A Soldier’s Perspective on Ukraine Pt. 2
An updated look into Ukraine’s increasingly difficult fight
Four months ago, Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine was going poorly. At the time, I wrote an article describing how Russia had failed as a professional army. I attributed the failure to four major factors. The first three were all closely linked. The army that invaded Ukraine on February 24th was poorly led, low on morale, and undersupplied.
The fourth point stood apart. Russia had tossed its own doctrine aside and invaded Ukraine as a western power would have done. The article concluded with the suggestion that Russia would revert to its regular attrition-based style of warfare at great cost to Ukraine. The war has now entered a dangerous phase for Ukraine that will be key in deciding the eventual outcome. This article highlights some of the key changes in the conflict and what they may mean for the future.
Russia pivots towards success
On April 6th, Russia abandoned its lighting strike on Kyiv and made two significant changes that have improved their success rate. One of these changes was at the tactical level, the other was at the higher, operational level.
Russian artillery has always formed the backbone of their tactics, but in the initial stages of the war they used it sparingly and chose to let their armored columns lead the fight. In a few circumstances it appears those armored columns moved beyond the range of their supporting artillery. To borrow a phrase from my old Squadron Commander, they led with their face. And because of it, they got a bloody nose.
In eastern Ukraine, Russia has now flipped the script. They are letting their artillery shells “soften up” enemy positions before the infantry and tanks move in. Once the objectives are secured, the artillery is moved up and the process repeats. Rarely are the ground units without artillery protection or going into unprepared areas.
This is how Russia has trained and equipped to fight. It allows them to flex their strength, which is a massive numeric superiority in artillery pieces and ammunition, while minimizing their weaknesses. The leadership and morale weaknesses displayed early in the war still exist in the Russian Army, but low-level leadership and troop morale is not as important in a set-piece battle. A set-piece battle being one where formations move according to a relatively rigid plan laid out at a high level. This is in contrast to the early Russian thrusts where low-level leaders were required to make judgment calls on the spot to maintain momentum.
For this reason, it is worth being wary of western pundits who condemn the recent Russian advances as “plodding” or slow”. A slow advance is not a surefire indicator of a failing army.
Russia’s operational change was quite shrewd. When they shifted their focus to eastern Ukraine, they effectively moved their own goal posts for success. The true intentions of Russia’s initial advance may never be known, but it seems likely a regime change was the desired outcome. What is clear is that they cannot leave on a failure, the Putin regime would lose face in front of the populace.
This operational change has given Russian propaganda enormous flexibility to continue selling the war at home. They are free to proclaim this was always their desired end goal, or just ignore the initial part of the war entirely and praise the recent successes. Western media has fallen victim to this too. Even this article is highlighting Russia’s turn of fortune when the truth is Russia comprehensively failed in its initial invasion and is now trying to salvage what it can.
From a military perspective, the operational shift was equally successful. It shortened supply lines and lengthened Ukraine’s. The narrowed focus of the war eases planning requirements and has put them around a local populace that is slightly more supportive of their efforts. Finally, the terrain in eastern Ukraine is significantly more open than it is in western Ukraine. This terrain favors armored formations by improving maneuverability and limiting Ukrainian ambush opportunities.
Ukrainian weaknesses
All of the advantages Russia has gained have had the converse effect on the Ukrainians. In the confined spaces north of Kyiv, Ukrainian forces had notable advantages. It was excellent terrain for small unit ambushes and the local populace was very anti-Russian. In the east, they have been pulled into an artillery duel and war of attrition that favors Russian numbers. According to the military ranking site GlobalFirepower.com, Russia started 2022 with 17,536 artillery pieces of varying types. Ukraine had less than 4,000.
While those numbers are sobering, they fail to capture the supply issues Ukraine has with its guns. Coming into the war, Ukraine was a nation caught between Russia and the West for arms procurement. And as the war progresses, more western arms are flooding in. This had led to a mishmash of old soviet weapons firing alongside modern western examples. Not only does each system have its own idiosyncrasies and maintenance requirements, but the ammunition is not cross-compatible between guns of western and Soviet make. All of this makes for a logistics nightmare.
Further complicating the logistics is where that ammunition is coming from. For their Soviet-era weapons, Ukraine is drawing from stockpiles that are quickly running dry. And they are dependent on supplies coming from the west for the modern weapons. These weapons are subject to long travel times, political issues, and limited reserves.
To highlight how limited some reserves are, the British defense think tank RUSI estimates that the Russians are firing approximately 20,000 shells per day, while the Ukrainians fire around 6,000. The United States could boost Ukraine's firing capacity to 10,000 shells per day only by boosting production which could take a few months if authorized. For the sake of comparison, last year the US Army only purchased 16,573 155mm artillery shells.
The case of the French delivery of 18 CAESAR 155mm artillery pieces further illustrates western limitations. Those 18 CAESAR cannons represent 25% of France’s entire arsenal. Currently, it takes France about 18 months to build just one CAESAR. And because they are not combatants, the US and France cannot place their economies on a war footing. A limitation Russia does not have.
It must be noted that guns are not the only major factor in a war of attrition, people are too. Casualty counts are always difficult to accurately measure between their propaganda value and the fog of war. But early in the war the ratio heavily favored the Ukrainians. Now it is likely that casualty counts are closer to equal or have tipped in favor of the Russians due to their overwhelming firepower superiority. Neither army is at a breaking point yet, but it will be placing significant stress on the Ukrainian forces.
Question marks in the West
Not only is western production not meeting Ukrainian demand, but there is always a risk of political will faltering. The resignation of Boris Johnson in the UK may have a chilling effect on British support. Johnson may have had many flaws as a Prime Minister, but he was one of the most vocal supporters of Ukraine amongst western leaders.
Meanwhile, the United States is increasingly looking inward with many ardent supporters of Ukraine growing wary of a brewing democratic crisis within the United States. While Ukraine still factors heavily in headlines, it is slowly losing prominence to a slew of Supreme Court rulings, shootings, and economic concerns.
As talk of recession and energy shortages in Europe loom while commodity prices stay high, governments may push for a resolution or slowly walk back their support. In short, the longer the conflict in Ukraine continues, the more likely the world is to tune the conflict out in favor of more immediate concerns.
Some positives
There is no denying that Ukraine is currently in a difficult spot, and it seems increasingly likely that peace will only come through some sort of negotiated settlement that will see Ukrainian territory given to Russia. An ejection of Russia from Ukraine by military force alone appears outside of Ukraine’s capabilities as they stand.
That being said, Ukraine is still holding its own against a much larger opponent. Russia has displayed signs of tiring. It has begun creating ad hoc battalions made up of reservists and whatever other trained personnel they can scrape together and is putting out increasingly desperate recruiting posters. Antiquated T-62 tanks are being pulled back into service to replace the hundreds of modern tanks Russia has lost.
Ukrainian artillery, despite limited numbers, is of increasingly modern make and their fire control measures are more sophisticated. Western aid is continuing to roll in for the foreseeable future and morale remains high. Ukrainian guerilla activity has also been effective, recently blowing up a major railroad bridge in Russian controlled territory.
Ukraine’s regular forces have been very active too. At the time of this writing (09 July), Russia has solidified its hold on the Luhansk Oblast after overcoming a bitter Ukrainian delaying action and is shifting focus south towards Donetsk. Concurrently, Ukrainian forces are counterattacking towards Kharkiv and Kherson where they appear to have reached the outskirts of the city.
Finally, on a geopolitical scale, Russia’s invasion appears to have backfired. Rather than creating a new iron curtain, Russia has driven Finland and Sweden into NATO and Ukraine towards the EU, increased western arms spending, and isolated Russia from much of the wider world.
This is a critical juncture for Ukraine. Failures now will mean Russia can consolidate its claim on sections of eastern Ukraine. It is possible some of these regions are already irreversibly in Russian hands. However, if Ukraine can withstand Russia’s grinding campaign and hold western support, they can blunt the Russian war machine and mitigate the worst of the damage to their country. Unfortunately for too many young men and women on both sides, the eventual outcome of this conflict is irrelevant, it is already too late for them.
Please note that the thoughts and comments here are the author’s own and do not reflect the views of the Department of Defense.
