Today we have released version 0.6.0 of Ict. The major features are:
+ implement EEE (Environment Entity Effect) infrastructure to enable inter-ixi communication
+ translate gossip listeners and gossip preprocessors to EEE to simplify IXI
+ let modules offer their functionality through API (/getModuleResponse)
+ allow module developers to add modules to Ict from loaded classes instead of having to load from a separate .jar file -> simplifies module development and testing
+ increase efficiency by checking incoming bytes against known transactions to avoid decoding the same transaction multiple times (#51)
+ hash gui_password before storing it in ict.cfg (#59)
+ fix #53 (adding the same neighbor multiple times to ict.cfg) …
Traditional voting systems have been around for a very long time. The idea is simple, you have some people that stay near the urns, people vote and at the end those persons have to count everything and see the turnout of that vote. There’s also mail based voting, which means you receive an envelope, vote and then you send it back. But both systems can be influenced by third parties, and are not reliable. Votes can easily be altered or eliminated behind closed doors. Not only that, also the transport of votes isn’t safe, as someone can get access to them or some of them can be lost. Moreover, people have to travel and waste time just to go and vote. A lot of them don’t do that, which is why the voting percentages are pretty low nowadays, at least when compared to a decade or two ago. And on top of that, the traditional voting system is expensive. …
Masked Authenticated Messaging (MAM), a genius protocol described by Paul Handy, is one of IOTA’s most potent IXI Modules.  Thanks to the design and feeless nature of the Tangle, it opens up many new use cases.
The objective of information security is to guarantee confidentiality, availability and data integrity. These features are prerequisite for things like traffic networking (e.g. V2X), verifiable supply chains, over-the-air updates and much more.
Masked Authenticated Messaging is therefore suitable for many applications, but also has its limitations.
The limitation lies in the way how signatures are handled in the current protocol. There are use cases in which different participants are in the same channel and each signature must be assignable: The ability to know who exactly produced a given message. With that, a recipient does not only know that the message is a genuine message from someone of the trusted group, they instead can identify the underlying author.
Besides that, there exist other important use cases where for example every author inside a channel must stay anonymous, but at the same time observable and assignable for an external trusted party. …