Africa’s Perfect Storm: The Worst-Case Scenario Facing Africa Today
This is not a prediction. In fact, I hope what I am about to write about does not come to fruition. Instead, it is outlining the worst-case scenario facing Africa today. While it is not a prediction, the chance that most, if not all, of these outcomes happening is certainly material; some are already happening.
There are three key geopolitical situations that impact Africa today. If those three situations unravel, it is possible that we will see warfare from the Atlantic Ocean to the Indian Ocean with participants from the Mediterranean to the Cape of Good Hope. If these three situations and external factors deteriorate, it may cause even greater upheaval which will lead to additional conflicts.
The first of these situations is the 2023 Nigerien Crisis due to their coup ‘d’état. While other articles and videos will delve deeper into this issue, I will talk about possible future actions. While a coup in the Sahel is not that rare, the latest coup set off a chain reaction that may lead to a military intervention from the ECOWAS, Economic Community of Western African States, members. ECOWAS has fifteen members from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf of Guinea, from Senegal to Nigeria (see Map 1). These members include Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger; members that are currently suspended due to recent coups. With the Niger coup, ECOWAS has mobilized an army, mainly under the strength of Nigeria, to reinstall the democratically legitimate government.
While it is unknown whether or not war will be started, it is clear that there is a significant chance of war and that it will involve all 15 members. The suspended members against the eleven other members. If this war becomes protracted, it will be devastating. These countries were not the most stable, especially when we consider four of them recently underwent coups, and have conflicts with rebellious groups, particularly Islamic extremists. However, it is important to note the geography of these countries may lead to some spillover into neighboring countries. If the main theatre of this war is Niger-Nigeria, then Chad and Libya may have refugee issues. Both of these countries also border Sudan, which is going through its own civil war.
Whether the Sudanese Civil War expands, that is uncertain. What is certain is that Sudan is in a second geopolitical situation that could lead to a second continental war and for the Sudanese Civil War to turn into a proxy war between belligerent nations. The main belligerents in this theatre are Egypt and Ethiopia, with Eritrea possibly joining in.
“Egypt is the Nile” (Toby Wilkinson). Perhaps no other river system has such an impact on a nation than the Nile has on Egypt. Because of the Nile, it gave the opportunity for a great civilization to grow. Because of the Nile, Egypt is one of the most populous nations in Africa as well as its more powerful ones. Without the Nile, Egypt is in trouble. Without the Nile, a country that already demands and imports much of its food products will lose its major access of freshwater. Just the threat of the Nile being reduced in size can cause Egypt to react as if its survival is a stake. Unfortunately for Egypt, the Nile does not start in its borders, but in Ethiopia. While for much of its history, no one touched the Nile, the Ethiopians are changing the game by building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
To the Ethiopians’ defense, this internal project will help its economy, its people, its energy, and Ethiopia itself. Not only will it serve to lift the people of Ethiopia up economically, but perhaps unite the country as well. Building such a grand project is, in the hope of the leaders, a uniting factor in a country that has not been very united. In fact, the Ethiopians just ended their own Civil War, the Tigray War, in November 2022. With divergent interests on the Nile and the risk of conflict, what is the worst-case scenario? Egypt attacking the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.
While we understand both Egypt’s interest in destroying the dam and Ethiopia’s interest in constructing the dam, any conflict can span into a regional war that stretches from the Mediterranean to the Horn of Africa. While land forces will likely not be used in this war between the two main combatants, this war can lead to a second Ethiopian Civil War, a proxy war in Sudan, and destabilize Egypt when their food exports are being threatened. If there is a second Tigray War, is not hard to imagine that Eritrea will support the Ethiopians again. In this case, we will also expect Egypt to support the rebels. This may escalate the original conflict into a longer and more destructive war. We will also expect Sudan to be a proxy war. Historically, Sudan took the Egyptian side when the Ethiopians were constructing their dam. With two, approximately equal, sides vying for Sudan, it will give the Ethiopians an opportunity to make an “enemy” into a friend. Lastly, Egypt is in a perilous situation. It was the biggest importer of wheat from Russia and Ukraine before the Russo-Ukrainian War (Duggal and Haddad 2022). Unfortunately, with both Russia and Ukraine escalating conflict and reducing trade in the Black Sea (Zeihan 2023), 85% of Egyptian imported wheat may be off the market soon (Galal 2022). This makes the Nile more important and gives the Egyptian political elite a reason to shift blame elsewhere. This makes Egypt more volatile and thus risk of conflict increases. While Somalia, Chad, and South Sudan may not be directly involved, their geography makes them susceptible to spillover effects.
Chad faces issues from both its East and West and its own repercussions with its own Coup. Since independence, South Sudan has been dealing with its own issues. Neither of these countries are stable and both border the Central African Republic, CAR. Both CAR and South Sudan also border a country that could bring nearly the rest of Africa to war, the Democratic Republic of Congo or DRC. Ever since the end of the Rwanda genocide, relations between Rwanda and the DRC have been hostile. This culminated in two wars in the Congo including the Great African War. This war had six countries that sent troops into the DRC, both in support and against the DRC, see Map 3. Other entities gave either limited or political support this time. The range of these countries stretched from Libya to South Africa. While this conflict ended over two decades ago, it can be revitalized.
Last year, tensions escalated between the DRC and Rwanda. Rwanda has been supporting Tutsi rebel groups in the DRC, the DRC supports Hutu rebel groups that want to overthrow Rwanda (Al Jazeera 2022). To put this in perspective, the Rwanda genocide was committed against the Tutsis by a government led by Hutus. This was the primary issue dating back to the original Congo Wars where Rwanda, led by the Tutsis fought with groups “accused of slaughtering Tutsis during the 1994 Rwanda genocide” (Al Jazeera 2022). With accusations flying, with most if not all of them being true, any escalation may start a 3rd Congo War. Whether it reaches the same height as the Second Congo War is yet to be seen.
Not only does this mean there could be three simultaneous continental wars in Africa that take place over most of the continent, but one situation may impact another situation. If the two sides in the Niger Crisis go to war in the Sahel, it may destabilize the Nile River Basin or the Congo Basin, either directly or indirectly. The countries that border this conflict may become destabilized by spillover effects or dragged in through military or political support. Other actors, witnessing the deterioration of the continent may take advantage of the situation and civil wars may be restarted. One of these wars could be the Libyan Civil War which is currently stopped by a ceasefire. Countries that are already unstable could face a new wave of instability with the chance of more coups and civil wars.
But this is not the worst-case scenario. Considering Russia and Ukraine are some of the biggest wheat exporters in the world and the Black Sea may be inoperable for shipping for either country, we can see another reason for discontent for nations that need foreign exports to feed their populace. The last time there was a disruption, it led to Arab Spring in 2011 (Zeihan 2023). If we combine the Arab Spring, three continental wars, the resurgence of coups and civil wars, and starvation for the most food-insecure regions in the world, we may be facing the greatest humanitarian crisis of the 21st century. Unfortunately, in this situation, one crisis begets another crisis. This will lead to a death spiral that may engulf the whole continent. While the collapse of a whole system may be a bit of a stretch, the next century for Africa may be tumultuous. 2023 or 2024 may be Africa’s 1848.
The impact will not be limited to Africa. The Arab Spring spread throughout the Middle East and destabilized the region. This brought its own civil wars and a migrant crisis. The last major migrant crisis led to the rise of National Populist parties in Europe and Brexit in the UK. This time, if the National Populists garner any more support, they will likely be in Government either as a coalition partner or the main power (Guglielmello 2023). This of course ignores that the European economy is a ticking time bomb (Guglielmello 2023).
I hope in five years, my predictions are not true and the impacts are minimal. If there is a war in Niger, hopefully it is short and loss of life is minimal. Hopefully, the Egyptians and Ethiopians can work together on the Nile. Hopefully, there is not a 3rd Congo War in the foreseeable future. However, if there are conflicts and these conflicts are protracted, natural laws may sweep all across Africa (Guglielmello 2023). If there are no Leviathans, the African people will suffer the most. With every passing day, the risk of multiple conflicts in Africa rises.
Story edited on 8/15/23 in order to correct that Egypt is the biggest importer of Russian and Ukrainian wheat, not the biggest exporter.
