Liberalism in China: The Protection of Class Interest
In a recent article for this publication, I discussed the difference in what the CCP and Western-style liberalism offer the Chinese people in terms of both wealth and culture. In what follows, I consider the sizable difference in what the two have to offer with respect to economic class and the social climate of modern China. Such issues go a long way in explaining how the CCP was able to prevail over liberalism in the nation.
Here, it is important to remember the classic Western developmental prediction that, as the basic material needs of the Chinese people were satisfied, they would begin to pursue something higher — most likely, they would turn to supporting democracy. Indeed, many Westerners assumed that, inevitably, calls for individual dignity and personal expression beyond material wealth would show the CCP to be an obstruction to this pursuit of individuality, liberty, security, and all the other cornerstones of the Western polis.
This idea was at least partially correct; these ideals and the desire for them did emerge in Chinese society. However, their precise interactions with Chinese society was not broadly anticipated in the West. Economic growth and increases in higher-level education did create a large middle-class as expected. However, any conflict between the party and the people that may have developed as a result of the frustration of liberal values is too insignificant to pose any real damage to the regime. This is due to two factors: (1) the inherent vulnerability of the Chinese middle-class, and (2) the special social conditions of China.
“The middle class — the petit-bourgeois — are often the most opposed to radical change […] they stand to lose the most.”
As regards the first point, although a strong middle class is often associated with a stable and healthily functioning democracy, the Chinese case provides a counterexample and shows that the relationship is far from direct. Middle classes are the bulwark of every stable and functioning society, but this is because they are the class in society that are the most vulnerable to change — and most likely to protect its interests against said change. Many leftists, in the wake of Marx, would claim that the concept of the middle class itself is false or flawed: they are still essentially part of the proletariat which does not own the means of production. Thus, under circumstances of unemployment or large-scale social instability, their living standards will in all likelihood be reduced to that of the lower-class proletarians.
The middle class — the petit-bourgeois — are often the most opposed to radical change and instability even if they are unsatisfied with the current order; they stand to lose the most. This attitude has made the middle class the anchorage of every society regardless of ideology: unless the current regime has done something extremely harmful to its immediate interests of course. As this has not happened in China, where the CCP has brought the Chinese middle-classes immense prosperity, there is now no reason for the middle-classes to agitate against the CCP in favour of Western Liberalism. In short, the Chinese middle-classes became prosperous under the CCP, so has no incentive to risk what they have gained and agitate in support of a foreign ideology.
As for the second, it is arguable that the unique social conditions of China itself provided another reason for the CCP’s decent amount of domestic support. China was a vast country that was developing during the era when the pro-liberal ideas thrived among the middle classes, and the majority of the country was still living in poverty. However, these people were far from the majority in China, despite dominating most of the channels of communication. China, and not just the West, has its own silent majorities with pragmatic and realistic needs. The least well-off needed what the CCP was giving them; poverty alleviation programs, basic infrastructure, education and investments. Unlike in other scenarios, these people were not depressed, hopeless urban proletarians with nothing to lose: for them, progress is constant. As people who are still struggling for a living, they are far more pragmatic than the middle class. Western concepts are foreign and useless to them, while the CCP provides real, pragmatic benefits.
“The once-resentful middle class discovered that it is in their best interest to maintain stability […] while the lower class found the CCP’s policies to be in their best interest.”
Beyond that, it is also merits noting that CCP functions differently to a stereotypical authoritarian dictatorship in the Western understanding. Despite holding an immense level of power within the country, it rarely lets the people feel this power. The State’s interaction with the people’s daily life is infrequent, however, there will be action taken if someone consciously invites it into their life. This factor, along with the autocratic tradition of China, ensures a minimal amount of conscious repulsion from and aversion to the level of power centralisation in the CCP.
In total, the once-resentful middle class discovered that it is in their best interest to maintain stability in the nation, while the lower class found the CCP’s policies to be in their best interest. The upper class, in this case, has been mostly assimilated into the system of the elite. And, as the primary interest holders, they have little incentive to oppose the CCP either. After all, there are individuals that will betray their class, but never a class that will betray their interest.
In short: as Western liberalism lost respect within China, the CCP bettered the nation and showed its system of governance to be far more compatible with the national condition of China. The end result is that the Chinese people have chosen the solution that is more instinctively and emotionally appealing. After all, the current autocratic system of the CCP is one that is more conformed to the demands of the Chinese people: meritocratic and technocratic, with strong mobilisation and organisational capabilities.
