How Liberalism Cost us the Afghan-American War
We are approaching the third anniversary of America’s humiliating defeat in Afghanistan. Despite the scarcity of present-day discourse surrounding Afghanistan, the electorate seems to have moved on from the conflict. They have especially moved on from assigning blame to Donald Trump or Joe Biden. Although, let us be clear, both men are accountable for the precipitous and hideously mismanaged withdrawal from the country. It remains glaringly axiomatic, however, that the Afghan-American War is now a useful tool for critiquing the antiquated, reactionary forces which shape contemporary American politics — especially liberalism and the system of democratic republicanism it supports — that has, from the outset, hindered America’s righteous triumph in that mountainous region.
Why the War Itself was Justified
Make no mistake: America’s involvement in Afghanistan was legitimate. I agree wholly with the Concerned Veterans of America Foundation’s conclusion that the war itself was a justified response to the September 11 attacks — an infringement on our sovereignty from al-Qaeda (and its backer the Taliban) which took the lives of nearly 3,000 hard-working Americans. And it must be acknowledged, in opposition to the vocal minority who opposed the war from its inception and who now childishly stroke their own egos in response to our premature withdrawal, there was no feasible alternative to the war.
In their display of arrogance, the Taliban proposed only a conditional surrender of Osama bin Laden, demanding he be spared from prosecution in the United States and instead handed over to a third party. This could not guarantee a just retribution in the eyes of the American people; it was manifest in the Taliban’s offers being made in bad faith. They refused to extradite a leader of a terrorist organization they allowed to operate with utmost impunity, and the reasons why should be obvious. No self-respecting American should entertain negotiations with terrorists seeking the most lenient of punishments for their comrades; to disagree with this stance is cowardice.
Setting aside our objective interests in the region, the war itself was justified on the grounds that we were committed to seek justice for those Americans who lost their lives on our own soil. Although I believe international law is largely worthless, save for rare cases where two equally powerful nations engage in war on a quid pro quo basis, President Bush rightly cited Article 51 of the United Nations Charter to validate the conflict against al-Qaeda and the reactionary government, the Taliban, which shielded them. The contents of that article are as follows:
“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”
If any arguments exist against deploying our forces to dismantle Osama Bin Laden’s terrorist empire and to confront his reactionary sponsors, they should not be entertained; the objections of those opposed to this war, especially if they come from American voices, are loathsome expressions of cowardice.
America’s Interests in Afghanistan
Disregarding the September 11 attacks, we must recognize that America harbored clear, objective strategic interests in Afghanistan. Among them are natural resources. According to Reuters, Afghanistan “is rich in resources like copper, gold, oil, natural gas, uranium, bauxite, coal, iron ore, rare earths, lithium, chromium, lead, zinc, gemstones, talc, sulphur, travertine, gypsum and marble.” The strategic significance of these natural resources, many of which are also found in Greenland (a country I favor annexing), are beyond dispute. From their use in robust, durable electronics — copper, lithium, and gold — to the rejuvenation of our deteriorating infrastructure through iron ore; the boldersting of our dominance over energy markets (via oil, coal, and natural gas); and the fortification of our military supremacy. Whether directly through an occupation or indirectly through a supportive regime, the immense wealth which could have been derived from these natural resources would serve to bolster America’s preeminence within the global system while concurrently yielding substantial benefits for ordinary citizens.
According to Lynne O’Donnell of Foreign Policy, these very resources are currently being exploited by Taliban leaders to cement their control over the local populace and amass personal wealth; moreover, it is evident that the funds accrued through these means will, once again, fuel international terrorism, thereby endangering the safety of Americans and our foreign comrades.
This dynamic aligns nicely with the second reason we had for being in Afghanistan, even after Osama bin Laden’s death. We had to maintain the balance of power in the Asian continent. As I have stated in a past article, a fundamental principle of American foreign ought to be preserving the balance of power in Eurasia. For the rise of a Eurasian hegemon would pose an existential threat to American sovereignty vis a vis Mackinder’s Heartland Theory. China, which has effectively recognized the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan as legitimate, has established trade relations as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), thereby securing its dominance in the region for decades to come. And there can be no doubt to the negative implications this has on American security and economic interests. The BRI creates an unfair advantage for the Chinese as they dominate trade in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region and Asia, positioning China as the global hegemon de facto.
To make matters worse, the Taliban has also opened up trade relations with Russia. The primary beneficiaries, in other words, of Taliban rule in the long-term are our sworn, civilizational adversaries, who now indirectly enjoy the vast wealth that follows their alliance with the contemporary Afghan elite. This development underscores the strategic imperative for the United States to have maintained a foothold in Afghanistan, both to inhibit the consolidation of power by hostile actors and to secure our long-term interests in the region (including maintaining the balance of power).
This brings me to the next strategic interest we had in Afghanistan: anti-terrorism insurance. As the Council on Foreign Relations noted, the Taliban remains on friendly terms with al-Qaeda. It can be reasonably assumed that if the Taliban benefits from improved relations with foreign countries such as Russia and China, as well as increased wealth from mining operations and integration into global trade, so too will al-Qaeda. This symbiotic relationship threatens to bolster the financial and operation capabilities of terrorism against Americans and their allies. In fairness, China would have an interest in encouraging the Taliban to keep al-Qaeda in check, given their desire to prevent al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in Xinjiang from offering refuge to Uighur terrorists. Russia may very well have comparable incentives. But while the alignment of these interests may serve as a temporary check on terrorism within the two big players in Eurasia, it does not negate the broader security implications of Taliban empowerment and the subsequent emboldenment of al-Qaeda.
It should be noted that the United States has maintained military bases across the world. According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the United States stations 80,000 soldiers and maintains multiple military bases, with a combined expenditure of 34.3 billion dollars, in Japan and South Korea between 2016 and 2019. This significant military presence is met with minimal opposition, save for a vociferous minority of isolationists. It is noteworthy that between 2016 and 2021, America incurred the loss of 88 soldiers in Afghanistan; and this figure pertains to both the wounded and killed, with the latter being a much smaller fraction of casualties.
Taking the 2016 deployment figure of 8,400 soldiers, this yields an annual casualty rate of 0.0021, or 210 per 100,000 soldiers. One is more likely to suffer death or hospitalization from a car accident, which carries a death rate of 13.8 per 100,000. Yes, you are more likely to face death or hospitalization because of a quick miscalculation trying to leave a busy Wendy’s parking lot than you would have as a soldier stationed in Afghanistan. The removal of even a modest number of soldiers gave rise to the Taliban’s resurgence and swift takeover. Had we merely maintained a single military base in Afghanistan, we would have preserved our anti-terrorism insurance by ensuring an American-aligned government — even if ineffective and corrupt — retained a semblance of control over Afghanistan’s urban regions.
Liberalism: The Impossibility of Long-Term Victory
Contrary to prevailing notions, which are often founded on cyclical, myopic interpretations of the history — which is vividly embodied in the phrase “Graveyard of Empires” — it is evident that the Americans possessed both the means and the potential to secure a long-term triumph in the conflict. The United States, blessed with an advantageous geographical position and a capacity for unparalleled innovations, America was not merely positioned to sustain a modest presence in Afghanistan for an extended period, be it decades or even centuries, but it also had the means to attain total victory. But this is why the Afghan-American War was a tragedy: the intrinsic principles of liberalism rendered any notion of a lasting and enduring victory a fallacy.
There are three important steps the Americans ought to have taken to secure domination in Afghanistan:
- The restoration of the Durrani Dynasty. It is imperative to acknowledge that the restoration of the Durrani Dynasty, whose last ruler was Zahir Shah, would have been strategically sound. Zahir Shah, renowned for his profound popularity and visionary modernization efforts, was instrumental in fostering national unity and visionary modernization efforts — fostering a strong sense of national unity amidst the ethnic and tribal diversity in the country before he was usurped by his opportunistic cousin. This dynasty, with its historical precedent of maintaining a judicious balance in relations during the Cold War, would have likely welcomed a protracted alliance with the Americans had the occupiers revived it from the grave. Such an alliance would have entailed cooperative engagements, ranging from free trade to counterterrorism operations.
- Exploiting Afghanistan’s dependency on food imports. A second measure would have involved taking advantage of Afghanistan’s acute dependency on food imports, a condition reflective of the country’s hideous geographical impediments to achieving food security. In the year 2019, Afghanistan imported 95 times more food than it exported. By leveraging dependency, the Americans could have effectively altered the balance of power in their favor, compelling local leaders and populations to submit to American interests under the duress of food shortages. The axiom that loyalty is arduous to secure amidst famine underscores the efficacy of blockades and siege tactics in consolidating influence and bolstering the position of any American-supported government.
- Maintaining a more effective and well-supported Afghan military force. The third essential strategy pertains to the establishment and maintenance of an Afghan military force that would have complemented the American military presence. The foundation of such a force would have not only required the provision of substantial resources but also the backing of competent leadership. Such an undertaking would have ensured that the Afghan military was not merely a nominal adjunct to American efforts but a robust partner in the pursuit of lasting stability and security.
It is my belief these three strategic measures compliment each other. Firstly, the revival of a strong, popular monarchy under the auspices of the Durrani Dynasty would have provided Americans with the foundational ability to construct a formidable, Afghan military force than was actually realized. After all, the Durrani Dynasty, with its inherent legitimacy and historical resonance, would have served as a unifying force capable of sustaining a strong military force. Such a military force would have been instrumental in advancing American interests and long-term objectives in the region.
Secondly, the exploitation of Afghanistan’s dependence on food imports would have presented an opportunity to quell potential dissent, especially among the ranks of the Taliban and its sympathizers (reluctant or otherwise). By manipulating this dependency — emulating centuries of successful blockades and siege tactics — the Americans would have ensured the Durrani Dynasty, or any government it backs for that matter, would have consolidated total power.
Lastly, by fostering a close and strategic comradeship with the newly revived Durrani Dynasty, the Americans would have facilitated an accelerated and effective modernization process within the country. As Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels noted nearly two centuries ago, modernization, which entails the rapid building of productive forces, leads to radical social and cultural changes. Any sort of legitimacy the Taliban had would have been severely undermined by a modernized Afghanistan.
Yet, it is precisely the flaws inherent to liberalism that rendered the realization of a decisive victory infeasible. The notion that a liberal-democratic republic, predicated upon the principles of egalitarianism and representative government, could undertake the task of establishing from the top-down a semi-constitutional, authoritarian monarchy — a regime that is so fundamentally distinct from America’s founding ideals — represents a paradox with no historical precedent. As Mencius Moldbug pointed out in his debate with the Marxist professor Ben Burgis, Woodrow Wilson was pressured to withdraw aid to the White Army in Russia on the grounds that the restoration of the Tsarist monarchy was antithetical to the liberal-democratic ethos of the American republic. This episode reveals the intrinsic resistance of liberalism to the notion of imposing a monarchical regime through military force.
Some may argue the United States maintains friendly (or rather “frenemy”) relationships with absolute monarchies like Saudi Arabia. But this comparison is flawed. There is a profound distinction between engaging in diplomatic and economic relations with already-existing monarchies and the endeavor to revive a defunct monarchy through military intervention. The American historical record reveals no instance of a liberal-democratic state seeking to establish a monarchic system by force, let alone a regime as historically distant as the Durrani Empire. Even in constitutional monarchies operating within the framework of parliamentary democracy like Great Britain, the historical foundations of liberalism inherent to these countries are fundamentally at odds with such a necessary political restoration. They would not — under normal circumstances — consider imposing an authoritarian monarchy, especially as of the late 20th and early 21st century.
There exists a superb explanation for why the Americans persisted in their support for the grossly incompetent and corrupt Afghan Republic, a course of action that undermined the establishment of a capable Afghan military force for counterterrorism: any alternative was simply infeasible. By the late 2010s, it was clear the Afghan government was so criminal and inefficient that its rapid collapse at the end of the Taliban was, in hindsight, unsurprising. When billions of American taxpayer dollars are wasted on programs the Afghan government mismanaged to line their own pockets, it is not shocking in the slightest that the puppet government became so unpopular.
It is self-evidence that any strategy involving the imposition of blockades to coerce the Taliban into surrender would inevitably encounter formidable democratic backlash. Regardless of how much American blood the terrorist organization inflicted at home. Liberalism’s “humanitarian fetishism” — a long-term consequence of its universalist principles, which became more apparent after the Second World War — manifests as a profound aversion to measures that are deemed cruel or harsh, even if they are strategically advantageous and the long-term consequences are overwhelmingly positive. This sacrosanct commitment to humanitarian concerns at all costs serves to obstruct the adoption of effective yet seemingly brutal strategies. In such a system, coalitions of vocal minority groups will take advantage of the backlash — think Code Pink and homophobic Muslim activists, both united in their contempt for American power — to sway public opinion and stop the blockades, ensuring Taliban dominance.
I feel this compliments Carl Schmitt’s assertion that liberal-democratic states are intrinsically predisposed to enemies of the state hijacking the country’s institutional frameworks. Schmitt’s argument finds merit in the Soviet-backed counterculture movement which successfully exerted pressure on the Democratic Party to withdraw support from the Vietnam War, demonstrating the inherent vulnerabilities of liberal democracy to subversion from within. While more robust regimes and effectively mask or mitigate such conflicts (such as China or Russia), liberal democracies, bound by an absolute commitment to transparency and public accountability, are perpetually exposed to security and critique from the herd. The emergence of a scandalous headline like “Pentagon Leaks: 1,000 Children Starved to Death Due to American Blockades in Afghanistan” will turn a warmongering public into an anti-war one overnight. The relentless pursuit of humanitarian ideals would supersede considerations of strategic necessity, thereby undermining efforts to achieve a decisive, total victory.
To achieve success in modern war, it is necessary for a nation to employ dynamic, adaptable bureaucracies. But the bureaucratic apparatus within the American government today is extensively influenced by the chaotic nature of partisan politics. Modern bureaucratic agencies exhibit an entrenched rigidity in their procedures — a rigidity exacerbated by the lack of competitive pressures and the capricious, arbitrary whims of the general population. Such agencies are further compromised by the dominance of senior personnel who disregard the evolving demands of 21st century military engagements in favor of clinging to the past. And when anti-war politicians, such as the Democratic Party, exemplified by figures like President Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry, wield significant power, they will wield significant, harmful influence over these bureaucratic institutions, exacerbating these issues to an intolerable degree. Which is why we saw stories like military helicopters with poor camouflage or how digging ditches proved more lucrative than educational jobs.
Concluding Remarks
To close this out, I feel we must confront the stark reality that the failures of the occupation in Afghanistan is bound to the inadequacies of liberalism. This ideological framework, while instrumental in the formation of our cultural identity, has revealed its contradictions in times of warfare and statecraft. We saw this first-hand in the Vietnam War and now we have seen it again in the Afghan-American War. Sure, there have been successful interventions here and there — such as Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Storm, which were both not only in America’s interests but actually did the jobs swiftly and without fail — but, overall, the failure in Afghanistan is a testament to liberalism’s capacity to achieve enduring success where it matters most.
When pondering the loss of over two decades of progress — and the fact that the victims of 9/11 all rolled in their graves when their murderers seized power in Afghanistan and humiliated the warriors hoping to avenge them — I find myself disillusioned. I may never truly forgive the incompetent leaders who played a role in our humiliating defeat in the conflict. And I will always dream of a day of reckoning, where a stronger civilization state which has transcended liberalism will return to Afghanistan for the purpose of revenge. It is a tragedy we may never fully absolve those who are responsible for such an embarrassing defeat.
In my opinion, the New America — which surges beyond the limits of liberal universalism while acknowledging our historic triumphs, such as the conquest of the west during Manifest Destiny and being the first humans to succeed in landing on the moon — would have been the only force capable of winning the Afghan-American War. We a technocratic, dynamic leadership that will guide the New America, forging new paths while breaking away from the archaic liberal institutions—such as the divisive nature of present-day partisan politics—which hold us back.
I hope we can use the War in Afghanistan to learn that, in order for the American civilization to realize its true potential, it must transcend, or move beyond, liberalism. I do not know what this will look like. But in envisioning a future where the ideals of liberalism are transcended — where dynamic, youthful leadership takes charge and guides the country to a new future — we may forge a brighter future for American civilization.
