences and concepts.
Certainty is therefore the result of observing the objective elements of knowledge (from conceptual and perceptual judgements) and their relationship to one another.
This is exactly how all sciences proceed.
Connections are made from thought to thought in order to bring order to what is immediately experienced as chaos or incoherence.
What can therefore be described as true in the sense of a qualitative understanding of truth is the expression of a relationship between two experienced things, i.e. the emergence of their lawful connection.
Reality thus confronts us through our own sensory organs, but not yet in its finished or final form.
For the full reality is only revealed when one brings one’s thinking into flow and thus completes the incomplete, first half of the reality of sensory experience with the contents of thinking (concepts).
[1] Read more about correspondence of theory and phenomen in “Do Thoughts Correspond to Reality?”:
[2] Read more about this example in “Do Thoughts Correspond to Reality? (Part 2)”:
[3] Read more about how concepts are formed in “How Do We Create Concepts?”:
[4] Read more about ‘conceptual judgements’ in “The Power of Logic”:
Note: This text was originally written in German and translated into English using Deepl, because I’m a native German speaker.
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