Sportswashing and the Ethical Dimensions of the Sporting World
“Cristiano Ronaldo joins Saudi Arabian club Al Nassr until 2025” (Reuters). This was the news headline I woke up to in December of 2022. As a huge soccer and Cristiano Ronaldo fan, I was shocked and honestly very pissed off by the news. How could Cristiano do this? Why would he abandon all the tradition and prestige of playing European football just to play in Saudi Arabia? However, as I continued to read, it became clearer: “$214 million a year for only two and half years” (Reuters). I rationalized to myself why he would be willing to take the money and go to Saudi Arabia. Ronaldo’s salary at his previous club was $70 million, and he has accomplished about everything there is to accomplish in the realm of European football(Reuters). On paper, the move made sense. Yet, I quickly questioned the transfer from another point of view, “Why would Saudi spend so much money on players like Ronaldo when no one watches their league and, in all likelihood, won’t tune in even with these star players?” I did some research on the topic and was formally introduced to the concept of sportswashing.
My initial research made it clear that my question about Saudi Arabia’s motivation for sportswashing had completely missed the mark. In fact, the problem I identified regarding viewership and awareness of the Saudi Pro League was the exact problem the country was trying to solve. In Saudi Arabia, money is not the issue as oil supplies have generated massive wealth for Middle Eastern countries; instead, they are focused on getting more eyes on the league and therefore the country. Regardless of the salary they pay players or how much money they make on media rights, Saudi Arabia is simply interested on bringing their country into the world’s gaze and, in turn, improving their geopolitical standing. As a society, we do not embrace this tactic; however, after the initial discontent surrounding the deal fades, our attention quickly shifts to other issues. We eventually stop caring about the unsavory owners and motives behind our favorite sports teams, especially if the team does well. Throughout this essay, I will continue to define and break down the dynamics of sportswashing and evaluate its efficacy. Specifically, through an examination of the case of Manchester City Football Club, it will be evident that sportswashing attempts to distract the global community from the human rights abuses of a sportswashing country and that this process occurs over three distinct stages, ultimately ending in normalization and society’s complacency.
The exact definition of sportswashing is ambiguous, and the media often uses slightly different phrases to characterize the process; however, the Cambridge Dictionary lays out a baseline for sportswashing as “the practice of an organization, a government, a country, etc. supporting sports or organized sports events as a way to improve its reputation” (Cambridge). The term “washing” means to cleanse something and has been used in similar contexts, like “greenwashing.” In this scenario, organizations create environmentally green initiatives or practices to distract from their previous and current environmental abuse. Sportswashing is no different. Sports are used to wash or cleanse the reputation of a government or country typically from the BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China, Saudi Arabia). Why exactly are these countries cleansing their reputation? In the eyes of most Western civilization, Middle Eastern and other BRICS countries’ have tarnished their reputation due to their oppressive culture and the frequent human rights abuses sanctioned and carried out by their governments. Women are consistently mistreated and given few personal rights, there is an exploitative wealth gap, and the authoritarian government uses violent, secretive tactics to deport, kill, or torture people(Amnesty International). These oppressive tactics contribute to a reputation that hinders the region’s participation in global politics and economics, denying them access to the same opportunities as more globally respected countries. It is this sullied reputation that a sportswashing country hopes the global society will eventually forget.
It is important to note that while this definition mostly demonizes the “sportswasher,” sportswashing is a two-way street, a business deal made between two parties. A capital-rich country that hopes to better its worldwide reputation does business with a culturally prestigious organization, country, or entity that is on the economic periphery of its own industry. Many soccer, tennis, and golf teams or leagues that lack the financial means to succeed are engaging with wealthy Middle Eastern countries that hope to use sports for the positive attention it garners. These teams are more vulnerable to the process of sportswashing, and the fans of the teams are more likely to accept the takeover due to the hope for success that it promises. Critics of sportswashing should not only consider the actions of one country but both parties involved as, clearly, both sides benefit from the deal.
An illustration of the complete sportswashing process is the Manchester City Football Club purchase in 2008 by the sovereign wealth fund of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) called the Abu Dhabi United Group(Pollard). I have been a die-hard Man City fan for over a decade. As an eight-year-old child mindlessly following whatever team my brother liked, I knew next to nothing about the nature of the club’s ownership for many years. Even though I eventually learned that the UAE owns the team, I still never fully understood the controversy of the deal in the context of sportswashing. In hindsight, that’s precisely what was happening, and my complacent response, along with most other Manchester City fans, gives insight into why society allows sportswashing to occur.
Sportswashing can be analyzed in three stages, and throughout the process, it becomes clear that society’s initial uproar slowly fades and eventually becomes nothing more than a whisper. The agreement to purchase a team or league, followed by the immediate media response, can be identified as Stage 1. In the case of Manchester City in the early 2000s, it had been a failing club for decades, falling in and out of England’s top division and never making a profit. At that same time, the United Arab Emirates was criticized for its mistreatment of women and foreign workers, arbitrary and violent detentions, as well as human trafficking. The UAE, a capital-rich yet poorly perceived country, saw an opportunity in Manchester City, a capital-poor but culturally popular organization. With the purchase of the club, the sovereign wealth fund instantly made Manchester City the richest club in the world and provided them with enormous resources(Pollard). While many Manchester City fans, like myself, see this as a great moment in the team’s bleak history of losing, the majority of fans are blind to the fact that their team’s new owners are an oppressive governmental regime. As stated previously, purchasing a club is a two-way agreement, and Manchester City fans were so excited at the prospect of their team becoming successful that many immediately defended the new owners. However, the English fans and sports media were less accepting of the move and focused on the incompatibility of the two entities’ values or practices. British sources like The Guardian characterized one member of the Abu Dhabi royal family, Shaikh al Nahyan, as a “human rights abuser of the worst kind” in reference to the torturing of an Afghan grain farmer in 2008(Taylor). Other media outlets like The Sun described the move as “selfish” and saw it as an intrusion on British culture(Blackburn).
In the second stage of sportswashing, the media continues to criticize the deal; however, this period is more significantly characterized by a string of counter-narratives during which the sportswasher responds to the critics. The sportswasher focuses on the benefits of their deal, often honing in on the close-mindedness of the outside world. In the case of Manchester City, principal owner Sheik Mansour appealed that he “is a football fan first and foremost” and wanted to make a lasting impact on the game(Conn). In interviews from 2008–2013, Mansour consistently referenced the “progressive and beautiful” country that is the UAE, specifically the developing capital of Dubai(Conn). Nonetheless, the media consistently fired back and cited human rights issues as reasons for criticism.
The back and forth of Stage 2 can be discouraging for some critics of sportswashing. The sportswasher rarely backs down from defending itself; thus, critics become discouraged that their efforts mean nothing and accept that there is very little they can do to have a practical impact. For many, the only option is to boycott and not watch the sportswashed team or league, but this is often not viable. For many, their love for sports means that they would rather support an oppressive regime by watching a game as opposed to not watching it all. This period of criticism, counter-narrative, and societal response in Stage 2 is typically drawn out, and in other modern examples, the process is still stuck here. However, it has been sixteen years since the Manchester City deal, and they have moved out of this contentious period into Stage 3, where the societal response to sportswashing becomes most important.
Stage 3 of sportswashing is defined by the calming of critiques and the normalization of the new union. The critique dies down, media interest declines, and the benefit of the injected economic capital in the team or league comes to fruition. This pattern of normalization also suggests that over time people’s attention shifts to different political, cultural, or news-worthy issues and eventually forget or become accustomed to the sportswasher’s influence. Given time and, ideally, sporting success, the newly purchased team or league feels normal to all fans, and in cases like that of Manchester City, they can even become ingrained into the tradition of that sport.
Today, the ownership of Manchester City by the UAE is completely normalized in the soccer world, although it is still used as fuel for banter by opposing teams. The process of normalization took 16 years, but the influx of money from the UAE finally allowed Manchester City to win their first Premier League and Champions League titles, cementing themselves as one of the best teams in the world. From my perspective as a fan, this is incredible. There is no matching the joy I felt as a fan, knowing that the team I love is the best team in the world. However, like most, I am complacent with the ownership of my team. I acknowledge that I have sometimes felt a clash in my conscience when I learn about some of the terrible acts that occur under the guise of Manchester City’s ownership group. Reading reports about the oppression in the UAE, specifically the arresting, torturing, and killing of foreign internationals, causes me to reflect on the team I support and whether or not I am actually acting in support of those crimes. Nonetheless, sports fandom is highly compelling, and these doubts are often short-lived, as is undoubtedly the case for most Manchester City fans. By remaining allegiant to our team, we effectively allow the sportswashing to happen. Still, it is essential to remember that this is by design. Sportswashers strategically choose the sports industry as their target because they recognize that sports play such a significant role in the lives of large numbers of people worldwide. Also, in a fragmented media landscape, it is one of the last forms of content that pulls on people’s competitive emotions and can truly bring them together physically(Rosenberg).
While the UAE may have succeeded in normalizing its role in English football, does this really equate to success? Success in the context of sportswashing is often hard to define and measure tangibly, but this is certainly a successful step in the right direction for the UAE. By using the power of sports, society becomes complacent, and the UAE can distract from past wrongdoings, working toward its primary goal of raising its geopolitical standing. Arguably, the UAE has been more successful in doing so than other sportswashing countries. Specifically, establishing Dubai as an international center and destination has improved the country’s perception. In general, more people are aware of the UAE than ever before, and its GDP is consistently growing, rising by 7.8% last year(Uppal). Overall, the process of sportswashing is generally “successful” for the sportswasher(Grix)
In the future, sportswashing will likely continue to be pervasive, with other nations like Saudi Arabia and Qatar recognizing the potency of sports in reshaping their international standing. Sports have a profound impact on a society’s collective consciousness, especially in the context of sportswashing. Ultimately, the duty falls onto me and all fans to reflect on exactly what kind of actions and world we are supporting. It is a collective responsibility to engage in conversations that transcend the joy of competition and dive into the ethical dimensions of the sporting world.
Works Cited
Blackburn, Martin. “A Decade since City’s Sheikh up, We Talk to Key Men in the Etihad Revolution.” The Sun, The Sun, 1 Oct. 2018, www.thesun.co.uk/sport/football/7149571/man-city-ten-years-on-sheikh-mansour-revolution/#:~:text=On%20the%20morning%20of%20September,financial%20ruin%20under%20Thaksin%20Shinawatra.&text=By%20the%20end%20of%20the,sign%20Robinho%20from%20Real%20Madrid.
“Human Rights in United Arab Emirates.” Amnesty International, Amnesty Int., www.amnesty.org/en/location/middle-east-and-north-africa/united-arab-emirates/report-united-arab-emirates/. Accessed 31 Jan. 2024.
Pollard, Rob. “The Remarkable Story of Manchester City’s Rise under Sheikh Mansour.” Bleacher Report, Bleacher Report, 3 Oct. 2017, bleacherreport.com/articles/2670212-the-remarkable-story-of-manchester-citys-rise-under-sheikh-mansour.
Reuters. Ronaldo Joins Saudi Arabian Club Al Nassr until 2025 | Reuters, www.reuters.com/lifestyle/sports/ronaldo-joins-saudi-arabian-club-al-nassr-saudi-state-tv-2022-12-30/. Accessed 1 Feb. 2024.
Rosenberg, Michael. Is 2022 the Year of Peak Sportswashing? — Sports Illustrated, www.si.com/olympics/2022/12/29/sportswashing-olympics-world-cup-daily-cover. Accessed 1 Feb. 2024.
Taylor, Daniel. “You’re Bought! Abu Dhabi’s Answer to Sir Alan Sugar in Manchester City Takeover.” The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 1 Sept. 2008, www.theguardian.com/football/2008/sep/02/manchestercity.premierleague.
“UAE: Prosecute Torture by Royal Family Member.” Human Rights Watch, 28 Oct. 2020, www.hrw.org/news/2009/04/28/uae-prosecute-torture-royal-family-member.
“Unpacking the Politics of ‘Sportswashing’: It Takes Two to Tango.” Sage Journals, journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/02633957231207387. Accessed 1 Feb. 2024.
Uppal, Rachna. UAE’s GDP Grew 3.7% in First Half of 2023, Supported by Non-Oil Sector, www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uaes-gdp-grew-37-first-half-2023-supported-by-non-oil-sector-2023-11-01/. Accessed 1 Feb. 2024.
