Iraq’s Other Alternative
Diane Maye is a former Air Force officer, defense industry professional, and academic. She is a PhD candidate in Political Science at George Mason University. The views expressed in this article are those of the author.
This post is a response to @PrivateSnuffy’s 10 June post in which he said:
We did not almost win in Anbar. We created a new faction of militants and local power-brokers who were content to jump through our western hoops and we were happy to call them the next Sons of Liberty so long as they killed Al Qaeda operatives. That was not winning, unless that was the entire objective of the Iraq occupation at any point in time.
Background
In March 2003, when Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist regime fell, so did the facade of public order. Without the regime in place to provide security, the Iraqi people took to the streets, looted, and burned the city of Baghdad. Initially, coalition forces were not ordered to contain the violence, which proved to be a critical error in decision-making. The impact of the lawlessness compounded the already dilapidated state of Iraq’s infrastructure, making it far more difficult to provide basic services. The looting made it difficult for the coalition to operate under the plans they had devised for the post-war occupation and recovery. The subsequent de-Ba’athification of the internal security police and military forces only exacerbated the problem, which resulted in widespread criminal activity and an inability to control the people.
The abolition of the Iraqi government, military, and security forces by the coalition forces created a power vacuum that was quickly overtaken by Shi’ia militias, Sunni insurgents, former Ba’ath party loyalists, and Al-Qaeda (AQI) operatives. By 2005, the Sunni Arabs of Iraq did not have an abundance of mature politico-military alternatives to al Qaeda. The only well-organized Sunni opposition to the Ba’ath party came from the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP), which was established in 1960, the secular Iraqi Communist Party, and Ayad Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord (INA) which included secular Sunnis, but operated in exile. The IIP was banned in Iraq and for decades and it operated out of Great Britain. The IIP had evolved out the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Egypt, and espoused the strict Islamism of the prominent Egyptian Islamic scholar, Sayyid Qutb. The Iraqi Communist Party had been in operation in Iraq since the 1930’s but never gained widespread support in the country. Ayad Allawi’s INA also included many former Ba’ath party members (both Sunni & Shi’ia) that had defected and wanted to effect regime change.
From the U.S. perspective, in 2006 the violence in Iraq appeared to be along sectarian lines, and many journalists, policy-makers, and scholars characterized Iraq as being a state of civil war.[1] Radicalized Sunni factions such as AQI, the Islamic Army, Hamas Iraq, and the 1920s Revolution Brigade were in open conflict with the Shi’ia militias like the Badr Brigades, Hezbollah Iraq, and the Mahdi Army (JAM). Likewise, all the militant groups were posing a threat to U.S. and coalition forces as well as the nascent Iraqi government’s attempts to restore security and order.
What is often overlooked is that the power vacuum also opened up divisions and fractures that took place within the various religious and ethnic sects. For many Sunnis, the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, an ancient Shi’ia holy site in the Iraqi city of Samarra, in February 2006, was the catalyst for the ideological divide between nationalistic Sunni insurgents and the radicalized Salafist fighters. After the bombing of the mosque, retaliatory killings, torture, and kidnappings greatly increased across the country, and by late 2006 there was a growing cleavage between the Sunnis and an even larger rift between the Sunni and Shi’ia factions. Many of the mainly Arab Sunni former Ba’ath party loyalists and military men also sought to distance themselves from the advances made by Salafist groups like AQI.[2] According to one former military officer under Saddam Hussein, the bombing of the al-Askari mosque not only incited a dramatic increase in sectarian violence, but because it was such an important national landmark, its destruction dramatically altered the psyche of many moderate Iraqis.[3] In 2006, Iraq fractured further along sectarian lines, but also between radicalized elements within each sect.
For many Sunnis, the bombing of the al-Askari Mosque, an ancient Shi’ia holy site in the Iraqi city of Samarra, in February 2006, was the catalyst for the ideological divide between nationalistic Sunni insurgents and the radicalized Salafist fighters.
The Sunni Awakening (or Sahwa) movement was actually connected to a much larger movement within Iraq at the time, which was fed by the Sunnis’ widespread discontent of the central government, the rise in Al Qaeda’s criminal activities in their neighborhoods and villages and a lack of political representation in Baghdad. The central government could not keep pace with the spread of the criminal organizations and by late 2005, Al Qaeda had complete control over many Sunni areas, especially in west Baghdad and the western provinces of Salahuddin, Tamim, Ninewah, Diyala and Anbar.
CASE 1: Abu Risha
In Anbar province, Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha is often credited as the founder of the Anbar Sahwa movement. Abu Risha was prominent sheikh from the al-Dulaymi tribe. For most of his life he had lived as an opportunist. This was compounded during the strict economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. after the Gulf War. He was well known for smuggling oil and conducting highway robberies along the vast stretch of desert highway that separates Iraq from Syria.[4] In 2006 he approached U.S. Marine forces operating in Anbar province to build an alliance to fight AQI. His move couldn’t have been more appropriately timed; the commander there, Army Lieutenant Colonel Sean MacFarland, was facing a rapidly deteriorating security situation. Earlier that year, the U.S. Marine’s headquarters-level intelligence staff had concluded that, “there was little the U.S. could do to stifle the insurgency in Anbar.”[5] Extraordinary measures would be needed in order to secure the area.
Abu Risha was the first tribal leader to encourage his followers to join the local police forces in Anbar Province to fight against the insurgency. Other tribal leaders followed suit, and the Sahwa spread throughout the province. As his movement grew, he founded a formal council for Sahwa matters, which included dozens of Sunni tribal leaders from his region. The collaborative pattern “spread rapidly thorough the province”[6] and thousands of young Sunni men joined the local police forces.
CASE 2: Abu Abed
One of the first leaders of the Sahwa movement in Baghdad, Sa’ad Al-Obaidi Ghaffoori (aka Abu Abed), was an intelligence officer in the army of Saddam Hussein. Encouraged by the success of the Anbar Awakening, and with the help of a local sheikh, in May 2007 Abu Abed took charge of the Sahwa movement in western Baghdad. Over the course of the next several months, Abu Abed worked with the U.S. military to gain control over the territory. He quickly rose into a position of great prominence, and successfully integrated thousands of young men into the fight against AQI.
Within three months of the initial collaboration, AQI was no longer operating in Ameriyah.
Charismatic Leadership
The famous German sociologist, Max Weber, stressed the importance of charismatic leadership in his analysis of power and legitimate authority. The importance of charismatic leadership as a source of legitimate authority was seen during the Sunni Awakening, but perhaps under-appreciated by coalition forces who were likely more accustomed to legal-rational and traditional sources of authority. The rapid rise of Abu Abed as a charismatic leader is especially important as his power rested on his image of being able to perform heroic deeds, often by what were seen as irrational or untraditional means.
Targeting AQI Leadership
The elimination of senior leaders is a common tactic when dealing with terrorist organizations. Abu Abed targeted two very important AQI leaders during his time with the Sahwa. The first was known by his nickname “Haji Sabah” or “The White Lion.” The White Lion was the leader of a dangerous AQI element operating in Baghdad. Abu Abed took an extraordinary risk; he directly targeted Haji Sabah and drew his men into a sustained urban fight that lasted for several hours. The gamble paid off, his forces eliminated Haji Sabah and his men, and gave Abu Abed the credibility to grow his new “Awakening” movement. The day after the urban fight, Abu Abed’s force grew to 600 men, all from the local area. Abu Abed’s second target was an AQI sniper known as “Abu Hareth.” The sniper was legend amongst Al Qaeda operatives because of his ability to target U.S. forces. Abu Abed know how to target and find this sniper because he had intelligence about a consistency in his weekly routine. Once Abu Hareth had been eliminated, Abu Abed’s force grew to around 2,000 men, and new Sahwa leaders had the courage to grow the movement in other Baghdad neighborhoods.
Implications
The U.S. routinely uses their advantages of superior airpower, battlefield intelligence, and precision strikes, to the target leaders of terrorist organizations. Oftentimes, however, the terrorist organizations are like a hydra, and quickly regenerate a new head. Yet, the tactic of targeted assassinations should not be dismissed. Abu Abed used the tactic to his advantage when he led the Sahwa movement in Baghdad. The important lesson learned is that the targeted assassinations were used in conjunction with a broader movement to engage the population against the terrorist network. Abu Abed didn’t simply eliminate the Haji Sabah and Abu Hareth and leave the neighborhood; he then enlisted the entire local population in his desire to eliminate the AQI network in Baghdad. The combination of eliminating the senior leader and replacing that leader with a more viable political and security alternative, proved to be a winning formula in the fight against radicalized Islamists.
The combination of eliminating the senior leader and replacing that leader with a more viable political and security alternative, proved to be a winning formula in the fight against radicalized Islamists.
The relationship between realignment and the occupying force’s policies in facilitating realignment is also important. In the aforementioned cases, the U.S. didn’t approach Abu Risha or Abu Abed with the notion of realignment or switching sides. To the contrary, the U.S. military’s role was to gain them success on the battlefield, which in turn gave them more legitimacy and popular support. So, the critical point in realignment for the U.S. military is really the point between the individual’s realignment and the battlefield successes.
In the case of the Sunni Awakening, the realignment should be viewed a social movement, that follows a unique life cycle. This particular social movement was a result of the cleavage between politically moderate Sunnis and the radicalized Salafist factions that supported AQI. The catalyst and success of this particular social movement can be linked to the charismatic leadership of both Abu Risha, who initiated the tribal realignment and with Abu Abed, who initiated the Awakening in Baghdad.
This particular social movement was a result of the cleavage between politically moderate Sunnis and the radicalized Salafist factions that supported AQI.
On the one hand the Sahwa was about gaining power and putting the Sunnis back into the political fold, while on the other its hard to imagine the Sahwa forming without the more moderate-leaning Sunni’s motivation to balance the threat from the Salafist AQI. Many of the leading scholars and practitioners of the U.S. Army’s doctrine on counterinsurgency have argued that counterinsurgency takes place at the small unit level. Although initially U.S. forces were not ideally postured to fight the insurgency in Iraq, the SOI had the autonomy to execute the small unit tactics that were successful against the insurgents in their neighborhoods. In essence, it was the SOI that reflected the counterinsurgency doctrine of population-centric, rapidly adapting, tactical-level resistance. The Sunni realignment also demonstrates that the impetus to “change sides” often happens on a personal level before it grows into an ideological movement. Likewise, the Sunni Awakening shows that realignment is often initialized because of betrayal and opportunities for political advancement, and not necessarily by monetary gain. As the Awakening movements grew, it became a way for former military members and jobless men to find meaningful employment. So, while the initial recruitment was ideologically driven, over time it became a security business and an alternative political organization.
[1] For examples see: John Burns, “If Its Civil War Do We Know It?” New York Times. July 24, 2005; Timothy M. Phelps, “Experts: Iraq verges on civil war,” Newsday. May 12, 2005.
[2] Sa’ad Ghaffoori, interview by author, Eskilstuna, Sweden, July 25, 2014.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Dhafir Abdul Karim, interview by author, Alexandria, VA, May 14, 2014.
[5] Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor, Endgame: The Inside Story of the Struggle for Iraq from George W. Bush to Barack Obama.(New York: Vintage Books, 2012), 248.
[6] Wilbanks, Mark and Efraim Karsh, “How the Sons of Iraq Stabilized Iraq” Middle East Quarterly 17:4 (Fall 2010) 59.
