Modernizing the Army’s Industrial Base in 2023
Army looks inward to solve its problems with heavy industry in America.
From the desk of James Blythe —
Previously, we talked a bit about the XM30 MICV, but that isn’t all that the Army has on its plate this year. Far from it.
Army Futures Command is currently focused on “developing the Army of 2040 and delivering the Army of 2030.” To do this, they are targeting the Army’s six modernization priorities which are oriented around new doctrines in multi-domain warfare -
- Long range precision fire(s)
- Next generation combat vehicle(s)
- Future vertical lift
- Air and missile defense
- Network
- Soldier lethality
Evolving concerns over Chinese military threats and the on-going Russia/Ukraine conflict is lighting a fire under the Army to figure out how its going to define — and dominate — the battlefield of the future.
It’s clear that future conflicts will be a mix of regular and irregular warfare. As such, a lot of work is being done to field novel weapon systems to properly equip the warfighter for the challenges of a diverse, multi-domain battle.
This means building stuff. Lots of stuff.
General Omar Bradley is often attributed with the saying, “amateurs talk strategy; professionals talk logistics.” That means producing ammunition and armor and heavy metal at scale and getting that materiale into the hands of the warfighter. In 2003, a report from the Rand Institute hinted at the poor condition of the United States’ military manufacturing machine. Of the arsenals and ammunition plants, the organization painted a stark picture about America’s ability to win the logistics war -
…These facilities provide the Army more capacity than it needs or believes it will need, so a portion of this industrial base is underused or mothballed. Further, much of the equipment in these plants is old, obsolete, and expensive to operate.
Luckily, someone in Washington was listening.
On top of the significant investments being made in new weapon systems, the Army has initiated a program to modernize its organic industrial base (AOIB). Although AOIB includes a plethora of governmental and commercial entities, current policy and funding priorities suggest that the Army is looking to use the lion’s share of this funding reinvigorate its internal manufacturing capability.
But why?
Congress has espoused the virtues of “manufacturing as a national defense issue” but realistically, policies within the DOD haven’t reflected that.
Recently, Army has emphasized procuring non-developmental products from foreign providers.
Programs like FCS and GCV resulted in huge sums of money being spent with very little return for the Army. As a result, the Army shifted away from high-risk technology moonshots, favoring procurement of non-developmental items. The impact to the manufacturing base has been significant.
Essentially, the only way to procure a new vehicle or capability that you don’t design and build yourself, is to get it from someone else. This is especially the case in the ground-vehicle sector.
Stryker was one of the last major vehicle production efforts prior to the Global War on Terror (GWoT). It was designed and manufactured in Canada.
Similarly, Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle and the Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) for the USMC are another example of foreign products being adopted by the Army. MRAP designs were based off those farmed from a variety of international sources, notably South Africa and the Middle East. Similarly, both BAE Systems and SAIC’s final contenders for the ACV program were based on existing amphibious vehicles produced for European and Asian markets. Luckily, the majority of production for these platforms was transitioned to domestic sources.
In looking to replace its cold weather terrain vehicle, the Army selected BAE Systems’ Beowulf. Beowulf is an existing system designed and produced by the company’s Swedish division. No announcements have been made about plans to transition production to the United States.
The M10 Booker is a variant on the GDLS UK’s Ajax. These vehicles are built in the United Kingdom and there’s no existing production line State-side either. In the final phase of the Booker’s predecessor program (MPF), BAE Systems’ variant of the M8 Armored Gun System — domestically designed and produced — was eliminated from competition for failure to meet requirements.
Although not non-developmental, the XM30 MICV competition has followed a similar path. In order to replace the aging Bradley Fighting Vehicle, originally homegrown in California, the Army is considering two contenders. American Rheinmetall is offering a variant of the Lynx, produced in Germany. GDLS is offering another variant of the UK’s Ajax. It seems likely that a successful program would be produced domestically, but where?
It is possible to take a system based on a foreign design and produce it domestically. Can the US support the production of so many new systems?
AOIB needs investment to revitalize the DOD’s ability to deliver on heavy industry commitments.
Love them or hate them, since World War II, a small number of original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) have provided the majority of design and manufacturing capability needed by the Army. Since the 1960s, defense spending as a factor of GDP has gone down by nearly half.
This means that what America spends on defense in relation to what it creates in value is declining.
As a result of low profits and limitations in defense spending, what was once a wide field of service providers to the DOD has consolidated into a handful of major companies — the Raytheons, Lockeed Martins, L3s, General Dynamics(s), Northrup Grummans, and BAE Systems(s) of the world. These “prime contractors” then often sub-contract elements of a program or product to downstream vendors.
Outwardly, the DOD and its OEMs are partners. Historically, there has been skepticism within the military about working with commercial manufacturers. A common refrain heard from military leaders — when speaking to industry — is, “how do we get what we need for the country without getting ripped off by you, commercial industry?”
This is typical of the mindset in defense procurement.
Taking advantage of existing commercial infrastructure for the development and manufacture of defense product has allowed the DOD to get innovation for free (previously financed by customers in the civilian market). Unfortunately, as American know-how has shifted away from manufacturing and toward software and service pursuits, the DOD has found that — much like its arsenals and depots — the ability of commercial industry to support new programs is increasingly a mixed-bag.
So how can the Army meet its modernization needs without a modern manufacturing industry?
In passing the Chips Act of 2022, Congress hopes to address issues with foreign sourcing of microelectronics — a critical gap in U.S. manufacturing. Along a similar vein, the Army has made it clear that they will be investing in their manufacturing base. The focus, however, seems to be on reinvigorating the Arsenals and Depots rather than investing in commercial vendors.
Army will drive work toward its existing facilities. Commercial industry will be expected to support.
Rock Island Arsenal (RIA) is receiving a significant stipend to invest in state-of-the-art equipment to revitalize it’s manufacturing capability. This facility is envisioned as the Army’s Center of Excellence for manufacturing. To this end, the Army has arranged the Joint Manufacturing and Technology Center (JMTC) as a commercial-esque branch of RIA and encourages OEMs to let them handle the manufacturing instead.
For a price, of course.
Although some have scoffed at the idea that the government is capable of replacing OEMs, RIA has already demonstrated the ability to take on the complexities of vehicle integration tasks traditionally left to commercial actors.
It’s not just RIA that the Army is relying on to support Army of 2030. The Ground Vehicle Systems Center (GVSC) working with ASTRO America seeks to build the world’s largest 3D printer — one capable of printing a vehicle structure on-demand. This has the potential to enable the Army to “cut out” the few big companies — like GDLS — that have experience in hull fabrication and do it themselves.
Long range precision fire projects like the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) concept are likewise being kept internal to the DOD. GVSC, Benet Laboratories, and Pictatinny Arsenal are looking to modernize the recently updated M109A7 Paladin with even greater lethality. What is interesting, is that the M109A7 Paladin was designed and is currently being manufactured by BAE Systems. Public releases do not specify whether BAE will have any on-going involvement in ERCA if that system goes to production.
With this drive towards a reinvigorated set of manufacturing capabilities internal to the Army, it seems likely that production agreements between OEMs and the DOD will be important considerations during program competition. Those commercial entities that “get on board” with supporting the Army’s goals are likely to sign contracts to base production — or some significant fraction of it — at a military arsenal or depot rather than commercial sub-vendors.
GDLS has significant advantages in running the government-owned Lima Tank Plant. Advocating to produce of the M10 Booker and their XM30 offerings would give the Army additional utilization at the plant whose fortunes have fluctuated over years. Similarly, Rheinmetall and others may be contractually persuaded to allow RIA-JMTC, or one of the Army Depots to contribute a significant amount of work in manufacturing production vehicles in the absence of an existing domestic provider.
Conclusions on the Strategy to Modernize the Army Industrial Base
Current conflicts are driving the Army to accelerate its modernization plans. As a result, they are attempting to procure an unprecedented array of new systems and capabilities. In order to succeed at this, Congress will need to make significant investments into America’s manufacturing base.
Right now, it looks likely that those investments will occur at the Depots, Arsenals, and Laboratories internal to the Army. Commercial entities will need to be wary of this shift in workload and follow the XM30 and ERCA programs closely to determine what part — if any — they will play. Production platforms like the AMPV and M10 Booker are likely to be used to test the waters and determine to what extent American manufacturers are ready to support the Army of 2030.
Good or bad, the Army’s current strategy to reinvigorate manufacturing in America seems to be primarily inward-facing. Time will tell if they are ready to rise to the challenge.
