Propaganda Analysis: How different actors in China’s information ecosystem portray the Ukraine war

Yun-ju Chen, Researcher, Doublethink Lab
Chia Yuan Hsu, Researcher, Doublethink Lab

Translation from our article which was published in Chinese on Jun 24th

Key takeaways:

1. As of March 31, Doublethink Lab’s “Ukraine-Russia War: Chinese Information Operation Observation” feed had monitored 203 items [1] of content, and observed two main discourses: those that rationalize Russia’s military operations, and those that divert the focus to avoid taking a firm position on the war.
2. Messages focused on rationalization are epitomized by conspiracy theories related to the establishment of a biochemical laboratory in Ukraine, as well as those that replicate Russian justifications that war was necessary to counter NATO’s eastward expansion or liberate Ukraine from neo-Nazis. In shifting the focus, China-sourced content mainly attacked Western countries that supported Ukraine, criticized sanctions, or called for peace and dialogue.
3. In observing these messages, we did not find any official Chinese actors, members of the government or diplomats, for example, directly condemning or criticizing Russia’s aggression. That said, very few directly supported the Kremlin’s actions. Instead, Chinese actors often position the United States and NATO as the protagonists of their narratives. We infer that the Chinese government’s strategy is to maintain the appearance of neutrality, while leveraging the war to attack Western countries, primarily the United States, and undermine perceptions of democracy.
4. If we define different “actors” [2] as people and accounts that publish messages, and differentiate them according to their proximity to the center of power, we found a complex division of labor and apparent cooperation across different levels in the information hierarchy.

Introduction

China’s official ambiguity as regards its stance on the Ukrainian-Russian war, even as evidence continues to emerge of Beijing-led efforts to support the Russian war effort, has made the Chinese information environment a locus of attention.

Since Russia invaded Ukraine, Doublethink Lab has been monitoring the Chinese information environment on a daily basis, tracking evidence of efforts to shape public opinion and conduct disinformation operations.

We publicly release our most important findings, as well as critical events, in both Chinese and English, and have amassed more than 370 observations so far.

In order to help understand shifts in the Chinese public opinion environment in different stages of the war, this article analyzes observations from February 22 to March 31.

The CSV file of tagging and classification can be downloaded here (Chinese)

Classification of narrative themes

We classified each piece of content into 17 narrative topics as follows:

• The US established a biochemical laboratory in Ukraine (35)
• Criticizing sanctions imposed by various countries (19)
• Attacks on Western countries that support Ukraine (19)
• Supporting peace and calling for dialogue (19)
• Evacuation and humanitarian assistance rendered to Chinese evacuees (15 items)
• NATO expansion (13 items)
• Ukrainian neo-Nazis (12 items)
• Western inability to aid Ukraine (11 items)
• Western countries incite war (10 items)
• Arms aid is fueling conflict (7 items)
• Ukraine has no will to resist (6 items)
• The US benefits from the war (6 items)
• Anti-Russian forces are divided (6 items)
• The US spreads disinformation (5 items)
• Falsified fact-checking against pro-Ukraine speech (4 items)
• Supporting Russia (4)
• Ukraine has no intention of stopping the war (2)

Previously, Doublethink established an analytical framework to classify social media narratives whitewashing memorials to the June 4th Tiananmen Square Massacre. That framework identifies three methods of discourse influence: evasion, denial, and rationalization.

Our analysis of the Chinese information environment in relation to the war in Ukraine recalls similar themes, namely shifting the focus away from the real issue (evasion) and rationalization of Russia’s actions.

Figure 1

Categories on the left of Figure 1 above can be framed as those that attempt to shift attention away from issues related to the war, or which question the motives of those supplying aid to Ukraine. On the right hand side, the narratives excuse and rationalize Russia’s aggression, often by mimicking Kremlin propaganda.

(1) Shifting the focus away from China’s stance on the war

Whether the issue is the ‘re-education’ camps in Xinjiang, Hong Kong protests, or the COVID-19 epidemic, China often “shifts the focus” in the face of criticism or difficult questions, and the Russia-Ukraine war is no exception.

In the first month of the war, Chinese officials were consistently unwilling to take a side in the war and condemn the aggressor. At the same time, messages in the Chinese information and media environment focused on criticizing international sanctions and attacking Western countries that supported Ukraine, shifting the focus of the discussion away from China’s stance on the war.

As a case in point, the influential Weibo account “Weibo big V writer”, which claims 6 million followers, on March 22 posted a sarcastic note entitled: “Western sanctions are a joke; they even sanction Russian cats”. Other posts highlight the humanitarian crises in Iraq and Afghanistan as illustrative of double standards from the US and its NATO allies.

In another instance, Chinese diplomat Zhao Lijian in March posted a Tweet mocking the US and NATO: “We bombed #Yugoslavia and #Iraq years ago, but now we are laying flowers for #Ukraine,” it said.

At the same time, Chinese officials have repeatedly stated that China “supports peace” and has called for “dialogue to resolve the crisis” in an attempt to create a neutral image. However, compared with European leaders, Chinese officials rarely mediate or intervene on specific actions or issues, evading the difficulties of being tied down to a particular policy or position.

(2) Rationalization mimicking Russian propaganda

Chinese officials have copied and repeatedly emphasized Russian political propaganda that rationalizes aggression, including citing Russian content pushing the conspiracy theory that the US established biochemical laboratories in Ukraine. This conspiracy theory alleges that the United States set up a biochemical laboratory and developed biochemical weapons on the Ukrainian-Russian border, threatening Russia’s national security. Similar accusations can be traced back to the first day of the war and have been continually raised by Chinese officials and institutions, including media.

Moreover, tropes such as the notion that Russia is facing a national security crisis caused by NATO’s eastward expansion, or that Russia is sending troops to liberate Ukraine from neo-Nazi forces, are commonplace in the Chinese information environment. The underlying thrust of such disinformation is to rationalize Russian aggression as a necessary military intervention. This Doublethink Lab report provides detailed analysis of how Chinese state media and influencers coordinated with Russian counterparts to propound the ‘Nazification of Ukraine’ conspiracy theory in Chinese public discourse.

Although we rarely observe the Chinese government, state media, or patriotic internet celebrities condemning Russian aggression, it is worth noting that, compared with Russian official propaganda, messages directly promoting a “positive image” of Russia — for example mentioning Russian troops delivering humanitarian aid in Ukraine — are rare in the Chinese information environment. Aside from the early stages of the way, when we detected an emphasis on the strength of Russia’s military, Chinese narratives tend to frame the US, NATO, and Western countries as protagonists.

Our analysis indicates that the overarching purpose of the Chinese government’s efforts to shape public opinion is to both maintain an outwardly neutral stance while using the war to undermine Western countries, primarily the US, as well as public confidence, interest, and trust in the democratic system.

Actor power hierarchy analysis

If we define “actors” as the entities that publish messages or content on various platforms, and then classify them according to their proximity to the center of power, we can further analyze narrative themes and strategies across the Chinese information power hierarchy. We can thus divide the actors into four tiers, according to their level of power:

1. Official roles (government agencies, key political figures and state media)
2. Mainstream patriotic media (large-scale, hosting news websites)
3. Flanking accounts (or those included in the CCP’s Cyberspace Administration of China’s whitelist of cooperative media, or which are known to cooperate closely with officials, but fall outside the first two tiers)
4. Content farms and accounts

Figure 2

Three of the most important themes identified previously provide a lens through which to analyze the different tiers:

I. NATO’s eastward expansion

• Official roles: Focus on the national security threat caused by NATO’s eastward expansion, rationalizing Russia’s invasion by blaming someone else for being the perpetrator, forcing Russia to send troops.
• Mainstream patriotic media: Mainly produce a broad-brush historical introduction, and present audio-visual content and articles that echo the issues raised by those in official roles.
• Flanking accounts: Adopt attitudes and opinions that closely track those in official roles, and which mainly criticize NATO.
• Content farms and accounts: None (we have not observed any widely followed messages related to this topic).

II. Neo-Nazi-related

• Official roles: None. Zhao Lijian’s Weibo page did not mention “Nazis”, “Azov Battalion” [3] or other related content; Hua Chunying (a spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did refer to the Nazi conspiracy theory but only in an English tweet).
• Mainstream patriotic media: Massively publicized the historical background of the Azov Battalion, and produced popular materials to reinforce the image of the Ukrainian government being controlled by the Nazis. Publishers also collaborated with Russia to link the Azov Battalion with the anti-extradition movement in Hong Kong, and suggested that the US-sponsored it.
• Flanking accounts, and content farms and accounts: In addition to following the lead of mainstream patriotic media, these actors issued content directly accusing the Ukrainian military of being brutal Nazis, illustrated by blood-splattered photos and other inflammatory content.

III. Biochemical laboratory related

• Official roles & mainstream patriotic media: Cited Russian media and asked for a response from the United States; 3/13 first described biochemical laboratories as an American conspiracy; 3/23 linked COVID-19 to the conspiracy for the first time.
• Flanking accounts & content farms, and accounts: 3/7 began to spread related conspiracy theories such as articles covering accusations that “the United States ordered the destruction of evidence of the labs”; and on 3/13 began to link COVID-19 to this for the first time.

(1) How topic choice varies according to power level

Clearly, different actors and power levels focus on different topics and there is a ‘division of labor’ element to their actions.

Addressing the extremes of the power spectrum: When Chinese officials and mainstream patriotic media hyped the Chinese government’s successful evacuation of its citizens in Ukraine to inspire patriotism, relatively few flanking accounts or content farms picked up the topic.

Conversely, officials rarely mentioned Nazi-related conspiracy theories, instead leaving lower-level actors to pursue this theme. That said, actors of all levels broadcast the “US biochemical laboratory in Ukraine” conspiracy, though it is notable that lower-level actors initiated the commentary and officials echoed the theme.

Moreover, officials largely limited their comments to Chinese-language posts on Weibo.

On Twitter, we only found a few related tweets thanking neighboring countries in English for their assistance in evacuating Chinese citizens from Ukraine.

(2) Narrative focus also varies across power levels

Even if addressing the same theme, actors at various levels deploy different narrative techniques. For example, analysis and commentary related to international relations and NATO’s eastward expansion tends to be the preserve of actors close to the power center, and the topics receive relatively detailed treatment.

On the other hand, content farms or accounts generally eschewed discussing international relations, instead focusing on NATO’s apparent disregard for Ukraine’s demands for a no-fly zone and weapons assistance, or the aforementioned bombing of Yugoslavia, emphasizing the organization’s hypocrisy and tendency not to honor its promises.

We also observed that higher-level actors are more inclined to use narrative methods such as insinuation, quoting Russian media, and historical allusion, while lower-level counterparts tend to leverage incendiary headlines and horrific media, as well as unverified or undisclosed sources.

This demonstrates that discourse about China’s role in the world, international relations and diplomacy are determined by officials, though citizens and other lower-level actors are free to elevate the official position to a more extreme or emotionally charged level.

Ecosystem analysis: Towards a framework to divide labor and mold the public discourse

The Chinese Communist Party and government agencies tightly control China’s media and intensively censor speech and text. Even the “commercial media” act as levers that cater to the main axis of government propaganda. In our report analyzing China’s information operations in the Taiwan 2020 election, we made detailed observations on the interplay between purely political actors and those motivated by commercial interests. We observed commercial media generally towing the Party line, in part because this is necessary to ensure long-term survival and attract sufficient web traffic. For example, as the Chinese government pursued an increasingly nationalistic agenda, patriotic and anti-American content attracts a lot of attention; whereas a handful of reports citing Western media, sympathizing with Ukraine, or condemning Russia were deleted soon after being published, and are hence difficult to exhume from the depths of the Chinese Internet.

In terms of chronology, we observed occasions when high-level actors set the agenda, and low-level actors echoed, extended, and produced complementary materials; at other times, low-level actors beat the drum first, and high-level actors followed up to firmly establish the tone of the discussion.

That said, we also observed low-level actors igniting discussions with sensational remarks absent proper evidence, only for a higher-level actor to strengthen the sentiment in a vague and suggestive way; the two working in tandem to shape the direction of public opinion. Such information flows force us to reconsider attribution metrics relating to China’s information operations.

While it is difficult to judge how these actors communicate and the degree to which their actions are coordinated, we hope our analysis can help identify and further understand their different target audiences, the division of labor across information operations, motives for manipulating public opinion, and the pressure the Chinese government may bring to bear on public discourse.

[1] Data used in this study are mainly sourced from the Ukrainian-Russian War: Chinese Information Operation Observations from 2/22 to 3/31, of which 136 items were selected from official accounts or spokespersons. Our analysis showed a skew toward high-level actors on Weibo, so 67 instances of lower-level actors publishing on Twitter and Weibo were added as a counterweight. Items are taken ‘as a piece’, i.e. are narrative content and we did not count or measure content size.

[2] Most of the information we collected and collated were posted on social media, but there were also comments made by official spokespersons at press conferences. Henceforth, we refer to the posting account or spokesperson as an actor.

[3] The Azov Battalion comprises a very small number of far-right National Guard troops in Ukraine; for its background and how it is discussed in the Chinese information environment, please refer to our other report: The Nazification of Ukraine in the Chinese information space.