Can the Army Build the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Fighting Vehicle?
Army is ready to replace the Bradley Fighting Vehicle. Will anemic industrial-base strangle new production?
EDIT (7/31/2023): Added link to follow-on article about Army’s current plans for modernization of its manufacturing industrial base.
From the desk of James Blythe —
The votes are in. The tallies have been counted and re-counted. Hanging chads have been relegated, mitigated, and eliminated with extreme prejudice.
Of the five participants in the Optionally Manned Fighting Vehicle (OMFV) program, only two remain. Oshkosh Defense, BAE Systems, and newcomer Pointblank Enterprises have been eliminated from competition. This leaves General Dynamics Land Systems and American Rheinmetall to move forward in Phases III and IV.
OMFV, now rebranded as the XM30 Mechanized Infantry Combat Vehicle (XM30 MICV), represents the only major acquisition program for ground systems in the Army’s sights for the foreseeable future. Unlike other modernization programs in their queue, XM30 is an all-new weapon system rather than an upgrade or refurbishment of an existing one. Like the Bradley Fighting Vehicle before it, the success of this program will be determined by whether the U.S. manufacturing base will be able to support it.
If successful, the United States can demonstrate that American manufacturing still has what it takes to provide for the national defense. If not, it may leave questions as to the true state of the domestic industrial base.
XM30 MICV is The Big One
In the ground vehicle world, the new XM30 program is it. As with the Bradley before it, this vehicle is designed to bring new capabilities to the warfighter and change the way battles are fought. This is the big Army modernization priority with potential to be a 50+ year dynasty.
For decades, the Army has attempted to replace the BFV and M113 platforms in their arsenal with more modern systems. Arguably the most proliferate combat vehicle in the world, the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier — developed in the 1950s — has shown its age in modern conflicts. In 2016, the Army began replacing its aging fleet of M113s with the new AMPV. In doing so, the vehicle brings extensive improvements in survivability, force protection, mobility, power generation, and has the ability for future expansion to host future technologies.
The BFV, however, has not been so easily replaced.
Bradley is not a tank. It is categorized as an Armored Fighting Vehicle (AFV) that serves a wide range of roles within the Army. Although numerous variants of the BFV have been developed and prototyped, the M2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle, M3 Cavalry Fighting Vehicle and M7 BFIST (fire support) variants are most common.
Production of the newest A4 configuration continues in limited numbers. Development of a follow-on A5 has been cancelled in favor of focusing on XM30 MICV and other modernization programs.
Despite significant concerns about the Bradley’s design and production in its early years, it has been successful. In the Gulf War, BFV destroyed more tanks than the M1 Abrams. During the Global War on Terror, its impact on the battlefield is unquestioned and a number of upgrades were made to the system to counter the evolving IED threat and improve system survivability in an urban environment.
Since the 1990s, various efforts have been made to replace the BFV. FCS, GCV, and FFV have all attempted to provide a modernized replacement for the vehicle but none have stuck.
If the Army is happy with the results of this next phase of the XM30 MICV program, the winner may potentially replace the entire fleet of BFVs. While Bradley is scheduled to remain in-service through 2030, is the writing now on the wall for the 40 year old weapon system?
If the Army replaces BFVs 1:1 with XM30s, that’s potentially 6,000 vehicles over 15 years. Those are significant numbers for manufacturing a ground vehicle of this size and scope. Although it’s not at the scale of automotive manufacturing, the specialized nature of combat vehicles means that serious, heavy fabrication must be done and will be done in volume. As a result, the XM30 contract has the potential to represent a major boon to US manufacturers if they can answer the call.
Manufacturing Challenges on the Horizon
Although the XM30 program is being hailed by top brass as a successful program, the question remains — will contractors be able to deliver on their production promises?
In the next phases, each competitor will be on the hook to provide 11 vehicles to the Army for evaluation.
There is limited capability within the U.S. to build new-production armored fighting vehicles on the scale of XM30. The Lima Army Tank Plant has been in recession for many years. Although the Trump Presidency saw a surge of life, the majority of activities are refurbishment of existing hulls and upgrading vehicles. A few brackets may be welded in or bulkheads modified, but otherwise additions consist of anything that can be bolted-in to an existing structure.
Realistically, the only companies that currently maintain an active production of ground vehicles are OSHKOSH Defense (producer of the JLTV) and BAE Systems (producer of the ACV FOV, Paladin FOV, and AMPV FOV). Recently AM General won the next phase of JLTV production and there are several companies that previously produced MRAPs that have some expertise remaining. Unfortunately, wheeled tactical vehicles are (comparatively) light weight with little in-common to the XM30 in design or work scope.
BAE Systems is the only company in the US currently producing anything on the scale of the OMFV. Additionally, the company’s legacy acquisitions not only designed and manufactured the original M113, BFV, and AAV, but have a history in the sustainment, refurbishment, and upgrade of these platforms. More recently, they have been responsible for production of new hulls for a range of platforms which take advantage of advances in robotic welding systems pioneered by the Army Research Laboratory and its commercial partners.
These programs, however, have not been without issue. This may have factored in to their elimination from the OMFV competition.
AMPV and Paladin have both seen major schedule delays over their history. BAE Systems and their partner companies have struggled with quality issues and maintaining production rates as they have gone “back to production” after twenty years of inactivity. This is not unique to BAE Systems or the defense industry. Elon Musk has publicly acknowledged the challenges with reinstitution of American manufacturing and transitioning a product to production. Lockheed Martin’s F-35 has a similar, rocky road to production over 20 years as a result of challenges in customer requirements, design deficiencies, and supply-chain issues within the manufacturing-base.
COVID-19 has exacerbated many logistical sourcing problems as well.
Ultimately, BAE Systems lost its bid at the XM30. The question remains as to whether the program will realize a production solution at its conclusion or if it will go the way of FCS, GCV, and many others. The Army has yet to make public the rationale for selection of America Rheinmetall and General Dynamics Land Systems for proceeding to the next phase, but it seems clear that a clear path-to-production success is needed — something that the other competitors might not have been able to demonstrate.
So what does the future hold?
Regardless of who wins the XM30 program, building the vehicles is likely to be a major challenge for American manufacturing.
The United States continues to struggle with talent acquisition and supply chain shortages within its manufacturing base. Analysts continue to champion better digital tools and AI as the saviors of manufacturers but, more fundamental gaps exist in these businesses. Shortages in skilled labor, design knowledge, and fabrication capability will continue to weigh down the ability of the country to provide for its own national defense.
As the Army pushes to revitalize its own depots and arsenals, how will production of the XM30 factor in to those plans? How will the remaining competitors utilize the logistical and strategic goals of Big Army to give them a competitive edge? Will manufacturers — either within the DOD or commercial industry — be able to meet the challenges of producing a new vehicle platform despite years of neglect? Or will allied nations, such as the Lynx production-base in Germany, be called on to aid in the transition to production?
What about on-going shortages in electronics from overseas vendors? Will this hamper the delivery of advanced digital tools that are required for XM30 competitors? What, if any, advances in AI will GDLS and Rheinmetall be able to leverage in this new vehicle offering?
Based on the U.S. Army’s official release on this topic —
…the Army intends to have a limited competition to downselect to one vendor at Milestone C near the end of fiscal year 2027, with first unit equipped anticipated in fiscal year 2029.
These questions, and more, will be answered in the next round of competition.
