LEX LUTHER AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL: A THEODICY

Part 2: The Philosophical Problem of Evil

It may prove beneficial to the reader to know exactly what the term “theodicy” actually means. It is comprised of two Greek words, theos meaning “God” and dice meaning “justice”. A theodicy therefore is an attempt to show that, not only does God exist, but also that He is just, regardless of the existence of evil in the world.

While it is true that God created all things in existence, it is not true that He created evil. Evil is not a thing or substance but a lack in some good thing, as such God cannot be the author of evil. Augustine argued that evil is privation, the same argument was echoed by Aquinas. Every creation of God is good; evil exists when that good thing is corrupted. That trees exist is a great good. Trees absorb carbon dioxide and expel oxygen; we expel carbon dioxide while taking in oxygen. Disease, decay, or rottenness in a tree is a lack in that good thing. Such decay exists as an evil in that tree, the evil does not exist a se. Some have argued, incorrectly so, that to state evil as a privation is to claim that evil is an absence of good, but that is simply not the case. Evil is a lacking or corruption of some good thing that should be there but is not, as in the instance of lost sight or limbs in those things which should possess them and do not. The fact that a stone cannot see is not evidence of evil because it lacks that ability. By their very nature stones do not possess such an ability, people and animals do, therefore for a person to lack the ability to see is an evil. Explaining evil as a lack in a good thing does not explain where the lack comes from. All it explains is the nature of evil as a real privation in good things. Where the corruption came from is another question.[1] Philosopher Jeremy A. Evans has said,

The concept of evil as a privation of the good has been essential in undermining at least one argument against the existence of God from evil, namely that God caused evil…God created only actual things (or substances). Evil is not an actual thing (or substance). Therefore, God did not create evil.[2]

The moral argument for God’s existence attempts to ascertain whether objective moral values and duties actually exist. If objective moral values and duties do exist, then God exists. If objective moral values do not exist, then God does not exist. Objective moral values and duties do exist therefore, God does exist. If we are going to claim that objective morality does not exist, and that morality only exists subjectively then Hitler did nothing wrong, he was simply doing what he believed was right. But if we know that to perform an act of genocide on a group of people in an effort obliterate them is abhorrently wrong, then we know that certain evils are objectively wrong and that therefore objective morality does exist.

When we speak of value, we are speaking of the worth of some thing, this idea is also transferable to persons as well as particular acts or behaviors. When dealing with moral values we are weighing certain particulars regarding whether those things, or persons, or acts, or behaviors are good or bad. Moral duty has to do with moral obligations, what one ought or ought not do.

A few years ago, I was speaking on Hamartiology, or the Doctrine of Sin, when one gentleman made the comment that “in order for us to know what good is, evil must exist”, but is that really true? Is there really no other way for us to tell what is good unless evil is present? As I thought about it, I concluded that the statement was false. All that would be truly necessary for Adam and Eve to know what good was, would be for them to know the nature and character of God, which they would have known intimately before the fall. True to his own method of inquiry, Socrates first posed the question, “Is the good good because God wills it? Or does God will it because it is good?” One of the world’s foremost apologists, Dr. William Lane Craig, has put the question this way,

Is something good because God wills it? Or does God will something because it is good? If you say that something is good because God wills it, then what is good becomes arbitrary. But if you say that God wills something because it is good, then what is good or bad is independent of God. In that case, moral values and duties exist independently of God. There’s a third alternative, namely, God wills something because He is good.[3] (Emphasis added)

In other words, if that which is good is only good “because God wills it”, then what is good is subjective based solely on His own discretion, not based on any legal grounds. If this is how good is determined, then God appears to act capriciously. But if you were to say God wills something because the act, in and of itself, is good or bad then moral values and duties are independent of God. But God, by His very nature, is good, it is not possible for Him to conduct Himself in any other way, He is a law unto Himself, for that reason “God wills something because He is good”. Adam and Eve would have known this.

The question comes down to this, can we be good without God? If the answer is yes, what reason could one possibly give for being good? How would you determine what good is in the first place? Would not all goodness become subjective? “In those days there was no king in Israel. Everyone did what was right in his own eyes”. (Judges 21:25 ESV)[4] If we are the ones to set the standard for that which is right and wrong then what becomes good for me may not be good for you. “Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance with the will of the Almighty Creator: by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the work of the Lord.” — Adolf Hitler (Mein Kampf).[5] Again, if that which is good is subjective from one person to another, then Hitler was merely doing what he believed was right and cannot therefore be faulted. For this reason, there must be an objective standard which has been set which states that the act of murder is not just bad, it is categorically wrong. But if there is no objectively set standard of duty, then there is no morally binding obligation weighing on my conscience, and yet my conscience prevails. Moral values and duties do not exist independent of persons, that is, benevolence, mercy, justice, etcetera, do not exist in a vacuum. Each exists as a verb, which can be active or passive. But in order for such to exist bodies must be present for such to bestowed upon another (active), or for one to be the recipient of (passive). Were such properties to exist independent of persons then their effects are non-binding and non-obligatory, yet my “conscience bearing witness” to show mercy to those who are suffering indicates that such properties do not exist independent of persons.

There are two aspects to the problem of evil, the Intellectual and the Emotional. The intellectual aspect can be further subdivided into the Logical Problem of Evil (LPE) and the Evidential Problem of Evil (EPE). The former addresses the plausibility of the existence of God and evil simultaneously. The latter addresses how such a God, if there is one, could allow for the existence of such evil in the world. But what would cause someone to question the first argument? Why would it not be possible for God and evil to co-exist? Do they know something about the nature of God to suggest that the existence of both God and evil is incompatible? The argument is often made that if God is omnipotent and omni-benevolent why does evil remain? Thus, leading to the conclusion that if God is powerful enough to remove it, He must be insensitive to it, or if He is all-loving and sensitive to it, then He must not be powerful enough to remove it. Or it may be that He just does not exist at all. But there is one aspect of the nature of God, which is often overlooked, namely, that He is omniscient while we are not. The adjective “omniscient” is derived from two Latin words, Omni meaning all and scient meaning knowledge. As such, anything that can be known is known completely by God, past, present, and future. He is infinite in knowledge, wisdom, and understanding.

Some will argue that if God is all-powerful, He could have created any world He wished, He could have created a world without suffering. But are those two claims necessarily true? Is it really true that God could have created any world He wished? As it turns out, such a claim is actually false. While God is omnipotent, He is nevertheless bound by certain constraints of His own nature. As He is perfect in existence, He must therefore create that which is also perfect, He must create “the best possible world”, to do otherwise would be contrary to His nature. As a perfect being possessing free-will, He must likewise create creatures which are themselves perfect, possessing free-will. The creation of free-will creatures such as we are, is not the problem, our misuse of that freedom is. Moral evil occurs when free persons misuse their freedom in such a way that the content of their will and/or actions violates a moral standard.[6] As such it begs the question, what is that standard, and where did it come from? Furthermore, in response to the question of whether or not God could have created a world without suffering, the answer is, He did. Then the reply invariably comes that, we still see suffering in the world today, so no He did not. For those arguing this point you need to go back and read part one of this article. Lex Luthor and the Problem of Evil: A Theodicy | by TheologyApologetic | Jun, 2024 | Medium Analytic Philosopher Dr. Alvin Plantinga has declared,

A world containing creatures who are significantly free (and freely perform more good than evil actions) is more valuable, all else being equal, than a world containing no free creatures at all. Now God can create free creatures, but he can’t cause or determine them to do only what is right. For if he does so, then they aren’t significantly free after all; they do not do what is right freely. To create creatures capable of moral good therefore, he must create creatures capable of moral evil and he can’t give these creatures the freedom to perform evil and at the same time prevent them from doing so.[7]

Also, God may have good reasons for allowing suffering, some greater good may be realized as a result. Without fail some will raise the question, “what possible good could come from allowing people to suffer”? But we actually do this all the time, when we take our children to the dentist, or to the doctor to get a shot, there is a measure of suffering and fear, but good will come of it. This brings us to the Evidential Problem of Evil (EPE) and the atheistic argument that it is improbable that God could have good reasons for permitting suffering. In “the Condition of Reasonable Epistemic Access” or “theistic skepticism” is the notion that if there were some greater good that may be realized from God’s permittance of the existence of evil in the world, our cognitive limitations simply do not allow for us to know or comprehend fully His reasons for doing so. Philosopher Dr. William Alston has stated,

each theodicy provided as a response to evil reveals ‘limits to our cognitive powers, opportunities, and achievements in arguing that we are not in the right position to deny that God could have that kind of reason [some greater good] for various cases of suffering.’[8]

For the atheist, to make the claim that no greater good could come from the allowance of evil and suffering is ignorant. As persons we are finite, contingent beings, limited by space, time, intellect, and insight. God is an infinite, necessary being, omniscient in existence. “I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning and from ancient times things not yet done, saying, ​‘My counsel shall stand, and I will accomplish all my purpose,’” (Is.46:9b-10). Due to our own limitations as finite creatures we are, quite simply, in no way able to make so great a judgement on whether or not God could have good reasons for the permittance of suffering. Dr. Stephen Wykstra has argued that,

the gap between our intellect and God’s is enormous. If there is any charity to be ascribed to a situation, it must be, of necessity, to the God whose intellectual powers have no rival. Thus, ‘if we think carefully about the sort of being theism proposes for our belief, it is entirely expectable — given what we know of our cognitive limits — that the goods by virtue of which this Being allows known suffering should very often be beyond our ken.’[9]

Does the atheist believe the existence of God is impossible or merely improbable or unlikely? And if so, improbable relative to what? What great enlightenment, what vast knowledge acquired, to lead one to such a conclusion? How many times have I come across this? The existence of evil and suffering in the world is often employed by atheists as a rescuing device when the argument starts to go sideways because the evidence for the existence of God is actually quite extensive. As such, they begin to realize that His existence is not impossible and therefore unlikely due to the degree of evil and suffering in the world. Craig has stated,

“I’m convinced that whatever improbability suffering may cast upon God’s existence, it’s outweighed by the arguments for the existence of God”.[10]

Furthermore, if we are going to be entirely honest, much of the suffering that people do experience is the result of poor choices or decisions they make themselves. Or, as the result of evil acts of individuals, or groups, perpetrated on another. Should someone move to a region prone to flooding and mudslides and a family home is destroyed, or people have died as a result, God cannot be faulted. If someone should live in a region prone to earthquakes and annual forest fires during the summer months, such as in California, again God cannot be faulted when these things occur. If someone should reside in a region prone to drought and their crops fail, God cannot be held responsible. Should someone reside in the region of “tornado alley” and their home is destroyed by one, you cannot blame God for that. In each of those cases, people choose to live in those regions despite the possible risks. I do not like the cold and snow, but my wife and I chose to have our home built in a region characterized as the “snowbelt”. So, during the winter months we receive more snow in our region than the average, but that was our choice to build there. These are examples of what is referred to as natural evil.

What about when people contract an illness? Certainly, some of the illnesses that people experience is again the result of choices we have made. Poor diet can lead to heart disease as well as certain cancers. Substance abuse like alcohol, tobacco, and drugs, legal or illegal can result in serious illness and/or death. Use of alcohol and/or tobacco can also lead to various forms of cancer. This type of evil is referred to as physical evil. Though some have encompassed physical evil with natural evil as being one and the same. Regardless, there is another aspect to this whole issue that runs at a deeper level. Making sense of these deep and often emotional experiences, this I will address in part three.

[1] Geisler, Norman L.. If God, Why Evil?: A New Way to Think About the Question (p. 26). Baker Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

[2] Evans, Jeremy A.. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs (B&H Studies in Christian Apologetics) (p. 1). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

[3] Craig, William Lane. On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Precision (Kindle Locations 2207–2208). David C. Cook. Kindle Edition

[4] Unless otherwise indicated, all scriptural quotes are from The Holy Bible. English Standard Version, with Strong’s Numbers (Wheaton IL: Crossway, 2008).

[5] https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/excerpts-from-mein-kampf

[6] Evans, Jeremy A.. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs (B&H Studies in Christian Apologetics) (p. 2). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition.

[7] Ibid., 18. Quoting Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974), 30.

[8] Evans, Jeremy A.. The Problem of Evil: The Challenge to Essential Christian Beliefs (B&h Studies in Christian Apologetics) (pp. 28–29). B&H Publishing Group. Kindle Edition. Quoting Alston, “Inductive Argument from Evil,” 59.

[9] Ibid., (p. 30). Quoting Stephen Wykstra, “The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of Appearance,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 16 (1984): 91.

[10] Craig, William Lane. On Guard: Defending Your Faith with Reason and Precision (Kindle Locations 2639–2642). David C. Cook. Kindle Edition.