Back in January 2022, the Athletic published an article titled Miedema’s identity crisis: Fewer goals, more pressing responsibility and a star striker stunted.
“Since Jonas Eidevall took over as Arsenal head coach, Vivianne Miedema, who earlier this season hit a century of goals for Arsenal, hasn’t reached the same levels as in previous seasons.”¹
Eidevall had introduced a more front-footed approach and charged his forwards with pressing the opposition to force turnovers high. Though the counter-press had made Arsenal more dangerous and produced some spectacular results, the team was also experiencing some growing pains.
And whereas Beth Mead thrived under the new regime, Miedema was, as Florence Lloyd-Hughes put it, going through an identity crisis.
The Dutch superstar was given the freedom to stay close to the goal and get into shooting positions under previous manager Joe Montemurro, and fired Arsenal to their first WSL title in almost a decade back in 2019, scoring a record-breaking 22 goals in 20 games.
Now asked to lead the press, Miedema found her touches both fewer and in less dangerous positions. And though her defensive work rate benefitted the Gunners’ other forwards, it came at her own expense.
Miedema’s contract was due to expire in the summer and Barcelona’s interest was common knowledge. The supporters braced themselves for heartbreak, and the arrival of Sweden striker Stina Blackstenius suggested that the club was preparing for life after her too.
That article was published at a dark time for the North London side, with three losses in four games to see out 2021, including a painful 3–0 defeat to Chelsea in the belayed FA Cup final and a brutal 4–0 beatdown at the hands of Barcelona.
Gunners and gooners alike must have thought they’d hit rock bottom, but somehow they managed to sink even further after the winter break, going out of the League Cup to Manchester United and losing 2–0 to bottom-of-the-league Birmingham City.
And it was amidst that pessimistic — fatalistic even — atmosphere that the article came out, but better times were just around the corner.
The draw against Man City kicked off the comeback, with Tobin Heath scoring at the death to stop the bleeding. Next up was Brighton, and Meadema — as the duo is affectionately known — scored in quick succession to secure a comeback win and a much-needed morale boost.
Many supporters feared that Blackstenius had arrived as Miedema’s replacement, but Eidevall denied it strenuously, insisting that they could play together.
The Miedema-Blackstenius partnership featured for the first time during the visit to Man United in February 2022, with Eidevall bringing on his compatriot in the 58th minute in search of the equalizer. Miedema released Blackstenius into space with a magnificent long ball from deep and the Swede put it past Mary Earps to rescue a point for her new side.
Eidevall started Miedema at 10 and Blackstenius at 9 during the crucial visit to Kingsmeadow the following week and the Miedema-Blackstenius partnership (as well as an in-form Mead) became the mainstay of Arsenal’s frontline from that point on.
Miedema expressed her happiness at her newfound partnership with Blackstenius and penned a new contract that summer. And when the Gunners kicked off their 22/23 campaign, it was once again with Miedema at 10 and Blackstenius at 9.
Yet the Miedema-Blackstenius partnership was at its last gasp.
Ahead of Arsenal’s visit to reigning UWCL champions Lyon in October 2022, Eidevall shocked much of the women’s football world by dropping Miedema and starting the young Frida L. Maanum in her place.
Maanum repaid Eidevall’s faith with an immense performance, netting a goal and an assist as the Gunners brought down Lyon with a sensational 5–1 upset. From that point on, the 22/23 season became the season of Maanum.
And Miedema found herself going from the first name on the teamsheet to not even making the starting eleven.
What was the reason for this sudden and dramatic turnaround?
The answer was, the Miedema-at-10 experiment simply was not working.
It started, as we’ve seen, auspiciously.
Miedema had always described herself as a “nine and a half” in the mold of her fellow Dutch Arsenal legend Dennis Bergkamp. She was a striker who preferred to drop off and get more involved in the game rather than simply stay in the box and wait for the ball, and Blackstenius was seen as the perfect foil for her.
The Swede would take up the center forward position to free up Miedema to involve herself in the game more and make use of her passing ability, while her channel running would drag opposition defenders out of position and open up space for the Dutch star to attack.
And out of possession, Blackstenius would assume the bulk of Miedema’s counter-pressing responsibilities, allowing her to remain central and attack the space in behind when the ball is won.
On paper at least, the Miedema-Blackstenius partnership ought to have been a fruitful one. But as always, individual players’ roles and responsibilities cannot be discussed in isolation — the proper context must be applied.
So what was the proper context at Arsenal?
Back in those early days, Eidevall would line up in a 4–2–3–1 with Lia Wälti and the skipper Kim Little as the pivots. January signing Rafaelle joined Leah Williamson in central defense while Steph Catley and Noelle Maritz were typically the full backs.
This was a strong backline, but its limitations were clear.
Whereas Rafaelle and Williamson were both world-class ballplaying defenders, neither Catley nor Maritz was known for their ability on the ball. Indeed, they were both more traditional full backs who excelled defensively and sought to overlap their winger and put in crosses in attack.
Katie McCabe was the other option at full back and indeed, the most technically secure of the three. However, McCabe was also the most adventurous by some distance and was often deployed as a winger outright.
Many top teams in both the women’s and the men’s game use an asymmetrical defense, with one full back given the freedom to either push on or invert into the midfield and the other asked to tuck in and operate as the third center back in buildup.
Given the prevalence of the 4–4–2 defensive shape in the modern game, a back three offers numerical superiority in the first phase of buildup, thereby making it easier to play out from the back.
Eidevall typically used a 2–4 buildup shape with both full backs advancing, but Martiz would stay deeper to give the Gunners a +1 when necessary. However, she was not a perfect fit for this role (nor was Catley), and her presence presented a target for an aggressive, well-coordinated press.
To find a way out of Eidevall’s dilemma, inspiration could be taken from Pep Guardiola, the man who’d popularized the situational back three during his time in charge of Barcelona.
Left back Eric Abidal was usually asked to stay deeper, but Guardiola would sometimes push both full backs on. Sergio Busquets, the defensive midfielder, would drop between the center backs while Xavi would take up the pivot position.
Eidevall had a defensive midfielder ideally suited for this role in Wälti, and the Switzerland captain would often drop into the backline like a half back. Little would become the holding midfielder and she would often pick up the ball deeper, carry it up the pitch and find a teammate ahead of her.
However, this created a new vulnerability elsewhere.
With Wälti becoming the third center back and Little sitting, Arsenal had a 3–1 in buildup. And whereas a double pivot of Little and Wälti was all but unpressable, Little by herself was potentially vulnerable. The former Scotland international was incredibly press-resistant, but even she could lose the ball when outnumbered and under heavy pressure, and the attacking midfielder would have to drop deep to support Little.
This was not a problem for Guardiola as his most advanced midfielder, Andrés Iniesta, was every bit as press-resistant as Xavi and Busquets. Iniesta could get on the ball deep and either dribble his way out of pressure or play in one of the forwards with his incredible vision and passing range.
But this was decidedly not the case with Miedema.
A 5’10 forward with a lanky frame, Miedema simply did not possess the nimbleness to wiggle away from defenders and dribble her way out of tight spaces like Messi or Iniesta. Nor did she possess the brute pace to burst past them like Kaká.
Miedema has sometimes been referred to as a false 9 due to her inclination to drop and get on the ball outside the box, but this is misguided. Much like Bergkamp, she is a second striker. And rather than wreaking havoc in the final third through dribbling, Miedema’s great strengths are her clinicality in front of goal and her ability to play defense-splitting killer balls.
Her assist for Blackstenius back in that first game was spectacular, but she’d picked up the ball facing forward and in space. If she was dropping to the halfway line to support Little, she’d almost certainly have to receive with her back to goal and under pressure.
How often did Dennis Bergkamp drop to the halfway line to support Patrick Vieira?
Bergkamp did his best work in the final third, and the same holds true for Miedema. Miedema at 10 works when she can remain high and get into goalscoring positions, and fails when she constantly has to drop to the halfway line and act as more of a pivot than a striker.
Maanum was brought in because she had the strength to shrug off defenders and the engines carry the ball up the pitch.
Miedema had neither.
Two years have passed since Lloyd-Hughes penned that article, yet her words seem as relevant as ever.
Eidevall never found the perfect role for Miedema, and her ACL injury brutally ended a good run of goalscoring form back in late 2022.
So does that mean there is no place for Miedema at Eidevall’s Arsenal?
The answer is no.
She is not an Eidevall 9, but she could yet be an Eidevall 10.
The Miedema-at-10 experiment was doomed by her inability to drop deep and support Little the first time around — logic follows that one would only have to eliminate the need for her to drop deep for the experiment to succeed.
Wälti would have to stay in the second line to free the 10 from second phase responsibilities, which would be made possible by a full back possessing the on-the-ball ability to operate as the third center back in buildup.
Unfortunately, Arsenal is still missing that full back.
USWNT full back Emily Fox, who the Gunners are rumored to be in advanced talks with, is a promising candidate, but even if she does make her way to Meadow Park, she will only be half the answer.
The relationship between the 9 and the 10 is almost invariably the most important one in a 4–2–3–1, and Eidevall has tweaked the 9’s role at times to get more out of his star player.
Two North London derbies are cases in hand.
The first took place back in September 2022. Arsenal had missed out on the title by a single, agonizing point in the 21/22 season and declared their intent with a resounding 4–0 victory over their local rivals in front of a record crowd at the Emirates.
What was noticeable about the lineup was that Caitlin Foord started in Blackstenius’ place ahead of Miedema while McCabe took Foord’s usual left wing position.
Blackstenius possessed the strength to hold up the ball and the pace to pose a threat in behind. Her work rate combined with her physicality made her a top pressing forward, and her game was very much based on her ability to make runs in behind as well as into the channel, and her willingness to hassle opposition players to force turnovers high.
However, Blackstenius was more limited with the ball at her feet and could not be counted on to get past defenders or play defense-splitting passes like Miedema. As such, her touches had to be limited, which in turn meant that Miedema was given more responsibilities on the ball.
This may seem like a positive, but Miedema would have to drop deep and spend more time linking up with the midfield and playing in her teammate rather than getting into goalscoring positions.
And Miedema, as we have seen, does her best work in and around the box.
Foord, on the other hand, was a winger by trade and brought a very different skill set to the center forward position from Blackstenius.
She assumed Blackstenius’ responsibilities as the pressing forward, chasing opposition players for the ball and running into the channels to allow Miedema to remain central and pounce on turnovers. At the same time, she offered another dimension of center forward play.
Unlike Blackstenius, Foord was a quick, technical winger who could be counted on to both keep the ball and get past defenders. As such, she also operated like a false 9, dropping off to link up with the midfield, pick up the ball and either spin away from defenders and dribble into dangerous positions or lay it off to a teammate.
Thus, Foord assumed much of Miemeda’s link-up responsibilities as well, dropping deep to allow the Dutch forward to remain high and take advantage of through balls. And when she received long balls into the channel, she could play her natural wing game, beating her defender and either having a shot on goal or playing in one of the other forwards.
With McCabe holding width on the left, Miedema and Foord interchanged positions constantly. If one of them drifted into the inside-left channel, then the other would remain central; and if one of them dropped, then the other would remain high.
With Foord ahead of her as a false 9, Miedema was able to play like a shadow striker. And while she had fewer touches, she was able to remain high and central and scored a brace for her trouble. Though Foord did not get on the score sheet herself, she was immense throughout and easily one of the best performers on the pitch.
Foord was the perfect foil for Miedema that day, and the Miedema-Foord partnership was indeed a familiar one on the red side of North London, having previously been used by Montemurro.
It was clear for all to see that Foord’s skill set complemented Miedema much better than Blackstenius’ did, but the Miedema-Foord partnership would not feature again before Miedema’s ACL injury.
This was no mystery — Foord was simply needed too much on the left to be moved central.
The Gunners were not short on left wing options, of course. McCabe had started there that day and summer signing Lina Hurtig was another option. But while McCabe excelled at both left back and right wing, she was not as influential at left wing. Added to the fact that Hurtig’s Arsenal career unfortunately never really took off due to constant injuries, Foord was by some distance the Gunners’ biggest difference-maker at left wing.
The second took place on the other side of Miedema’s ten-month spell on the sidelines.
The League Cup group stage game between the North London sides took place on a freezing evening in December 2023, and it was unremarkable except for two things.
First, Miedema made her first start since returning from injury.
Second, Miedema started as the nominal left winger with Blackstenius at 9 and Maanum at 10.
The false winger is, of course, far from a new concept.
The Gunners’ men’s side, for example, had used the false winger back in the 21/22 season, with Emile Smith-Rowe coming inside like a left-sided attacking midfielder while the left back Kieran Tierney pushed on to provide width and the nominal 10 Martin Ødegaard moved over into the right half-space.
Perhaps taking a page from his colleague’s book, Eidevall instructed McCabe to push on and operate as the winger in attack, allowing Miedema to remain narrow in the left half-space. Maanum would position herself in the right half-space and right winger Cloé Lacasse would hold width.
And whenever McCabe was pinned deep, Blackstenius would move out wide and offer herself as a target for long balls forward, allowing Miedema to remain closer to the goal.
The thinking behind this approach was obvious.
Though Miedema was the left winger on paper, she would spend the vast majority of the game in the inside-left channel from where she could run in behind and shoot. Blackstenius pulling out wide would both eliminate the need for Miedema to do so and drag defenders out of position, opening up space for the Dutch forward.
Yet, though the plan made sense on paper, it only had limited success in practice.
Miedema was able to spend much of the game in the half-space, but often deeper.
Blackstenius’ channel running ought to have freed Miedema to take up the center forward position and attack the box, but this was rarely the case. The Swede remained the most advanced forward even when she was wide, and Miedema had to accordingly position herself deeper between Blackstenius and McCabe.
Though Blackstenius could hold up the ball, she could do little more than simply lay it off to a teammate given her limited technical ability. As such, Miedema often received some distance outside the box. And as much time as she spent in the half-space, Miedema was rarely released in behind.
Rather than freeing her to come into the left half-space, it would be more accurate to say that the false winger role shackled her to the left half-space. With Maanum given the freedom to drift central from the right half-space — or rather, remain central in her nominal 10 position — Miedema had few touches in central areas and almost none on the right.
As a result, her movement — or lack thereof — was one-dimensional and predictable for the opposition defense.
The false winger role relegated Miedema to playing second-fiddle to Maanum in defense too.
Arsenal almost invariably use a defensive shape of 4–4–2/4–2–3–1 with the 10 joining the 9. This had paid dividends in the 22/23 season as both Blackstenius and Maanum were willing runners and major threats in transition, and Eidevall understandably retained the Blackstenius-Maanum front two in defense.
As such, Miedema was confined to the periphery, and to get his star forward more involved in the game, Eidevall instructed the defenders and the midfielders to hold onto the ball at times, slowing down the attack deliberately to give McCabe time to make her way up the pitch.
But all this accomplished was to hamstring McCabe too.
With an out-and-out winger like Foord ahead of her to occupy the opposition full back, McCabe (or Catley) would be able to receive the ball deeper and either carry it forward or hit those long balls into the channel.
But with Miedema permanently in the left half-space, McCabe had to get herself up the pitch and receive the ball facing the opposition full back like a winger. This both reduced McCabe’s influence and deprived the Gunners of a reliable method of ball progression.
Arsenal’s attack often lacked urgency and intent, and though they dominated possession, they were not able to put it to good use.
The Miedema-at-10 experiment had failed because of Blackstenius’ limited technical ability, and the Miedema-off-the-left experiment failed for the same reason.
But if Blackstenius is not the key to unlocking Miedema and Foord cannot be the key to unlocking Miedema, then who is?
This question had stumped Eidevall back in 2022, but a lot has happened since and the Gunners finally have the answer in their new number 23, Lionesses forward Alessia Russo.
Continued in Part II.
If you enjoyed this, please leave a clap, subscribe and follow me on Twitter @lucey_footy.
You might also enjoy my previous article on Arsenal Women, The Three-Year Itch: Arsenal’s Swedish Marriage.
¹Lloyd-Hughes, Florence, ‘Miedema’s Identity Crisis: Fewer Goals, More Pressing Responsibility and a Star Striker Stunted’, The Athletic, 2022 <https://theathletic.com/3084001/2022/01/21/miedemas-identity-crisis-less-goals-more-pressing-responsibility-and-a-star-striker-stunted/>
