Coupmakers’ haunted dreams

Can the striking parallels between the 2016 Mothers’ Day attacks in Thailand and the 2007 New Year bombings help us figure out who was responsible?

On August 11 and 12, 2016, multiple coordinated bomb and arson attacks targeting tourist areas of Thailand killed at least four people and wounded more than 30. The attacks coincided with the 84th birthday of the widely reviled Queen Sirikit Kitiyakara, and were clearly aimed at damaging Thailand’s national economy by undermining the lucrative tourist industry. This was extremely unusual, because (contrary to some attempts to argue otherwise) separatist insurgents in Thailand have never mounted such an ambitious and provocative operation before, and it is unclear who else would have the motivation and capacity to launch such attacks. The Thai junta and their cronies made no effort to provide credible information, and made blatantly ridiculous comments totally disconnected from reality, further undermining their credibility.

The Mothers’ Day attacks were unlike anything Thailand has experienced before, but the closest parallel is the 2006/7 New Year bomb attacks in Bangkok. Like the Mothers’ Day blasts, the New Year attacks took place in a climate of fear and oppression under an anti-democratic military regime, and explicitly targeted the national economy and the tourist industry. The incompetence of the government of military-installed prime minister Surayud Chulanont in finding who was responsible for the attacks helped destroy the credibility and power of the political and military clique of the hyper-royalist Privy Council chief Prem Tinsulanonda, architect of the 2006 coup. It will be interesting to see whether the floundering junta of current dictator Prayuth Chan-0cha does any better.

The following article is a detailed analysis of the 2006/7 New Year bomb attacks and their aftermath. It makes extensive use of leaked U.S. embassy I share it in the hope that some of the parallels may help us figure out who was behind the latest attacks

Just as darkness fell in Bangkok on the last day of the tense and turbulent year of 2006, the bomb blasts began.

At the Victory Monument, a triumphal fascist-style obelisk at the center of a traffic-choked intersection, erected by the military in the 1940s to celebrate short-lived gains in a border skirmish, an explosion shortly after 6 p.m. tore apart a crowded bus shelter and shattered the windows of nearby shops and restaurants.

“At first, I thought the noise was a flat tire,” Thanapon Prukthara, who was working at an outdoor restaurant close by, told Time magazine. “But then I heard all this screaming and saw people lying on the ground, so I rushed to help the wounded.”

Songkran Kanchana, 36, died at the scene; 26-year-old Ekkachai Ruangpoom died the following day in hospital. One of Songkran’s relatives, Kwanjira Kajana, said he had been the single breadwinner for his elderly parents:

I would like the person who did it to stop and think about how much loss it is causing and whether some people who died had to look after others or not. Like Songkran who became a victim, he had the responsibility of caring for his parents. But he was killed without committing any wrong, so how will his family survive? Please do not do it anymore.

Beside the Sarn Chao Pho Seua, or tiger shrine, at one of Bangkok’s biggest and busiest wet markets in Khlong Toey, a nail bomb in a garbage can sprayed shards of shrapnel that blew up cooking gas cylinders nearby and pierced the heart of the shrine’s 61-year-old caretaker, Suvichai Nak-iam, as he rested on a bench outside, his work for the day just finished. His wife Sirilak, who sold food at the market, told the Bangkok Post that she was in her home nearby when she heard the news:

I felt numb and weak at the knees when my neighbour shouted, ‘Come out of the house! Come out of the house! Your husband has been killed! Those howls constantly echo in my head…

I was in a sarong going to wash dishes and clothes. I didn’t even know there was a bomb explosion as a neighbouring house was blasting music. It was only when I ran to the shrine and saw my husband lying face-down that I realised it. I pushed myself through the crowd but was blocked by officials. I just wanted to hold him tight but couldn’t.

An ambulance arrived, and began weaving through the Bangkok traffic towards Chulalongkorn Hospital:

I was really scared but I tried to tell him he would be all right. He didn’t say a word but nodded his head feebly. When we reached the hospital, the doctor administered CPR and blood started gushing out of his open wound all the way to the ICU. Around 30 minutes later, my entire body was shaking and my heart sank when the doctor told me that my husband could not be saved. I still couldn’t believe it. He’s a good, innocent and beloved man. I feel sorry for the loss of his life.

The two of them had met 15 years before, when both were married to other people:

At the beginning, I didn’t really like that old, bony man. But he said he loved me and felt sorry for me as I was always been beaten by my husband. He said me and felt sorry for me as I was always been beaten by my husband. He said he wanted to protect me…

We’ve had our moments of hardship and struggle, being labourers and ice cream peddlers. Suvichai used to walk under the scorching sun for many kilometres until his shoes wore out, but still earned only 80 baht a day. It was impossible to have enough money to live. Some days, he even ate rotten food just to survive.

Suvichai had taken care of the shrine for six years, and his wife said it had transformed their lives.

We finally had enough food to eat. He quit drinking alcohol and I had my own business. Our lives were getting better and we even had money to save.

Three people were wounded by the nail bomb at the shrine, including a 10-year-old girl.

In the north of the city at another busy traffic junction, the Saphan Kwai intersection near the Big C superstore, a blast beside a police post wounded two people. Explosions around the same time damaged two other police boxes, one at the Khae Rai intersection even further north and the other at the entrance to Soi 62 on busy Sukhumvit Road, without causing casualties.

At Seacon Square, a vast mall in the east of the capital, a suspicious device was found in a trash can beside a gold shop. Security guards carried it to the parking lot where it exploded. There were no casualties, but panicked scenes ensued as thousands of shoppers at the mall were told to evacuate and shops were shuttered.

At the Major Cineplex on Phahonyothin Road, another major artery that runs north from Victory Monument, a security guard found a suspicious-looking black bag left unattended in a fast food restaurant and took it into a back room. It exploded a short time later, damaging electrical circuits and causing a partial blackout in the cinema complex. News of this incident only emerged a day later; the Cineplex owner had tried to keep it secret, fearing the news would damage his business.

By 7 p.m. there had been seven blasts in the capital. Shopping malls across the city shut down early, and worried Bangkok residents headed for home.

At 8 p.m., Thai television and radio broadcast an address from King Bhumibol, unrelated to the bombings. He noted that many things had happened over the year and, as usual, urged unity. TV stations displayed his Happy New Year card, featuring the king with his beloved pet dog Tongdaeng and various other mongrels.

At the stroke of midnight, two bombs were detonated nearby, one at the Best Sea Foods restaurant beside a pier on the Saen Saeb canal north of the plaza, and one beside a phone booth at a pedestrian overpass. At least nine people were wounded, most of them foreigners who had ignored instructions to leave the area. A bomb at another nearby tourist area, the Suan Lum night bazaar, was defused by police.

Thais were already weary and unsettled after a year of political instability that had battered the economy and dented tourism, and after the bombings a palpable atmosphere of anxiety permeated Bangkok. Less than four months after the coup that deposed Thaksin Shinawatra, bickering among Thailand’s new leadership, clumsy policy missteps and a string of embarrassing allegations had already battered confidence in junta leader General Sonthi Boonyaratglin and the prime minister he had installed, Surayud Chulanont, the bombings. The bombings dealt another blow to their credibility, and from the start the reaction of the Thai authorities only made things worse.

On January 1, both Surayud and Sonthi dropped heavy hints that Thaksin was behind the bomb attacks, without actually naming him:

In a January 1 public statement, Thai Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont said: “From the evidence we have gathered, there is a slim chance that (the string of bombings) is related to the southern insurgency. It is likely related to people who lost their political benefits.” The latter reference clearly pointed toward deposed Prime Minister Thaksin and his associates.

Council for National Security (CNS) Chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin publicly echoed Surayud’s remarks later the same day, saying the government had detected “some links to the masterminds but never expected they would do something like this.” Sonthi said the CNS had summoned for questioning four former aides of Thaksin… [07BANGKOK15]

In fact, neither of them knew what they were talking about. As CNS Secretary General Phattiyakul told U.S. ambassador Ralph “Skip” Boyce the same day, the most plausible theories were that the bombs were planted by southern separatist Muslim insurgents or by allies of Thaksin, but as yet there was insufficient evidence to support any conclusion:

Citing discussions at a CNS meeting earlier in the day, Winai said he and his colleagues were unsure who had carried out the attacks. However, they felt the culprits were likely either southern Thai Islamic militants (unaffiliated with the Jemaah. Islamiyah international terrorist network) or political actors linked to deposed Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra.

Acknowledging the bombs appeared similar in composition to devices used by southern militants, Winai nevertheless said the knowledge of how to construct such devices was widespread. Expressing doubt that the southern militants had the necessary support in or familiarity with Bangkok, Winai considered it 90 percent likely that political figures had organized the attacks, intending to discredit the government and harm tourism and the overall economy. The modus operandi of using bombs to create a sensation, without aiming to cause massive deaths or injuries, seemed more suited to political figures rather than southern Thai militants… Winai acknowledged the bombings injured many people, but – given the planned New Year’s Eve festivities – the numbers could have been significantly higher. Winai speculated that many injuries might have resulted from low-level operatives having used poor judgment in placing their bombs, contrary to the intent of the planners. [07BANGKOK3]

Certainly there were some reasons to suspect Thaksin’s hand in the attacks. Several mysterious – and generally harmless – bombings over the previous two years had appeared to be targeted at his opponents:

Many observers will find it plausible that Thaksin or his supporters may have orchestrated bombings in order to discredit those who overthrew him. During the last two years of Thaksin’s administration, there were numerous incidents in which bombs were placed at Bangkok sites associated with Thaksin’s opponents, including:

– On March 27, 2006, an unexploded bomb was discovered next to the Democrat Party headquarters;

– On March 9, 2006, a small bomb exploded at a guardpost outside the house of Privy Councilor Prem Tinsulanonda; on the same day, a bomb exploded at the Royal Vajiravut College, targeting anti-Thaksin academic Chai-anan Samutthawanit;

– On February 22, 2006, a small bomb exploded at the Santi Asoke Buddhist Sect, associated with leading Thaksin opponent Chamlong Srimuang;

– On December 8, 2005, a small bomb exploded at a phone booth outside of Lumpini Park, which had become a site for recent anti-Thaksin rallies; and

– On November 3, 2005, a small bomb exploded on property of the Manager Media Group, owned by leading Thaksin critic Sondhi Limthongkul.

Additionally, security officials reported the discovery of explosive material in a car parked close to Thaksin’s residence on August 24, 2006. At the time, many people suspected Thaksin’s loyalists engineered the incident in order to generate sympathy for Thaksin, or to justify imposing a state of emergency. The truth behind this incident remains unclear. [07BANGKOK15]

But, as Boyce noted, there were grounds for considerable doubt:

While it is not difficult to imagine pro-Thaksin operatives carrying out the earlier bombings, the devices used were significantly less powerful than the December 31. bombs, and the Thaksin-era detonations clearly targeted the Prime Minster’s opponents. Thaksin has publicly denied having a role in the New Year’s Eve bombings, and this denial seems plausible, given the differences in the modus operandi; the extensive scrutiny the government was already applying to Thaksin and his loyalists; indications from open sources that Thaksin wanted to return to Thailand; and the fact that political allegations against the CNS had successfully garnered prominent coverage and put the CNS and RTG on the defensive, seemingly obviating the need at this stage for Thaksin to order desperate measures. [07BANGKOK15]

Moreover, while Muslim separatists had never before targeted Bangkok or anywhere outside the south, they had at least twice recently mounted complex co-ordinated bomb attacks:

– In a September 16 attack, six bombs exploded in stores and streets in Hat Yai, a Buddhist-majority city which serves as a commercial center in southern Thailand and draws foreign tourists from Malaysia. Several people died, and at least 60 were injured. (Hat Yai has been the target of significant separatist attacks before.)

– In an August 31 daylight attack, at least 23 bombs exploded at banking facilities in the southern province of Yala, marking a significant expansion of attacks against commercial targets. [07BANGKOK15]

Separatist insurgents also had a possible motive – Surayud had made a series of conciliatory gestures to southern Muslims, and this could have spurred hardliners to plant the bombs in a bid to prevent peace efforts that could undermine their support:

Prime Minister Surayud has made a concerted effort to promote reconciliation with disaffected Muslims in Thailand’s southern provinces… Despite these gestures, militant activity in the South has continued at a steady pace, indicating that some separatists are disinclined to accept the olive branch which Surayud extended. Some of our contacts assess that the continued violence in the South since the coup is, in part, an effort by separatists to undermine Suryayud’s attempt at reconciliation. A widespread perception that southern separatists carried out the Bangkok bombings would entail a significant loss of face for Surayud and could result in public demand for more aggressive security tactics in the South. [07BANGKOK15]

This being Thailand, other possibilities could also not be ruled out. The junta might have staged the attack itself to justify a renewed crackdown; it would certainly not be the first time Thailand’s military had resorted to such dubious tactics:

We cannot at this stage rule out another theory, that persons associated with the current regime carried out the bombings to create a pretext for extending military rule. Small pieces of circumstantial evidence could bolster this idea. Critics might point out that the authorities have been slow to ease political restrictions. The administration has not yet forwarded for royal endorsement the decree to lift martial law in much of the country. In late December, the authorities considered but rejected a proposal to annul restrictions on political party activities, claiming the situation was not yet sufficiently stable – despite the CNS having just secured over 550 million Baht (over 15 million USD) to form a new “Special Operations Centre,” over 13,000-strong, accountable directly to the CNS. [07BANGKOK15]

There was also the chance the attacks were the result of a power struggle between the police and military. There had long been tension between them in Thailand, and it had become more acute given widespread support for Thaksin amongst the police. The lack of trust was highlighted when deputy army commander Anupong Paochinda told Thai television shortly after the blasts that soldiers were on the streets and that police must cooperate with them and do their jobs properly.

The hypothetical involvement of members of the security forces in the bombings might not necessarily have been at the behest of the CNS. We note that, since the coup, the new regime has generated ideas about how to reorganize (read: marginalize) the national police force. When a member of a Surayd-endorsed working group floated a decentralization proposal in mid-November, media reports quoted National Police spokesman Lieutenant General Achirawit Suphanphesat as saying “Please don’t treat the police organization with contempt. Give us some respect. The day we are transferred to local organizations, the country will go up in flames.”

It is possible to imagine that figures in the police might have been complicit in the December 31 attacks. We have heard scattered reports consistent with this theory; for example, some of the police booths which were bombed should have been manned around the clock but were empty when attacked. We also have heard some closed circuit television cameras near targeted areas became dysfunctional shortly before the bombings. [07BANGKOK15]

In short, potential suspects included supporters of Thaksin, enemies of Thaksin, southern separatists, the military, and the police. Or some other group. But the junta had already tried to blame Thaksin, and as Boyce noted, that was not the smartest of moves:

The physical evidence from the bombings is under examination. Many of the specialists with the metropolitan police, which has jurisdiction in this matter, have received USG training, and we are optimistic they can conduct a capable forensic analysis. We worry, however, that the authorities jumped to a conclusion and announced their views prematurely. Their credibility now depends on showing the involvement of Thaksin or his associates, who, whether involved or not, will surely try to spin recent events to advance their own interests. The stakes are high, and the investigation could be politicized down to the working level. Given that many previous bombings, attempted bombings, and alleged attempted bombings remain unsolved, we are not optimistic that the perpetrators – or the mastermind – will be uncovered. [07BANGKOK15]

A meeting with Foreign Minister Nitya “Nit” Pibulsonggram on January 3 provided further evidence of panic and disarray within the government. He told Boyce that the cabinet had spent the whole morning speculating who was behind the blasts, but not, it appeared, on the basis of any actual evidence:

Nit said the cabinet had devoted that day’s morning meeting entirely to theorizing about the perpetrators of the December 31 bombings. Nit said it was clear that the Surayud administration’s political opponents had orchestrated the bombings. The RTG’s speculation focused intensively on former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh; Chavalit had publicly signaled his interest in assuming a leadership position in Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party, presumably in order to become Thailand’s next Prime Minister. He had publicly criticized the interim administration and the Council for National Security, presumably because he and his allies were excluded from the post-coup cabinet. And Chavalit had the character and nefarious network to carry out such attacks. [07BANGKOK16]

Boyce noted, as politely as possible, that it might be a good idea to actually investigate and try to find some evidence:

The Ambassador repeated to Nit the counsel he had provided Winai, that the RTG would need more than just a theory, however persuasive that theory might be. The RTG could not appear to be disregarding forensic evidence that implied the involvement of southern separatists…

The longer that the government continued to make allegations without presenting strong evidence, the more this process would look like a witch hunt, the Ambassador cautioned. And although the RTG might not want Thaksin on Thai television, barring him from the local airwaves might just lead him to speak out on CNN or other international networks. Dejected, Nit asked quasi-rhetorically, “What can we do?” The Ambassador again advised that the government focus on building a legal case based on the evidence. [07BANGKOK16]

But Nitya appeared to believe, though without properly explaining why, that it would be impossible to build a case against Thaksin, and seemed upset about mounting public dissatisfaction with the performance of the junta and the government it had installed:

Nit expressed doubt that the RTG, being bound to uphold the rule of law, could build a case that would implicate Chavalit or other allies of former Prime Minister Thaksin in the bombings. The Ambassador, citing the investigations of public transportation bombings in London and Jemaah Islamiyah bombings in Indonesia, said he did not see that following legal procedures would necessarily hamper the investigation.

Nit, increasingly exasperated, bemoaned the public beating that Surayud’s administration was taking. The media, which of late had not been particularly charitable toward the cabinet, was claiming the administration had not done enough in response to the bombings. Newspapers had published in its entirety a letter from Thaksin in which the former Prime Minister denied culpability for the New Year’s Eve attacks. Nit had also heard Thaksin wanted to make his case on television – but the government would not allow this, Nit said. [07BANGKOK16]

As Boyce noted in his closing comment at the end of the cable, the ineptitude demonstrated by the government in the three days since the bombing provided plentiful justification for the public’s worsening loss of confidence:

His inability to envision a strong case against the New Year’s Eve bombers reinforces the impression – indeed, commonly expressed in the press, much to Nit’s dismay – that the cabinet’s performance remains unimpressive. Despite having all the tools of the government apparatus at their disposal, top RTG officials seem not to realize the need to go beyond elucidating conspiracy theories (whether accurate or not). The rush to judgment about the bombings… illustrates a lack of sophistication and, with the government’s position on the matter now public, could have serious and deleterious ramifications as further facts. about the attacks come to light. [07BANGKOK16]

Sure enough, the same day, Surayud was embarrassingly forced to concede he still had no idea who was behind the bombings:

In public remarks on January 3, Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont moderated his January 1 claim that the bombing was likely orchestrated by political figures who had been disadvantaged by the coup. Surayud said he had made. assumptions based on the modus operandi of the bombers. “We cannot pin down exactly any group of individuals who did it,” he said. “I haven’t had any evidence or information.” (Comment: Surayud loses face by acknowledging his earlier remarks represented a rush to judgment, but, given that the media is not giving him a free pass, it is better to acknowledge the error now than to prolong the agony. End Comment.) [07BANGKOK55]

But compounding the sense of disarray amongst Thailand’s leadership, one of the most virulently anti-Thaksin of the country’s generals, who had been a central conspirator in the coup, continued to pin the blame on supporters of the former prime minister:

General Saprang Kanlayanamit, Assistant Secretary General of the Council for National Security (CNS), in January 3 public remarks, maintained that the former regime had organized the December 31 bombings in order to discredit the government. Saprang announced that the CNS’s Special Operations Center would clamp down on those causing chaos in the country. He said the government had so far been lenient in dealing with those who had become “persona non grata” (read: Thaksin Shinawatra and cohorts), but the authorities would now employ “harsh measures.” [07BANGKOK55]

Chavalit – a former army chief who had long since become seen as a bête noire of the palace, Prem and the current military leadership – publicly denied involvement and taunted the junta, challenging them to provide evidence to the contrary:

Former Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh – alleged privately by Foreign Minister Nitya Pibulsonggram and others as having a hand in the bombings – publicly denied involvement. Chavalit labeled as “gross incompetence” Saprang Kanlayanamit’s failure to arrest the culprits if he had incriminating information, as Saprang had claimed. Chavalit denied also a rumor that Thaksin had provided him with 1.5 billion Baht (over 40 million USD) in order to undermine the CNS and Surayud’s administration. [07BANGKOK55]

Illustrating the appalling reputation of the Thai military for factionalism, infighting and intrigue, the cable quoted a senior foreign intelligence official as saying internal conflict within the junta was very possibly behind the bombings:

A high-ranking Bangkok-based intelligence official from a friendly country … offered his perspective on the December 31 bombings. This official, with many years’ service in Thailand, admitted uncertainty about the culpable group, but leaned toward believing the perpetrators were domestic political actors rather than southern separatists. He doubted Thaksin’s personal involvement, however, noting that Thaksin might instigate violence if pushed into a corner, but his situation had not yet become sufficiently dire to spur Thaksin to take such steps.

The official considered it plausible that Chavalit or his associates might be involved. (Comment: Chavalit, while currently aligned with Thaksin, also has interests distinct from the former Prime Minister’s and should not be seen simply as Thaksin’s tool. End Comment.) He also believed one of the more likely scenarios was that disaffected members of the CNS – those he termed “minority shareholders” – orchestrated the bombings to gain greater power, or perhaps to pave the way for a second coup d’etat against Surayud and the current CNS leaders. The September 19 coup required very little manpower, the official noted, and this fact might well inspire an ambitious figure to launch a new putsch.

The official worried aloud about the possibility of continuing violence, as various actors might seek to discredit or destabilize the government in order to seize power for themselves. The best way to restore stability, he opined, would be for the Thais to hold elections and install a government with greater legitimacy. [07BANGKOK55]

On January 4, the junta continued to waffle as more signs of incompetence and disarray emerged. Ministry of Foreign Affairs Permanent Secretary Krit Garnjarna-Goonchorn along with generals Anupong and Saprang held a briefing for the Bangkok diplomatic corps in which they again hinted at Thaksin’s involvement without offering any new evidence:

In a very carefully worded statement, Krit pointed out that the investigation into the blasts continues, but asked the assembled diplomats to refer to Prime Minister Surayud’s recent public statements blaming perpetrators harboring ill will to the country. Krit explained that the PM was referring to groups who “lost out politically.” Links to the southern separatist movement were “rather unlikely.” According to Krit, Surayud “is trying to provide analysis devoid of political bias.” Any further analysis is likely to cross into “speculation” but, Krit added, “the Army may have information that I do not.” …

While Generals Anupong and Saprang – who are also leading members of the Council on National Security (CNS) – did not provide prepared statements, they dominated the question and answer session that followed…

Several diplomats asked for further information on the details of the attacks, evidence collected and Surayud’s assertion that a southern separatist link was unlikely. The Ambassador pressed for the government to conduct a rigorous investigation under the law, and to provide resulting evidence to interested embassies as soon as possible. Anupong stressed that the investigation remains ongoing and will focus on evidence and be conducted “under the law.” He also confirmed that the RTG had intelligence warning of a possible “incident” in Bangkok before the end of the year, but this information lacked details on the location, timing and nature of this event. Saprang echoed this information, saying that government officials were surprised that the perpetrators of the attacks would focus on a holiday like New Year’s. Saprang said that security officials expected a “disruptive” event, not bomb attacks, and were caught off guard.

While failing to provide any new evidence disproving a southern link, Saprang and Anupong both provided their arguments against separatist involvement. Anupong admitted that officials are not positive that southern militants were not involved in the attacks. However, the timing of the bombings, during an Islamic holiday (Note: the Eid Al-Adha fell on December 31 this year. End Note) and the nature of the devices used – smaller and less lethal than those in the South – supports this conclusion, he said. According to Anupong, the December 31 bombs were completely different from those used in the South. Moreover, the attacks in Bangkok were not likely to benefit the separatists. Just the opposite, according to Anupong. Insurgent attacks in Bangkok would inspire nationwide outrage.

Saprang agreed, emphasizing that, in his view, there is no link between the December 31 attacks and the South. According to Saprang, the separatists in the South believe that they have the advantage, because the population is living in a state of fear. Expanding their attacks to Bangkok would only invite a backlash; it would be counterproductive. Moreover, if the southern militants did conduct the Bangkok attacks it would be to their advantage to take credit for this operation, and they have not done so. (Comment: Saprang did not further explain the inherent contradiction between these two thoughts. End Comment.) In Saprang’s view, this reinforces his conclusion that the perpetrators of the attacks are trying to discredit the government and not related to the restive South. According to Saprang, the masterminds behind the bombings intended to block the government’s efforts to return to democracy. Saprang asserted that the attacks were an attempt to discredit the current government and to erode public support for Surayud. [07BANGKOK59]

Whether or not the attacks were designed to discredit it, the government seemed to be doing an excellent job of discrediting itself all on its own. At the end of a briefing heavy on idle speculation and very short of concrete facts, Boyce asked Krit why no police representative had been present:

Krit did not directly answer the question, but explained that the government’s initial plan was to have Krit and CNS Secretary General Winai Phattiyakul conduct the briefing. Winai, however, was traveling upcountry and unable to attend, but did not want to delay the briefing. When MFA officials asked CNS Chairman and Army commander Sonthi Boonyaratglin who should attend the briefing, Sonthi suggested GEN Saprang. When GEN Anupong learned that Saprang – among the most outspoken and personally anti-Thaksin figures in the Army – would be briefing the diplomatic corps, Anupong insisted he attend as well, to serve as the “antidote” to Saprang. Krit went on to explain that, shortly before the briefing, he and the two generals had sat down to prepare their points. Saprang, according to Krit, was very emotional in denying any suggestions of a southern separatist connection to the bombings and convinced that Thaksin supporters were behind the blasts. Just before entering the briefing auditorium, Saprang began to calm down and even asked Anupong to “reel him in” if he got carried away. [07BANGKOK59]

This was the almost comically inept backstory to a briefing by some of Thailand’s senior military and civilian officials to the world’s ambassadors in Bangkok, with the credibility of the junta and the image of the country at stake.

An ABAC opinion poll of Bangkok residents on January 4 found only 11 percent had “full confidence” in the government’s response to the bombings. Illustrating the tensions among the squabbling members of the junta – and the atmosphere of fear and undercertainty that had Bangkok on edge – troop movements that evening sparked a flurry of coup rumours, and more whispers about Saprang:

On the evening of January 4, Embassy sources from various sectors, including the police, contacted us to relay news of unusual troop movements. The JUSMAG Chief phoned a high-ranking military officer, who assured him that ongoing troop movements were part of a regular rotation. Nevertheless, rumors were rife that Council for National Security (CNS) member General Saprang Kalayanamitr was behind the movements, due to his dissatisfaction with the current regime’s “softness” against those seeking to undermine the interim government (e.g., former Thai Rak Thai officials). People drew various conclusions, ranging from a coup against Surayud Chulanont’s administration to a military-led crackdown against officials associated with the previous government.

Responding to the rumors, the Defense Attache contacted Saprang, who claimed to be at home, after having had dinner with foreign contacts. Saprang also told the Defense Attache that ongoing troop movements were part of a regular rotation; troops that had been in Bangkok since December 31 were departing, and others from Ubon Ratjasima were heading south. Saprang attributed the alarmist rumors to opposition figures (specifically, former Prime Minister Chavalit) trying to drive a wedge between himself and CNS Chairman Sonthi Boonyaratglin. Sonthi engaged in media interviews on the night of January 4, to assure the public that there was no reason to be concerned about the soldiers’ movements. [07BANGKOK83]

The incident did nothing to dispel suspicions that the bombings were somehow connected to a conflict between competing military factions. An escalating war of words between Saprang and Chavalit – who still had his own network of supporters in the military – inflamed these concerns:

Press reports quoted Saprang as saying “I hope the public will… compare between my (aristocratic) family roots and a shyster.” Meanwhile, a surrogate of Chavalit’s claimed his patron did not deign to respond to Saprang, who “will soon be dead.” A longtime observer of the Thai military cautioned us that the bitter public conflict between these two figures would exacerbate factionalism in the Army and could galvanize officers of various ranks who had been disadvantaged by the CNS seizure of power.

Comment: Regardless of who detonated the December 31 bombs in Bangkok, the attacks have heightened tension not only between the CNS and its opponents, but also within the ruling clique. Despite the outward appearance of calm following the September 19 coup, it seems clear that there are important political forces which have yet to reach equilibrium. The January 4 rumor flurry, coming on the heels of the New Year’s Eve attacks… will likely further decrease public confidence in the current government and heighten the anxiety of top officials. End Comment. [07BANGKOK83]

The following day, Thaksin phoned Boyce, and told the ambassador he thought southern separatists were to blame for the bombings:

Thaksin asked inquisitively whether we knew who had carried out the attacks. I said we did not. He said he suspected southern separatists, pointing out that the modus operandi was similar to that in recent Hat Yai attacks…

I acknowledged the devices used in Bangkok resembled those from the South but pointed out that they could be easily copied by others. Thaksin did not dispute this but complained that Prime Minister Surayud, despite lacking evidence, had publicly accused him within hours of the bombings. Surayud had subsequently walked back his comments, I pointed out, noting that he’s not stupid, to which Thaksin quipped, “He’s not smart.” [07BANGKOK80]

Despite the failure of the junta and the police to come up with worthwhile evidence, however, U.S. diplomats received information from more competent sources indicating it was highly unlikely that southern militants were involved. One well-informed analyst, with “a deep pool of contacts in the South, including members of. several insurgent groups” told the embassy that “his contacts uniformly denied that any separatists were involved in the bombing”:

Several of his contacts made the point that the southern insurgent groups have long had the capability to conduct bomb attacks in the capital but have refrained from doing so because they are fighting to regain control of their home territory in the South. As one insurgent put it, “We are fighting to free our homes, the battleground is Pattani, not Bangkok. What would be the point?”

A separate contact… who is involved in the manufacture of IEDs used in the South, also said that the bombs used in the South are more lethal, and a separatist attack in Bangkok would have been designed to kill many more people. [07BANGKOK83]

There was also circumstantial evidence that police were involved in – or at least aware of – the bomb plot:

Our police contacts have confirmed that there were no officers on duty at all three of the police posts that were bombed, adding to suspicions that the police – who are worried that the military dominated government is trying to sideline them – were involved somehow.

A trusted contact told us that on December 31 he heard comments on a police Special Branch radio… that could be interpreted as showing police foreknowledge of the attacks. Our contact claimed that during the round of bombings early in the evening, an unidentified voice on the radio warned one or more associates, “There are two more…” After the midnight explosions, a voice informed, “It’s over.”

Open sources reported that, at the Nonthaburi bomb site, eight closed circuit television cameras mysteriously ceased functioning three hours prior to the first explosions. [07BANGKOK83]

Other shreds of information made the picture even murkier. A report in the Thai Rath newspaper on January 2 gave details of an ammonium fuel oil bomb packed with nails that had been found and defused on New Year’s Eve on Pattaya North Road, with a timer set to go off just after midnight. But it was never mentioned again or confirmed by officials. Was it hushed up to prevent even worse damage to tourism in the notorious beach resort, or was the report bogus? Meanwhile, police thought they had a lead with the discovery of graffiti with the letters “IRK” at three of the bomb sites – this was said to be the acronym for a militant terrorist group trained in Afghanistan. The explanation, however, turned out to be something else entirely:

Some of our police contacts, however, report that a local Western grafitti artist has contacted police to explain that this is his “tag” which was coincidentally located near several of the bomb locations, as well as in numerous areas that were not bombed. [07BANGKOK83]

On January 10, Boyce called on Surayud at Government House. Yet again, it quickly became apparent that Surayud lacked any sensible basis for many of his statements about the bombs:

The Ambassador… requested further details of the information that had prompted Surayud to state at the National Legislative Assembly on January 4 that people should “get ready for a new form of threats which may occur and last for a period of time…” Surayud declined to flesh out his remark, saying that he had to wait until the police provided him with further information. The Ambassador pressed whether Surayud’s warning of further attacks reflected assumptions rather than intelligence reports. Surayud replied: “I don’t have any confirmation at all.”

Surayud did, however, provide more scraps of evidence that appeared to suggest police complicity – or perhaps just incompetence:

Surayud remained committed to reforming the Royal Thai Police, he said. Referring to the New Year’s Eve bombings, Surayud said, “A lot of people think the police didn’t work (as) hard as before,” hinting that he agreed with that assessment. He related that, prior to the attacks, a contact had informed him of rumors from former colleagues in the intelligence community that bombings would take place in Bangkok on New Year’s Eve, at specific locations, including the Seacon Square mall and the vicinity of the Central World mall (which, in the event, were targeted). Surayud said he had warned the National Intelligence Agency (NIA) chief on December 19 that the NIA should take action to reinforce areas where the metropolitan police might appear ineffective. Surayud said he had sought to hint publicly about his security concerns when he had stated that he would remain in Bangkok for New Year’s Eve.

If the police had received threat information and not acted on it, this might imply some important figures should be subject to disciplinary action, the Ambassador remarked, alluding to rumors that RTP Chief Kowit Wattana might lose his job. Surayud said that he had to wait for a report, expected the following week, from a committee on police reform. [07BANGKOK179]

The lame insistence on waiting for a committee’s report before taking any decisive action was typical Surayud – an elderly and, by most accounts, well-intentioned man, he appeared out of his depth, weak and indecisive as prime minister, drawing mounting criticism not only from his political opponents but also from many of his former allies, and indeed from Boyce:

Surayud is increasingly disengaged on a number of issues we believe are important. His administration is being pummeled in the press for the lack of progress on the bombing investigation, but Surayud shows no sense of urgency. The intelligence services apparently blew off a threat warning, capricious economic decisions are hurting the Thai economy, but Surayud does not appear to feel that he needs to respond in any way or hold anyone accountable. His pledge to lift martial law is hung up on some bureaucratic glitch, and Surayud is taking a hands-off approach. This does not augur well for the interim government’s ability to steer Thailand through the very difficult months ahead. [07BANGKOK179]

Increasingly flustered and with public support leaking away by the day, the junta took the ham-fisted and depressingly predictable approach of trying to force the media to report only positive news. It only served to highlight their ineptitude:

General Winai Phattiyakul, Secretary General of the CNS, summoned 50 editors and media executives to Army headquarters on January 10. According to press reports, Winai said the CNS wanted the media to report only “constructive” news, and a failure to comply with this request would result in stricter measures (NFI). Thai daily The Nation quoted Winai as saying “I would like to urge all the TV and radio stations to stop airing statements of the former prime minister and executives of the former ruling party. You guys should know that if we allow representatives of the former premier to make statements every day, the public will be confused.” Winai appears to have been motivated in part by coverage of a letter in which Thaksin denied culpability for the New Year’s Eve bombings in Bangkok. The print media gave prominent coverage to objections by civil society figures to restrictions on press reporting. [07BANGKOK232]

On January 12, Boyce had a meeting with Buwornsak Uwanno, the former Thaksin ally who had deserted Thai Rak Thai months earlier after privy council pressure and was on friendly terms with some of the key members of the junta. He confirmed the impression that the junta was in shambles, severely divided over what to do about Surayud’s perceived weakness, and with some hawkish members of the military already – astonishingly – plotting yet another coup:

During a meeting with the Ambassador on January 12, Borwornsak Uwanno warned that the challenges the current leadership faces could derail the transition back to democracy. He complained that Prime Minister Surayud was too much like an “English gentleman.” The government’s economic failures had undermined its credibility, as had the lack of progress on the investigation of the New Year’s bomb attacks. He said that some of the junta members “had been approached” to stage another coup, presumably in response to the growing sense of political impasse which has undermined support for the interim government.

Borwornsak … is close to CNS General Secretary Winai Phatthiyakul, in part because both of them were detained together by the military during the 1991 coup d’etat. A consummate insider and representative of the “Bangkok elite,” he is well-positioned to comment on the internal workings of the interim government/CNS, and we think his concerns are well-founded…

Borwornsak launched into a convoluted account of the investigation into the New Year’s Eve bombings. He joined the criticism of national police chief Kowit, implying that he had been in the south on December 31 because he had some kind of foreknowledge of the bombing and wanted to shift the responsibility for the response to his deputy. But Borwornsak also claimed that the Council for National Security (CNS) thought they had identified Thaksin supporters behind the bombing, not General Chavalit or the police (two popular recent suspects.) A military source told Borwornsak that the bombs were like those planted last year at the Democrat party and at the residence of Privy Council president Gen. Prem. Surayud is feeling the pressure to do something in response to the lack of progress by police in the investigation; Borwornsak predicted that the police chief would be out of his job shortly. (Comment: We keep. hearing different stories about these bombs and will try to get more definitive information from the forensics team, which should have a final report ready this week. Most sources are saying the bombs are constructed like those in the south; this is the first claim we’re heard linking them to the previous bombs in Bangkok. End comment.)

The fact that some sections of the military and the Thai elite thought that the best solution to the cabinet’s floundering performance was to launch another coup, against a government that had been installed by their previous coup less than four months earlier, is staggering proof of their intellectual bankruptcy and contempt for democracy. Thailand is one of the few countries on earth where people have even heard of the concept of a “re-coup”:

Given the political tensions and uncertainties, Borwornsak warned that a “re-coup” was possible. He said that both Gen. Sonthi and Gen. Winai “had been approached” to stage a further military intervention. Borwornsak did not go into detail on what this would entail, but the idea has been circulating in Bangkok, even cropping up in the Thai press as “the only way out” of what is beginning to feel like another political impasse. Presumably, the “re-coup” would involve some bolder members of the junta taking over, easing out the more cautious leaders, and putting in place “a new gameplan.” This would likely include a faster track in the corruption investigations – perhaps seizing assets first, and justifying it later – and maybe dropping the constitution drafting process.

(Comment: Although a coup against one’s own government sounds ridiculous, this has happened here before: elected prime minister Thanom launched a coup against his own government in 1971. Thanom dissolved Parliament, banned political parties and strengthened military rule until he was forced to flee the country two years later in the wake of violent protests. End comment.) The Ambassador said that such a move would be disastrous for Thailand, and Borwornsak agreed. “Talk to Winai,” he said. Borwornsak – who was brought in by the junta in the early hours of the September 19 coup to assist with legal issues – said he told Winai, “If you do this, don’t call on me; I won’t help you.”

The generals who had toppled Thaksin were quite plainly bewildered and scared:

Borwornsak told the Ambassador, “the CNS is not sleeping well at night,” and we believe it. Before the new year’s bombing, many of the coup’s early supporters were disillusioned and impatient; since the bombing, many seem angry and afraid. The government’s popularity has plummeted, as has confidence in its ability to deliver on its promises. While the idea of a “coup within the coup” seems outlandish, but there is a growing feeling that the interim government/CNS have painted themselves into a corner, are “weak,” “feeble,” and “too gentlemanly,” (to quote from some of the headlines.) They are hemmed in by provisions of the interim constitution and the legal procedures they themselves established; now they find that they may be unable to achieve the goal of their putsch – ensuring that Thaksin cannot return to power again – unless they make, at a minimum, a drastic course change… Although the talk about another coup is still pure speculation, we will continue to let people know the unequivocal USG view: that another “coup” or related action would be wholly unjustified and indefensible, and disastrous for Thailand’s relations with the U.S. and other countries. [07BANGKOK311]

Boyce titled the cable “COUPMAKERS’ HAUNTED DREAMS”

POSTSCRIPT — Nine years later, the Thai police and military are still unable to provide any credible information on who was behind the New Year bombings and why.