Harmless Delusion Theory of Humor: Responding to Questions and Objections

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After the initial publication of my new universal humor theory, the Harmless Delusion Theory (HDT), I received many questions, arguments, and potential counterexamples. I’ve summarized and compiled them in this article along with my responses. I hope this helps clarify my theory, as well as continue to demonstrate its uniquely strong explanatory power and ability to withstand challenge.

First, here again is my theory:

To find a stimulus funny, we must perceive that a person has a delusional belief. This means we must perceive 1) that a person believes something is correct or true and 2) that it should be clear to this person that it’s incorrect or untrue. In other words, we must perceive that a person has a clearly wrong belief. We must simultaneously perceive that the stimulus is harmless, meaning that it feels to at least some degree okay, acceptable, inoffensive, or safe to us personally.

1. We already have definitions of ‘funny’ and ‘humor’. Why do we need a new one?

How is ‘funny’ or ‘humor’ defined? It is standardly defined by our reaction to it. Something that ‘makes you laugh’, ‘causes laughter’, or ‘causes amusement’. Defining something only by our reaction to it doesn’t tell us what it actually is. My purpose with my theory is to provide a much better definition of ‘funny’ or ‘humor’ by helping us understand exactly what it is.

2. It seems like there are many things that cause or explain humor. How can you say it’s just this one concept of harmless delusion?

I can understand this view because humor seems so varied. But I think it’s helpful to think about it alongside other things we find pleasurable, such as music, dancing, drama, paintings, drawings, sculptures, photography, architecture, fashion, design, nature, food, sports, games, puzzles, magic, sex, etc. With all these other things, the experience is just “enjoyment” or “pleasure”, but with humor it’s this unique kind of enjoyment or pleasure called “funny”. In this big picture, it seems reasonable that there is just one thing that is tipping the experience into the category of “funny”.

Also, I am not claiming that other factors don’t frequently play a part in our enjoyment of humor and the funniness we experience. As I’ve stated, I believe there are many of these enhancers. But because none of them are necessary and sufficient for humor, they cannot be the root cause of humor. And their presence does not negate the fact that there can be this set of two necessary and sufficient conditions I’ve identified.

3. Delusion has a specific clinical meaning. Are you using the word in this way?

No, I am not. There are two commonly used meanings of delusion: a formal clinical one and an informal nonclinical one. I’ve clarified that I’m using the latter. The clinical version is the mental illness or disorder where a person maintains a firm belief that is impervious to contrary evidence. The informal nonclinical usage of the term is for a less severe belief. Delusion in this sense is where a person believes that something is correct or true despite having clear evidence it is incorrect or untrue. Unlike clinical delusion, nonclinical delusion does not require that the person hold the belief with conviction or show strong resistance to counterevidence.

4. By harmless, do you mean not harmful?

With the word harmless, like with the word delusion, I am using a precise, commonly-understood definition. Harmless can mean 1) not harmful or damaging, or 2) innocuous, not offensive, or not upsetting. I am using both senses of the term.

5. Is the delusional person us or is it another person?

The person we perceive as having delusional belief can be either ourselves or another person. Though I think the vast majority of the time we find something funny we are perceiving delusion in a person other than ourselves. I believe this is because we very infrequently realize we were wrong and that the correct thing should have been clear to us. And when we do, it usually doesn’t feel harmless to us (we’re annoyed or upset).

6. What exactly does your theory say are the cognitive processes we go through?

My theory is that we experience a stimulus as humorous when we perceive that a person has a delusional belief and feel that the stimulus is harmless. This implies that we need to perceive/judge both what is ‘clearly right/true’ and what is ‘clearly wrong/false’ to register the person’s belief as delusional. My assertion is that, in all humor, when we perceive what is ‘clearly wrong/false’, it always can be attributed to, and we always do attribute it to, the mind/belief of a person. And that this process is instantaneous because of our powerful ability to perceive the beliefs of other people (theory of mind). It is this resulting perception of a ‘clearly wrong/false belief’ that directly leads to the experience of humor.

7. Why does a joke get less funny the more you hear it?

I account for this two ways: 1) Surprise and novelty are humor enhancers (they coexist with humor and boost it). Repeated exposure to a joke reduces the surprise or novelty, and thus the humor. Generally, we likely still perceive a person’s harmless delusional belief and find it funny, just less so. 2) Repetition could increase negative feelings like annoyance, which reduces the harmlessness and thus the humor.

8. My neighbor reads her horoscope every day because she believes in astrology. I perceive that as a harmless delusional belief. It makes me roll my eyes, but I find no humor in it, harmless though it may be.

Harmless means that it “feels to at least some degree okay, acceptable, inoffensive, or safe to us personally”. An eye-roll indicates it feels “not okay” to you, so it’s not harmless to you. This would explain why you find it unfunny. I personally see astrology as harmless delusional belief. Thus, I still find it humorous. But now it’s like an old joke I’ve heard many times. The enhancers of surprise and novelty have mostly gone away, so the humor is minimal (but still present).

Because humor is based on our perception, whether people who believe in astrology (or ESP, ghosts, flat-earth, etc.) are funny is up to each of us. To find these people funny, we must perceive them to be delusional and harmless to us. If we don’t have that perception, we won’t find them funny. This is consistent with what we see in the real world. Some people find them funny and some don’t. In fact, this is what we see in the real world with everything found funny (or not), and it’s for this precise reason.

9. We see people make harmless mistakes every day. They miss dentist appointments because they got the day wrong, they accidentally say the wrong person’s name when talking, they take the wrong highway exit, etc. How do you account for the lack of humor there?

Delusion is not just “mistaken belief” or “false belief”. It is mistaken or false belief that is held even though what is correct or true is clear. We’re unlikely to perceive the maker of a minor mistake as delusional because we’re unlikely to feel that the correct or true thing should be clear to the person. Most of us know from experience that such minor slip-ups are easy to make because it often only takes something like a slight lack of awareness or slight misunderstanding to make them. For us to perceive delusion, we need to judge that the correct or true thing is clear enough that the mistake shouldn’t have been made.

Of course, it’s also reasonable to think that someone might perceive one of these small errors as delusional belief and find it funny. For instance, my young daughters might laugh at my taking the wrong exit, because their inexperience with driving causes them to think that the right exit should have been obvious to me, and thus they view my mistake as one I shouldn’t have made. Whether the correct or true thing is clear is determined by the perceiver.

In other words, the distinction between perceived false belief and perceived delusion is a matter of the extent to which a person’s false belief is judged by the perceiver to be reasonable or justified. And this judgment is made based on the evidence the belief-holder is perceived to have. Granted, it is subjective how a perceiver will judge the person, but my theory accounts for that. If the perceiver doesn’t judge that the evidence of what’s correct or true is clear to the holder of the false belief, they won’t see them as delusional, and thus won’t find them funny.

10. My son’s belief in the tooth fairy would be an example of harmless delusion but unfunny.

I don’t think a child’s belief in the tooth fairy is completely humorless. I recall being mildly amused when my children fell for it. But I think mostly we don’t perceive them as delusional, because we don’t think that the truth about the tooth fairy should be clear to them. They are very young and rely on us to learn about the world, so when we say it’s real, why are they wrong to believe us? We also know that we believed it ourselves.

11. By your definition, it would seem that all “make believe” is inherently humorous. Why isn’t it?

There’s no perceived delusion inherent in the action of make believe because no one is perceived as believing that untrue things are true. The person pretending is perceived as believing that untrue things are untrue (i.e., they believe that things are not real in the make-believe world). The person they might be pretending to be is perceived as believing that true things are true (i.e., they believe that things are real to them in the make-believe world).

12. Why aren’t harmless lies always funny?

There’s no perceived delusion inherent in the action of lying because no one is perceived as believing that an untrue thing is true. The liar perceives themselves as believing that an untrue thing is untrue. The hearer of the lie who doesn’t know it’s a lie perceives the liar as believing that a true thing is true. The hearer of the lie who knows it’s a lie perceives the liar as believing that an untrue thing is untrue.

13. What about hyperbole and metaphor, which involve a person stating something clearly untrue in a literal sense? Why are these often not funny?

Hyperbole has strong inherent potential to be found funny, and sometimes is, because by definition it involves clear overstatement or overreaction, a form of delusional belief. It often isn’t found funny because many hyperbolic expressions are so common and familiar that they are perceived as normal statements rather than as hyperbole and exaggeration. Only the intended meaning has force. For instance, “ages” and “forever” only come across as “a long time”; “millions”, “tons”, and “an arm and a leg” only mean “a lot”; “dying to” only means “really want to”; etc. However, in cases of unconventional hyperbole, we may focus more on the literal meaning of the statement because of its novelty and creativity. This greater attention on the literal can increase the chance that the expression will be found funny because of the higher likelihood it will be perceived as delusional overstatement.

Metaphor, unlike hyperbole, is not defined by delusional belief. Thus it has much less inherent potential to be found funny. A metaphor is essentially a description based on comparison or analogy. Evidence shows that people generally understand metaphorical statements at the same speed as literal ones¹. This suggests that we typically process the intended metaphorical meaning instantly, without activating the literal meaning. Because we tend not to process the clearly untrue literal meaning, and thus don’t perceive the person making a metaphorical point as believing something untrue, the potential for humor is minimal. For example, the person using the metaphor “his words cut deeper than a knife” will tend to be perceived only as believing the true thing that the words hurt emotionally, and not at all the untrue thing that they made a physical opening. And the person using the metaphor “she has a heart of gold” will be perceived only as believing the true thing that she is kind and caring, and not at all the untrue thing that her heart is made of gold.

14. A contradiction that isn’t funny is the following sentence: “This sentence is false.”

Delusional contradiction is belief something is the case and isn’t the case at the same time. Paradoxes like this one can be funny if it comes across strongly that a person believes both sides without realizing it’s a contradiction (e.g., Homer Simpson’s belief that alcohol is both the cause of and solution to all life’s problems). I don’t think that’s quite the case with this paradox. Plus, if the “figuring out” of the riddle takes work, which seems to be the case with this one, that can reduce the funniness (less harmlessness). Notice how the following phrases aren’t what we normally see as funny, but when George Carlin puts a spotlight on them as oxymorons/paradoxes, the delusional contradiction of the phrase creator/communicator (and thus funniness) comes across more strongly: “jumbo shrimp”, “original copy”, and “silent alarm”.

15. Wouldn’t the unfunniness of misdirection, magic, and optical illusions present problems for your theory?

I think the implication here is that these things cause us, in a way, to believe things that are untrue, and that, according to my theory, we should find this delusion in ourselves funny. My theory says that we’re unlikely to perceive ourselves as delusional when we experience these things, and that this is why they are typically unfunny. We don’t perceive delusion in ourselves here because we know that we were deceived or that the evidence was ambiguous, and therefore we feel our belief was reasonable or justified. As I said above in #9 regarding the difference between mistaken/false belief and delusional belief, for us to perceive delusion we need to judge that the correct or true thing is clear enough that the mistake shouldn’t have been made.

16. What about breaking the fourth wall, or when an actor has a blooper? Why is this funny?

Breaking the fourth wall is a complex thing because it plays with our suspension of disbelief (a complex thing itself), so is admittedly tricky to analyze. I think one plausible explanation is that this is delusional contradiction. When we’re viewing fiction we are suspending disbelief and imagining that the character believes they are a real person (in the make-believe world). We partially maintain this suspended disbelief when the character breaks the fourth wall and exhibits a belief that they’re not a real person. This has the effect of the character seeming to believe they’re both real and not real at the same time. Continuing to view them as the character can also make the character seem delusional in other ways. For instance, if an actor forgets their line that is an answer to a simple question, the character might seem to have delusional lack of knowledge for not knowing the answer.

17. Why are practical jokes and pranks funny?

In my foundational article, I showed how the target of a prank can be a source of humor by appearing to have a delusional belief (the belief a house can disappear). Sometimes in a prank, the practical joker themselves has a delusional belief — one that is pretended. This pretense is obvious to the observer but hidden from the target. The result is another source of humor, as we see in this example from Candid Camera:

The targets are real customers at a restaurant. The prankster poses as a fellow diner who sits extremely close to them, talks loudly on the phone, and reaches over to take their bread. The delusion we observers find funny is the prankster’s pretend belief that it’s acceptable or appropriate to do this, even though it clearly isn’t (Norm Violation). We might also find the target’s delusional lack of awareness that they’re being pranked funny. It’s clear to us what’s happening, so we feel it should be clear to them.

At first, it’s usually only the observer who can experience the humor because the hidden pretense causes the target to perceive harm in the prankster’s delusional belief. But when the prank (and the pretense) is revealed, the perception of harm is reduced, and the target is now more likely to find the prankster’s pretend delusion funny. The target might also now find their own lack of awareness of the prank funny. We might laugh with the target because we can now see these things through their eyes.

18. Why are the kinds of videos in shows like “America’s Funniest Videos” funny?

These types of candid videos frequently consist of unintentional humor caused by a delusional lack of judgment or delusional lack of awareness. Examples of delusional lack of judgment are the father getting hit in the groin because he gets too close to his son swinging the baseball bat, the person standing up on the boat and falling in, and the person trying to walk across a sheet of ice and falling down. In each case, we find it funny because we think it should be clear to the person that they are using poor judgment. Examples of delusional lack of awareness are the person trying to walk out of their house and crashing through the screen door, the person jumping on a bed and hitting their head on a spinning ceiling fan, and the cat knocking drinking glasses off the table. We find each of these funny because we think these obstacles were clear enough that the lapse in awareness shouldn’t have happened. With the cat, we easily personify it and think of it as a person knocking the glasses over. This type of unintentional humor is often enhanced by a large dose of schadenfreude.

19. Do you think harmless delusion can explain humor from things like tickling, play fighting, and chasing?

I would say that humorous tickling, play fighting, and chasing are all forms of humorous pretense. A person (or other primate) pretends to have a delusional belief, and this pretend belief is what is found funny. In this case, the delusional belief is related to the norm violation of attacking or threatening another. When we find these physical threats funny, it’s because we perceive the “attacker” as believing their behavior is appropriate or acceptable, even though it clearly isn’t. That we know the threat is pretended helps us to feel it’s harmless. This explanation is basically the same as the one for insult humor in my earlier article. The main difference is that, with insults, the attack is verbal rather than physical.

20. What about things that seem funny because they are just so obviously and clearly true?

If you say that something is funny because it’s “obviously and clearly true”, you need to explain why everything “obviously and clearly true” isn’t funny. And why everything funny isn’t “obviously and clearly true”. The perception of “truth” merely acts to sometimes enhance humor that is caused by the perception of harmless delusion. Humor that involves truth is often about the ways we exhibit and experience others’ delusional beliefs in our everyday lives. We see and enjoy that it is true that this delusion actually does occur or seem to occur in reality.

For example, when Ellen DeGeneres points out the tiny difference between airplane reclined seats and upright seats, and how airlines seem to think of it (upright = alive, slightly reclined = dead), what we find funny is the airline’s delusional belief she draws attention to (the belief there’s a difference in safety, even though there really doesn’t seem to be). When Seinfeld points out how we think hiding our wallet in our shoe at the beach is a good idea, what we find funny is the wallet-hider’s delusional belief (the belief it’s a secure place, even though it clearly isn’t).

Or take this George Carlin line: “Have you ever noticed that anybody driving slower than you is an idiot, and anyone going faster than you is a maniac?” This draws attention to a delusional belief many of us have ourselves. Clearly everyone else isn’t stupid or crazy, but the circumstances of driving cause us to overreact and believe others are much worse than they actually are. That it’s true we sometimes have this belief acts to enhance the humor.

21. What is it we are “getting” when we view the cartoon below? The most parsimonious explanation is that “getting” the cartoon is what is making it funny, the putting together of two different and seemingly incompatible frames of reference and their associations in a playful way (Swiss Army knives and French love of wine), rather than any delusion.

While that may be a simple explanation, it is too broad and superficial to be sufficient for humor and valuable in our understanding of it, as I’ve explained in my critique of incongruity theories. An explanation that is perhaps not as simple, but is more precise and insightful, is that the cartoon is funny because we perceive that a person believes that it’s sensible to create or own a single device with twelve of the same corkscrews, even though it clearly isn’t sensible (delusional lack of judgment). Also, the cartoon greatly exaggerates the love the French have for wine, making them seem like they believe wine is much more important than it actually is (delusional overvaluation). We “get” this (i.e., perceive these delusions) quickly because of our high-powered theory of mind. I’d argue that my explanation describes what is noticeably at the heart of the cartoon and is therefore much more accurate and meaningful than saying it’s funny because we playfully “put together two incompatible frames of reference”.

22. I think you are stretching your theory too much with some of your explanations.

I admit my theory needs to be stretched. Any valid universal humor theory would need to have this flexibility in order to cover all humor. But I don’t think it ever stretches to the point of breaking. The key question to ask is if an explanation is plausible. Is it plausible that a harmless delusional belief is present and perceptible in the stimulus found funny? I contend that it always is.

23. Isn’t your theory the same as the Benign Violation Theory (BVT)?

I think my theory and BVT have similarities, but they are different in significant ways. The “benign” and “harmless” conditions are basically the same, however the “violation” and “delusion” conditions are very different. Knowing that humor is fundamentally about a person’s delusional belief is, I contend, significantly more meaningful and useful than knowing it is about, as BVT claims, something “wrong” or “not as it should be”. A multitude of things could cause something to seem wrong or not as it should be, so it ultimately doesn’t really tell us much. By knowing it’s about delusional belief, we understand specifically the root cause and true nature of humor. Plus, we can then delve further, as I have, into the different kinds of delusion in order to gain even greater insight.

I think the following comparison highlights the value of my theory in relation to BVT. Which set of terms seems to more accurately and meaningfully describe what is present in funny things?

• Types of Violation (BVT): Norm violation, Bad, Incorrect, Wrong, Worse than expected, Illogical, Physical threat, Identity threat.
• Types of Delusion (HDT): Overstatement/Overreaction, Understatement/Underreaction, Lack of Knowledge/Judgment, Lack of Awareness, Misunderstanding, Norm Violation, Contradiction, Nonsense, Impossibility, and Absurdity.

And, importantly, I hypothesize there are instances where HDT and BVT will make different predictions. BVT’s lack of specificity will sometimes lead to false positives. These same false positives will not occur with the more-precise HDT. Here are two notable examples:

1. Minor errors, such as those in speaking, typing, math, etc. BVT will incorrectly predict these errors will likely be funny, because they are cases where something is wrong or not as it should be. HDT will correctly predict humor would likely not occur because they are cases with a lack of delusion. As explained earlier, we’re unlikely to perceive the maker of a minor mistake as delusional because we’re unlikely to feel that the correct or true thing was clear enough that the mistake shouldn’t have been made. We know from experience that such minor slip-ups are easy to make with just a slight lack of awareness or misunderstanding.
2. Cases where we experience something both pleasant and unpleasant, such as eating extremely spicy food or receiving a vigorous massage. BVT will incorrectly predict that this will likely be funny to the eater or massage receiver because their perception is that they enjoy it (benign) yet also feel pain (violation). HDT will correctly predict humor would not occur, as there is no perceived delusional belief. The eater or massage receiver will not perceive it as a delusional contradiction (or any other type of delusional belief) to enjoy spicy food or the massage because the person knows that it’s possible, reasonable, etc. for something to taste/feel good and feel painful at the same time.

24. What about the Semantic Script Theory of Humor² and the General Theory of Verbal Humor³? How is your theory an improvement?

These more detailed incongruity theories attempt to provide more specificity to “incongruity” by saying that the opposing things need to be associated in some way or, as Victor Raskin says, “make pseudo-sense together”. But, ultimately, this overarching concept of an incongruity that is “associated”, “relevant”, “pseudo-logical”, “of a certain type” etc. is, in my view, still too imprecise to be useful in our understanding of humor itself. It might be necessary (because it’s vaguely defined), but it isn’t sufficient to explain all humor. Many situations with these qualities are non-humorous. The two counterexamples given above for BVT would also apply here.

The theorists also give a very long list of ways things might be opposed (script opposition) and techniques/processes that connect them (logical mechanism). This is essentially a list of possible elements we might find in humorous stimuli. While this may be useful in cataloging the various components of humorous instances, it has little value in helping us know what’s at the center of humor itself. The collection of script oppositions and logical mechanisms is also neither necessary nor sufficient for humor. This is evident in the theorists’ own admission that creating an exhaustive enumeration of all of them is impossible.

I maintain that the concept of delusion is superior because 1) it explains all cases of humor, not just verbal humor, 2) it more precisely, concisely, and meaningfully describes what is present and noticeable in all humor, 3) the list of ten types of delusion is an exhaustive list that focuses only on what triggers humor (not an inventory of elements found in humorous instances), and 4) with the condition of harmlessness, it appears to be necessary and sufficient for humor (still to be proven conclusively). While SSTH and GTVH might describe a wide array of possible symptoms of humorous instances, HDT describes the root cause of humor itself.

25. It doesn’t matter how many examples you show. It is still cherry picking. They haven’t been randomly assembled. You, the theorist, have picked them.

I agree all the examples are not conclusive evidence, but it’s not quantity for quantity’s sake. It’s about comprehensiveness. I’ve now illustrated how the following forms of humor can all be explained by HDT: canned jokes, cartoons, tv, movie, books, standup, practical jokes, physical humor, tickling/play-fighting, first-person, third-person, unintentional, puns, malapropism, paradox, non sequitur, bathos, pretense, insult, anti-humor, analogy, anthropomorphism, hyperbole, verbal irony, situational irony, dramatic irony, parody, and satire. I feel this goes a long way to supporting the universality of my theory. Plus, I believe I’ve been able to plausibly refute all potential counterexamples presented to me by others.

26. I have seen no evidence that delusion is sufficient (with harmlessness) to cause humor.

The best and most convincing evidence (right now) that harmless delusion is sufficient for humor is that there’s no evidence that it isn’t sufficient for humor. I’ve seen no evidence of an instance of harmless delusion that is clearly humorless. It’s noteworthy that no other prominent humor theory can make this claim. Incongruity, benign violation, surprise, superiority, and relief all have instances that are clearly humorless.

To test sufficiency we can do a rigorous experiment (as I’ve proposed) and thought experiment that addresses possible counterexamples (as I’ve done myself and with those sent to me by others, some of which are included above). I argue that there has not been a successful counterexample using thought experiment. I anticipate that a rigorous experiment like what I’ve proposed will provide more conclusive evidence.

27. You can’t be the sole arbiter, explainer, and validator of your theory. The concept of delusion will be hard to reliably identify within the stimuli for anyone but you.

It would be challenging to operationalize, but I think it can be done reliably. A possible way is to ask people the following in a questionnaire: “Do you agree or disagree that a person appears to believe something is correct or true and that it should be clear to this person that it’s incorrect or untrue?” Or you could spell things out more: “Do you agree or disagree that [identify person in stimulus] appears to believe [describe what the person appears to believe is correct or true] and that it should be clear to this person that it’s incorrect or untrue?”

28. If you know the secret to humor, why aren’t you a world famous comedian?

While I do claim that my theory identifies the unifying core element of humor, I don’t claim it is a guaranteed formula for creating successful comedy. You could perhaps use my theory and ten types of delusion as a basic guide (e.g., let’s make this character overreact or let’s make him misunderstand or let’s make her contradict herself), but from there you’re on your own to use skill and creativity to devise the joke. My theory in no way gives a person that skill or creativity, and isn’t meant to.

Contact Gary at howhumorworks@gmail.com

References

1. Gibbs, R. W., Jr., & Tendahl, M. (2006). Cognitive Effort and Effects in Metaphor Comprehension: Relevance Theory and Psycholinguistics.
2. Raskin, V. Semantic mechanisms of humour. New York: Springer Science & Business Media, 2012.
3. Attardo, S., and Raskin, V. ‘Script theory revisited: Joke similarity and joke representation model’, in: HUMOR: International Journal of Humor Research, 4 (3–4), 1991, 293–348.

The “How Humor Works” series presenting the Harmless Delusion Theory

• Part 1: How Humor Works (foundational article)
• Part 2: How Jerry Seinfeld’s Humor Works
• Part 3: How Humor Works in ‘Airplane!’
• Part 4: How Humor Works in ‘Annie Hall’
• Part 5: This article