Not in Plain Sight: Dangerous Engineering Flaws in Winnipeg’s Design of Pedestrian Corridors

Executive Summary (Élyse Elle, ed.)

Christian Sweryda
Zero Vision
4 min readJan 29, 2020

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See below for links to the full story in Parts 1, 2 & 3.

Winnipeg has had several serious pedestrian crashes with many resulting in fatalities. These crashes have largely been occurring in pedestrian corridors (corridors) which consist of overhead lighted signs and flashing yellow beacons activated by a pedestrian push-button. There are two deficiencies inherent in the design of corridors that are largely related to the injuries and fatalities.

The first deficiency is that there are no eye-level flashing beacons located beside the road for drivers that are too close to the corridor to observe the ones located overhead, or for drivers that typically will not be looking up. This is also inconsistent with all other types of traffic control that will have devices placed at eye-level. Examples are flashing red lights above stop signs, railway crossing beacons, and traffic signals placed near the stop line.

The deficiency is specific to corridors and has been identified by the city as a correction needed to the two corridors where an eight- and four-year-old died. The city has known about the problem since at least 2012 when advocacy began, and it was identified by the city’s own traffic signals engineer in 2013. A pilot project done by the city in 2016 found that when the eye-level beacons were added to a corridor, the rate of drivers yielding to pedestrians increased. The cost of the correction is only $500 per corridor with the total cost to correct the entire city (about $90,000) being less than the cost of one set of traffic signals.

Rather than implement the correction on a widespread basis, in 2017, the city took out the set it had already installed. In the wake of the most recent pedestrian deaths, the city’s engineering response has largely been to convert corridors to traffic signals, which is a much more ‘aggressive’ treatment, substantially increasing driver and pedestrian delay.

The second deficiency is the immediate activation of the auditory chirping that commences when a pedestrian pushes the corridor’s activation button. This encourages the pedestrian to immediately enter the roadway before it is safe to do so. Pedestrians prematurely entering the roadway has been identified as a causal factor of the crashes. Traffic signals, in contrast, do have a delay before the chirping and walk signal are activated.

The deficiencies with pedestrian corridors are only part of a bigger problem of subpar traffic engineering in Winnipeg. To name a few, other problems include inadequate speed limit signage, inadequate construction zone signage, short yellow lights, and missing school zone signs.

Instead of focusing on the engineering problems, Winnipeg’s advocates such as police, Manitoba Public Insurance, and city politicians have focussed their efforts on blaming drivers and promoting increased traffic enforcement. These efforts are part of the broader conflict of interest in road safety when those who are in part responsible for the failures of safety can deflect attention from their own responsibilities, while making millions of dollars from blaming the road user. The efforts to blame road users have become such an engrained part of the culture that the talking points are now regurgitated by the public at large whenever crashes occur. This is repeatedly reflected in the media which regularly parrots the narratives of the city and police without asking the critical questions or drawing attention to the underlying issues. For instance, the city's own studies supporting the safety advantages of adding eye-level beacons have not been made public through any media coverage.

When the city did add eye-level beacons at the corridor where a child died on St. Anne's Road, engineers were praised for their proactive efforts. There was no attention drawn to the fact that it was a problem known about long before the child died, and that the solution was only being implemented at the one location where the crash happened, even though the deficiency was common to all corridors. A feedback loop has thus developed where those who have failed to improve safety are profiting from the peril while evading their own responsibilities. For instance, advocacy for increased traffic enforcement, lowering speed limits and raising fines is largely based on advocates using crashes to point to, even though the 'solutions' are largely disconnected from the actual crash causes.

There is huge potential for safer roads should the focus be redirected towards engineering improvements. This will take a change in culture, and widespread public advocacy if road safety is to ever be taken seriously.

Due to size, this project has been split into three separate pieces:

PART 1 - THE ISSUE — Outlines the design deficiencies involving Winnipeg's pedestrian corridors and shows the comparisons to other forms of traffic control including a case study of Winnipeg's worst corridor.

PART 2 - THE CURRENT RESPONSES — Details the response by the city and demonstrates awareness of the problems but a pattern of inaction towards the clear solutions. Also explored is the engineering actions that are being taken (installation of more traffic signals).

PART 3 - THE POLITICS OF ROAD SAFETY — Examines why the current unsafe situation continues unopposed and the contradictions involving those responsible for road safety. Media framing and the manufacturing of public sentiment is explored in detail followed by a discussion of the potential for safer roads should the awareness and priorities shift.

Most of this work was drafted through the summer and early fall of 2019. What is outlined is representative of the situation as it was up until October 2019. An earlier version of PART 1 was put online in October 2019. As such, any changes made to the situation involving corridors since that time will not be reflected in the writing.

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