Self-ownership problem #3: ownership asymmetry
I’ve gone on about problems with the concept of self-ownership, particularly as libertarians use it. Problem #1 is that it is self-contradictory. Problem #2 is that is inconsistent with some accounts of appropriation, with the result that people are generally the property of their mothers.
This post suggests a third problem, that of asymmetry. Simply put, attacks on one’s body and one’s self are qualitatively different, and generally much worse, than corresponding attacks on things that one owns.
Compare the following pairs of violations:
Destruction:
1. Somebody completely destroys your house
2. Somebody completely destroys your body
Decommission:
1. Somebody cuts some wires on your car, causing it not to start
2. Somebody cuts some nerves or veins in your body, causing you to not be able to move.
Mutilation:
1. Someone hacks the legs off of your chair
2. Someone hacks the legs off your body
Damage:
1. Someone hits your fence with a baseball bat
2. Someone hits you with a baseball bat
Theft:
1. Someone steals your book
2. Someone kidnaps you
Restraint:
1. Someone puts up a barrier, preventing your car from moving
2. Someone pins you down, preventing you from moving
Rape:
1. Someone has sex with your sex doll without your consent
2. Someone has sex with you without your consent
Slavery:
1. Someone uses your car to haul heavy equipment without your consent
2. Someone uses your body to haul heavy equipment without your consent
Invasion of privacy:
1. You discover that someone installed a camera in your garage, and spied on your car without your knowledge
2. You discover that someone installed a camera in your bedroom or bathroom, and spied on you without your knowledge
Disrespect:
1. Someone insults your house
2. Someone insults you or your body
In each of these cases, people who recognize private property in external things might find example (1) offensive, but would recognize (2) as worse. Physical harm, invasion of privacy, dishonor, and loss of control over our bodies is qualitatively different, and generally worse, than physical harm, invasion of privacy, dishonor, and loss of control over external things that we own.
All of this points to our relationships with our own bodies and minds being much more important than our relationships to external things. This seems distinct enough to merit a different moral category. Attacking our bodies — things that we are — is systematically morally worse, often much worse, than attacking things that we own. The best way for a moral theory to capture this is to reject the category of ownership as applied to bodies.
