Inside the Failed Seasons of the L.A. Lakers and Miami Heat
The Heat and Lakers outlasted everyone in the NBA Bubble, but this postseason, they were among the first to be ousted. What happened?
Editor’s Note: This article is Part 1 of a two-part series focused on the Lakers and Heat. Part 2 focuses on how the Lakers and Heat can improve their rosters in a crucial offseason. Find Part 2 here.
When the Miami Heat and Los Angeles Lakers faced off in the 2020 NBA Finals in an unlikely matchup of two vastly different teams, there was no shortage of dominant performances and high-level play.
The two teams outlasted the rest of the league in the NBA Bubble in a grueling, taxing journey.
While the Heat’s culture and LeBron James’ leadership abilities can appear to be more fabled than anything else, there was no coincidence that the Heat, who are known for a militaristic culture, and the Lakers, led by a leader in James who is known to “keep the main thing the main thing” (a Heat inspired phrase), were the last two teams in the Orlando Bubble.
Along the way, Anthony Davis proved himself as a talent worthy of being considered a top-five player in the NBA, Jimmy Butler ascended from being a very good star player to a brilliant, near-superstar level player, and Bam Adebayo was almost unanimously considered a top-five center in the league.
One year later, both the Heat and Lakers were eliminated in the first round — in highly disappointing fashion one might add. So what happened?
There are many reasons that contributed to these two teams’ demises, some major and some minor. So without further ado, welcome to the demise of the 2020–2021 L.A. Lakers and Miami Heat.
1. Injuries (and COVID-19 Protocols)
No discussion about the Heat or Lakers’ seasons can be had without discussing the fact that these two teams were ravaged with injuries and COVID-19 related absences.
The Lakers, despite inconsistent play from Anthony Davis, Dennis Schröder, and Marc Gasol early on, were at the top of the Western Conference standings to begin the season. They had a record of 21–7 when Anthony Davis first went down with a calf and Achilles injury, leaving LeBron James to carry a major burden for L.A.
Meanwhile, the Miami Heat started their season off at 7–14, due in large part to a lengthy COVID-19 related absence from Jimmy Butler.
It shouldn’t be forgotten, however, that both Butler and James played at an MVP-level for the better part of this season. When Davis went down, James carried a major load for L.A., and especially after the All-Star break, the Lakers looked to be refreshed and revitalized, despite missing Davis.
Meanwhile, Butler’s numbers, particularly from February to April, were every bit as good as his numbers in the NBA Bubble, as he carried the Heat from the doldrums of the Eastern Conference standings to the playoffs.
Of course, everything changed for the Lakers when James suffered a high ankle sprain on March 20th, leading to the longest injury-related absence of his career — the constraints of the NBA season never gave him enough time to fully recover.
James never really looked as explosive as he had been prior to the injury in the first round against the Phoenix Suns, and yet, they had a 2–1 lead in the series and a fairly convincing lead in Game 4 when Anthony Davis (who was playing on a hyperextended knee) strained his groin. L.A.’s season effectively ended at that moment, as it was clear that Davis was the key to the Lakers winning Game 2 and Game 3.
Meanwhile, though much has been made of Jimmy Butler’s struggles against the Bucks, including being outscored by Bucks role player Bryn Forbes, an under-discussed aspect of his struggles is the fact that, since suffering a wrist injury in Philadelphia, his shooting has fallen off a cliff. That wrist injury (and Butler’s subsequent inability to shoot threes) allowed the Bucks to treat Butler like Giannis Antetokounmpo, as they walled off the paint at every opportunity and forced him to make jump-shots.
Outside of James, Davis, and Butler, the two teams struggled with the league’s health and safety protocols; most notably, Dennis Schröder, the only player on L.A. to not get vaccinated by the end of the season, was suspended twice for violating the protocols. Both of his absences were 14 day stretches, which limited the time that L.A. had to gel as a team, while also harming his conditioning.
Had there been no injuries this season for either team, who knows what these two teams’ ceilings would be. The Lakers would have as strong of a chance of making the NBA Finals as any other team in the West, even if their chances of repeating as champions was markedly lower than their chances of winning their first ring. Miami, meanwhile, probably would have hit their ceiling at a Conference Finals appearance, and not having to play the Bucks or any other top seed in the first round (because of their poor record to begin the year) would have helped their playoff success a lot.
2. Losing the “Math Battle”
Though injuries will always be the caveat that explains the failures of the Heat and Lakers this season, an underrated aspect of these two teams’ failure comes down to math.
Last season, the Heat turned their season around by trading for Jae Crowder, who was essentially a throw-in when the Heat acquired Andre Iguodala. Yet, Crowder, a physical, versatile wing who shoots a high-volume of threes and comfortably spaces the floor as a forward, was the perfect fit for Miami.
He unlocked their lineups: the starting lineup the Heat rolled out during the playoffs (Dragic, Robinson, Butler, Crowder, and Adebayo) was a +27.0 in the regular season and was elite in the playoffs outside of their minutes against L.A. Substitute Kelly Olynyk for Adebayo and Iguodala for Butler, and that lineup was a +40.2 in 78 minutes.
So, while Miami perhaps cannot be faulted for wanting to “run it back” after a Cinderella run in the Orlando Bubble, they can be criticized for trying to replace Crowder, who sought a multi-year contract, with collection of cheaper players like Avery Bradley and Moe Harkless (while also resigning Meyers Leonard).
Bradley was never a strong positional fit on a Heat team with a crowded backcourt, Harkless doesn’t have the three-point shooting ability nor the physicality of Crowder, and Leonard was virtually immobile on defense, which is why he lost his starting spot in the postseason the year prior.
Overall, even if a team led by to non-shooters in Butler and Adebayo has a ceiling of making the Conference Finals, Miami wasn't giving themselves a chance at reaching that ceiling by not resigning players like Crowder, who was a perfect positional and cultural fit in South Beach. By the time the playoffs rolled around, Miami didn’t have enough floor spacing to cover up Butler and Adebayo’s deficiencies as shooters.
For L.A., after their aforementioned hot start (21–7), their troubles came with their overallocation of resources to the center position. Between Montrezl Harrell, who they used their valuable mid-level exception on in free agency, and Marc Gasol, L.A. had plenty of production at center once Anthony Davis returned from injury.
But, they seemingly overreacted to Gasol’s streaky play and poor rim protection, and they ended up signing Damian Jones and then, more significantly, Andre Drummond.
Of course, L.A. fans will fondly remember the tandem of JaVale McGee and Dwight Howard as elite rim protectors to justify trying out Drummond and Jones as centers. However, what they seem to forget is that McGee fell out of the rotation after just the first round, and Howard was only useful against Portland and Denver in the postseason — two teams with slow-footed, high-post centers in Jusuf Nurkic and Nikola Jokic.
Drummond’s signing was an issue because, with his stature, age, and contract status, Frank Vogel was essentially forced into ceremonially starting him and playing him significant minutes. Yet, lineups with Drummond instead of Gasol were more average than elite, and the front-court combination of Davis and Drummond was a poor fit.
A dominant two games from Davis in the first round skewed the lineup data for Los Angeles. When AD went down, however, it became clear that Drummond’s lack of shooting ability was hurting LeBron James’ already limited ability to drive to the basket while nursing an injured ankle, and that reality sealed L.A.’s fate.
3. The Shortest Offseason in NBA History
Much has been made about the 71-day offseason that the Lakers and Heat endured, but its impact cannot be understated. For players like Anthony Davis, who typically begin their offseason by taking a month off to recover physically and mentally, the short turnaround was draining, which likely explains Davis’ poor play at the beginning of the season.
Meanwhile, both Frank Vogel and Erik Spoelstra, two strong-minded, disciplined coaches, could not afford to practice much at all, in part because of COVID-19 protocols, and in part because their teams’ players were drained physically and mentally by their run in the NBA Bubble.
As Ethan Skolnick and Ira Winderman, two of the most plugged-in reporters in Miami, explained, the COVID-19 protocols prevented the Heat — known for their culture and hard-nosed practices — from building camaraderie and chemistry. The protocols also put their practice schedule on the same level of laissez-faire, non-competitive teams, meaning the Heat lost out on one of the competitive advantages that helped them in the NBA Bubble: their unrelenting, militaristic practice routine.
L.A. tried to compensate for the obvious fatigue caused by trying to win two championships in one calendar year by trading for Dennis Schröder, signing Montrezl Harrell, signing Marc Gasol, and picking up Andre Drummond on the buyout market. Yet, the aforementioned injuries and COVID-19 related absences meant that the team never built up chemistry, and the players who were on the 2020 Lakers team never built an incredibly strong bond with the newcomers, which was necessary for L.A.’s repeat bid.
4. Trade Inaction
Of course, despite all of the unforeseen, and somewhat unfair, circumstances that the Heat and Lakers went through this season, they will always be criticized for their inaction on the trade market.
The Heat may or may not have had a trade package for a disgruntled James Harden who was playing out his final days in Houston early in the season.
The case for the Heat actually having the assets to make a move for the former MVP is the fact that, at the beginning of the season, the trade value of Tyler Herro, Duncan Robinson, and Precious Achiuwa were at their peak. Herro and Robinson had come off of terrific stretches in the NBA Bubble, and Achiuwa — to the most optimistic viewer — was a versatile big in the same mold as Bam Adebayo.
However, in all likelihood, the Heat were never going to have the assets necessary to trade for Harden. If Rockets GM Rafael Stone learned from his predecessor, Daryl Morey, he would likely realize that championship teams aren’t built on undersized, 6' 5" guards like Herro. Therefore, the Heat were probably just a bargaining chip to leverage the Sixers to give up Ben Simmons along with other young players, or for the Nets to give up the historic amount of draft picks that they ended up trading.
The Heat ended up pulling the trigger on a Victor Oladipo trade, which ended poorly due to injury, though Miami deserves some level of credit for identifying a player with a skillset they needed (a downhill, athletic guard).
Meanwhile, L.A. stood pat at the trade deadline, hoping that they would have enough time for their talented roster to mesh. If reports are to be believed, they could have had Kyle Lowry for Dennis Schröder, Kentavious Caldwell-Pope, and Talen Horton-Tucker. Obviously, that trade would harm L.A.’s depth and would take away the team’s most consistent 3 & D option (Caldwell-Pope), but in hindsight, Lowry alone likely would’ve been enough for L.A. to make it past the first round (assuming they had a healthy Davis).
Another reason to criticize the Lakers for not trading for Lowry comes down to free agency: with Alex Caruso, Horton-Tucker and Schröder both being free agents, there is no guarantee that L.A. will retain all of its backcourt depth, but had they traded for Lowry, they could have had a future HOF point guard locked down by agreeing to a contract extension with Lowry (he sought a 2-year, $50 million extension).
In the end, while the Lakers and Heat facing off in the Finals might have been somewhat fluky due to the 4 month hiatus and the environment of the NBA Bubble, their failures this season were fluky as well.
Had L.A. been fully healthy, their ceiling was a championship team: they probably don’t have the wing defenders to stop the Nets, but against, say, the Hawks, Sixers, or Bucks, L.A. would have had a strong chance of repeating.
Meanwhile, had Miami been fully healthy, they maybe, just maybe, could have made the Conference Finals. In any case, they got one of the worst matchups possible (the Bucks) in the first round as a by-product of a slow start that was out of their control (Jimmy Butler missed many games early in the year due to COVID-19 protocols).
Everything that went into this season — daily COVID-19 testing, a packed schedule, and a shortened offseason — caught up to the Heat and Lakers, and ultimately, that was more fluky than their runs in the NBA Bubble.
