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Sex Sells

What is morally wrong with prostitution ? Should prostitution be legally prohibited ?

Gabriel Schmidt
Writing in the Media
5 min readMar 8, 2017

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Over the past decades, the sexual morality in modernised societies has seen some tremendous changes in its conceptualisation. This « modernised » outlook on sexual intercourses and the more precise definition of the role and place of intimate relations in society has brought, for instance, the gay community as to be recognised and their rights upheld in the most recent instances. However other outlooks on the morality of the practice of commodified sex are still resilient. The most prominent being prostitution. If this practice is although not seen as the most depraving behaviour in society anymore, the argument for it to be still heavily morally flawed is still strongly held by many people. It remains also illegal in many places. The problem is that, while the ethical issues of its practice are still discussed, it provides a viable source of revenues for many women. Therefore if prostitution is morally wrong, should the state prohibit it by means of legislation ?

If we are to fairly analyse the moral intricacies of prostitution, we must define it first and draw the boundaries of its practice. Prostitution is defined as a commodified sexual intercourse between two individuals, might it be between men, women, or both. It involves that the individual conceptualises her own body as being a legitimate source of revenue when using it to have an intimate relation with another individual. On the other hand, it implies that another individual can use her source of revenue to obtain a commodified sexual relationship with the first individual. For the purpose of this essay, the issue of pimping is inexistent, for the sake of individuals to be autonomous in their course of actions. Indeed our issue of prostitution cannot cover the case where an individual is coerced into her sexual choices for it would be de facto seen as an unmoral, harmful and constrained practice giving every reason to outlaw it.

The first ethical issue is quite straightforward then. Prostitution is morally wrong because it is degrading for the individual who is prostituting herself because it pervades the genuine offering of the self that constitutes a genuine sexual relation between two loving individuals, as it allows individuals to use their body instrumentally (for the gain of wealth), and allows individuals to use their wealth to obtain a sexual relation. The Kantian deontology would clearly state that to see individuals as means to arrive to an end is definitely morally wrong (Driver 2007, p.90). Nonetheless, if it is true that to see individuals as means and therefore to instrumentalise every type of social relation is morally doubtful, it definitely does not give any reason for the state to engage in coercion by the mean of law. Indeed, one should see a common parallel in this case where individuals are using their body to gain a living, if we think about sportsmen, who are giving the most of themselves to live up to their expectancies.

The feminist argument holds that the case of prostitution is inherently different because, in the words of Anderson, « The prostitute, in selling her sexuality to a man, alienates a good necessarily embodied in her person to him and thereby subjects herself to his commands. Her actions under contract express not her own valuations but the will of her customer ». Indeed sexuality is embodied in every individual as an inseparable feature. But so are the legs of Usain Bolt. It would seem absurd to hold that it is morally dubious that the sprinter sells his legs’ intrinsic capabilities under contract because it subjugates his will over the will of spectators. Moreover, the act of selling one’s sexuality under contract does not empower the man over the woman but sets the actual limits of the man’s will. In a legal environment where prostitution is actually allowed and prostitutes vested with rights and essence, without necessarily embody it with the « offer and demand » market norms, the professional under contract is capable to govern over her own business and acts in a way that cannot supersede the professional sphere and pervades the personal sphere.

Another argument that seeks to prove that prostitution is morally wrong is the moral statement that prostitution is a degenerative behaviour. By contrast, this argument holds that generative behaviours are morally valuable because they are « positive » behaviours leading to personal gain and therefore leading to more autonomy. The rationale holds that prostitution is de facto degenerative because of the proximity of prostitution and criminality, and drugs for instance, and the inherent predatory instinct of men and the relative weakness of women in this relationship. If prostitution is not regulated it is true that degenerative behaviours will occur, for them it is so much easier to evolve when not recognised in any form. It is also important that it is possible for degenerative behaviours to arise from this activity. If the recognition of the law allows the existence of such a practice and by its binding regulates it as to provide individuals a genuine professional sphere in which they can trade (giving rights and freedom of practice) while understanding that prostitutes are willing to regulate themselves, then the course of degenerative behaviours are instantly impeded.

From this point of view onward it is difficult to establish the case for prohibition of prostitution on the basis of moral commitments. If it is important to recognise that there is in fact a possibility for degenerative behaviours in a non-regulated environment and a probability that allowing sex trade is weakening our capability to create a genuine sphere where a woman’s sexuality can be valued alongside her personal dignity (i.e. in a intimate relationship), it does not provide true reasons for the state to use the law to coerce individuals who practice it. Indeed prohibition would restrict women’s access to economic opportunities, if we recognise that to some extent, women economic opportunities are weaker than men ones. Therefore creating recognition and legitimacy around this practice would be a win-win situation, where individuals have the free will of engaging in it, and agree on regulating themselves which benefits the state.

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