Liberalism in China: The Olympics, Propaganda, and Western Hostility
In an earlier article for this publication, I outlined the two key differences between China and the West: namely, the differing sense of insecurity, and the different levels of political pragmatism. I now turn my attention to a recent ideological shift in China, and to how a people who were at one point open to democracy suddenly turned into fervent supporters of autocracy.
For many Westerners such a shift is incomprehensible. After all, it seems to run contrary to the liberal interpretation which sees history as unidirectional movement towards progress. However, this shift makes perfect sense in the context of the differences between China and the West. The Chinese people simply found another, more suitable, solution and discarded the alternative; democracy was the optimal solution no longer, and autocracy took its place. This process has two aspects that occurred simultaneously: the de-legitimation of liberalism in China, and the CCP regaining its legitimacy.
In China, liberalism is inevitably associated with the West. This is an important reason why liberalism gained popularity in China in the first place; the prosperity of the West was a convincing argument for the idea that liberalism was the solution to China’s problems. It is interesting then that the failure of liberalism in China was not brought on by a perceived decline of the West, but by the perceived hostility from it.
Countless sanctions and other restrictions are targeting China on the international stage. These include exclusion from the international space program, the technological blockade, and many other unilateral actions initiated by Western countries. These terms are imposed for many reasons — primarily ideological — yet all of them are designed with the explicit intent of undermining China. From the Chinese perspective, characterised as it is by pragmatism, it makes little sense that political action should be ideologically motivated.
That ideological difference justifies such action implies that there must be an ulterior motive — though precisely what this could be is open to interpretation.
Beyond this, the Western response to Islamic terrorism in China, and its reaction to the Beijing Olympics, has only intensified hostility towards the ‘Western’ ideology. It is difficult to support an ideology whose supporters undermine your proud achievements and consistently advocate and propose action which undermines state authority and degrades the quality of life for citizens.
However, simple hostility from the West is not enough to delegitimise liberalism. After all, when many Chinese people were followers of liberal ideals, the “outer problems” (i.e. foreign affairs) were those that liberalism was a perceived solution to. So while foreign hostility might have made the Chinese unwilling to follow a foreign ideology, many still deemed liberalism to be necessary for China to progress and move forward.
This attitude changed after 2008.
The 2008 Olympics was unquestionably a proud moment for China. They altered international perceptions and boosted national confidence. For the first time China, under the leadership of the CCP, had shown some hope to its people. China no longer appeared to be a nation deep in poverty and squalor and, according to many, 2008 was the first time in their life that they had ever been proud to be Chinese. Such emotion is precious to people who had never felt any reason to be nationalist or patriotic.
For underlying cultural reasons, expressions of patriotism are quite rare in China as there exists a prominent resentment for self-promotion. It was only after 2008 Olympics that people began to give serious thought to the fact that the path provided by the CCP might, in fact, be a viable one. Moreover, after 2008, the Western media gained a negative reputation in China for its negative representations of the country during its Olympic coverage. Negative perceptions of Western governments soon followed if and when they expressed opposition to China’s hosting the games.
The 2008 Olympics served as a turning point in Chinese ideological development. Not just because of the excellent level of organisation the government had demonstrated during the entire event, but because of the symbol it served as. Joseph Goebbels, infamous Nazi propagandist, argues that if a piece of material aims to influence the masses, then it must be as direct and provocative as possible. If it requires its audience to think and comprehend, it has already failed. Such is the role the 2008 Olympics has served in China; it is a clear and direct message to the general masses. It is not that the CCP did not have any redeeming qualities before the 2008 Olympics. In fact, the CCP’s long term orientation and stable leadership is vital to the economic miracle of China. However, it is the 2008 Olympics that gave the general public the willingness to realise and recognize these qualities.
After the games had passed, a series of terrorist attacks occurred, and the Western response, in both governmental material and press coverage, further consolidated hostility. Attacks targeting innocent people in a public space were described as merely “knife-wielding attacks”; meanwhile the UK Government urged China to “make deep reflections” on its internal issues in its official declarations regarding the 2014 Kunming train station attack. Such statements and coverage did nothing but provoke a people who had just suffered such a catastrophic tragedy. The attention this action received also aided the CCP’s propaganda. The large-scale terrorist attack shocked the nation as a whole, and became the focal point of every news report.
The prominence of this event in Chinese media amplified the both the horror of terrorism and the unsympathetic Western response.
The reason why these events matter so much is that they send a message to the Chinese people that, for their nation and their society to move forward in a direction they desire, the largest obstacle in their path is not the autocratic government within the country; but instead its foreign adversaries. These foreign powers claim that they act to support the people of China and further their liberties, yet their every action is against the interest of the Chinese people.
Thinking from the pragmatic perspective of the Chinese people, what the West was selling became simply unattractive. To the Chinese, what is restricting their “liberty” is not a government that interacts with them a few times in a year, it is reality itself. A nation can prosper while individuals suffer, but an individual can’t prosper while the collective is in such an impoverished state; especially for those who are in the lower echelons of the hierarchy.
An individual’s choices are perceived to be limited by factors such as poverty, poor infrastructure and the pressure from social culture, not the CCP.
For individuals living inside China, the CCP is far from the largest obstruction to developing their full potential as a human being: in fact, it is helping them. It’s college entrance examination system allows people to enjoy an equal opportunity. The rampant growth of its economy and the stability of the State allows millions with ambitions and will to surge from the lower class into the upper and upper-middle class of the society. Its infrastructure, construction, and poverty alleviation programs allow the underprivileged to access education and the resources of the outside world. Hundreds of millions were brought out of poverty, which has then led to a cultural revival. As people are materially satisfied, they began seeking emotional comfort, and thus classical cultures have flourished again.
Despite the CCP’s questionable record of cultural preservation, now it is openly encouraging the revival and growth of traditional ideas, philosophies and arts. In the past decade, changes in China have occurred at break-neck pace. Social transitions that would take half a century in the West are happening within a few years in China. Such changes can be attributed to local customs, population distribution, people’s desires, and ways of interaction. And while all of this change has been happening, the West’s perception of China has remained inert. The Western view is structured by the dichotomy of autocracy and democracy.
Western Liberalism is becoming more and more of a minority fetish in China, that is looked down upon by the social majority. Its followers are regarded as delusional, unrealistic and unpragmatic. Although, for the most part, it is hard to define its attributes: the pejorative term “White left” is now used in Chinese political debates.
