Blood on Whose Hands: The Demise of Peace Talks
With rumblings of a possible Peace Deal that would have ended the Russo-Ukrainian War back in 2022, we can only imagine a world where this terrible war would have ended within two months instead of pushing past two years. While the positive impacts of a Peace Deal could not be understated, what was the outline of this possible Peace Deal and why did it die?
In Istanbul, both Moscow and Kiev sent representatives to negotiate the end of the war. For the final rounds of the talks, this was the deal on the table:
“The seventh round of talks on March 29 saw the renewal of face-to-face negotiations in Istanbul. The discussion centered on a draft treaty, the gist of which was permanent Ukrainian neutrality and non-nuclear status, in return for which Ukraine would have security guarantees similar to Article 5 of the NATO military alliance from China, Russia, UK, France, Belarus and others. Ukraine would also start a 15 year consultation period on the status of Crimea, though reserving the right to reconquer Luhansk and Donetsk. For its part, Russia would “ drastically reduce” military activity near Kyiv to “create the necessary conditions for further negotiations.” Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive had started a week before the Istanbul peace talks. The Russian offer to “withdraw” on March 29 was thus far from voluntary.” (Skidelsky 2024)
There are four main points from this possible treaty.
1) Ukraine would be permanently neutral and have security guarantees from both NATO and Russia.
2) While the Donbas would not be returned to Ukraine, Ukraine could annex them at a later time. Would this imply Moscow giving a free hand to Kiev regarding this region?
3) Crimea’s status would be settled in a 15-year consultation period. While this is ambiguous, the implication would be Crimea would be left in Russian hands.
4) Russia offered to move their forces away from Kiev after it was clear that the Ukrainians were already pushing them away.
While there are several articles written about Russian strategic motivations (Guglielmello 2023 and Guglielmello 2023), the first point of this deal should alleviate Russian worries about Ukraine. Having Ukraine undergo a process of Finlandization would prevent powers Russia considers hostile from having troops within a geographically vulnerable access point to their nation.
At the same time, Ukraine would go from fighting what was then viewed as one of the world’s strongest armies to having a security guarantee from the world’s strongest alliance and their once enemy. If NATO was the impossible goal for Ukraine (which it is), then this could have been the realistic goal of achieving the same practical outcome.
However, the second and third points may have been enough for Ukraine not to sign the Peace Deal if the choice was left up to them. Throughout the peace process, Ukraine was determined to take back lands Russia annexed or occupied, such as Crimea and Donbas. While there is ambiguity within the final talks, we can ascertain that Crimea would likely stay with the Russians and that if Russian troops did “leave” Donbas, it did not necessarily mean that Donbas would have been given back to the Ukrainians. After all, Russia supported rebels since 2014 before invading in 2022. It is conceivable that Russia may continue supporting them after leaving. Due to this, it is fair to say that “the two sides were never as close to each other as the formula they concocted suggested” (Skidelsky 2024).
While a Peace Deal was not inevitable, it is reasonable to assume that a Peace Deal was possible despite the positions of the negotiators. Neither Ukraine nor Russia could cede the Donbas or Crimea without losing face on the international landscape. Giving land after a failed invasion would have made Russia a laughingstock and allowing Russia to keep Ukrainian land would be impossible for all Ukrainians fighting for their national sovereignty. How could both countries save face? By having perfectly ambiguous terms. Did the second point give Ukraine a free hand to Donbas thus letting Russia give back the Donbas without giving it back? Did it give Ukraine de jure sovereignty over Donbas but de facto power to either the rebels or Russia itself? Regarding Crimea, what is a 15-year consultation period and what would its conclusion be?
Ambiguity gives everyone the chance to say they won the deal without actually winning the deal. This shows that despite earlier negotiated positions, it is theoretically possible to see a Peace Deal that satisfies both sides without harming them politically. It also makes what happens regarding outside powers incredibly important. A week after the talks that produced this deal, then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson made it clear to the Ukrainians that any Peace Deal with Russia was out of the question.
“Johnson brought two simple messages to Kyiv. The first is that Putin is a war criminal; he should be pressured, not negotiated with. And the second is that even if Ukraine is ready to sign some agreements on guarantees with Putin, they [the NATO powers] are not.” (Skidelsky 2024)
The United Kingdom was not the only country opposed to a Peace Deal.
When State Department spokesman Ned Price was asked about Zelensky being “open to a…diplomatic solution” at a March 21, 2022, press briefing, he rejected a negotiated end to the war, even if the negotiated settlement met Ukraine’s goals. “This is a war,” Price answered, “that is in many ways bigger than Russia, it’s bigger than Ukraine.” The U.S. rejected Ukraine negotiating an agreement with Russia that met Kiev’s goals in favor of pressuring Ukraine to continue fighting in pursuit of larger U.S. goals and “core principles.” (Snider 2023)
In fact, the hosts of the negotiation felt that all progress had been halted due to NATO intervention.
As Putin’s account of the tentative agreement and Ukraine’s promise not to join NATO was confirmed in the Foreign Affairs article, so too is his claim that the US stopped the negotiated settlement confirmed. Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that, because of the talks, “Turkey did not think that the Russia-Ukraine war would continue much longer.” But, he said, “There are countries within NATO who want the war to continue.” “Following the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting,” he explained, “it was the impression that…there are those within the NATO member states that want the war to continue, let the war continue and Russia get weaker.” (Snider 2023)
If the Ukrainian government did not want to sign a Peace Deal with Russia, that would be understandable. After all, there was and still is Ukrainian land under the control of a foreign power. If Ukrainian leaders were determined to get all of their lands back, that is their right as a nation to try to get their land back. However, it is incredulous that American, British, and NATO leaders would prevent a Peace Deal at a time when Ukraine’s leaders were seriously considering peace. If Ukrainian leaders wanted a Peace Deal with Russia, that was their right too. Whatever strategic interests Ukraine has should be decided in Kiev and not in Washington, London, or Brussels; especially when it is Ukrainian lives on the line.
And in a similar vein, America’s interests should not be dictated by Ukrainian leaders but by its own interests and that of its citizenry. Further examination would lead us to conclude that having a Peace Deal could have been in America‘s’ interests. The two reasons repeated for America’s interests in Ukraine are we cannot allow a sovereign country to be invaded by its neighbor and that helping Ukraine prevents Russia from invading a NATO country such as Poland and/or Romania. Let us deal with each of these “interests” separately.
The idea that an invasion from Russia would lead to further deterioration of global peace ignores the State of Nature. The idea that an invasion from one power against another power would ruin the peaceful international order only works if the international order is already peaceful. Unfortunately, the world is both anarchic and violent. Even if we agree that since 1945 we have been living in the most peaceful time, there have been countless wars, civil wars, and genocides (Guglielmello 2023). This war does not fundamentally change the global landscape. And even if it did, let us examine how foreign policy based on principles instead of strategic interests would lead us to World War III.
If an invasion of one power from another power is enough to ruin the international order and thus encourage other powers to invade, then allowing any country to commit genocide would allow other countries to commit genocide. If this is the case, where is the outrage from the powers that control America’s security network and foreign policy about China and the Uyghurs?
Would it not be America’s duty to protect the Uyghurs from genocide committed by the Chinese? Then again, such foolishness would lead to war with China at a time when we are poking the Russian Bear with a stick. Unfortunately, there is evil in the world and evilness in man that we cannot stop (Guglielmello 2023). America is the largest and most powerful nation in today’s world and may be the strongest power to ever exist; but, it does not have the capability to police the world. If we try, we will die. There is no Leviathan that is powerful enough to bring order to the world. And if there were, that may pose a series of other serious issues.
The other reason given is that if we want to prevent World War III, we must stop Russia in Ukraine. The theory goes if Russia wins in Ukraine, then they will invade either Poland, Romania, or both. While most politicians trot this line out without giving any reasons, there are some political analysts who argue that due to geographic reasons, Russia cannot stop at Ukraine.
Using this analysis ignores the same geographic concerns of NATO members that already border Russia (i.e. the Baltic States) (Guglielmello 2023), but this concern instantly vanishes if Ukraine and Russia sign the Peace Deal. It would make Russia’s invasion of Romania impossible. It would make Russia’s invasion of Poland unthinkable. Yes, Russia could in theory stage an invasion of Poland from either Belarus or Kaliningrad, but why would they invade Poland if Russian interests are satisfied with the Peace Deal regarding Ukraine? We find there would be little or no reason for Russia to invade if this is true. So if we want to avoid WWIII, a Peace Deal would have been the optimal solution.
If it seems that I am being lenient with the power that started the invasion, let us put that notion to rest immediately. While Russia claims that it had a Peace Deal that it was satisfied with and blames the West for ruining it, let us examine the fourth point of the Peace Deal. At that point of the war in 2022, Ukraine stopped the Russian advance and started their successful counteroffensive. The Russian government’s offer to back away from Kiev when its army was being forced back from Kiev does not create the belief that the Russians were negotiating in good faith. In fact, if Russia knew how much the US, UK, and NATO did not want a Peace Deal, it would give them additional incentive to produce a Peace Treaty that the Ukrainians could contemplate signing. After all, a Peace Deal that fails due to the Western leaders allows Russian leaders to blame those powers for the continuation of the war and play the victim. But, it is hard to pretend to be on the side of the angels when one started the bloody invasion in the first place.
Could peace be attained in either March or April of 2022? At this point the answer is unknown. But if peace could have been attained, it could have satisfied the interests of Russia, it could have satisfied the interests of Ukraine, and it would have satisfied the interests of the West.
Instead, we have tens of thousands of additional men who are dead, hundreds of thousands who are injured, and a devastating wave of violence with no end in sight. It is regrettable that the situation in Ukraine has turned into an unending hellscape. It is even more regrettable that we may have missed our only chance to prevent the fields of Ukraine from turning into ash and dust.
